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“Nobody’s free until everybody’s free.” 




Recognizing Freedom: Manumission in the Roman Republic 
by 
Tristan K. Husby 
 
Advisor: Liv Mariah Yarrow 
Roman manumission was at the center of three different groups: the Roman state, Roman slave-
owners, and freeborn Romans who did not own slaves. I draw upon G.F.W. Hegel, Orlando 
Patterson, Judith Butler, and Pierre Bourdieu to describe Roman manumission as a ritualized 
practice that transforms a slave’s life from unlivable to livable. The term “unlivable” comes from 
the philosopher Judith Butler, who developed it in conversation with Hegel’s master/slave 
dialectic and the term “social death,” which sociologist Orlando Patterson used to describe 
slavery. Hegel and Patterson’s thoughts on the movement and experience of freedom are useful 
for theorizing Roman slavery precisely because they constructed their universalized ideas out of 
the particulars of Roman history, including slavery and manumission. This framework of 
ritualized practice brings to the fore the Roman state’s stake in manumission. On the one hand, 
the state taxed and regulated manumission, processes that depended on the “state’s sight”, a term 
that I take from anthropologist James Scott but augment with Michel Foucault’s thoughts on the 
intersection of sight and power. The connection between the state’s sight and the surveillance of 
manumission appears both in the movements and words that made up the action of manumission 
and in the stories concerning the origins of manumission that survive in Livy, Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, and Plutarch. Manumission also contributed to what it meant to be a slave-owner. 
Roman slave-owners negotiated the expectations of other slave-owners as part of their 
Abstract 
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competition with other slave-owners, including their own family members. Philip V and 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus point to how Greeks commented on Roman manumission. Such 
Greek thought influenced Roman conception and evaluation of manumission, which in turn 
formed the social terrain upon which Roman slave-owners—both historical, such as Cicero, and 
fictional, such as the characters in the works of Plautus and Terence—surveilled and competed 
with each other. In order for manumission to have the power to free slaves, freeborn Romans, 
ones who did not own slaves, had to recognize the freedom that manumission granted. They 
recognized the freedom of manumission, but did so while distinguishing themselves from former 
slaves. This distinction from former slaves was connected to slavery providing them with a 
“psychological wage”, a term that I take from W.E.B. Du Bois. In their plays, Plautus and 
Terence reproduce the distinction between former slaves and freeborn Romans through the level 
of language and also the level of performance, most especially the masks that the actors wore 
during the performance. Livy likewise reproduces this distinction in his description of the 
manumission of volones and the freeing of captive freeborn Roman soldiers. In Rome, the state, 
slave-owners, and those who were freeborn but who did own slaves benefited from making 
slaves’ lives unlivable and, therefore, had an interest in guarding the boundaries of manumission. 
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LESB. quid hic est locutus tecum? PHIL. Quid censes? homost: 
volt fieri liber, verum quod det non habet. 
 
LESBONICUS: What was it that he spoke with you?  
PHILTO: What do you think? He’s human: he wants to be free, but he has nothing which he 
can give. 
Plautus, Trinummus, 563-4, translation my own. 
 
 For Plautus’ Philto, it is obvious that the search for freedom motivates all slaves. Philto 
clarifies that the slave in question, one Stasimus, has nothing to give his owner. That is, Philto 
implies that if Stasimus had something to give to his owner Lesbonicus, then Stasimus would be 
free. Because Romans slaves could pay their owners for manumission, Philto suggests that the 
freedom that Stasimus wants is the freedom of manumission. Furthermore, Philto naturalizes this 
urge for manumission: Stasimus does not want it because he is a particularly special slave, but 
merely because he is human, “homost.” To be human is to want to be free, and to be a Roman 
slave is to want to be manumitted, to become a citizen of the Roman Republic. 
 Manumission during the Republican Period deserves study distinct from the study of 
manumission during the Imperial Period for the simple reason that, under the Republic, the 
Romans hailed the citizenry as their sovereign power. While it is possible to overemphasize the 
difference between lives of Republican Romans and the lives of Imperial Romans, I hold that the 
political differences between the Republic and the Empire are great enough to justify an 
investigation into the practice and conception of manumission during the Republican period 
alone because an integral aspect of Roman manumission was that manumitted slaves were also 
granted citizenship. Unlike during the Imperial Period, during the Republic, this citizenship 
meant that manumitted slaves became part of the sovereign power of Rome. Furthermore, this 
question of citizenship is not a topic ancillary to the ancient texts, but is rather a concern that 
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Roman writers themselves addressed: Plautus has the pimp Dordalus describe manumission as an 
opportunity to make the “great citizenry greater.”1 When paired with Philto’s comments, it is 
possible to see Plautus as exploring how manumission united slaves, slave-owners, and the state.  
 Manumission therefore stands at the boundary between slavery and freedom, but also at 
the boundary of who is, and who is not, a Roman. Manumission was part of the question of what 
it meant to be human, to be free and to be Roman. Because the scope of these questions is large, 
even to ask “what was Roman manumission and how did it work?” is to set down a path that 
meanders through a variety of types of evidence and methods of analysis. First, the evidence and 
its modern interpreters: While freedmen and freedwomen of the Empire left behind a plethora of 
tombs describing their families, friends, feuds and occupations, there is no comparable 
epigraphic record during the Republic. Instead, there are descriptions of manumission in the 
literature of this time, such as the works of Plautus, Terence, and Cicero. Furthermore, later 
writers, specifically those who lived during the Empire, such as Livy, Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Plutarch, and the jurist Gaius, also describe the practice of manumission in the 
Republic. The diversity of this evidence matches the diversity of analyses of manumission. 
Fields of study similar to fields known by the ancients, like literature, history, and law, offer 
lenses through which to study manumission. However, modern fields of study, unknown to the 
ancients, such as economics and sociology, also offer methods for analyzing the role that 
manumission played in Rome. Rather than restrict myself to a singular disciplinary lens, I instead 
draw upon a range of disciplines, from philosophy to anthropology, to describe how 
manumission functioned in the Roman Republic.  
 I ask why and how three different groups participated in and benefited from 
manumission: the Roman state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans who did not own slaves. 
                                                 
1 “civitatem maximam maiorem” Persa, 475. For more on this passage, see Chapter 3 Section 4a.  
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While I am committed to finding, highlighting, and analyzing the voices and experiences of 
Roman slaves, I believe that it is necessary first to articulate the interests that these three groups 
had in slavery and manumission, prior to exploring how slaves themselves approached and 
strategized for manumission and other forms of freedom. Philto’s comments may indeed reflect 
the belief and desires of Roman slaves. But what does it mean that it is the slave-owning Philto 
who asserts that slaves desire freedom because they are human? 
 The dramatis personae of Plautus’ surviving plays include a preponderance of slaves; his 
plays also contain many comments on slave life, including manumission. Amy Richlin argues 
that Plautus as a playwright was genuinely interested in slaves.2 Slaves were both members of 
Roman acting troops and the Roman audience, and therefore, Plautus’ interest in slaves is a 
logical extension of his interest in his surroundings. In contrast, Kathleen McCarthy and Roberta 
Stewart argue that Plautus appropriates slaves and slaves’ lives for the purposes of his story-
telling, and moreover, he does so in a way that makes slaves’ desire for freedom anodyne rather 
than subversive.3 In contrast to McCarthy and Stewart, Peter Spranger analyzes the slaves in 
Plautus and Terence together. In his more holistic approach, he notes that both playwrights 
carefully distinguish between characters who are slaves and freeborn characters who are 
enslaved.4 In other words, while Philto asserts that Stasimus wants freedom, the freedom of 
Stasimus’ potential manumission is distinct from the freedom that accompanies the release of an 
enslaved citizen.  
 Other Roman writers, such as Cicero and Livy, demonstrate a similar concern in 
identifying how slaves are distinct from freeborn citizens. William Fitzgerald traces this concern 
across a number of different examples of Roman literature, in particular pairing the comedians 
                                                 
2 Richlin (2014).  
3 McCarthy (2000). Stewart (2012). 
4 Spranger (1984: 27-28). McCarthy analyzes the slaves of Terence separate from her work on Plautus (2004).  
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with Imperial writers, such as Horace and Petronius.5 Because there is more surviving Imperial 
literature than Republican literature, it is easier to create portraits of slaves and manumission 
from surveys that include this time period. On the other hand, Sandra Joshel’s close reading of 
Seneca Epistle 47 provides a model for how to extrapolate the nuances of slavery and slave-
ownership from a single text, an approach necessary for the temporarily scattered texts of the 
Republican period. In this letter, Seneca advises his addressee Lucilius on the proper practices of 
slave-ownership. Joshel argues that through this advice, Seneca uses slaves as mirrors of their 
owners: they reflect the virtues and vices of their owners.6 Does Philto assert that Stasimus wants 
to be free because Philto himself wants to be free?  
 But while Seneca’s letter is closely rooted to his Neronian times, replete with descriptions 
of decadent banqueters and depilated slaves, authors of other pieces of Imperial literature are 
dedicated to reconstructing the Republican past, including Republican manumission. Roman 
jurists, for example, were keenly interested in Republican manumission and even provide 
evidence for how Romans treated and manumitted slaves in the past. Alan Watson uses the 
evidence that the jurists provide about the Twelve Tables to reconstruct the social world of the 
early Republic, including the lives of slaves.7 Similarly, Salvatore Tondo uses the evidence of 
jurists and other writers to examine Roman manumission anthropologically.8 In contrast, W.W. 
Buckland examines the Roman laws of slavery as law; that is, he attempts to piece together the 
legal thinking that motivated the practice within Roman courts.9 While the laws of Roman 
slavery do not constitute how the Romans themselves practiced slavery, the law is an important 
                                                 
5 Fitzgerald (2000). 
6 Joshel (2011). For other approaches to literature and Roman slavery, see Alston et al. (2011) and Serghidou 
(2007).   
7 Watson (1975). 
8 Tondo (1967). 
9 Buckland (1970). 
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aspect of slavery and manumission, since manumission was a legal process. For example, the 
Roman jurists reveal that the money that Stasimus would have used to buy his manumission 
from Lesbonicus was called a peculium. The study of Roman law as law can also reveal how 
peculium articulated the connections of slave, slave-owner, and a slave’s property.10 But to ask 
how Plautus’ depiction of Stasimus’ peculium, and tentative manumission, relates to the reality 
of Roman slavery is to ask not a legal question, but a historical one. 
 The attempt to place Stasimus’ search for manumission in historical context runs into two 
problems. First is the problem of the quantity and quality of evidence pertaining not only to 
manumission, but slavery generally during the Roman Republic. Second is the problem of 
understanding Roman slavery on its own terms because historians and Classicists have always 
examined Roman and slavery and manumission with at least half an eye on issues of their day. 
For example, in 1848, Henri-Alexandre Wallon composed his history of ancient slavery with the 
express purpose of advancing abolitionism, a cause in which he was an active participant.11 In 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the contemporary concerns of historians persisted in 
informing their works, even if the political urgency of scholarship on ancient slavery was not as 
clear. These concerns spark the indignation of Niall McKeown, who calls for greater vigilance in 
the rejection of contemporary concerns and sympathies that might influence the study of ancient 
slavery.12 Despite McKeown’s objections, it remains the case that to write about Roman slavery 
is to act within the present, as well as to be in conversation with other scholarship on Roman 
slavery. Joseph depicts ancient slavery as symbiotic, which K.R. Bradley rejects in his histories 
                                                 
10 Buckland (1970: 187-206). 
11 Wallon (1848, second edition 1879).  
12 McKeown (2007a). His type of concerns about historiography goes as far back as Nietzsche’s “Vom Nutzen und 
Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben” (1873) and also include more recent figures such as White (1973). But 
Nietzsche and White come to very different conclusions than McKeown about the proper way forward. 
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of Roman slavery, as he emphasizes slave-owners’ cruelty.13 M.I. Finley uses Marxist ideas to 
articulate what was at stake in the relationship of slavery, as well as try to make the most of the 
scanty amount of surviving evidence, which is the first problem of studying Republican 
slavery.14 Likewise, Keith Hopkins uses a variety of sociological theories to construct a complex 
argument about the relationship of Roman imperialism, farming, and slavery, while Walter 
Scheidel uses models from demography to answer how many slaves there were in Italy at fall of 
the Republic.15 In contrast, William Harris and Jean-Christian Dumont pay no particular 
allegiance to models, but instead gather as many references to slaves amid the literature, in order 
to create synchronic accounts of Roman slavery.16 A common refrain in these histories is that 
manumission is both an end of slavery, in that it releases slaves from bondage, and a function of 
slavery, as it motivates slaves to be loyal to their owners. Stasimus’ desire for manumission is a 
desire that perpetuates his bondage.   
 This desire also has the potential to transform Stasimus into a freedman. Just as in 
histories of Roman slavery manumission is an end, so too in histories of Roman freedpeople 
manumission is a beginning. Both Georges Fabre and Henrik Mouritsen shift through the 
literature of the Republican and the Imperial Periods in order to describe manumission as the 
starting point of a freedman’s life.17 Similarly, Susan Treggiari and A.M. Duff use manumission 
as the starting point of the lives of freedmen, but they focus their attentions on the Republic and 
the Empire respectively.18 However, there is no reason to only examine manumission as a 
starting point. One can, instead, analyze manmission as a focal point. Matthew Perry approaches 
                                                 
13 Vogt (1975). Bradley (1987), (1989), (1994). 
14 Finley (1968) and (1980).  
15 Hopkins (1978). Scheidel (1997). 
16 Harris (1980). For an explicit debate of the worth of these two different methods of inquiry, cf. Harris (1999) and 
Scheidel (2005); cf. Hin (2013). Dumont (1987).  
17 Fabre (1981). Mouritsen (2011a).  
18 Treggiari (1969). Duff (1928).  
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manumission an aspect of a freedwomen’s relationship with her owner from before, during, and 
after her manumission.19 Ingomar Weiler further disrupts manumission’s status as a beginning, 
or end, as he places manumission alongside other conclusions of slavery (Beendigung des 
Sklavenstatus), such as slave flight and asylum.20 In other words, Philto believes that Stasimus 
wants manumission because he wants freedom. But what if Stasimus’ desire for freedom did not 
correspond to a desire for manumission?  
 The questions of whether slaves want freedom and if so what kind of freedom are 
concerns that cut across not just the study of ancient slavery, but the study of slavery generally. 
The answer to the question “did Roman slaves want freedom?” matters, as the answer shapes the 
representation of many aspects of slave life besides manumission, such as revolt. Because of 
their different answers to this question, K.R. Bradley and Theresa Urbainczyk provide practically 
contrasting assessments of the slave wars in Sicily and mainland Italy.21 Sociologist Orlando 
Patterson is keenly concerned with the question of the slave’s desire for freedom, both in his 
account of slavery generally and manumission specifically. Indeed, Patterson makes 
manumission central to his universalizing account of slavery, presenting manumission as the 
inverse of enslavement. Patterson’s book Slavery and Social Death: a Comparative Study was 
controversial and thought inspiring when he published it in 1982, and today, it continues to shape 
the discourse of the study of slavery within Classics and many other disciplines beyond that of 
sociology.22 A further testimony to its importance is the book’s influence outside of slave 
                                                 
19 Perry (2014).  
20 Weiler (2003). 
21 Bradley (1989), Urbainczyk (2008). Yavetz (1988) provide yet other perspectives. Capozza surveys the slave 
revolts in Rome prior to the Sicilian slave wars (1966). 




studies, as well as the types of questions that it prompts within the field of slave studies.23 For 
instance, Joseph Miller’s argument that it is best to approach slavery as a strategy, rather than as 
an institution, is an idea that he forms in opposition to Patterson’s thought.24 In other words, 
while the debate over what slavery is and how it functions continues, this debate occurs in 
Patterson’s shadow. Slavery and manumission are part of a contemporary, and contested, 
discourse. It is therefore worthwhile to ask what Stasimus’ manumission was and also to ask how 
manumission mattered to an audience that included slaves, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans 
who did not own slaves.   
 In Chapter 1, I begin by exploring which theories can articulate what Roman 
manumission was, and I end by proffering a description of manumission as a ritualized practice 
that transforms a slave’s life from unlivable to livable. Patterson defines slavery as social death 
and manumission as social rebirth, two terms that provides sociological clarification, while 
jettisoning the unproductive, legalistic definition of slavery as a form of human property. 
Patterson grounds his definition of slavery and manumission in part through the work of 
philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, most especially Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman from The 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Significantly, both Hegel and Patterson were readers of ancient Rome, 
including Roman slavery. Indeed, these thinkers are useful for articulating the movement and 
experience of Roman freedom and slavery to a large degree because they constructed their 
universalized ideas out of the particulars of Roman slavery. I supplement my reading of Hegel 
and Patterson with the philosophy of Judith Butler. I turn to Butler’s term “unlivable” to augment 
Patterson’s description of slavery as social death, as Butler’s philosophy points both to new uses 
                                                 
23 For an example within Classics, see Zelnick-Abramowitz (2005: 25-7). For an example from anthropology, see 
Graeber’s work on debt (2011: 170-1). For Patterson’s influence on Butler, see Chapter 1 Section 5b.  
24 2012: 1-36. Andreau and Ducat give a recent defense of slavery as an institution in both the Greek and Roman 
worlds (2006).  
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for Patterson’s term, as well as new connections between Patterson’s understanding of the social 
and Hegel’s understanding of the self and the body. Butler’s emphasis on the body connects to 
the term “practice,” which I take from sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and from the term 
“ritualized,” which I take from religion scholar Catherine Bell. Specifically, these groundings of 
manumission in the movements of the body provide a framework for analyzing the three types of 
manumission described in Roman law.  
 Cicero makes clear that there were three types of manumission in the Roman Republic 
that the Roman state considered equally capable of freeing slaves.25 These three types of 
manumission were manumissio vindicta, manumissio censu, and manumissio testamento, or 
manumission by the staff, manumission by the census, and manumission by testament, 
respectively. Evidence from Roman comedies, legal writings, and letters provide the details that 
are the basis of my reconstructions of the movements and words that made up these different 
types of manumission. In Chapter 2, I pair these reconstructions of the practice of manumission 
with analysis of the aetiologies that the writers Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch 
provide on the origins of manumission. Specifically, I analyze the movements of manumission 
and the stories concerning the origins of manumission to describe how through manumission the 
state had a direct relationship with slaves, a relationship that was not mediated by slave-owners. 
All of these lines of questioning stem from the question, “What was at stake in manumission for 
the Roman state?”. 
 My guiding question for Chapter 3 is “How did manumission contribute to what it meant 
to be a slave-owner?”. For my answers, I return to Butler and her thoughts on subjection, which 
is to say, the process of becoming a subject. Roman slave-owners had to negotiate a variety of 
pressures and expectations when performing manumission, most especially the expectations of 
                                                 
25 Topica, 10. See Chapter 2 Section 7 for more.  
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other slave-owners. Even though these expectations did not have the force of law, they did carry 
disciplining force, as a number of examples from the comedies of Plautus and Terence, as well as 
the letters of Cicero, demonstrate. Furthermore, how Roman slave-owners looked at 
manumission was complicated by their valorization of Greek culture, including how the Greeks 
thought about and valued manumission. I therefore, examine what the Greeks Philip V and 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus said about Roman manumission and connect that to the discussions 
on the propriety of manumission in Plautus and Cicero. This pairing of Cicero and the comedians 
yields another important theme: that of manumission as a source of fraternal rivalry. Both Cicero 
and the comedians at the time completely downplay the importance of the Roman state in order 
to elevate the importance of non-state surveillance. 
 Slave-owners were of course not the only ones who surveilled manumission for the 
simple reason that not all Romans were slave-owners. Freeborn Romans who did not own slaves 
also participated in the surveillance, maintenance, and continuation of manumission. But while 
slave-owners had to internalize knowledge of manumission in order to succeed as slave-owners, 
non-slave-owning Romans examined manumission for the purpose of distinguishing themselves 
from former slaves. Because Plautus and Terence staged their comedies before the public, a 
public that included Romans who did not own slaves, I again examine the comedies, this time to 
ask how these performances participated in the divisions between former slaves and freeborn 
people. In doing so, I compare the language that the playwrights use to describe the freeing of 
freeborn people with the language that they use to describe the freeing of slaves. But I also 
analyze the plays as performances, in particular arguing that the racialized appearance of these 
slave masks connected to freeborn Romans’ need to distinguish themselves visually from former 
slaves. For while Roman authors are consistent in describing slaves’ bodies as visually 
Introduction 
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ambiguous, nonetheless, the theater-goer Julius Pollux read slave masks as distinct from the 
masks of freeborn characters. This need for a visual distinction was linked to how the Romans 
ascribed to slaves negative characteristics, including cowardice. Livy’s history of the volones, a 
unit of slaves whom the Romans recruited to fight Hannibal, emphasizes how these slaves were 
cowards and generally unfit to be soldiers. Livy writes of the volones in this way, even though he 
himself records how Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus—ancestor of the famous plebeian tribune—
freed them for winning the battle of Beneventum. I examine Livy’s disparaging description of 
these soldiers as an example of a psychological wage paid to freeborn Romans, as Livy’s 
assumption that these slaves were cowards is connected to his valorization of the courage of 
freeborn Romans. Freeborn Romans benefited from making slaves’ lives unlivable and therefore 
had an interest in guarding the boundaries of manumission. 
 The slave’s transformation into a civis demanded the recognition and participation of the 
Roman state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans. All three of these groups benefited from 
slaves’ status as slaves, but they also benefited from slaves’ pursuit for freedom. The state 
benefited because manumission increased the rolls of the citizenry and brought in more revenue. 
Slave-owners benefited because manumitted slaves continued to owe a debt of gratitude to their 
former owners. By insisting that former slaves were distinct and inferior from themselves, 
freeborn Romans benefited psychically from manumission. Because while freedmen and 
freedwomen formed a group superior to slaves, nonetheless they were inferior to freeborn 
Romans. Against this backdrop, Roman slaves struggled to gain their freedom through 
manumission.  
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Chapter 1: Theorizing manumission 
1. Introduction 
Maiores vero triginta annorum servi semper manumitti solent, adeo ut vel in transitu 
manumittantur, veluti cum praetor aut pro consule in balneum vel in theatrum eat.  
 
The practice is that slaves over thirty are readily manumitted; it is such an everyday matter that 
manumissions are performed even en route from one place to another, for instance, when the 
praetor or proconsul is on the way to the baths or the theatre.  
Gaius, Institutiones, 1.20, trans. Gordon and Robinson. 
 
 Sometime during the second century CE, the jurist Gaius wrote his Institutiones, a text in 
which he introduces to future lawyers the practice of law, including the laws surrounding 
manumission. In this passage on the Lex Aelia Sentia, he demonstrates that the Romans faithfully 
obeyed the precepts of the law that prohibited the manumission of slaves under the age of thirty 
without special warrant. In providing details culled from his own observation of daily life, the 
jurist shows that manumission was not simply a matter of law, but was instead an important 
strand in Rome’s social fabric. Indeed, in this passage Gaius literally takes manumission out of 
the law courts and places it in the streets of Rome with words that can evoke in our historical 
imagination the image of a briskly walking slave-owner maintaining a firm grip on the arm of his 
slave, while simultaneously besetting a harried praetor, who is much more eager to get to the 
baths than he is to oversee the manumission of yet another slave under the July sun. Nonetheless, 
by the end, the praetor has enacted something like a bit of magic: standing before him is now a 
Roman civis, where before there had been a slave. 
 One place to begin to understand the magic of Roman manumission is Orlando 
Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death, the most influential book of sociology on slavery. In this 
work, Patterson provides a universalizing theory of the process of enslavement, slavery, and 
manumission. But Patterson’s theory has an unusual relationship to Roman manumission. 
Because Patterson is a close reader of Roman history, most especially Roman slavery, his 
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universalizing ideas on slavery are constructed out of his reading of Roman slavery. That is, he 
constructed his universalizing theory not out of abstract arguments alone, but historical evidence, 
including Roman historical evidence. Indeed, Patterson clearly states the great value he places on 
both Greek and Roman history, writing in his preface that 
All who engage in comparative studies live in apprehension of the specialist, and no group is 
more to be feared than the students of Ancient Greece and Rome – not because they are more 
hostile to generalists than other specialists, but because their subject has more traps and pitfalls 
for the unwary comparativist than any other.26 
 
This praise is sincere, as in Slavery and Social Death Patterson engages with Roman writers 
ranging from Pliny to Publilius Syrus and scholars of antiquity ranging from Franz Bömer to 
M.I. Finley.27 Patterson’s theory of slavery and manumission not only has Roman roots, but is a 
universal theory constructed out of Roman particulars. In a real sense, Patterson’s sociology is 
Roman history.  
 At the same time, Patterson’s sociology is one that searches for “the universal features of 
the internal structure of slavery.”28 Patterson’s emphasis on the universal is connected to his use 
of the philosopher G.F.W. Hegel. Hegel’s philosophy pushes all investigations towards the 
absolute and the universal.29 Patterson’s own investigation into the “universal features” of 
slavery is in part his answer to this call. Hegel describes the universal in his own, idiomatic 
language giving rise to his reputation as an obscure thinker. Indeed, Hegel’s style is a 
justification to ignore him.30 But to ignore Hegel is to set aside not only an influential 
philosopher, but also an insightful reader of Roman history and Greek literature. Hegel’s 
                                                 
26 1982: xii. Patterson is consistent in this praise. See his more recent treatment of Greek slavery (2008).   
27 Pliny: 1982: 339. Publilius Syrus: 1982: 77. Bömer: 1982: 66-7. Finley: 1982: 70.  
28 1982: x.  
29 Cf. “Hegel wants us to see that any here, now, or this is really a universal.” Kain (2005: 34).  
30 “For English-language commentators Hegel is a great (and in analytical circles unmentionable) ‘other’, a 
‘difficult’ philosopher not in the analytical or empirical tradition…Metaphorically, those in the English-speaking 
world are always advised and warned when ‘Continental’ philosophy looms ahead, as if in a fog on the far side of 
the Channel.” Carver (2000: 37).  
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knowledge of Roman slavery informed his composition of The Phenomenology of Spirit, 
including his famous description of the struggle between the bondsman and the lord. True, 
Hegel’s book pursues many goals distinct from reconstructing and representing the Roman past, 
since, for Hegel, history is the movement of the World-Spirit through self-consciousness towards 
absolute knowledge.31 But it is because Hegel was a reader of Roman slavery that his struggle of 
the bondsman has so many affinities to Roman slavery. These affinities explain why Classicists, 
such as William Fitzgerald and Roberta Stewart, continue to cite Hegel as an influence in how 
they study Roman slavery.32 Despite his book’s many other commitments, and despite his book’s 
strangeand allusive style, Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit is grounded in Roman slavery 
and Roman manumission. 
 Because of this grounding, the debate over how to interpret The Phenomenology of Spirit, 
most especially the struggle of the bondsman, is also a debate about Roman manumission. While 
Patterson reads the struggle of the bondsman as including a defnitive break between the 
bondsman’s enslaved past and free future, philosopher Judith Butler instead reads the struggle of 
the bondsman as “the resolution of freedom into self-enslavement.”33 Butler therefore 
complicates Patterson’s use of Hegel and Patterson’s resulting description of slavery as social 
death. For Patterson describes slavery as social death, and manumission as social rebirth, through 
recourse to Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman. More specifically, Patterson references Hegel’s 
struggle of the bondsman to shore up the psychological aspects of his sociological description of 
slavery. However, Butler complicates Patterson in three ways. First, Butler is a reader and user 
                                                 
31 “Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness or its object in various ways, according to the precise 
stage it has reached in the development of the World-Spirit into self-consciousness.” §234. For absolute knowledge, 
see §789. Throughout, I use A.V. Miller’s translation of The Phenomenology of Spirit. I also reference the texts via 
the paragraph number. 
32 Fitzgerald 2000: 28-9. Stewart: 2012: 8-9, 113, 116.  
33 1997: 31.  
Chapter 1: Theorizing manumission 
 15 
of Patterson’s work. Indeed, she uses Patterson’s term “social death” in conversation with her 
own term, the unlivable life. Second, Butler provides a reading of Hegel’s struggle of the 
bondsman that conflicts with Patterson’s, as her reading emphasizes that although Hegel make 
uses of experiences and events from slavery, he is nonetheless theorizing about subjects more 
generally. Third, Butler’s reading of Hegel emphasizes the continuity of the bondsman’s 
inferiority to the lord, a reading that challenges Patterson, as Patterson reads Hegel as describing 
a rupture: the bondsman is initially enslaved and socially dead, but then he is manumitted, free, 
and socially reborn. Butler’s reading of Hegel provides a way to describe slaves as living 
unlivable lives, thereby making manumission the transition to a livable life. This framework 
emphasizes the alleviative, rather than the assimilative, aspects of manumission.   
 First, what is the Phenomenology of Spirit? Section 2 of this chapter explores the 
Phenomenology as work in which Hegel is not only making a number of arguments about the 
development of consciousness, but also universal history—in this case, universal history as the 
story of all human affairs. In order to proceed on both fronts simultaneously, Hegel employs a 
purposely difficult and obscure style, in which he forces the reader to take his words on his own 
terms, rather than on terms that have easy reference to preceding and contemporaneous literature. 
Thus, even though Hegel’s work includes prolonged critiques and conversations with a variety of 
ideas, events, and authors, specific ideas and people are only faintly visible through his prose. 
Indeed, Hegel scholar Philip Kain is fond of saying that the Phenomenology is allusive in a 
manner similar to a novel.34 Despite the passage’s seeming timelessness, the struggle of the 
bondsman functions as a description of consciousness that has definite, if oblique, connections to 
events in Hegel’s lifetime, such as the advent of capitalism and the Haitian Revolution.  
                                                 
34 See Section 3b.  
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 That readers of Hegel, such as Susan Buck-Morss and Andrew Cole, connect Hegel’s text 
to these historical events is a testament to the philosopher’s broad interests, including an active 
interest in antiquity generally and Roman history specifically. In Section 3, I position Hegel as a 
reader of ancient Rome. Indeed, Hegel wrote a number of his early works directly on Classical 
topics. I use this Roman lens to analyze the conflict between the bondsman and lord and the 
stages that follow this struggle. Because of connections to antiquity in the passages that 
immediately follow the struggle of the bondsman and antitiquity, readers are justified in applying 
a Roman context to his description of the previous conflict. For example, Hegel names the stages 
that follow the struggle of the bondsman and lord after two ancient schools of philosophy, 
Stoicism and Skepticism. Hegel’s description of the bondsman and lord is, in part, the product of 
his reading of Roman history and Roman slavery. As a result, there is a productive correlation 
between his description of the bondsman and Roman slaves.  
 Section 4 concerns how Patterson uses Hegel’s conflict between the bondsman and lord 
for the psychological aspect of his own theory of slavery as social death. Patterson elaborates 
how slavery deprives slaves of honor, thereby excluding them from the very society that their 
labor supports. For Patterson, manumission is the slave’s admittance into society. That is, 
manumission is social birth, or rebirth. Patterson uses this idea to theorize how manumission was 
connected to how freedmen and freedwomen received the social necessities of recognition and 
honor. How this allocation of freedom is functioned is important to Patterson, as he argues that 
freedmen and freedwomen experienced a type of freedom distinct from the freedom of the 
freeborn.  
 Patterson’s description of slavery and manumission is useful and powerful, but Butler 
provides ideas and vocabulary that can improve it. In addition to being a reader of Hegel and 
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Patterson, Butler is also a close reader of Michel Foucault, whose conception of power she 
places in conversation with Hegel, without attempting to resolve the contradictions between the 
approaches of the two thinkers. Like Patterson, Foucault posits power as shaping all 
relationships, but because Foucault differs in his description of power, Butler’s thought yields a 
different picture of the nature of manumission. Section 5 explores how Roman slaves were 
integrated into Roman society, but integrated in such a way to their permanent disadvantage. 
When applied to Roman slavery, Butler’s vocabulary describes Roman slavery as a practice that 
made slaves’ lives unlivable. That is, while slaves were still very much part of society, 
nonetheless they could not thrive. Slaves could only thrive by becoming free, by becoming 
former slaves.  
 While Butler’s work articulates the ethical stakes within the experience of slavery and 
slave-ownership, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu provides the tool to describe how manumission fit 
into Roman society by being iterative, improvised, localized, and strategic. Bourdieu defines 
practice as encompassing strategic and situational aspects, which are two aspects essential to 
Roman manumission, as slaves and slave-owners manipulated the contexts of manumission. The 
Romans also incorporated formulae and instruments into the practice of manumission, indicating 
how they wished to distinguish manumission from other practices. Catherine Bell’s term 
“ritualized” describes how the Roman slave-owners and slaves worked to make manumission 
unique. Importantly, slaves engaged in this ritualized practice while in negotiation not only with 
their slave-owners, but also with the Roman state, other slave-owners, and non-slave-owning 
Romans. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 in turn investigate the pressures at play within manumission 
through slaves’ relationships with these different groups.  
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2. The struggle of the bondsman and lord 
 My reading of Hegel’s description of the struggle of the bondsman and lord is based on 
my understanding of the Phenomenology as a whole. This section of the Phenomenology not 
only advances the book’s central arguments, but also interacts with the texts and events that 
informed Hegel’s thought. There are two challenges to interpreting this complex book: first, its 
enigmatic style; second, its use of allusions. Analyzing the events and people that informed 
Hegel’s writing of the Pheneomenology provides some solutions to both these challenges. While 
my concerns about obscurity and allusion may appear tangential in this summary of the struggle 
of the bondsman, they are necessary platforms for my larger argument about Hegel, Roman 
slavery, and freedom.   
a. What is the Phenomenology? 
 The Phenomenology was a book that Hegel considered overdue. Hegel needed a book to 
advance his academic career, which by 1807 was one marked by more failures than successes.35 
The thirty-seven-year-old Hegel composed this long book in a remarkably short amount of time, 
and under great duress, during 1806 and 1807.36 1806 was a hard year for Hegel, as it was then 
that his mistress Christiana Burkhardt was pregnant with their son Ludwig.37 1806 was also the 
year of Napoleon’s invasion, and destruction, of the Holy Roman Empire, which was the 
government under which Hegel had lived his entire life. Rather than sending the last pages of the 
Phenomenology through the post, Hegel carried it to the publisher himself, not wanting to risk 
losing the manuscript in the mail.38 Despite these adverse conditions, Hegel finished the book to 
his satisfaction, and years later, he continued to refer to it as integral part of his systematic 
                                                 
35 Pinkard (2000: 221-230). 
36 Cf. Pöggler (1973: 193).  
37 For the importance of Ludwig, see Kaufmann (1965: 91-5). Hegel never married Burkhardt, but instead married 
Marie Helena Susanna von Tucher in 1811 (Pinkard 2000: 296-300). 
38 Pinkard (2000: 230).  
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philosophy.39 However, the continuity of Hegel’s philosophical system over the years is, 
unsurprisingly, a matter of debate. While I occasionally reference Hegel’s other works, my 
interest in Hegel is the Hegel of the Phenomenology.40  
 Hegel wrote the Phenomenology in an allusive and opaque style. Indeed, Hegel’s style is 
so notable that Buck-Morss, Kaufmann, and Pinkard have offered a range of causes to explain it. 
Buck-Morss notes that Hegel did not have any assurance of either academic freedom or freedom 
of speech, and thus his obscurity should be read as a form of self-protection.41 Kaufmann offers a 
more psychological explanation: he argues that Hegel’s “poetic impulse” overpowered his need 
for clear and logical presentation of his arguments.42 In contrast, Pinkard places Hegel’s verbal 
obscurity in the context of his circle of friends, who included the philosopher F.W.J. Schelling 
and the great poet J.C.F. Hölderlin. Pinkard makes the case that just as Hölderlin sought to break 
with traditional poetic subjects and perspectives, in part, through his self-conscious change in 
vocabulary, so too did Hegel seek to use a style of writing that forces readers to abandon the 
words upon which they relied, thereby forcing them to think for themselves.43 What is true is that 
Hegel’s obscurity contributes to the myriad of different, and at times conflicting, interpretations 
of his book.  
 Despite containing critiques of many different philosophers and philosophies, the 
Phenomenology names only thirteen historical and fictional people within its hundreds of pages. 
This small number points to the challenges readers face in establishing with whom, and in what 
manner, Hegel criticized and absorbed his predecessors. Most of these individuals are ancient 
                                                 
39 Cf. Encyclopedia §25. Cf. Kaufmann (1965: 240).  
40 Furthermore, attempts to synthesize the Phenomenology with later writings needs to be done carefully. Editors’ 
somewhat creative revisions to Hegel’s posthumous publications are numerous (cf. Kaufmann 1965: 218-224).  
41 Buck-Morss (2009: 17-20; cf. also 59 n. 111). 
42 Kaufmann (1965: 121).  
43 Pinkard (2000: 82).  
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Greeks, and their names are a good indication of how, for Hegel, antiquity was quite close to the 
nineteenth centuruy: Anaxagoras, Antigone, Aristotle, Descartes, Diogenes, Hamlet, Homer, 
Kant, Lichtenberg, Origen, Plato, Solon, and Sophocles.44 More sympathetic readers of Hegel 
defend the indirect manner in which he engages with other writers, even though these readers 
themselves argue about what is the best way to incorporate these allusions into an interpretation 
of the text. Kain writes that because these allusions are similar to those in a novel, readers should 
approach them as opportunities for expanding the text: “[The allusions] are not specific, precise, 
and limited. They are general, open, even symbolic—as if they were trying to refer to as much as 
possible.”45 However, the allusions are also quite capable of tripping up readers. Kaufmann notes 
that an early American scholar of Hegel, Josiah Royce, assumed that a quotation of Goethe’s 
Faust meant that the succeeding four pages were Hegel’s thoughts on Faust.46 Kaufmann, 
persuasively, argues that Hegel’s reference to Goethe’s poem is not a strong enough foundation 
for Royce’s assumption that the pages following this quote are best understood as Hegel’s 
analysis of Faust.47 However, careful establishment of a connection between the Phenomenology 
and another text can lead to a fruitful analysis of Hegel’s thought. For example, Kain first notes 
the unmarked correspondences between the beginning of the Phenomenology and numerous 
sections of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to show how Hegel is criticizing Kant in these 
sections of the book. Likewise, Karin de Boer makes the persuasive case that in the 
Phenomenology’s section on womanhood—which follows the discussion of Antigone—Hegel is 
thinking about Greek domestic life through Aristophanes’ plays.48 This point prompts a re-
                                                 
44 Kaufmann assembled this list (1965: 125).  
45 2005: 21.  
46 Hegel quotes Faust, Part I, in §360. Royce (1919: 190 ff.) 
47 1965: 121-5.  
48 2010.  
Chapter 1: Theorizing manumission 
 21 
evaluation of how Hegel approaches Antigone’s relationship to her family, demonstrating the 
worth of taking Hegel’s allusions seriously.  
 The above discussion, on Hegel’s style and allusiveness, points to the problem of 
summarizing even individual clauses in the Phenomenology. How then to summarize the book as 
whole? The fairest description I have found is from Kaufmann, who is, likely, able to summarize 
the book gracefully because he himself he does not wish to elevate, or denigrate, Hegel’s 
project.49  
The basic idea of the Phenomenology of Spirit is that a philosopher should not confine himself 
to views that have been held but penetrate behind these to the human reality they reflect. It is 
not enough to consider propositions, or even content of consciousness; it is worth while to ask 
in every instance what kind of spirit would entertain such propositions, hold such views, and 
have such a consciousness. Every outlook, in other words, is to be studied not merely as an 
academic possibility but as an existential reality.50 
 
Hegel’s project is to describe the development of consciousness. In this project, he shifts among 
descriptions of individuals, civilizations, and all of history. At the same time, it is possible to use 
these accounts in an atomized way, such as to merely look at psychology of an individual’s 
consciousness. As a result, the struggle between the bondsman and the lord can be read as the 
conflict between two separate individuals, but other possible readings include it as a description 
of a conflict within a civilization or of a conflict central to human history.51 
b. What is the struggle of the bondsman and lord? 
 The section of the Phenomenology that I call the struggle of the bondsman and lord is 
better known as the master/slave dialectic.52 I prefer the more cumbersome appellation, “struggle 
                                                 
49 Kaufmann is more well known for his translations and interpretations of Nietzsche (e.g. 1974), whom many 
consider a kind of anti-Hegel. Given Kaufmann’s interest in existentialism, he unsurprisingly makes Hegel relevant 
to existentialists.   
50 1965: 115.  
51 In Kojève’s reading, the conflict between the lord and bondsman begins with human history (1969: 52). Stern 
reviews some of the different ways of reading through the problem of interpreting the struggle of the bondsman 
(2002: 25-7).  
52 Arthur argues that it was mid-twentieth century French thinkers who first analyzed this passage as an example of 
Hegel’s dialectic (1983: 67-8).  
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of the bondsman and lord.” This term more accurately reflects Hegel’s own words and is 
therefore a reminder of the gap between the philosophy of Hegel’s own text and the philosophy 
that is merely associated with Hegel. For Hegel titles this section of his text Herrschaft und 
Knechtschaft, “lordship and bondage,” and repeatedly uses the German words Herr and Knecht 
for the eponymous characters.53 A pleasant corollary of this method is that it leaves aside the 
question of how the dialectic functions in Hegel’s philosophy; for while Hegel does use the word 
dialectic elsewhere in his work, it is not an important word in the Phenomenology.54 However, 
despite my preference for using Hegel’s own terminology, I nonetheless seek elucidation of the 
text from those who do describe this passage as the master/slave dialectic, such as Jean 
Hyppolite. His summary is especially useful:  
…[the struggle of the bondsman] consist[s] essentially in showing that the truth of the master 
reveals that he is the slave, and the slave is revealed to be the master of the master.55  
 
Importantly, for Hegel this process is not abstract, but physically perilous. Although Hegel titles 
this section with abstract ideas, he calls the account of the encounter of the lord and bondsman a 
“life-and-death struggle.”56  
 The conflict between the bondsman and lord results when two parties try and secure a 
stable and consistent recognition of their own self-consciousness from each other. Prior to being 
bondsman and lord, the two had been equals.57 As their consciousnesses developed in parallel, 
they both reached the stage in which they sought recognition from others. Despite this mutual 
need, they attack each other. This attack is both a way to find recognition in the other and, by 
                                                 
53 Title of the section: §166. Herr: §190. Knecht: §190. Throughout this dissertation, I use Miller’s translation 
(1977). 
54 While Hegel does mention the dialectic in the Phenomenology, it is only in minor contexts (cf. Kaufmann 1965: 
153-162).  
55 Hyppolite (1974: 172). 
56 “…den Kampf auf Leben und Tod bewähren.” §187.  
57 §182. 
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risking death, a way to “supersede this otherness of itself.”58 Despite this commitment to fight to 
the death, in the struggle neither dies. In place of death, the loser, the bondsman, is bonded to the 
winner, the lord. The lord then commands the bondsman to do his work, allowing the lord to 
enjoy the fruits of this labor without exertion.59 But despite having leisure time that the 
bondsman does not, the lord’s consciousness is developmentally stymied.  
In contrast, the bondsman’s consciousness advances through his work, as the experience 
of this work provides an independence that the lord cannot find in the results of the work.60 
Bondage also forces the bondsman to confront the fear of death.61 The combination of work and 
the threat of death fosters a self-discipline and knowledge that make it clear that “The truth of 
the independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman… a 
consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly 
independent consciousness.”62 That is, the bondsman has reconciled to a kind of independence 
that was impossible prior to his struggle with the lord. However, Hegel concludes this section by 
noting that “having a ‘mind of one’s own’ is self-will, a freedom which is still enmeshed in 
servitude,” emphasizing that this independence is not complete.63 That this consciousness 
continues to change is evident through how Hegel arranges the text: The struggle of the lord and 
bondsman makes up most of section 4a of the Phenomenology, which Hegel titles “Independence 
                                                 
58 “Es muß dies sein Anderssein aufheben...” (§180). On the risk of death, §187. 
59 “but the lord, who has interposed the bondsman between it and himself, takes to himself only the dependent aspect 
of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it.” (§190). 
60 “…in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself exists essentially 
and actually in his own right.” (§196). 
61 “for it [servitude] has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite 
unmanned, has trembled in every fiber of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its 
foundations… Through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail; and 
gets rid of it by working on it.” (§194). 
62 “Die Wahrheit des selbständigen Bewußtseins ist demnach das knechtische Bewußtsein... sie wird als in sich 
zurückgedrängtes Bewußtsein in sich gehen, und zur wahren Selbstständigkeit sich umkehren.” (§193).  
63 “...der eigne Sinn ist Eigensinn, eine Freiheit, welche noch innerhalb der Knechtschaft stehenbleibt.” (§196).  
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and dependence of self-consciousness: lordship and bondage”.64 The following section is titled 
“Freedom of self-consciousness: Stoicism, Skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness”.65 I 
emphasize the titles of these two sections to make clear that Hegel does not see the struggle of 
the bondsman as an isolated event, but rather one intimately involved in the development of 
human reality.  
 While the struggle of the bondsman is today one of its most famous passages of the 
Phenomenology, in the nineteenth century, readers, such as Karl Marx, were not drawn to it. 
Even though the passage has many affinities to Marx’s philosophy, Marx himself does not 
directly comment on it.66 Rather it was Alexandre Kojève, a twentieth century scholar of Hegel 
and Marx, who argued for the importance of this passage. For Kojève, the struggle between the 
lord and bondsman is not about a particular instance in human history; rather, it describes a 
struggle that motivates all of human history. “Consequently,” he writes, “History stops at the 
moment when the difference, the opposition, between Master and Slave disappears.”67 In 
contrast, readers ranging from Herbert Marcuse to G.A. Kelly see the struggle of the bondsman 
as Hegel’s articulation of the conflict between propertied and property-less classes, in other 
words, as Hegel’s version of class struggle.68  
 Andrew Cole objects to such readers of the struggle of the bondsman, arguing these 
readers are determined to make Hegel a proto-Marx, thereby ignoring the context of Hegel’s own 
words. Cole argues for reading this passage as Hegel’s thoughts on feudalism, not capitalism, 
noting that this term best describes the German economy in Hegel’s time. Cole’s combination of 
                                                 
64 “Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewußsteins; Herrschaft und Knechtschaft.” (§178). 
65 “Freiheit des Selbstbewußtseins; Stoizismus, Skeptizismus und das unglückliche Bewußstein.” (§197). 
66 Cf. Wood (1993) and Levine (2012). Burns and Fraser review the various ways Marxists have interpreted Marx’s 
relationship to Hegel (2000). Carver argues that Engels emphasized Marx’s relation to Hegel as a strategy to 
establish Marx’s authority as a philosopher (2000). In contrast, Cole argues that in some passages of the Grundrisse 
and German Ideology Marx is alluding to Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman (2004: 595-6).  
67 1969: 43. 
68 Arthur catalogues a number of readers who present the struggle of the bondsman in this light (1983: 69 n.10).  
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philology and history makes a persuasive point: whatever other texts or historical events with 
which this passage does intersect, Hegel was certainly commenting on his own times, on its own 
terms.69 However, rather than use Cole’s argument to seal Hegel’s text shut, I use Cole’s 
argument as the foundation upon which to build more connections between the Phenomenology 
and the world.70 Furthermore, Cole’s position is easier to understand when it is clear that he is 
also arguing against Steven Smith, who asserts that this section was Hegel’s critique of 
Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery.71 For while Aristotle writes that slaves and slave-owners are 
ontologically distinct people, Hegel’s philosophy provides a narrative in which the two people 
change positions and power over time.72 One of Cole’s points is that this Hegelian struggle does 
not simply occur in Ancient Greece, but also in Hegel’s Germany.73  
 To limit Hegel’s thought to nineteenth century Germany is to ignore Hegel’s own 
commitment to universalism, a commitment that Buck-Morss has him answer in her analysis of 
Hegel’s debt to the Haitian Revolution. Buck-Morss’ recruitment of Hegel to the Haitian 
revolution touched off a controversy over her own treatment of contemporary research on Haiti 
and Hegel, most especially her treatment of the Hegel scholar Pierre-Franklin Tavarès.74 
Nonetheless, I build upon Buck-Morss’ work because she holds Hegel to the high standards that 
he sets for himself.75 Buck-Morss’ book points to the productive ways that Hegel’s struggle of 
the bondsman can be read alongside historical events, even when Hegel does not explicitly name 
them. Drawing upon Hegel’s own notes and reading habits—in particular his love of 
contemporary journalism—Buck-Morss contextualizes Hegel’s universal struggle of the 
                                                 
69 2004.  
70 Indeed, Cole himself wants to keep the text hermeneutically open (2004: 583).  
71 Smith 1992.  
72 The key passage of Aristotle on slavery are Politics (1254a4-b24) and Nicomachean Ethics (1160b24-32). The 
best overview of Aristotlean slave theory is Garnsey (1996: 107-127).  
73 Cf. Buck-Morss (2009: 59 n. 110). 
74 See Buck-Morss (2009: 14-6), Décembre (2016), Joseph (2012: 46) and Joseph (2016). 
75 “To what degree is Hegel himself accountable for the effective silencing of the Haitian Revolution?” (2009: 17).  
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bondsman amid the backdrop of the Haitian revolution, most especially the revolution’s abolition 
of slavery.76 By framing radical anti-slavery as a universal human project, Buck-Morss makes 
the Hegel of the Phenomenology into an unknowing, but eager, evangelist of the Haitian 
revolution, a philosopher who translates the slaves’ uprising into the pursuit of universal and 
absolute freedom. In order to read Hegel in this way, it is necessary to note how he condemned 
the work and lives of Black people and Africans, making the supposed “unhistoricity” of African 
societies and civilizations fundamental to his history of the world.77 By pitting Hegel’s professed 
universalizing claims about the development of freedom into conversation with the struggle for 
freedom in the Haitian revolution, Buck-Morss points a way to use Hegel for what she calls the 
double liberation of universal history: “Universal history engages in a double liberation, of the 
historical phenomenon and of our own imagination: by liberating the past we liberate 
ourselves.”78  
 It is because readers like Buck-Morss continue to find such powerful potential in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology that I turn to it for my analysis of Roman manumission. To turn to Hegel is not 
to simply apply Hegel’s thought to Roman manumission, as if using a microscope to look at a 
Petri dish. Instead, I argue that Hegel’s thought itself was formed in dialogue with Roman 
manumission. Furthermore, this Roman context for the struggle of the bondsman strengthens 
Butler’s cautioning about the liberatory potential of this passage: Butler argues that to read the 
struggle of the bondsman merely as the triumph of the oppressed over oppressors is to ignore 
how Hegel implies that the lord returns with the unhappy consciousness. In other words, Butler 
emphasizes the conservative aspect of Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman, since in her reading it 
                                                 
76 Buck-Morss (2009: 48-52). 
77 2009: 148. For Hegel’s racist adaptations of African history, see Bernasconi (1998).  
78 2009: 149.  
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reproduces inequality, rather than overthrowing it, similar to how Roman manumission 
maintained Roman slavery.79  
3. Hegel, slavery, and Roman manumission 
 Hegel was a reader of Roman texts and reader of contemporary scholarship on Rome. He 
drew upon this knowledge in his integration of Rome into his philosophy, including his 
description of Stoicism and Skepticism. In that section of the Phenomenology, Hegel deploys a 
clear allusion to Stoicism, and several vague sentences that have long been read as him analyzing 
Stoicism’s relationship to Rome. In this section, after clarifying my claim of Hegel as a reader of 
Rome, I revisit the arguments for understanding Hegel’s evocation of Rome in his discussion of 
Stoicism and then argue that is possible to use this Roman setting as a way to think through his 
previous discussion of the struggle of the bondsman and lord. As my above discussion of the 
struggle of the bondsman makes clear, it is unproductive to insist that this passage is ‘about’ a 
singular event or group of people. Rather, the most productive interpretations of the 
Phenomenology are those with many points of entry into Hegel’s text. I argue that Hegel’s 
struggle of the bondsman maps well onto the discussion of Roman manumission not because 
Hegel articulated an abstract theory of slavery that one can then apply to Roman slavery, but 
because his text is already involved with Roman slavery. Therefore, to study Hegel’s struggle of 
the bondsman is to learn about Hegel and his thoughts on Roman slavery and manumission.  
a. Hegel as a reader of ancient Rome 
 Hegel was a reader of ancient Rome in two ways: first, Hegel read the works of Greek 
and Roman writers who lived under the Roman Empire. Second, Hegel read contempory 
scholarship on Roman history, including historiographical works such as Gibbon’s Decline and 
Fall of the Roman Empire as well as more philosophical approaches to history, like Herder’s 
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This too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity.80 In approaching Hegel as a 
reader of Rome, I build on the work of Valerio Rocco Lozano, who has written a systematic 
analysis of the use of ancient Rome in Hegel’s early writings.81 But while he charts in Hegel’s 
essays and articles the development of ideas that are central to the Phenomenology, Lozano does 
not analyze the Phenomenology itself.82 As a result, my arguments for reading ancient Rome 
alongside the struggle of the bondsman compliment, but do not replicate, Lozano’s work, most 
especially because I position Hegel as a reader of Rome in order to reposition Roman slavery as 
a conflict in conversation with the struggle of the bondsman.  
 Hegel was a reader of Rome because reading and writing in Latin was an essential part of 
his education and, simply, because knowledge of Rome was essential to nineteenth century 
European education. When Hegel first went to school at age five, he already knew the first 
declension of Latin because of his mother’s tutoring.83 Reading Latin and Greek texts was a 
central aspect of Hegel’s education, including his years studying theology at Tübingen 
University. There, Hegel’s study of Christianity was in part historical and therefore built and 
further developed his knowledge of Roman literature and history.84 When Hegel renounced his 
commitment to theology and instead dedicated himself to philosophy, he nonetheless used the 
historical and philological skills that he learned in his theological training in his philosophical 
work, including his writings that preceded the Phenomenology.  
 While the Phenomenology was Hegel’s first book, during his earlier years Hegel 
composed essays and articles that are important to examine as Hegel’s preliminary approaches to 
aesthetics, theology, and politics prior the Phenomenology. Some of these early writings are on 
                                                 
80 Gibbon: Lozano (2011: 52-6 and 107) and Pinkard (2000: 56-59). Herder: Pinkard (2000: 43 and 61). 
81 2011.  
82 Cf. Macor’s review of Lozano (2012).  
83 Pinkard (2000: 4).  
84 Pinkard (2000: 34-8). 
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explicitly classical themes, such as Hegel’s exploration of the origin of comedy and tragedy.85 
More significantly, Lozano also argues that ancient Rome is a uniting thread for the aesthetic, 
theological, and political ideas that Hegel pursues in his early work. For in addition to studying 
Roman poetry directly, Hegel also engages with it indirectly: his comments on Molière’s 
L’Avare are in part a reception of Roman literature because Molière based his play on Plautus’ 
comedy Aulularia. Lozano points out that this connection between the French and Roman plays 
is key for Hegel’s thoughts on both Romanitas and Festigkeit (“fixity”), a term important to his 
aesthetic thought.86 Similarly, Hegel’s political thought was always in conversation with Rome, 
as he used Roman history as a juxtaposition to current, political developments. Hegel’s use of 
Rome in this regard is so consistent that Lozano argues that there was a change in which Rome 
Hegel prefers: when he initially approved of the direction of the French Revolution, he evoked 
Republican Rome. When Hegel soured on the revolutionaries’ project, he evoked Imperial 
Rome.87 Lozano argues that this negative view of Imperial Rome carried over into Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, specifically that Imperial Rome was a place defined by its lack of freedom, both 
internal and external, despite having many different possibilities for enacting freedom.88 Hegel 
inserts the origins of Christianity into the friction generated by Imperial Rome’s Republican past, 
which for Hegel is Rome’s free past. In doing so, Lozano argues that Hegel frames Christianity 
as the “…realization and actualization of the potential logic implicit in the Roman world.”89 
Ancient historians will likely find this framing of Christianity familiar, and for good reason: one 
of Hegel’s students was the influential Johann Gustav Droysen, biographer of Alexander the 
                                                 
85 Specifically, Hegel’s 1788 essay “Ueber einige charakterische Unterschiede der alten Dichter”; see Lozano (2011: 
206-215).  
86 Lozano (2011: 169-172).  
87 Lozano (2011: 176). 
88 2011: 176.  
89 “…como realización y actualización de las potencialidades lógicas implícitas en el mundo romano” (2011: 179).  
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Great and coiner of the term “Hellenism.”90 This aspect of Hegel’s theology is important for 
reading Roman slavery in the Phenomenology because Hegel’s Christianity is a thread that 
definitively binds his thoughts on the development of freedom to the Roman world. But Lozano 
points out that we can go further. Indeed, he calls upon us to reread the Phenomenology while 
examining how Hegel charts the development of freedom by alluding to the Roman world, 
including the struggle of the bondsman.91 
b. Ancient Rome and the struggle of the bondsman and lord 
 Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman connects with Roman slavery in two ways. First, there 
are similarities between bondsmen (Knechten) and slaves (Sklaven), and, therefore, it is possible 
to read Hegel’s description of the relationship between the bondsman and lord as a charting of a 
similar relationship between a Roman slave and slave-owner.92 This method essentially takes 
Hegel’s philosophy as an abstract theory that can be applied to the practice of slavery. However, 
this method ignores how in his typically obscure manner, Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman is in 
direct conversation with Roman slavery, as is clear from the Roman context in the section that 
follows the struggle of the bondsman in the Phenomenology, namely Hegel’s discussion of 
Stoicism, Skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness. Kain and Pollhammer have noted that this 
section contains an allusion to the freedman philosopher Epictetus, as well as descriptions that, 
while vague, are easily read as describing the Roman Empire. This allusion to Epictetus 
establishes the Roman context for Hegel’s description of Stoicism. I use this context, in 
particular Epictetus, to reread the struggle of the bondsman in a Roman setting. In doing so, I 
suggest that we need to take Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman seriously as a philosophy of 
                                                 
90 I am grateful to Professor Yarrow pointing out this connection to me. For Hegel’s influence on Droysen, see 
Bauer (2001).   
91 2011: 178.  
92 In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel only ever uses the word Knecht to describe the figure of the bondsman, cf. 
§189, §190, §191, §193, §195, §196, and §199. As Buck-Morss points out, in both earlier and later writings on the 
topic of recognition, Hegel appears to use Sklave and Knecht interchangeable (2009: 52 n.90, 62 n.119).  
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Roman slavery, not because Hegel was articulating a general theory of slavery, but because 
Hegel himself was drawing upon the history of Roman slavery and manumission when he wrote 
this passage.93 That is, Hegel’s description of the end of the bondsman’s bondage has many 
similarities to manumission, most especially because it a transition to a type of freedom that, 
while quite real, nonetheless does not reorder existing social relationships. Instead, following 
Butler’s reading of the struggle of the bondsman, manumission marks a moment of the slave’s 
internalization of the Roman slave-owner. For Butler argues that the unhappy consciousness, a 
type of consciousness which succeeds the bondsman, contains a psychic, rather than corporeal, 
version of the lord.94 
 Hegel’s section on Stoicism contains an allusion to two important Stoic thinkers, 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Hegel writes, 
This consciousness accordingly has a negative attitude towards the lord and bondsman 
relationship. As lord, it does not have its truth in the bondsman, nor as bondsman is its truth in 
the lord’s will and in his service; on the contrary, whether on the throne or in chains, in the 
utter dependence of its individual existence, its aim is to be free, and to maintain that lifeless 
indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the bustle of existence….95 
 
That the “throne” represents Marcus Aurelius and that the “chains” represent Epictetus is, at this 
point, an old interpretation.96 The more recent, and intriguing, question is how this allusion can 
function as a hermeneutical key for Hegel’s description of Stoicism, by putting his conception of 
Rome into dialogue with his description of the development of Stoicism.  
 Kain argues that the allusion to Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius corresponds to Hegel’s 
description of Rome. For in Hegel’s discussion of Stoicism, Hegel is quite specific about what 
                                                 
93 Lozano also points in this direction (2011: 178). 
94 For more on Butler’s reading of the struggle of the bondsman, see Section 5a.  
95 “...sein Tun ist, in der Herrschaft nicht seine Wahrheit an dem Knechte zu haben, noch als Knecht seine Wahrheit 
an dem Willen des Herrn und an seinem Dienen, sondern wie auf dem Throne so in den Fesseln, in aller 
Abhängigkeit seines einzelnen Daseins frei zu sein, und die Leblosigkeit sich zu erhalten, welche sich beständig aus 
der Bewegung des Daseins, aus dem Wirken wie aus dem Leiden, in die einfache Wesenheit des Gedankens 
zurückzieht.” §199. Throughout this dissertation, all underlined portions of quotes are my own emphases.  
96 Cf. Findlay (1958: 98) and Kaufmann (1965: 138). 
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political and cultural conditions that make this new way of thinking possible, even though he 
does not name which government oversaw the transformation of Stoicism from a mere school of 
philosophy into something truly universal:   
As a universal form of the World-Spirit, Stoicism could only appear on the scene in a time of 
universal fear and bondage, but also a time of universal culture which had raised itself to the 
level of thought.97  
 
In this description, Hegel is not so much interested in explaining Stoicism’s origins in fourth 
century BCE Athens as he is, instead, interested in explaining how, under the Romans, Stoicism 
became a form of thought so significant that, in his words, it was “a universal form of the World-
Spirit.” Kain clarifies that, for Hegel, Stoicism’s role as a universal form in Imperial Rome is 
connected both to the emotional detachment that the Stoics used to define Stoic psychology and 
also to Hegel’s own conception of Imperial Rome as a government that lacked personal 
investment in its citizens, and is therefore similar to a slave-owner.98  
The citizen of imperial Rome had lost all opportunity to participate in a public assembly where 
citizens themselves could be in control of important civic matters. The citizen had become a 
small cog in a big, complex, and impersonal machine…. In an important sense, all are slaves in 
Rome. All must serve the abstract concerns of a huge and far-flung empire. And they serve 
much as a slave does—they must be ruthlessly disciplined to serve effectively and they must 
sacrifice all personal concerns.99 
 
In other words, Kain argues that Hegel wants the reader to approach Rome from the perspective 
of Epictetus, the slave in chains, rather than from perspective of Marcus Aurelius, the emperor 
on the throne. The Stoic consciousness results from the work and freedom of the struggle of the 
bondsman.  
 But while Hegel alludes to Epictetus through the imagery of chains, Epictetus did not 
spend his entire life in chains. Importantly, the two texts through which Hegel knew Epictetus, 
the Encheiridion and the Discourses, were written after Epictetus was manumitted and had 
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98 For apatheia in Stoic psychology, see Nussbaum (1994).  
99 Kain (2005: 57). Emphasis my own.  
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founded a successful philosophical school.100 Hegel uses chains to allude to a man who had not 
remained a slave, but who had become a manumitted freedman. Epictetus is, furthermore, an apt 
key for unlocking the struggle of the bondsman because Epictetus’ manumission was connected 
to his success as a philosopher. That is, the ancient sources on Epictetus’ biography suggest that 
his owner Epaphroditos had been in part motivated to free him because of his talents in 
philosophy.101 In other words, Epictetus’ intellectual development and freedom are intertwined, 
similar to how the development of the bondsman’s development of consciousness is intertwined 
with the freedom that he gains through his struggle with the lord.  
 Because Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman has three important similarities to Roman 
slavery and manumission, the struggle of the bondsman is in conversation with Roman slavery, 
most especially the enslavement and manumission of Epictetus. First, the bondsman was 
originally free prior to his struggle with the lord. Likewise, many Roman slaves were born free. 
Second, the bondsman performs physical labor for the lord, while simultaneously facing lethal 
threats for failing to perform this labor correctly. So, too, did Roman slaves physically labor for 
Roman slave-owners. Third, despite the important affinities of the struggle of the bondsman to 
the Haitian revolution and Marxist conceptions of the struggle of the proletariat, Hegel does not 
write that the bondsman triumphs over the lord through violence or any sort of radical social 
change. Rather, Hegel concludes the section of the bondsman by simply commenting on the new 
type of freedom that the bondsman experiences through his laboring. That is, like Epictetus’ own 
advancement, the freedom of the bondsman does not upset the physical or social world. The 
world accommodates the bondsman’s new freedom, similar to how the politics of Roman world 
easily accommodated Epictetus’ new freedom as a freedman. Instead, it was Epictetus’ Stoic 
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philosophy that was a challenge to the Roman world, as his philosophy challenged the Romans 
to conceive and practice an entirely different type of freedom, similar to how it is the 
bondsman’s development in consciousness, rather than his power, that challenges the lord. That 
Epictetus challenged the Roman world is a rather radical proposition, and it may seem strange 
that Hegel entertained this idea. But one of the most revered figures in Aurelius’ Meditations is 
Epictetus.102 For a philosopher such as Hegel who revered powerful, political leaders, Aurelius’ 
attention to Epictetus might be an indication of Hegel’s goals for his own work.103 
 In this charting of the struggle of the bondsman onto the biography of Epictetus, the 
lord’s consciousness exits while the bondsman’s advances, transforming into the Stoic 
consciousness. This absence of the lord poses problems for using Hegel to analyze slavery, as 
slave-owners do not simply disappear when slaves become free. One way to read the struggle of 
the bondsman is that Hegel suggests that while the bondsman’s consciousness advances, the 
lord’s consciousness is stalled, having reached an impasse. Indeed, that is how Patterson reads 
Hegel as commenting on slave-owners, much to Patterson’s dissatisfaction. For while Patterson 
finds in Hegel a number of important ideas and descriptions on how slavery and manumission 
played a key role in the development of freedom, the sociologist frames his theory of slavery as 
breaking with Hegel’s philosophy a number of key ways.   
4. Patterson, Hegel, and Roman slavery 
 Rejecting the common definition of a slave as a human who is treated as property, in his 
book Slavery and Social Death: a Comparative Study, Patterson instead defines a slave as a 
human without honor.104 Notably, even Joseph Miller, who explicitly positions his theory of 
                                                 
102 Cf. Meditations 1.7, 7.18, 11.34, 11.37.  
103 Hegel’s reverence of Napoleon is best known from his letter to Niethammer on October 13, 1806, in which Hegel 
announces that Napoleon is the World Spirit (Hegel Briefe 1.74 = Hegel 1969: 119-121).  
104 1982: 13. Patterson is most insistent that the property definition does not work for slaves (1982: 21-27). 
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slavery in opposition to Patterson’s, refuses to return to a definition of slavery as property.105 For 
Patterson, people without honor are socially dead because honor is essential to social life.106 
Following this logic, Patterson then defines manumission as social birth or rebirth because it is 
the process through which a slave either enters or re-enters society, as after manumission the 
slave is able to become an honorable person.  
 In both his description of slavery as social death, and his description of manumission as 
social birth, Patterson turns to Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman for psychological and 
sociological insight: first, to describe the experience of slavery; second, to theorize how slavery 
shapes and constrains the essential, and life-affirming, processes of recognition within society; 
third, to describe the consequences and limitations of slavery within slave-holding societies; and 
fourth, to distinguish two types of freedom: the freedom of the freeborn versus the freedom of 
the freedperson. That is, Patterson asserts that the freedom of former slaves is qualitatively 
distinct from the freedom of slave-owners. Significantly, Patterson relies on a number of 
examples from Roman slavery to make his argument about freedom, power, and social death. 
While, like Hegel, Patterson is more concerned about Imperial Rome, nonetheless, I frame his 
work as a piece of Classical scholarship that needs to be taken as such, rather than a universal 
theory of slavery developed in isolation from the particulars of Roman history. Patterson’s 
thought therefore provides an important direction for approaching the power of Roman 
manumission.   
a. Patterson, Hegel, and social death  
 Patterson’s theory of slavery and social death is an argument original to Patterson, but he 
is open about his many debts to Hegel, both for his thoughts about slavery and also his thoughts 
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106 Patterson makes clear that he takes phrase “social death” from the anthropologists Claude Meillasoux and Michel 
Izard (1982: 38), but he provides a completely different explanation of why slavery is social death.  
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about the relationship of slavery to freedom. For Patterson, slavery and freedom are intimately 
connected because it is slavery that makes freedom possible. As a result, Patterson puts freedmen 
and freedwomen at the center of his history and philosophy of freedom. Such centering of 
freedpeople means that Patterson makes manumission fundamental to the development of 
freedom, even if manumission originated as a tactic of slave-owners to further their control over 
slaves.  
  Patterson describes slavery as social death, as that phrase motions towards how slave-
owners refuse to recognize slaves either as members of their own community or as members of 
an outside community. While Patterson frames this exclusion in terms of the loss of honor, he 
also notes that it has important intersections with Hegel’s description of recognition in the 
struggle of the bondsman.107 For Patterson, enslavement is the process of removing a person 
from the social sphere, a removal that occludes a person from the recognition that is an essential 
aspect of the accumulation and maintenance of honor. Patterson’s definition of honor is based on 
that of anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers, who argues that honor “…is a sentiment, a 
manifestation of this sentiment in conduct, and the evaluation of this conduct by others, that is to 
say, reputation. It is both internal to the individual and external to him—a matter of his feelings, 
his behavior, and the respect he receives.”108 By describing the slave as a person without honor, 
Patterson argues that communities make people slaves by refusing to acknowledge their 
honorable sentiments and the manifestations of those sentiments. For Patterson, slaves lack 
recognition of their honor.109 Significantly, recognition is precisely what both the bondsman and 
lord sought from each other at the beginning of their struggle.  
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108 1968: 505. Quoted in Patterson (1982: 79).  
109 For an example of the importance of the recognition of honor, see Patterson’s analysis of Frederick Douglass 
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 Patterson also turns to Hegel to discuss labor and the threat of death in enslavement, and 
in doing, Patterson makes clear how he reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman: as a potential 
universal theory of slavery. That is, he reads the Phenomenology as trying to articulate ideas like 
his own. Patterson uses Hegel to argue that fear, most especially the fear of death, is fundamental 
to the experience of slavery. Hegel asserts that the bondsman’s fear is integral to his experience 
of a truth that is distinct from the truth of the lord: 
For this consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd 
moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of 
death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every 
fiber of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations.110  
 
Patterson interprets this passage to argue that the slave’s experience of the fear of death makes 
his desire for freedom all the more acute: “The slave, by his social death, and by living ‘in mortal 
terror of the sovereign master’ becomes acutely conscious of both life and freedom.”111 
However, Patterson disagrees with Hegel about how the slave, despite being in mortal terror, 
achieves freedom. In Patterson’s reading, Hegel asserts that labor is the activity that frees the 
bondsman, while Patterson insists that labor has nothing to do with the slave’s pursuit of 
freedom.   
 Patterson clarifies that in his own theory of slavery as social death conflicts with Hegel’s 
struggle of the bondsman in two important ways. First, Patterson notes that, for Hegel, the act of 
laboring is the answer to the riddle of why it is the bondsman’s, rather than the lord’s, 
consciousness that advances. The sociologist agrees that this theory has explanatory power for 
the experience of workers, but he also asserts that it is wrong to apply it to slaves. Patterson notes 
that while many slaves were workers, “There is nothing in the nature of slavery which requires 
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the slave to be a worker.”112 For in Patterson’s survey of precapitalist societies, many slave-
owners owned slaves entirely for reasons of status and honor. Significantly, Patterson is defining 
labor very narrowly here. Feminist economists, such as Barker and Feiner, have since stressed 
the importance of approaching caring and nurturing work as forms of labor.113 Patterson also 
insists that the owners held the slaves solely for reasons of status and honor because these slaves 
were economic burdens.114 As a result, Patterson does not posit labor as the process that pushes 
slaves towards freedom.115 Instead, it is their lack of freedom that makes freedom meaningful.   
 The second way that Patterson reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman as diverging from 
his own thought of slavery is in the description of the owner. Hegel is quite clear that in the 
struggle of the bondsman, the consciousness of the bondsman advances in a way that the lord’s 
does not. Hegel’s silence on how the lord’s consciousness progresses, while he details precisely 
how the bondsman’s consciousness advances, prompts many readers, Patterson included, to 
conclude that the lord as having reached some sort of impasse.116 For Patterson, the idea that 
slave-owners are developmentally stalled does not adequately describe either the continuity of 
slave-ownership or the thriving lives that slave-owners had within slave-owning societies, 
including ancient Rome.117 Indeed, Patterson advances Pliny the Elder as one of the most self-
aware slave-owners of all human history because of his honesty about how thoroughly Romans 
relied on slaves for physical, intellectual, and caring labor.118 For Pliny writes,  
alienis pedibus ambulamus, alienis oculis agnoscimus, aliena memoria salutamus,   
aliena et vivimus opera, perieruntque rerum naturae pretia et vitae argumenta. nihil aliud pro 
nostro habemus quam delicias. 
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115 Cf. Butler (1997: 39). 
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We use other people’s feet when we go out, we use other people’s eyes to recognize things, we 
use another person’s memory to greet people, we use someone else’s help to stay alive – the 
only thing we keep for ourselves are our pleasures.119  
Pliny, Naturalis Historia, 29.8 = 29.19, trans. Weidemann. 
 
While slave-owners were parasites who required slaves for their own lives, in Patterson’s 
reading, Pliny’s comment demonstrates that this parasitism does not necessarily inhibit their 
personal growth or even their ability to reflect.120 Rather, this parasitism simply requires slave-
owners to confront their own dependencies in order to be honest with themselves. However, in 
arguing that this quote represents Pliny’s thoughts on slaves, Patterson ignores the quote’s larger 
context, which makes clear that Pliny is specifically castigating those Romans who do not learn 
medicine, thereby making themselves reliant on Greek doctors. Patterson’s source for this quote 
is Thomas Wiedemann, who includes it in his sourcebook on Greek and Roman slavery. 
Wiedemann’s justification for this inclusion is that Pliny is attacking Greek doctors who are 
themselves slaves.121 Unfortunately, Patterson does not admit to the medical context in which 
Pliny lays out his invective. As a result, Patterson does not present this quote as opprobrium of 
the medically ignorant, but rather as a self-aware confession of the parasitic nature of Roman 
slave-ownership.122 Patterson places this quote at the end of Slavery and Social Death, where he 
argues that slavery is a type of parasitism.123 The self-aware aspect of the confession is important 
for Patterson’s distinguishing himself from Hegel, as Patterson uses this self-awareness as 
evidence that slave-owners are not permanently stymied. For Patterson, contra to Hegel, slave-
                                                 
119 Quoted in Patterson with an incorrect citation to the location of the passage in Pliny (1982: 339).  
120 “…Pliny the Elder, who in one of his few inspired moments made himself unique among the slaveholders of all 
time by laying bare the parasitic nature of the relation between slaveholders and slaves…” (1982: 339). 
121 Patterson on Wiedemann as a source (1982: 339 n.11). Wiedemann (1986: 68).  
122 Pliny just prior to this quote: “medicoque tantum hominem occidisse inpunitas summa est…merito, dum nemini 
nostrum libet scire, quid saluti saue opus sit.” 29.8 = 29.18-19. Cf. How Clark reads this quote in the context of 
Patterson (2013: 137).  
123 1982: 336-342. 
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owners are capable of advancing developmentally to a point in which they can accurately reflect 
on their situation.   
 Patterson allows that slave-owners are capable of honest reflection, but he does not 
expect them to be consistently honest about their motives, as his analysis of Roman law makes 
clear. Patterson makes a powerful argument about the fundamental importance of Roman law to 
our modern conception of slavery as a form of ownership, in which the owner has absolute 
dominion over the slave. That is, just as how Hegel constructs his universal idea of the struggle 
of the bondsman out of the particulars of Roman history, so too does Patterson construct his 
universal theory of slavery out of the particulars of Roman law. Patterson begins with the 
assertion that relying on property as the primary definition of slavery is insufficient because 
within legal thought any persons can become property, but this property status does not entail the 
absolute dominion that is associated with slavery. Patterson notes that there is no inherent 
necessity that a society would need to define property as the object of one’s complete dominion. 
Indeed, as Patterson points out, the Greeks themselves never did: among the Athenians, notions 
of property were always connected to notions of proper use.124 Patterson speculates that the 
differences between Greek and Roman slavery, such as the as the Romans’ dependence on slaves 
for agricultural production, combined with the Romans’ inclusiveness created a need for an 
absolute distinction between slaves and other peoples unmatched in the Greek world. Patterson 
then frames the results of the Romans’ solution to this problem: 
…the Romans invented the legal fiction of dominium or absolute ownership, a fiction that 
highlights their practical genius. It is not as jurists that we should applaud the Romans, but as 
applied sociologists. Let us see how dominion worked. First, by emphasizing the categories of 
persona (owner) and res (thing) and by rigidly distinguishing between corporeal and 
incorporeal things, the Romans created a new legal paradigm in which there could be no room 
for ambiguity in deciding what was and what was not the object of property…. If it is difficult 
                                                 
124 Patterson on Greek law (1982: 28-30). For Athenian law and property, see MacDowell (1978: 133-54) and Maffi 
(2005). Edward Harris, in part to cover up how differently the Athenians treated property than the Romans, 
advances the idea that all human conceptions of property are fundamentally compatible (2006: 188).   
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to explain why the Romans would want to invent the idea of a relation between a person and a 
thing (an almost metaphysical notion, quite at variance with the Roman way of thinking in 
other areas), it becomes impossible to comprehend why they should want inner psychic power 
over it unless we understand that, for most purposes, the “thing” on their minds was a slave.125 
 
To further clarify: Patterson is arguing that it was Roman slavery that shaped the Romans’ legal 
ideas of property ownership, not the reverse. Patterson advances the radical centrality of slavery 
to Roman property while also asserting that Romans were quite aware that they needed this legal 
authority for their slaves and their slaves alone.126 In other words, Patterson does not see Roman 
slave-owners as acting misguidedly because of some impasse; rather, they understand their needs 
as slave-owners and act to meet these needs, while refusing to acknowledge the extent to which 
their role as slave-owners shaped their motives.  
But while Patterson does not see slave-owners as facing an existential impasse, he does 
believe that slave-owners and former slaves had a fundamentally different experience of 
freedom. Patterson quotes Hegel in order to justify his own argument that freedom is birthed in 
the experience of slavery itself:  
The slave, by his social death, and by living in “in mortal terror of his sovereign master” 
becomes acutely conscious of both life and freedom. The idea of freedom is born, not in the 
consciousness of the master, but in the reality of the slave’s condition. Freedom can mean 
nothing positive to the master; only control is meaningful.127 
 
Patterson uses Hegel in order to define freedom as the bondman’s experience, rather than the 
lord’s. For while Patterson rejects the notion that the slave-owner is developmentally stymied by 
the practice of slave-owning, he nonetheless asserts that the slave-owner does not experience a 
desire for freedom. Instead, the slave-owner experiences control and a sense of honor. The slave, 
in contrast, first experiences freedom through its absence. The slave’s acute experience of the 
loss of freedom clarifies his or her desire for it, as well as clarifies the importance of freedom for 
                                                 
125 1982: 31.  
126 “I am inclined to think that the Romans knew exactly what they were doing when they developed the doctrine of 
dominium; they were too legally clever not to have been aware of it.” (1982: 30).  
127 1982: 98. Patterson quotes §194 of the Phenomenology from Baillie’s translation (1910: 237).  
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all other people.128 For this reason, Patterson argues that the experience of slavery precedes the 
experience of freedom:  
Before slavery people simply could not have conceived of the thing we call freedom. Men and 
women in premodern, nonslaveholding societies did not, could not value the removal of 
restraint as an ideal…. Slaves were the first persons to find themselves in a situation where it 
was vital to refer to what they wanted in this way. And slaveholders, quick to recognize this 
new value, were the first class of parasitic oppressors to exploit it.129 
 
Patterson is emphatic that this conclusion of the importance of slavery to freedom results from a 
Hegelian methodology, and so he describes his method as dialectical.130 Unsurprisingly, 
Patterson’s thoughts on manumission are, similarly, informed by Hegel. However, Patterson also 
turns to the work of anthropologist Marcel Mauss to explain what he calls “the meaning of 
manumission.”131  
b. Patterson, Hegel, and manumission 
 In examining the practice of manumission in slave-owning societies throughout world 
history, Patterson makes use of different societies’ thought to examine what he calls “the 
conception of manumission” as well as the motions and words that constitute the ritual of 
manumission. Both investigations are necessary to articulate what he labels “the meaning of 
manumission,” which he frames through the theories of gift exchange from Mauss, but also 
Mauss’ anthropological successors Raymond Firth and Marshall Sahlins. Nonetheless, 
Patterson’s description of manumission has a decidedly Hegelian twist because, unlike other gift 
exchanges, manumission includes the development of a new kind of freedom. 
 Patterson’s first investigation into manumission, the “conceptual problem,” begins with 
Roman law. In Roman law, Patterson finds the clearest answer to the question of why 
                                                 
128 Patterson also argues that the slave first experiences dignity through its loss (1982: 100).   
129 1982: 340.  
130 “An empirical exploration of this unique dimension of the dialectic of power in the master-slave relationship will 
be one of the major tasks of this work.” (1982: 2). Patterson contrasts the dialectical to the mechanical (1982: 314).  
131 1982: 210.  
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manumission cannot be a transaction of buying and selling, what lawyers name conveyance. 
Patterson notes that Roman slave-owners allowed their slaves to own property and money, 
ownership which they called peculium.132 Slaves used this peculium to purchase their freedom 
from their owners. Nonetheless, the slave was not the true owner of the peculium because the 
owner was entitled to all money raised by the slave, whether by the slave’s labor, credit, or good 
fortune.133 Manumission, therefore, cannot be a conveyance, as slaves do not truly own the 
money with which they pay for their freedom.134 Furthermore, there is an additional problem in 
framing the slave-owner as the seller of the slave’s freedom: in conveyance, there is a buyer, a 
seller and a thing conveyed between the two.135 To describe manumission as conveyance is to 
insist that in this relationship, the seller and the thing are the same. Patterson rejects as 
incoherent this explanation of manumission as conveyance. He then turns to the motions and 
instruments that made up the practice manumission in order to investigate manumission as a 
ritual of redemption.136   
 In examining the rituals that make up manumission, Patterson again turns to Roman law, 
this time to contrast the Romans’ practice of postliminum with the manumission practices of the 
Mbanza Manteke of central Africa. Postliminum was a legal recourse available to captured 
Romans to ensure they could regain their citizenship and property.137 Patterson takes 
postliminum as an example of how Romans refused to conceive of enslavement as a permanent 
status, but rather as status that was the result of vicissitude.138 Patterson juxtaposes this Roman 
conception with how the Mbanza Manteke insisted on the permanence of enslavement. The 
                                                 
132 1982: 210.  
133 Cf. Buckland (1970: 187-206). 
134 1982: 211. Patterson attributes his argument in this regard to Buckland (1982: 211).   
135 1982: 210-11.   
136 “Rituals of redemption” (1982: 214).  
137 The best overview of postliminum, including the problems of understanding its development within Roman 
Republican history, is Leigh (2004: 60-77).  
138 1982: 215. Cf. Mouritsen (2011a: see 14-25 and passim). 
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Mbanza Manteke also accept the return of people whom others had captured and enslaved. But, 
unlike the Romans, the Mbanza Manteke received these captives as slaves into their own 
societies, as emphasized by the chalk that they marked on their bodies during the moment of the 
exchange.139 In other words, while the Roman captives come home free, the Mbanza Manteke 
captives come home as slaves. Patterson then reads the motions and materials that made up the 
return of the chalked captives as an example of a gift exchange: the slave is a gift from the 
outside community to the Mbanza Manteke.  
 In contrast, while manumission is similar to this exchange of hostages among the Mbanza 
Manteke, Patterson notes how manumission differs fundamentally in that it involves the creation 
of a freedperson. That is, for Patterson, gift exchange cannot explain how prior to manumission 
beginning there is a slave, while after manumission has ended there is a freedperson. 
Nonetheless, Patterson is drawn to the model of gift exchange because he wants to highlight how 
slaves frequently gave their owners a sum of money for their freedom.140 Indeed, this aspect of 
manumission is important to the study of Roman manumission because payment for 
manumission was so standard in Rome that the jurists developed sophisticated legal explanations 
of how this exchange functioned.141 But because Patterson notes that the owner already owned 
this money, he asserts that the gift exchange that is most similar to manumission is the gift 
exchange between humans and the gods. For just as the gods are already entitled to all that 
humans give them, so too are slave-owners already entitled to all that slaves give them.142 For 
this reason, Patterson describes manumission as an asymmetrical gift exchange, a phrase that 
connects to his description of manumission as social rebirth. 
                                                 
139 1982: 215. 
140 1982: 214.  
141 Cf. Buckland (1970: 187ff.).  
142 1982: 213-4.  
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 Manumission is an asymmetrical gift exchange for Patterson because enslavement was an 
asymmetrical exchange. Patterson describes enslavement itself as a form of debt, the debt that 
the slave owes to the slave-owner. Patterson argues that the justification of slavery is that the 
owner has either directly or indirectly given the slave physical life. Notably, this is an idea that 
the Romans themselves articulated, as the jurists used this explanation to articulate why slavery 
is justified, even though under natural law no one is born a slave.143 The owner gives the slave 
physical life in exchange for the slave’s obedience; that is, the obedience is a proxy for the 
slave’s entire life, which is owed to the slave-owner. This exchange strips the slave of honor, 
making the slave socially dead. For Patterson, the functioning of this process becomes only more 
evident when juxtaposed with the gift of manumission.  
Enslavement was separation (or symbolic execution), slavery was a liminal state of social 
death, and manumission was symbolic rebirth…. The master gives the slave physical life either 
directly (if he was the original enslaver) or indirectly (if he purchased or inherited him), in 
return for which the slave is under obligation to reciprocate with total obedience and service. 
In the act of repaying his debt, the slave loses social life. This loss, however, is not part of the 
repayment to the master; it is rather one of the terms of the transaction – the exchange of 
physical life for total obedience. With manumission the master makes another gift to the slave, 
this time the gift of social life, which is ideologically interpreted as a repayment for faithful 
service.144 
 
In this passage, Patterson notes that it is the owner who gives the slave two gifts that are beyond 
the slave’s ability to repay in full. The first gift is the gift of physical life. The owner, whether 
directly or indirectly, chooses to spare the slave, rather than kill the slave. The slave, therefore, 
owes the owner his or her very life.145 The second gift is the gift of manumission. While the 
slave may pay for manumission, Patterson here notes that manumission remains a gift because 
just as a slave’s physical life is irreplaceable, so too is a slave’s social life. Specifically, the 
slave’s physical and social lives are irreplaceable because they are necessary for the slave to 
                                                 
143 Digest 1.5.3. For more on this passage, see Buckland (1970: 1-9) and Mouritsen (2011a: 10).  
144 1982: 293-4.  
145 This formation of enslaved life as a gift has many similarities to clemency, cf. Dowling (2006: 16-8).  
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accumulate, discharge, and manage past and future debts. Therefore, manumission is not simply 
an act of exchange, but an act of creation and birth: the slave is created as freedperson and 
birthed into social life. Patterson binds this creative aspect of manumission to his ideas on the 
development of freedom, ideas that are intimately intertwined with his reading of Hegel.  
 Patterson further describes manumission as the slave’s “negation of the negation,” a 
Hegelian term that emphasizes the novelty and distinction of the former slave’s freedom. That is, 
as I discussed in Section 4a above, Patterson is emphatic that freedpeople and slave-owners have 
qualitatively distinct experiences of freedom because it is the slave who first experiences 
freedom by experiencing the lack of freedom in slavery: 
As enslavement is life-taking, it follows logically and symbolically that the release from 
slavery is life-giving and life-creating. The master gives, and in giving he creates. It must 
always be the case that the master give up something, so that the slave may gain something 
else. The master would seem to gain nothing. Hence he incurs a loss. What results from this 
deliberate loss is a double negation: the negation of the negation of social life, resulting in a 
new creation—the new man, the freed man.146  
 
The term “negation of the negation” explains the qualitatively distinct experience of the former 
slave’s freedom, for just as slavery is the negation of the slave’s freedom, so then the 
freedperson’s freedom is the negation of slavery, which is to say the negation of the negation of 
freedom. Notably, Hegel himself does not use this term to describe the struggle of the bondsman. 
Patterson instead uses this term from Hegel’s Science of Logic to supplement his reading of 
Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman; to emphasize that while manumission creates freedom, it is a 
new type of freedom.147  
 Patterson turns again to Roman slavery to ground his idea of manumission as the creation 
of a new type of freedom, that is to say, a form of social birth. Specifically, he notes that the 
                                                 
146 1982: 211.  
147 Hegel describes the negation of the negation in Science of Logic (§21.113-4 = 2010: 98-99).  
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Roman legal scholar W.W. Buckland describes Roman manumission as the creation of a civis.148 
The Romans were unusual in human history in this liberality of citizenship; most human 
societies did not equate manumission with entry into the citizenry. Nonetheless, Patterson finds 
in this unusual aspect of Roman manumission an indication of how manumission functions in a 
universal sense. That is, Patterson takes this unusual particularlity of Roman history as reflecting 
a key aspect of manumission universally, which is that manumission is a form of rebirth.149 
Because not all societies allowed former slaves to become citizens, manumission, instead, is the 
social rebirth of a slave. This rebirth distinguishes the freedom of the freedperson from the 
freedom of the slave-owner: for the freedom of the former slave is a freedom marked by the 
experience of lack of freedom or, more specifically, social death. 
 But does social death distinguish slaves from other people, or does the term highlight the 
pains and struggles that are part of slavery, pains and struggles that are not unique to slavery? 
Other sociologists have used Patterson’s term to describe the conditions of people other than 
slaves. For example, Joshua Price uses this term to analyze the lives of prisoners in the US, while 
Lisa Marie Cacho uses it to explore the intersection of racism and the American criminal system 
more broadly.150 Furthermore, as I demonstrate in the next section, Butler goes a step further and 
uses Patterson’s terminology as part of her discussion of subjects, subjection, and subject 
formation. Butler also deploys another term, unlivable life, which she develops in conversation 
with Patterson’s thought on social death. I argue that Butler’s work on the unlivable life is an apt 
                                                 
148 1982: 211. 
149 “Furthermore, while the thing created might have been a civis in the special case of Rome, this was not the case 
in most slaveholding socieities, so the special half of his [Buckland’s] solution is of little value to someone 
concerned with slavery in comparative terms. The matter of what has been created remains unresolved.” (1982: 
211).  
150 Price 2015. Cacho 2012. 
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description of the lives of Roman slaves and is one that elucidates the importance of Roman 
manumission.   
5. Butler, Hegel, the unlivable life, and Roman slavery 
 Like Patterson, Butler is a close reader of Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman. Unlike 
Patterson, Butler joins the struggle of the bondsman to Hegel’s description of the unhappy 
consciousness. Butler does so because while she sees the passage from bondsman to unhappy 
consciousness as having important contributions to the discussion of freedom and power, she is 
concerned that those who read the struggle of the bondsman in isolation from the rest of the 
Phenomenology risk missing how the unhappy consciousness is a continuation of the lord’s 
dominance over the bondsman. Butler provides a persuasive reading of the struggle of the 
bondsman in which after the struggle, the bondsman does not face the opprobrium of an external, 
physical lord, but does face the scorn of an internalized, psychic lord.  
 Butler puts her reading of Hegel in conversation with Foucault’s description of power, in 
part to posit possible solutions to Foucault’s disregard for psychic interiority. Furthermore, 
Foucault’s thoughts on power are very useful for describing the dynamics of a complex practice 
such as manumission, especially when combined with the vocabulary of Bourdieu. Foucault 
himself advocates a pragmatic, rather than systematic, approach to the adoption of various 
thinkers, thereby making his own work suitable for combining with Hegel. By combining 
Foucault’s thoughts on power with ideas from Hegel and Patterson, Butler provides an ethical 
way of thinking about Roman manumission that is sensitive to the numerous social forces at play 
in manumission, including slaves’ own participation. For while the state, slave-owners and 
freeborn Romans all participated and had stakes in a slave’s manumission, so too did slaves 
themselves. The difference was that the slaves’ stake in manumission was their freedom and 
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their participation was their very lives. Just as Patterson’s description of slavery as social death 
has powerful ethical dimensions, I similarly use Butler’s phrase “unlivable life” in part because it 
flags the injustice and moral harm of slavery that continues after a slave’s manumission.  
a. Butler, Hegel, and power 
 Butler rereads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman in part to emphasize the importance of 
bodies, a move that is directly connected to Foucault’s insistence on the corporeal nature of 
power. Foucault looked at how power functioned in institutions such as psychiatric asylums and 
prisons, rather than explicitly political institutions such as governments, making his thought 
useful for articulating how power functioned in practices that are not often thought of as 
political, such as manumission.151 Foucault’s thoughts on power are integral to my own 
discussion of the power of manumission, as well as my reading of Butler’s description of power. 
Butler reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman as a way to highlight the trajectories, and turns, of 
power that flow through the body and the psyche. In doing so, like my Romanizing reading in 
Section 3b above, Butler reads the struggle of the bondsman as a part of a longer narrative that 
includes Hegel’s description of Stoicism and the unhappy consciousness.  
 Foucault articulates four aspects of power that connect to the functioning of Roman 
manumission. First, Foucault asserts that power operates upon the field of the body; power is 
always localized. In other words, to appeal to a grand description such as ‘Rome has power over 
Greece’ is insufficient for describing how power operated when the Romans manumitted Greek 
slaves. Rather, an analysis of Roman manumission must take into consideration how the very 
bodies of slaves and slave-owners were positioned and moved. Second, there is an intimate 
relationship between knowledge and power. As a result, in the study of humans, the aims of 
                                                 
151 Foucault on asylums: 1973. Foucault on prisons: 1995.  
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knowledge can never be disentangled from the aims of power.152 For Foucault, just as knowledge 
is a tool of power, so too is power a tool of knowledge.153 This aspect of power undergirds how I 
approach the legacy of slaves, as the study of ancient slavery interacts with the current practices 
of slavery in this contemporary, post-abolitionist world, as well as interacting with forms of 
oppression that are direct descendants of Atlantic slavery. Third, Foucault argues that all human 
power exists only in relationship; indeed, Foucault goes so far to state that such power is 
essential to constituting us as humans.154 Fourth, because of this relational aspect of power, 
power is never completely hierarchical or unilateral. Rather, because power does not reside with 
a single person, any instance of domination is simultaneously a “conduit from below.”155 These 
last two aspects of power are essential to understanding how manumission was a practice that 
demanded the participation of slaves in order to generate the power to free them.   
 But I cannot use Foucault’s thoughts on power uncritically, or even in a manner 
completely faithful to Foucault’s arguments, as he insists that some of these aspects of power are 
specific to modernity, and he explicitly contrasts this functioning of power to how power 
functioned in the past.156 At the beginning of Discipline and Punish, he reads the difference 
between “public execution and the time table” as a difference between two distinct time periods. 
He posits that in monarchical France, and presumably in earlier time periods as well, power was 
spectacularly enacted on the body, unlike in the nineteenth century and later, in which power was 
constitutive of subjectivity. Because Foucault himself advocated a thoroughly pragmatic 
approach to thinkers, going so far as to say the best way to pay tribute to an author’s thought is to 
                                                 
152 While Francis Bacon writes “sapienta est potentia,” he does not assert ontological similarity between power and 
knowledge but rather that knowledge is a tool of power. Gutting contrasts Foucault and Bacon (2014).  
153 Foucault (1984). 
154 1980: 93. 
155 Foucault (1980: 199-201). In contrast, in the formulations of power such as Weber and Dahl, power can reside in 
a single person (Weber 1978: 53, Dahl 1957: 202-3, cf. Gutting 2014). 
156 1995: 7. For more this issue of using Foucault’s thought, see Chapter 2 Section 2a.  
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“use it, deform it, to make it groan and protest,” using Foucault’s thoughts on power for a study 
of antiquity seems fitting.157 In doing so, I am in good company, as Butler also makes Foucault 
groan.  
 Butler’s description of Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman is both pre-political and 
political, thereby complimenting the corporeal discussion of power that she takes from Foucault. 
Butler’s reading of Hegel is pre-political in the sense that she uses the conflict between the lord 
and bondsman in order to explain why an unequal distribution of power and socially 
differentiated consciousnesses precede the genesis of political relationships.158 The pre-political 
nature of Butler’s reading comes through in her description of Hegel’s Phenomenology as a 
“…reflection upon the very possibility of beginning, and a gesture towards a conception of 
infinity which is without beginning or end….”159 At the same time, her reading of the struggle of 
the bondsman is political, as she uses it to demonstrate how Hegel, like Foucault, shows that 
“[The] limits to liberation are to be understood not merely as self-imposed but, more 
fundamentally, as the precondition of the subject’s very formation.”160 For Butler, both Hegel 
and Foucault are highlighting how the conflict between the body and the psyche is a dynamic 
bound up with the production of subjects, who have the coherence to manipulate power on their 
own.  
 This reading of the struggle of the bondsman, therefore, dovetails with her reading of 
Foucault’s description of power as intimately involved the formation of subjects. Specifically, 
Butler turns to Foucault to discuss the third and fourth aspects of power that I highlighted above, 
how power is relational and constitutive.  
                                                 
157 1980: 53-4.  
158 See also (2016: 32). 
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We are used to thinking of power as what presses on the subject from the outside, as what 
subordinates, sets underneath, and relegates to a lower order. But if, following Foucault, we 
understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing the very condition of its 
existence and the trajectory of its desire, then power is not simply what we oppose but also, in 
a strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbor and preserve in the 
beings that we are.161 
 
One of Butler’s goals in The Psychic Life of Power is to demonstrate how Hegel’s 
Phenomenology anticipates Foucault’s description of power as providing the venue for “the 
inhabitation of the body.”162 Butler is aware of how Hegel and Foucault’s thoughts conflict with 
each other in fundamental ways, but she nonetheless deploys the two thinkers together.163 This 
pairing allows her to write the body back into Hegel’s text as well as posit the unhappy 
consciousness as a bondsman who has internalized the directives of the lord. 
 The Phenomenology includes the following sequence in section B, Self-Consciousness: 
the struggle of the bondsman, Stoicism, Skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness.164 While it 
is dangerous to assume that the entire Phenomenology is best read as a narrative progression, that 
hermeneutical technique is valuable for combining the two sequential subsections Independence 
and dependence of self-consciousness: Mastery and bondage and Freedom of self-consciousness: 
Stoicism, Skepticism and the unhappy consciousness.165 Furthermore, in his description of the 
development of Stoicism, Hegel alludes to his earlier passages on the lord and bondsman, 
demonstrating the progressive connection between the struggle of the bondsman and Stoicism, 
implying that the consciousness of the bondsman is the consciousness that transforms into the 
consciousness that is Stoicism. For Hegel writes, “Stoicism is the freedom which always comes 
                                                 
161 1997: 2. 
162 1997: 33. Butler’s project also maps out similarities of Hegel’s Phenomenology to Nietzsche and Freud, topics 
that are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
163 Cf. 1997: 59-60. 
164 “Selbstbewußtsein.” 
165 “Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewußsteins; Herrschaft und Knechtschaft” and “Freiheit des 
Selbstbewußtseins; Stoizismus, Skeptizismus und das unglückliche Bewußstein.” For more on these titles, see 
Section 2b above.  
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directly out of bondage and returns to the pure universality of thought.”166 That is, Stoicism is a 
consciousness that values thinking about abstractions, rather than engaging in the particularities 
that constitute the world.167 The history of bondage undergirds Hegel’s description of Stoicism; 
the history of bondage frames his thinking about abstraction as a strategy for avoiding the pains 
that accompanies living in the world, and all of its particularities.  
 This commitment to abstraction ultimately leads to the change from Stoicism to 
Skepticism, as the consciousness’ desire to remain at the level of abstraction draws it to practice 
contrarianism: the destruction of all claims about the real.168 Such contrarianism initially allows 
the consciousness to remain in abstraction, but at the cost of disowning Stoicism. For the 
constant contrarianism evokes a change in desire. While Stoicism valued abstraction as a form of 
freedom, Skepticism finds pleasure in contradicting all claims about reality.169 This pleasure is 
not sustainable, as altercations with other consciousnesses forces Skepticism to examine the 
contradictions within its own arguments.170 This self-reflection marks the change to the unhappy 
consciousness, as the unhappy consciousness is a “single consciousness, [but] must ever have 
present in the one consciousness the other also; and thus it is driven out of each in turn in the 
very moment when it imagines it has successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the other.”171 
 Butler notes that while Hegel does not reflect on bodies as “sites of experience,” 
nonetheless bodies play an important role in the Phenomenology, as the lord and bondsman are 
positioned in opposition to each through their bodies.172 This concern about Hegelian bodies 
connects to her interest in Foucault’s invitation to consider the “soul as the prison of the 
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body.”173 Hegel describes the unhappy consciousness as a single consciousness that has another 
consciousness present in it, a division resulting from the altercation of Skepticism. For Butler, 
this division allows the unhappy consciousness to “take itself as its own object of scorn.”174 In an 
attempt to avoid this scorn, the unhappy consciousness devotes its own body to the service of 
unchangeable thought.175 While this scorn is connected to other distinctions of the unhappy 
consciousness from Skepticism and Stoicism, the important result is that the unhappy 
consciousness is in a psychic conflict. This conflict similar to the struggle between the bondsman 
and the lord, but it is contained within a single body.  
Every effort to reduce itself to inaction or to nothing, to subordinate or mortify its own body, 
culminates inadvertently in the production of self-consciousness as a pleasure-seeking and 
self-aggrandizing agent. Every effort to overcome the body, pleasure, and agency proves to be 
nothing other than the assertion of precisely those features of the subject.176 
 
As in her pre-political and political reading of the struggle of the bondsman, Butler articulates 
this containment as part of power’s production of the subject. 
 Butler’s reading dovetails with my Romanized reading, as both use Hegel’s description 
of the unhappy consciousness to elaborate the context and meaning of the earlier struggle of the 
bondsman. First, Butler does draw attention to the many Christian themes in Hegel’s unhappy 
consciousness, such as devotion, self-sacrifice, and the figure of the priest.177 In doing so, this 
most unhistorical of writers makes the unhappy consciousness historically specific, as she 
implicitly casts the unhappy consciousness as interacting with Rome by calling out these 
Christian themes as well as evoking the ancient schools of Stoicism and Skepticism.178 Second, 
                                                 
173 Quote from Foucault (1995: 30). Cf. Butler (1997: 32-33).  
174 1997: 46.  
175 The unchangeable (unwandelbar): §208-212. Cf. Butler (1997: 48-50). 
176 1997: 53.  
177 Butler is not the first to make such connections; Kaufmann makes clear that since Lasson’s commentary on the 
Phenomenology, the readers have noticed and built upon the Christian themes (1965: 140ff).  
178 “I believe that the Lacanian group that writes in Žižekian vein is the only group of scholars who have called me a 
historicist, and I am delighted by the improbability of this appellation.” (2000b: 136). 
Chapter 1: Theorizing manumission 
 55 
in Butler’s interpretation of the development of the bondsman, his freedom is hard-won, but still 
limited, as he internalizes the subordination and mortification that he had endured under the lord, 
and repeats such subordination on himself, as the unhappy consciousness devotes its body to the 
service of unchangeable thought. Butler’s emphasis on internalization for the unhappy 
consciousness adds an important psychological nuance to my reading Roman manumission 
through the struggle of the bondsman. That is, Butler’s argument about the internalization in the 
unhappy consciousness corresponds to how Roman slaves needed to internalize Roman values, 
and practices, to first become worthy of manumission and then survive as freedmen and 
freedwomen. To reread the example of Epictetus through the unhappy consciousness, his 
philosophy of Stoicism becomes not simply a response to his enslavement, but also a way for 
him to work through the masterly demands that were once external, but are now internal. In such 
a reading, while manumission remains the casting off of metal chains, it is simultaneously the 
beginning of a struggle with psychic chains.  
 To review: while Patterson reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman in order to articulate 
how slavery and manumission create a new kind of freedom, Butler’s emphasis on the unhappy 
consciousness makes the bondsman’s struggle with the lord a story of continuity, rather than 
rupture. This continuity is important to Butler, in part because she wants to use the struggle of 
the bondsman to describe the formation of subjects throughout human history, in contrast to 
Patterson, who turns to the struggle of the bondsman to argue why it is was slaves who first 
experienced freedom. Of course, the proper Hegelian response to this dilemma is to attempt to 
synthesize these two approaches, to assert that manumission was fundamental to the 
development of freedom and to assert that the freedom of manumitted slaves included psychic 
struggles.  
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b. Butler, the unlivable life, and Roman slavery 
 Livability and its opposite, unlivability, lie at the intersection of three different poles in 
Butler’s thought: grief, gender, and intelligibility, a term closely related to recognition. There is 
in Butler’s description of livability and unlivability a vocabulary suitable for illuminating what 
was at stake in Roman manumission for slaves, slave-owners, the state, and freeborn Romans. 
Rather than use Butler’s vocabulary to judge the moral worth of Roman manumission, I instead 
turn to it to outline how manumission was part of slaves’ strategies for living amid the interests 
of disparate groups who had different interests in manumission. Roman slavery made life 
unlivable for slaves, and manumission was the transition to a livable life. 
 Butler’s connection of grief to livability is perhaps best apparent in her analysis of 
Sophocles’ Antigone. In her reading, Antigone is “…not to have a life to live, to be condemned 
to death prior to any possibility of life.”179 Butler connects Antigone’s foreclosed life to her 
ungrievable grief for Polynices, but also writes that Antigone is not alone in having ungrievable 
grief, that it is common to the condemned:  
Antigone refuses to obey any law that refuses public recognition of her loss, and in this way 
prefigures the situation that those with publicly ungrievable losses—from AIDS, for 
instance—know too well. To what sort of living death have they been condemned?180 
 
The implication is that in order to live a livable life, one must be able to mourn and to grieve, and 
the prohibitions against grief are trespasses against one’s full flourishing. Bonnie Honig objects 
to Butler’s connection of grief to livability, suggesting that Butler is creating new criteria for a 
moralizing humanism, specifically, a humanism defined primarily through the need to grieve.181 
I instead read Butler as an ethical tactician; that is, she does not hold out a definitive telos for 
ethical action. Instead, she evaluates the kinds of ethics that are possible in a given terrain. Her 
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tools livability and unlivability are suitable for the ethical terrain of Roman manumission, just as 
they are suitable for charting the terrain of gender.  
 In the preface to the 1999 edition of Gender Trouble, Butler not only reflects on the style 
of her writing, but also breaks from her own impersonal style to comment on the role of gender 
in her own childhood and adolescence.182 She reviews how the assumption that gender was either 
natural, or a cultural constant, was the justification for a violent policing within her family. This 
violence is the background for her description of her experience of foreclosed life, “I also came 
to understand something of the violence of the foreclosed life, the one that does get named as 
‘living,’ the one whose incarceration implies a suspension of life, or a sustained death 
sentence.”183 Butler then alludes to this part of her life when she clarifies that her current 
research includes asking how gender determines what is livable:  
What continues to concern me most is the following kinds of questions: what will and will not 
constitute an intelligible life, and how do presumptions about normative gender and sexuality 
determine in advance what will qualify as the “human” and the “livable”?184 
 
Butler is of course most famous for her examination of gender and performativity, and so any 
analysis of her questioning how gender determines livability needs to be read in this light.185 By 
examining gender through the lens of performance, Butler rejects the easy notion that gender is 
something added to a preexisting human; instead she insists that we approach gender as 
contingent upon, and participating in, others’ recognition in a way that includes the very 
production of our bodies.  
 The importance of recognition in Butler’s thought is apparent in the above quote on 
intelligibility. For Butler, intelligibility is an attribute necessary for humans to participate in 
recognition, a recognition that is, in turn, necessary for a livable life. The quote above also 
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indicates that intelligibility is closely connected to issues of gender. However, in her work on 
other topics, such as war, Butler describes recognition as necessary for aspects of life distinct 
from gender:  
But here I am wondering whether there is not also a differential way of regarding populations, 
such that some are considered from the start very much alive and others more questionably 
alive, perhaps even socially dead (the term that Orlando Patterson developed to describe the 
status of the slave), or as living figures of the threat to life…war seeks to deny the ongoing and 
irrefutable ways in which we are all subject to one another, vulnerable to destruction by the 
other, and in need of protection through multilateral and global agreements based on the 
recognition of a shared precariousness.186 
 
Notably, Butler uses recognition in this passage after beginning with a review of Patterson’s 
description of social death and asking how this term might illuminate the conception and 
treatment of populations other than slaves, specifically populations who are considered threats to 
life, rather than recognized as fellow precarious humans.  
 Butler explicitly, and implicitly, refers to Patterson’s term “social death” throughout her 
work, refusing to deploy the term uncritically, but attracted to how it succinctly evokes a 
subject’s dependence on inclusion, as well as the harsh penalties of exclusion. For Butler, the 
term is simply too inviting to be used only as a description of slavery. In Antigone’s Claim, after 
she summarizes how Patterson uses social death to describe slavery, Butler then pivots and opens 
up the term to people other than slaves.  
… [Patterson] offers us the important concept of “social death” to describe this aspect of 
slavery in which slaves are treated as dying within life.  
 “Social death” is the term Patterson gives to the status of being a living being radically 
deprived of all rights that are supposed to be accorded to any and all living human beings. 
What remains uninterrogated in his view, and that I believe resurfaces in his contemporary 
views on family politics, is precisely his objection to slave men being deprived by slavery of 
an ostensibly “natural” patriarchal position within the family.187 
 
Butler is aware that by opening up this term to non-slaves, she re-asks the question of what it is 
that slaves miss through their enslavement. Nonetheless, she does not seek to establish a 
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definitive list of human activities, relationships, or experiences that slavery denies slaves, 
although her work on the connection of grievability to livability suggests that at the very least 
slavery denies slaves the healing power of grief and also the dignity of being grieved. Given 
Butler’s cautions against assigning transcendent value to certain relationships, it is unprofitable 
to assume that Butler seeks to correct Patterson’s views about slaves and fathers by offering a 
different list of what social death denies.188  
 But significantly for the study of Roman slavery, Butler charts new territory for 
examining how social death is constructed and maintained, a process that I see as connected to 
her interpretation of Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman, which is to say, connected to her 
thoughts on the formation of subjects. In The Psychic Life of Power, there is an allusion to 
Patterson’s social death in Butler’s phrase the “socially dead,” which refers to those whose 
deaths are not so much ignored, as they are celebrated as a form of triumph.   
Can we read the workings of social power precisely in the delimination of the field of such 
objects, objects marked for death? And is this part of the irreality, the melancholic aggression 
and the desire to vanquish, that characterizes the public response to the death of many of those 
considered “socially dead,” who die from AIDS? Gay people, prostitutes, drug users, among 
others? If they are dying or already dead, let us vanquish them again. And can the sense of 
triumph be won precisely through the practice of social differentiation which one achieves and 
maintains “social existence” only by the production and maintenance of those socially dead?189  
 
Notably, in describing the triumph that these deaths evoke, Butler focalizes from the perspective 
of the triumphant. She does so, I argue, not because she wishes to align herself with this feeling, 
but rather to highlight how this triumph is forged through the complicity of all the subjects 
producing social existence. In other words, Butler asks if social death is the result of our own 
social existence, if another must become the socially dead as we struggle to become subjects. For 
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remember that Butler reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman in such a way that it reflects 
universal patterns in subject formation, suggesting this kind of internalization is not unique to 
slaves, bondsmen, or other people, but is rather indicative of life itself. Butler does not answer 
her question about the relationship of the socially dead to the desire to vanquish, but her 
searching points to how Patterson’s term enables questions of a radically different nature than the 
ones he originally asked about slavery. Butler’s broadening of the scope of social death to ask 
questions of complicity is, in part, the basis of my exploration of how the Roman state, slave-
owners generally, and freeborn Romans shaped the practice of manumission.  
 Describing Roman slavery as unlivable emphasizes that slaves were indeed alive, that 
they were family members, workers, writers, and the many other roles and identities that 
complicate any attempts to think about Roman slaves as a single class of people. That is to say, 
their social death did not entail social isolation, a point that Patterson himself emphasizes.190 As 
people integrated into Roman society, Roman slaves had social lives, but these were lives that 
other Romans worked together in various way to make unlivable. The term unlivable life also 
brings to the forefront how enslavement is a precarious condition. While the dead are complete 
in their deadness, the living, by the mere virtue of being alive, are incomplete: their lives 
continue forward into the unknown future. This future included the possibility of physical death, 
as well as manumission, but also flight from slavery and armed resistance to slave-owners. In 
this incompleteness and precariousness, those living unlivable lives face the possibility of further 
wounding, including both physical wounding as well as social degradation. The inventiveness of 
human cruelty means that an unlivable life can always be rendered even more unlivable, just as 
the life of a slave can always be rendered more painful or degrading. However, the 
precariousness of the unlivable life also keeps open the possibility of ecstasy, including the 
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ecstasy of freedom obtained through manumission, flight, and revolution. The conception of 
slavery as an unlivable life implies that manumission is the transition to a livable life, while 
simultaneously allowing the past of slavery to linger and haunt. Furthermore, because it is the 
transition to a livable life, rather than recognition with a society, manumission becomes 
compatible with flight and revolution, rather than a norm against which slave’s flight and revolt 
must be measured. 
6. Roman manumission as ritualized practice 
 Manumission was a ritualized practice that transitioned slaves from an unlivable life to a 
livable life. My use of the term practice comes from Bourdieu, who develops this word in 
conjunction with his theory of habitus. My Bourdieu is, primarily, the one found in the work of 
religion scholar Catherine Bell, whose work on ritual prompts me to analyze Roman 
manumission as ritualized practice. In her analysis of theories ritual, Bell takes to task Émile 
Durkheim and Clifford Geertz for ignoring how the ritual that is the object of their theorization is 
an object that their very own theorization calls into existence.191 That is, the conception of ritual 
as a coherent and stable identity is more the result of the demands of one’s own schemas than it 
is a coherence and stability that is inherent in the events and actions that make up rituals. In place 
of theory, Bell proffers a framework for approaching ritual as a type practice, that is, an activity 
distinct from other practices only to extent that its practitioners themselves need to distinguish it 
from other actions.192 Because the Romans’ descriptions of manumission included both 
magistrates reluctantly performing governmental duty for a singular slave in the street and a 
general magnanimously granting freedom to thousands of a slaves after battle, it is important for 
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any definition of manumission to be flexible enough to accommodate the diverse contexts in 
which Romans freed slaves.193   
 Bourdieu describes practice as situational and strategic. By situational, Bourdieu means it 
is not possible to consider it abstractly without some loss, as practice is corporeal, with gestures 
and words that are entirely dependent on the original context.194 Abstraction is of course 
necessary when considering the influences and causes upon some practice, but because a practice 
is so particularized, to divorce it from its context is to reject possible avenues of investigation 
that are unique to that particular context. By strategic, Bourdieu means that participants can use 
their logic and sense in manipulative and expeditious ways.195 Bourdieu is also quite insistent 
that practice operates by a different logic than “logical logic.”196 Bourdieu notes that by viewing 
practice as strategic, it becomes clear how practice is not merely the repetition of a past action, 
but an invention that is sensitive to demands of the moment, even if this novelty bypasses the 
immediate awareness of the practitioner. Hence, he describes practice as “the intentionless 
invention of regulated improvisation.”197 This kind of tension between the anonymous 
expectation of others and the demands of the moment is present in Gaius’ description of the 
harried magistrate.198 
Bourdieu’s description of habitus articulates how manumission functioned as part of the 
culture of slave-ownership among the Romans. Indeed, it is through Bourdieu’s habitus that it is 
possible to treat manumission as an object of historical inquiry, as habitus is the site of the 
accumulation, and circulation, of a society’s past practices, as well as that which informs the 
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improvisation of current practice. More specifically in terms of slavery, I use habitus to explain 
how Roman slave-owners had similar, coherent, but changing, methods for treating and acting 
around slaves. Significantly, the habitus is not congruent with social structures, but is rather a 
location and component of, and for, such social structures. Bourdieu would point how the 
Romans taught each other the mechanics of slave-ownership through bodily motions. Indeed, 
since Bourdieu suggests that whole cosmologies are communicated in injunctions such as “stand 
up straight!”, it is easy to imagine the whip similarly communicating the cosmology of slave-
ownership.199  
Bourdieu posits the idea of habitus as a way to surpass the problems of describing 
practice as the obedience to particular rules.200 Bourdieu’s formulation has the benefit of both 
describing the intentionless reformation of various practices in response to new problems, as well 
as emphasizing the importance of timing and the sense of style in practice. That is, for Bourdieu, 
the habitus is a “generative principle of regulated improvisations” that adjusts to the pressures of 
the moment in order to produce “practices that cannot be directly deduced from the objective 
conditions.”201 In other words, for Bourdieu one never merely follows a tradition, but instead one 
practices it at that particular moment, a practice that can in turn become the basis of another 
practice in the future. In an important contrast to structuralist models, Bourdieu writes that the 
habitus is a “product of history,” as the dispositions that constitute it “survive in the present and 
[it] tend[s] to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practice structured 
according to its principles.”202 Since Bourdieu’s habitus is within time and is, indeed, part of the 
fabric of a society, it is possible to chart a history of the changes within the habitus overtime.  
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Second, the term practice suggests continuity, rather than separation, from the majority of 
human activity. This similarity is important when approaching manumission as ritual because 
one of the false steps in theorizing ritual is to demarcate it as so separate from other activity that 
it becomes necessary for theorists to distinguish ritual from ceremony, from magic, and so 
forth.203 Indeed, Bell entirely discards the question of “is this a ritual?” to instead consider 
ritualization as a choice that participants may use in order to distinguish a certain practice from 
others. For Bell, the word ritualization also emphasizes how no activity is essentially a ritual, but 
is instead only a ritual because the participants demarcate it so in relation to other activities. As 
an example, Bell offers up the example of the Christian mass. The mass is defined in opposition 
to meals through formalization (i.e., presence of qualified participants and special food) and 
periodization (i.e., how it occurs, at a minimum, every Sunday). Nonetheless, formalization and 
periodization are not essential aspects of mass, as some Christians practice masses that are 
markedly informal and irregular, that is, they practice masses that are in opposition to the 
formalized and regularized masses.204 Similarly, formalization was not an essential in the 
Romans’ conception of manumission: on the one hand, in manumissio vindicta, the Romans 
required the slave-owner, a magistrate and a fictive litigant to recite specific formulae and hold a 
festuca staff at particular moments in order to consider the slave properly manumitted.205 On the 
other hand, when Roman actors freed slaves on the stage, the slave-owner simply declared the 
slave free.206 
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7. Conclusion 
I chart what influence of the Roman state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans had on the 
shape of manumission. I do so because in order to write properly how slaves participated in and 
experienced manumission, it is first necessary to confront the problem of recognition that Butler 
describes: “The problem is not merely how to include more people within existing norms, but to 
consider how existing norms allocate recognition differentially.”207 In other words, the history of 
Roman manumission must accommodate the slaves’ experience as humans while simultaneously 
recording how they were part of a society that systematically created conditions that made their 
lives unlivable. To assert simply that one will consider ancient slaves as human is to run the risk 
of ignoring how our only methods of knowing about Roman slaves is through sources that are 
invested in their denigration. It is because the state, slave-owners, and non-slave-owning Romans 
profited from making slaves’ lives unlivable that their stakes in manumission were so high. 
My interest in these social stakes in manumission may raise questions about my interest 
in Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman. For while Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman is indeed quite 
useful for describing the psychological and experiential concerns relationship between slaves and 
the slave-owners, what can this relationship explain about the relationship between the slave and 
the state or the slave and a freeborn Roman who does not own slaves? Hegel does not describe 
the struggle of the bondsman as occurring within any particular social context, and as a result, 
the struggle of the bondsman is not good at illuminating the interests of groups of people, other 
than those who can be read as either the bondsman or the lord. But while Hegel does not 
articulate a social context for the struggle, Patterson does. While Hegel does not raise questions 
of others’ complicity with the struggle of the bondsman, Butler does. Patterson and Butler both 
apply a telescopic lens to Hegel that brings into focus various shortcomings within the struggle 
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of the bondsman, vis-à-vis his ideas on the worth and value of the enslaved. But they also bring 
to Hegel a wide-angle lens that highlights the connections that bind the struggle of the bondsman 
to a wider and more fully socialized context.  
 Despite Patterson’s and Butler’s augmentations and rearticulations of Hegel, I 
nonetheless also turn to other thinkers in order to analyze the social functions of the words and 
movements that made of manumission. For this reason, in this chapter, I turn to Bell, Bourdieu, 
and Foucault, as their vocabulary of power, practice, and ritualization provide useful tools for 
articulating the function of Roman manumission. While I return to these thinkers in Chapters 2, 
3, and 4, in those chapters I also bring in other thinkers in order to bring into focus unique 
aspects of the relationship between manumission and the group in question. Therefore, Chapter 2 
incorporates ideas of anthropologist James Scott, whose work on how states organize knowledge 
articulates part of what was at stake in the Roman state’s interest in manumission. Likewise, 
Chapter 3 introduces the term secondarity. Although the philosopher Rémi Brague originated the 
term as part of a larger project to describe the relationship of Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem in 
European history, Classicist Emma Dench demonstrates that it’s possible to detach the term from 
Brague’s theological goals and instead use it to articulate how the Romans positioned themselves 
vis-à-vis their Mediterranean neighbors. I use secondarity to describe how the Romans 
incorporated Greek ideas on Roman manumission. Finally, Chapter 4 includes the terms 
psychological wage and racialization. Racialization is a term that I take from the sociologists 
Omi and Winant, while psychological wage comes from sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois. I use the 
term racialization to describe one tactic that freeborn Romans, who were not slave-owners, used 
to distinguish themselves from slaves and former slaves. Such freeborn Romans were motivated 
to make and enforce such distinctions in order to collect a psychological wage, that is, a sense of 
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superiority over both slaves and former slaves. That freeborn Romans who did not own slaves 
became aligned with slave-owners rather than slaves returns the question to Butler because 
Butler describes social death as part of the process of subjection, that is, the process of becoming 
a subject. This interest in complicity, in turn, prompts a return to both Patterson and Hegel’s 
struggle of the bondsman. This understanding prompts a return to Patterson, in order to explore, 
more fully, the relationship between slaves and non-slave-owning free people. Such an 
exploration of Patterson in turn prompts a return to Hegel in which the reader is equipped to 
make Hegel’s thought follow through on his commitment to describing the movement towards 
absolute freedom.
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Chapter 2: Seeing like a state: The state and Roman manumission 
1. Introduction 
 How did the Roman state see manumission? This question forces an examination of what 
kind of relationship there was between the Roman state and Roman slave-owners qua slave-
owners. This question also brings to the forefront how the Roman state had a relationship with 
slaves, one that was not mediated through the slave-owners. For example, that the state could, 
and did, expect such loyalty from slaves to the extent that slaves betrayed their masters for the 
sake of the Roman state. In articulating how the Roman state saw manumission, I argue that the 
state had interests in, and values of, manumission that were distinct from the interests of either 
the slaves or the slave-owners. Manumission was an issue of patronage between the slave-owner 
and the slave; in other words, manumission was a point on the pole between the slave and the 
slave-owner. This chapter lays the groundwork for a similar pole between slaves and state.  
 Since manumission is a legal process, involving the transition of the slave from one legal 
category to the other, it may appear obvious that manumission is a process intimately involved 
with the state.208 However, I argue that the ways that the state shaped the practice of 
manumission went beyond the creating and enforcing the laws by which the Romans manumitted 
their slaves. First, the state was interested in cultivating a certain kind of slave-owner, one who 
manumits his or her slaves in way consistent with policies around Roman citizenship. Second, 
the state wanted only certain kinds of slaves to be manumitted, slaves who were loyal to Rome 
and could support the common good. Third, the state saw manumission as a source of revenue. 
Over the long term, newly freed slaves benefited the Roman economy, politics, and culture. In 
the short term, the taxes on manumission provided the state with revenue. 
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 While in this chapter I examine a wide range of evidence, including some from the 
beginnings of Latin literature but also legal writings from the third century CE, I do so in order 
to extrapolate how Republican Romans thought about manumission and how such thoughts were 
connected to the Roman state. The evidence for this thought includes writers such as Plautus, 
who lived during the Repulic, and Plutarch, who lived during the Empire. When reading a source 
such as Plutarch, I stress his status as a writer who is reconstructing the Republican past. 
Nonetheless, his work, and the work of other writers, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus and 
Livy, are also valuable for the details from the past that they preserve. These details provide 
important evidence for how Republican Romans thought about and practiced manumission. 
Despite this emphasis on thought, nonetheless the exact proces of manumission is important, and 
so the movements and words that made up manumission are part of my larger argument about 
the relationship between manumission and the Roman state.209  
 To articulate how the state shaped how slave-owners approached manumission, in 
Section 2 of this chapter, I turn to Foucault’s thoughts on power, especially the relationship of 
sight and power. Foucault’s work points to how the state’s sight is diffuse and multifaceted. I use 
his work in tandem with that of anthropologist James Scott to explain how the state’s gaze is 
present, not only in government officials, but also at times, in Roman citizens. For Scott connects 
how states order their knowledge to how states centralize power, a process that, for him, is 
closely connected to how the state looks at people, land, and resources. I argue that the Roman 
state relied on these espials to regulate and tax manumission, as well as discipline slave-owners. 
 The Roman state’s tools for shaping manumission included both regulation and taxation. 
On the one hand, the state used these tools to further its interest in manumission as a source of 
financial gain. On the other hand, I argue that these laws were attempts to make slave-owners 
                                                 
209 For more on my use of these sources, see Section 2d.  
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look at their manumissions from the perspective of the state. In Section 3, I argue that Livy’s 
testimony suggests that, already in the early second century, the Roman state surveilled slaves as 
slaves and that, therefore, it is logical that the state had an interest in manumission. However, as 
the next section makes clear, manumission does not relate to state power merely because it 
connects to Roman tax revenue. Rather, manumission was of interest to the state because of the 
power of manumission to force Romans to recognize the freedom of a former slave.210 This 
chapter investigates manumission as a moment in which slaves become visible to the state as free 
and explains how the state’s gaze was a key part of recognizing former slaves as Romans.  
 I find evidence for the state’s gaze on manumission both in the physical act of 
manumission and in how ancient writers thought about manumission. Roman writers asserted 
that there were three types of manumission, manumissio vindicta (literally “manumission by 
wand”), manumissio censu (manumission through the census), and manumissio testamento 
(manumission through a will).211 I extrapolate how the state saw manumission from scholarly 
reconstructions of these three different ritualized practices. For example, the combination of 
ritual instruments, movements, and words in manumissio vindicta were means by which the 
Romans created a type of power by which the state could see and recognize a slave as a citizen. 
The state’s perspective on manumission also survives in ancient descriptions of manumission 
itself and in discussions on the origins of manumission and Romulus’ asylum. 
 In Section 4, I argue that the Romans connect and struggle with how manumission and 
the state relate to each other in the myth of Romulus’ asylum. Both the asylum and manumission 
challenge the conception of the boundaries between Roman and non-Roman, as well as the 
boundary between slave and free. The boundary between citizen and non-citizen was a matter of 
                                                 
210 For recognition and humanity, see Chapter 1 Section 3 and Section 5.  
211 Cf. Cicero Topica, 10 and Gaius Intitutiones, 1.17. See Section 7 below.  
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importance for the state, as such boundaries are essential to determining which people the state 
calls upon for military service and for taxes. Furthermore, the description of these boundaries in 
this chapter lays part of the groundwork for my exploration of the manumission the volones in 
Chapter 4. The approach that I use for Romulus’ asylum is similar to the one that I use for 
examining the stories concerning the origins of manumission in Sections 5 and 6.  
 Rather than explaining manumission as a reward for loyal service to a slave-owner, 
which is how the Romans frequently discussed manumission, these origin stories instead frame 
manumission as a prerogative of the state. One origin story, that of Vindicius, frames 
manuimssio vindicta as originally a reward for the slave daring to value loyalty to the Roman 
state over loyalty to his owners. The other origin story, that of king Servius, depicts Servius 
enfranchising slaves through some form of manumissio censu, despite the protests of slave-
owners, likewise demonstrating that the state’s interests were not identical to that of individual 
slave-owners. These two origin stories indicate that the Roman state had two different ways of 
viewing manumission: the state saw manumission as a tool to garner the loyalty of slaves and as 
a tool to increase the citizenry. Both these tools strengthened the state’s power. These 
aetiological stories also point to the state’s interest in the control of slaver-owners as slave-
owners.  
 This chapter concludes with an examination of manumissio testamento. Unlike 
manumissio vindica and manumissio censu, there is no surviving aetiological account of how the 
Romans began this practice. Nonetheless, the Romans did take this particular form of 
manumission seriously, since Augustus targeted this practice for legal reforms at the end of the 
first century. This account of Augustus and manumission anticipates the Conclusion, in which I 
analyze how first century Romans used manumission to centralize their power. Augustus’ 
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reforms occur within a larger context of state involvement with Roman wills, demonstrating that 
Roman slave-owners practiced this form of manumission while negotiating their visibility and 
vulnerability to the state’s gaze. 
2. Theorizing the state’s gaze 
 I theorize the phrase “the state’s gaze” as an activity that is connected to sight, power, 
and knowledge. While I primarily turn to Foucault in order explain how these three operate, I use 
a modified form of Foucault’s thought. At first glance, Foucault’s commitment to connecting 
issues of power to the advent of modernity makes it impossible to apply his theories to antiquity, 
especially because his description of power and discipline is part of his other projects on the 
development of contemporary knowledge.212 I argue that it is possible to jettison Foucault’s 
thoughts on modernity while nonetheless keeping his descriptions of power and sight. To fortify 
this position, I turn to the work of James Scott. Although Scott mainly writes independently of 
Foucault, nonetheless, his work touches on similar concerns about power and knowledge. But 
while Foucault examines the organization of knowledge in order to make arguments about its 
development and periodization, Scott instead focuses on the organization of knowledge as part of 
state centralization. Foucault and Scott bolster my own theory of how the Roman state’s gaze 
worked with manumission.  
 I argue that this description of the state’s gaze is suitable for a combination of evidence 
that includes the following: first, the physical actions associated with manumission; and second, 
how ancient writers conceived of manumission as relating to issues of the citizen body. On the 
one hand, the gaze is a physical act and is, therefore, relevant for evidence that relates to the 
ritualized practice of manumission. On the other hand, unlike other physical activities, the gaze 
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is easily abstracted, and so questions about conceptualization are closely related to issues of the 
gaze, including how and why characters in stories use a particular gaze. This section concludes 
with my elaboration of how I use ancient historiography as evidence for Roman thought, since in 
this chapter I pay close attention to stories which are, almost certainly, not historical, despite the 
insistence of ancient writers.  
a. Foucault 
 In Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, he uses the history of the prison in order to explain 
how the advent of modernity changed the distribution of power and how power operates. The 
cleavage between the pre-modern and modern in his thought is fully evident in the opening of the 
book, in which he juxtaposes the torturous execution of Damiens the regicide in 1757 CE and 
Léon Faucher’s rules for the juvenile delinquents in his prison from 1837.213 According to 
Foucault, the difference between these punishments is indicative of the disciplinary function of 
power in modern states, in which subjects face punishment not only from transgressions, but also 
for failure to meet standards and norms. This concern with normalization connects to issues of 
sight, since it is only through frequent observation and examination of subjects’ progress towards 
that norm that authorities can judge the subjects. This observation and examination in turn 
depends on specific kind of knowledge, one that is abstracted so that it might be applied to any 
individual regardless of his or her context. Foucault sees these issues most readily accessible in 
Bentham’s description of the panopticon, a piece of prison architecture that allows for permanent 
surveillance of prisoners, without the prisoners ever being aware of whether or not they are being 
watched.214 In other words, dissymmetry and disequilibrium are essential to Foucault’s 
                                                 
213 Foucault (1995: 3-7). 
214 Foucault (1995: 195-208). 
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panopticon.215 The panopticon, and the power that it operates upon the prisoners, is indicative of 
the aims and functioning of what Foucault calls the “disciplinary society.” For Foucault, this 
disciplinary society is specific to modernity, as it depends upon, among other things, the rise of 
the bourgeoisie.216 While Foucault never explicitly describes how power functioned in antiquity 
according to his ideas, he clearly demarks this period as operating with a different type of power, 
as he juxtaposes how visibility and power functions in modern societies to how it functioned in 
antiquity generally and among the ancient Greeks specifically.217 I therefore risk misapplying 
Foucault’s thoughts on power in attempting to use it to describe how manumission functioned in 
antiquity.  
 However, I argue that it is possible to apply Foucault’s description of discipline and 
power to Rome because while ancient Rome lacked modern technology, in many ways Foucault 
concerns about modernity overlap with descriptions of centralization of Roman state power.218 
True, Foucault created his ideas in order to analyze European states and peoples from the 
eighteenth century and onwards. For example, in his description of power in disciplinary 
societies, Foucault is quite insistent that anonymity is key to making discipline asymmetrical. 
Note some of his more gnomic utterances: “Visibility is a trap,” and “invisibility is a guarantee 
of order.”219 While anonymity and discipline do not easily combine in antiquity, nonetheless, 
there is good reason to examine Foucault for the intersection of power and sight in antiquity. For 
example, the stories of Gyges’ invisible ring and Deioces’ tower in many ways anticipate 
                                                 
215 (1995: 201-3). 
216 Foucault (1995: 222-3).  
217 “We are much less Greek than we believe. We are neither in the bleachers, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic 
machine, invested by its effects of power…” Foucault (1995: 217), translation modified. Foucault also claims that 
“Antiquity had been a civilization of spectacle” (1995: 216). 
218 I also take comfort from Butler’s discomfort with theories of modernity: “I do not traffic in theories of modernity 
because the concept of modernity strikes me as too general.” (2016: 108).   
219 (1995: 200).  
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Foucault’s concerns about the intersection of power and visibility.220 The other reason is that 
Foucault’s discussion of power and sight articulates the Roman state’s stakes and functioning in 
the surveillance of citizens.  
b. Scott 
 In order to stress manumission’s connection to sight, state power, and knowledge, I take 
the title of this chapter from Scott’s book, Seeing like a State. In that book, Scott argues that 
states can only make their utilitarian calculations about people and resources if those states have 
access to knowledge of a certain aesthetic, namely one that is ordered and abstract. In other 
words, for Scott, the state’s sight is a gaze that summarizes for the purpose of focusing on 
projects of extraction or discipline. For Scott notes that without such ordering and abstraction, 
knowledge is impossible to bring to a political center in a coherent manner. While in Seeing like 
a State, Scott makes a strong connection between these projects and the aims of modern states, in 
a later book, the Art of Not Being Governed, he nonetheless makes similar claims about the 
projects of pre-modern states in Southeast Asia.221 Although Scott remains attuned to how issues 
of technology, among other things, significantly change the nature of states in the modern period, 
in his later work, he is willing to analyze pre-modern states as disciplining their populaces in 
ways similar to modern states. For in the Art of Not Being Governed, Scott analyzes a range of 
materials and knowledges as sites of contesting the centralizing tendency of pre-modern states, 
including root vegetables and distances of measurement.222  
 Foucault and Scott’s work is fruitful for the study of the intersection of the Roman state 
and manumission because both thinkers approach the state as a relationship rather than as an 
                                                 
220 Gyges’ invisible ring: Plato, Republic, 359d1. Deioces’ tower, from which he governs his country through spies, 
Herodotus, 1.96ff. For the pairing of these two stories, see Graeber (2001: 101-2).  
221 Scott names the collection of ideas and practices he investigates “high modernism” (1998: 87-102).   
222 Scott argues rice is an excellent crop for states, while root vegetables an excellent crop for nomads (2009: 64-97). 
Scott collects local methods of measuring distances, including measuring how a long a walk is by the time it takes to 
smoke a cigarette (2009: 48, cf. 1998: 25).   
Chapter 2: See like a state: The state and Roman manumission 
 76 
institution that is clearly demarcated from the rest of society. As a relationship, the state is a 
conduit of power that is indistinguishable from knowledge, since the collective actions that 
constitute politics depend on the subjects knowing how to interact with each other in a particular 
manner. In this broad sense, both every occurrence and every discussion of manumission is 
obviously political and is closely related to how power operated at ancient Rome. Manumission 
was also in the sight of the state, since in order to act the state had to know who was and who 
was not a citizen.  
c. The state’s gaze and manumission 
 The state’s gaze is a useful heuristic for analyzing who looked at manumission and also 
why a slave-owner could not manumit a slave without the state. Manumission entailed the 
Romans collectively altering how they recognized the slave, and such alteration required the 
movement towards a new consensus of how this slave ought to be seen and treated. The Romans 
created this consensus, in part, through laws and, in part, through the relationship between the 
slave and the slave-owner. But the slave-owner could not manumit slaves alone; the presence of 
representatives of the state were necessary in order to evaluate both the slave and the slave-
owner. I argue that these representatives had the state’s gaze not only because they were acting 
on behalf of the state, but because—as Foucault and Scott reveal—their sight served the purpose 
of disciplining, abstracting, and summarizing. These purposes were the purposes of the state, but 
they were connected to the purposes of the slave-owner and slave; all three worked together to 
convince others to recognize this slave as a freedperson.  
 Those who looked at manumission from the perspective of the state included the 
governmental officials who looked at slaves when they performed the legal action of 
manumission. Such officials included the censors who registered slaves as citizens and the 
magistrates who participated in the legal ceremony of manumisssio vindicta that freed slaves. 
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However, the state’s gaze was diffuse and not limited to these officials, but included witnesses to 
these procedures: both those witnesses who were required by law and those who were not. For 
these witnesses performed a similar, albeit distinct, role from the government officials in that 
they were looking at the slave, examining the slave and judging the slave’s worth as a potential 
Roman citizen. Because the Roman state did not trust that slave-owners viewed the 
manumissions that they conducted, from the perspective of the state, the presence of other 
witnesses was necessary to attempt to ensure that each particular manumission was performed in 
a way that conformed to the expectations of the Roman state.223  
 In other words, a key component of the presence of the witnesses was their ability to 
discipline the process through their gaze. Their gaze had this power because they could report 
infractions to officials, but also for the subtler reason that the mere process of rendering such a 
procedure public makes it vulnerable. Indeed, Cicero’s treatment of his freedman Chrysippus 
makes clear that when witnesses were absent, slave-owners could, and did, manipulate the 
process in their favor.224 This disciplining gaze was also connected to abstraction and 
summation, since through these witnesses, the state’s gaze did not acknowledge the (potentially) 
personal aspect of the relationship between slave and slave-owner. Instead, the state sees and 
judges whether a particular manumission follows generalized guidelines. In its concern only for 
legal procedure, the state’s gaze desires a mere summary of the conditions of manumission, most 
especially if such a summary follows the laws surrounding manumission. These issues of 
summary and abstraction were also connected to recording and remembering manumission, since 
                                                 
223 The slave-owner and even the slave could hold the state’s gaze as well, since these two quite could certainly have 
internalized the priorities and values of the state in regards to their manumission at hand. But since this chapter is 
focused on the state’s role in manumission, I leave aside this question for Chapters 3 and 4.   
224 See Section 5e below.  
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it was through the state’s gaze on manumission that the Romans were able to verify if 
manumission had actually occurred.   
d. Finding the state’s gaze in ancient historiography  
 This chapter aims to deploy Foucault and Scott’s ideas about the intersection of power 
and sight as a way to connect the ritualized movements around manumission to how the Romans 
used a variety of stories to explain why manumission was important. In other words, I 
supplement this very physical description of power—how power operates through the act of 
looking—with evidence based on how ancient Greeks and Romans wrote about ideas and stories 
that relate to manumission in thematic concerns. Since most of these ideas and stories are 
contained in works of ancient historiography, it is necessary to state what metholdogy I use for 
studying these works of historiography. I closely examine the histories of Livy and Dionysius, as 
well as different biographies from Plutarch, in order to find evidence of how the Greeks and 
Romans thought about manumission and topics similar to manumission, such as the 
enfranchisement of runaway slaves at Romulus’ asylum. That is, rather than attempting to 
reconstruct particular instances of manumission, I use these historiographies to reconstruct how 
the Romans’ thinking on manumission was closely bound up with thoughts about the state and 
the state’s role in manumission.225  
  The stories that these historians tell about manumission are evidence of how the ancients 
thought about the state’s gaze. While the historians do not describe the physical act of 
manumission, they do tell originary narratives, such as Romulus’ asylum, they had to explain the 
                                                 
225 In doing so, I take as a starting point Woodman’s arguments for reading ancient historiography as literature 
(1988: 197-215). For Woodman’s influence on this point, see, for example, Darbo-Peschanski (2007: 41), Kraus and 
Woodman (1996), Haynes (2003), Henderson (1998), Nicolai (2007: 19-21), Saïd (2007: 76). For an invective, 
disguised as an argument, against Woodman’s treatment of ancient historiography as literature, see Lendon (2009). 
However, Lendon’s histrionics are mere childplay compared to historian E.P. Thompson’s unconstrained contempt 
for Louis Althusser (1978), an anger that comes from a similar place as Lendon’s. 
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state’s stake in manumission.226 Since ancient historians collected ideas and details from a 
variety of sources, many of which are now inaccessible, I attribute these ways of thinking to an 
ancient Roman public rather than the individual author, after taking into account how the author 
affects the representation of this way of thinking.227 True, sometimes the author addresses his 
readers directly and makes clear his stance or interpretation on a particular issue, but other times, 
his thoughts are best apparent through a comparison of his version of a story with that of another 
author’s. For example, by comparing how Livy tells the story of Romulus’ asylum to Dionysius’ 
version, it is possible to see contrasting opinions on the boundary between who was Roman and 
who was not. I then use these opinions as evidence for my larger argument about the role of the 
state’s gaze in the recognition of the slave as a Roman citizen. But prior to using this approach 
for the historians’ descriptions of the origins of manumission, I first examine Livy for his 
descriptions of the various ways that the state used laws to restrict how and why slave-owners 
manumitted slaves, and also how the state profited from manumission. 
3. Taxing and regulating manumission 
 Livy recounts how the state attempted to control slave-owners’ motives for freeing their 
slaves and how the state profited from a tax on manumission, descriptions that are important 
prologues to Augustus’ reforms of manumissio testamento that I examine in Section 7. In short, 
Livy describes the state as disciplining the slave-owners, so that they only used manumission for 
purposes that were agreeable to the state’s aims, especially in regards to the boundaries of the 
citizen body. Reconstructing how successful the state was at these endeavors is impossible to 
determine only using Livy’s descriptions. Given the limited reach of the Roman state as a pre-
                                                 
226 While classifying these originary narratives as myths may do more to confuse the issue than clarify it, I 
nonetheless find scholarship on the relationship of ancient historiography and myth useful for understanding both 
why Livy and Dionysius included these stories and what role the stories have in their works (cf. Marincola 1997: 
117-127 and Saïd 2007).  
227 Cf. Gehrke (2001).  
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modern state, it is unlikely that it achieved complete compliance. Nonetheless, these regulations 
point to how the Roman Republic aimed at creating disciplined slave-owners, specifically ones 
who looked at manumission not only from the perspective of their own interests, but also from 
the perspective of the state. Since the Romans taxed manumission, in many ways, freedom for 
slaves doubly benefited the Roman state, since manumission increased the citizen body and also 
provided short-term gain in the form of taxes.  
a. The state and the motives of manumission 
 Livy describes an episode in which the Roman state created new legal procedures in 
order to prevent slave-owners for using manumission for ulterior or purely personal reasons. In 
effect, Livy depicts the Roman state attempting to discipline slave-owners so that they looked at 
manumission from the perspective of the state, in addition to the perspective of slave-owners. 
The reforms of 177 concern not only the boundary between the Roman citizenry and slaves but 
also how all slave-owners were expected to participate in policing that boundary. These reforms 
also participate in the story of Rome’s new authority over the other peoples of Italy. With 
Hannibal’s death in the 180s, Bispham is right to suggest that at this time the Italians’ line of 
thought was “if Hannibal had been unable to remove the Roman yoke, who else could?”228 Livy 
records how a moral panic caused the Roman state to commit disciplining slave-owners directly, 
rather than through the various states that represented the other Italians.229 Such disciplining 
suggests that the state was attuned to the potentiality hidden in individuals but was dissatisfied 
with how the other states were mediating the relationship between their own citizens and 
Rome.230  
                                                 
228 Bispham (2008: 113). For the death of Hannibal, see Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal, 12 and Livy, 39.51.  
229 In contrast, Bispham notes that the Romans made the Latin allies themselves quash the Bacchic cults (2008: 118). 
230 Cf. Foucault (1995: 126).  
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 According to Livy, the Romans reformed manumission in 177 in response to a diplomatic 
crisis with the Latins. In that year, Latin ambassadors addressed the Senate and complained that 
too many of their fellow countrymen were illicitly becoming Romans.231 For while the Romans 
had for many years made it easy for Latins to become Roman citizens, these ambassadors 
complained that recently men were not fulfilling these minimal requirements, but were instead 
committing fraud. One type of fraud pertained to manumission, since in order for a Latin man to 
become a Roman citizen when he came to Rome, he had to leave his son at home. However, 
Livy explains that the Latins used manumission to get around this requirement: 
nam et ne stirpem domi relinquerent, liberos suos quibusquibus Romanis in eam condicionem, 
ut manumitterentur, mancipio dabant, libertinique cives essent; et quibus stirpes deesset, quam 
relinquerent, ut cives Romani fiebant. 
 
To avoid the necessity of leaving a son at home, men would hand their sons over as slaves to 
anyone with Roman citizenship, on the condition that the sons would be manumitted; as 
freedmen they would become citizens.232  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 41.8.10, trans. J.D. Chaplin. 
 
On the one hand, by focusing on how it is the Latins who commit fraud, Livy downplays how 
these strategies only succeeded with the complicity of Roman slave-owners. On the other hand, 
Livy’s description highlights how manumission necessarily made the boundary between Roman 
and non-Roman porous: since anyone can become a slave, therefore anyone can become a 
Roman. Manumission therefore complicates and even threatens the binary of Roman and non-
Roman. 
 In order to combat this appropriation of Roman citizenship, the senate passed a decree 
that attempted to ensure that all slave-owners thought of the security of the Roman citizenry 
when they manumitted slaves. Livy records that the Senate reformed manumission in the 
following way:  
                                                 
231 Briscoe’s commentary on this crisis focuses on the Latins seeking citizenship, rather than the sale of Latin sons 
(2012: 61-66).  
232 For Latins as genial prisoners of war in Rome, cf. Livy 2.22.  
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ad legem et edictum consulis senatus consultum adiectum est, ut dictator, consul, interrex, 
censor, praetor, qui nunc esset quive postea futurus esset, apud eorum quem qui manu 
mitteretur, in libertatem vindicaretur, ut ius iurandum daret, qui eum manu mitteret, civitatis 
mutandae causa manu non mittere; in quo id non iuraret, eum manu mittendum non 
censuerunt. 
 
The Senate added its own decree to the consular law and edict: if anyone should ask a senior 
magistrate, present or future, to perform a manumission or a vindication of free status, the 
dictator, consul, interrex, censor or praetor now or in the future should require the petitioner to 
take an oath that the purpose of the manumission was not to alter civic status; in any case there 
was no such oath, the Senate forbade the manumission.  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 41.9.10-11, trans. J.D. Chaplin.233 
 
In other words, slave-owners had to be ready to swear that they were not manumitting slaves 
either for ulterior motives or for the sole purpose of turning their slave into a Roman citizen. 
Notably, Livy’s description of the law does not describe what kind of motives were permissible, 
thereby providing space for a multiplicity of reasons that slave-owners might free their slaves. 
Based on other evidence of the discourse that slave-owners used to justify manumission, likely 
this law implied that the slave-owners ought to manumit only those slaves who had proven their 
loyalty to them. However, the ambiguity in this law also leaves open another reason to free 
slaves: their loyalty to the Roman state, as exemplified through the story of Vindicius.234  
b. Taxing manumission 
 Livy makes two obscure references to a tax on manumission. A combination of literary 
and epigraphical sources from the Imperial Period only somewhat illuminates how this tax 
functioned, complicating attempts to reconstruct what kind of tax the Romans actually had 
through a synthesis of the evidence. Although Livy’s account lacks enough coherence to provide 
firm evidence that the Romans had instituted a tax on manumission for as long as he asserts, his 
description of the Manlian law indicates that a key component of how the Roman state viewed 
manumission was as a source of revenue. And as a source of revenue, the state viewed 
                                                 
233 For the textual difficulties of this passage, see Briscoe (2012: 70-1).  
234 See Section 5 below.  
Chapter 2: See like a state: The state and Roman manumission 
 83 
manumission in opposition to the interests of individual slave-owners and slaves, since the state 
collected this tax from them.  
 While Livy’s account of the year 357/6 primarily focuses on the actions of the consul 
Gaius Marcius, the historian ends the year with the following description of how the consul 
Gaius Manlius passed a law outside Rome proper. Rather than being concerned with how this 
law functioned, Livy is instead concerned about the context in which the consul passed this law. 
nisi quod legem novo exemplo ad Sutrium in castris tributim de vicesima eorum, qui manu 
mitterentur, tulit. patres, quia ea lege haud parvum vectigal inopi aerario additum esset, 
auctores fuerunt; ceterum tribuni plebis non tam lege quam exemplo moti, ne quis postea 
populum sevocaret, capite sanxerunt; nihil enim non per milites iuratos in consulis verba 
quamvis perniciosum populo, si id liceret, ferri posse.  
 
Nothing worth mentioning was achieved by the other consul apart from his setting a precedent 
in having a law proposed in his camp at Sutrium, through a tribal assembly, which levied a five 
percent tax on manumitted slaves. Since no insignificant revenue accrued to the depleted 
treasury from this law, the senators ratified it. The plebeian tribunes, however, less concerned 
about the law than they were about the precedent, made it a capital offense for anyone in future 
to hold an assembly of the people outside Rome. For, they claimed, when soldiers were sworn 
to obey a consul, there was nothing that could not be brought into law by them, no matter how 
detrimental to the people it might be.  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 7.16.7-8, trans. J.C. Yardley.235 
 
Livy imagines that already in the fourth century Romans were manumitting their slaves so 
frequently that the Senate understood that a tax on manumission would provide a large source of 
revenue. Just how Livy imagined that manumission was so profitable is unclear, since he does 
not describe what value that tax is measuring. Given the historian’s own description of how the 
census tallied the worth of slaves, it is reasonable to assume that Livy thought that the vicesima 
referred to the price of the slave. Whether the Roman state in the fourth century had already 
created a bureaucracy sophisticated enough to collect taxes based on the worth of a slave is hard 
to measure. Livy undermines the trustworthiness of this account of the origin of the vicesima tax 
                                                 
235 Confusingly, the Romans referred to this tax either as the vicesima or the as the vicensima. Furthermore, since the 
name literally means “twentieth,” they sometimes used this expression to refer to other taxes which taxed at the 
same rate, cf. Livy 43.2.12. 
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by later asserting that it was paid only in gold, a detail that suggests that he is reporting his own 
reconstruction of the past, one based on plausibilities rather than an authoritative source.   
 In his description of how the Romans used the funds raised from this manumission tax 
during the second Carthaginian War, Livy gives precise amounts of how much this tax brought 
to the Roman coffers in measurements of gold.  
cetera expedientibus quae ad bellum opus erant, consulibus aurum vicensimarium, quod in 
sanctiore aerario ad ultimos casus servabatur, promi placuit. prompta ad quattuor milia 
pondo auri. inde quingena pondo data consulibus et M. Marcello et P. Sulpicio proconsulibus 
et L. Veturio praetori, qui Galliam provinciam erat sortitus, additumque Fabio consuli centum 
pondo auri praecipuum, quod in arcem Tarentinam portaretur; cetero auro usi sunt ad 
vestimenta praesenti pecunia locanda exercitui, qui in Hispania bellum secunda sua fama 
ducisque gerebat. 
 
As the consuls were making all the other necessary preparations for the war, the decision was 
taken to withdraw the gold raised by the five-per-cent tax [vicensimarium], which was being 
kept in reserve in the inner treasury to meet emergencies. Approximately 4,000 pounds of gold 
were withdrawn, and from this sum the consuls, the proconsuls Marcus Marcellus and Publius 
Sulpicius, and the praetor Lucius Veturius (who had drawn Gaul as his province) were each 
given 500 pounds.  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 27.10.11-13, trans. J.C. Yardley. 
 
Henrik Mouritsen and Dominic Rathbone argue that, in this passage, it is possible that Livy is 
conflating the vicesima with an archaic practice in which former slaves deposited dedicated gold 
in the aerarium Saturni.236 This thesis is plausible because, in the Greek world, former slaves 
made dedications in Greek temples. However, these dedications were of uniform amounts, rather 
than being a variable dependent upon the slave’s price.237 In contrast, A.R. Meadows argues that 
the source of this gold was ultimately Ptolemy IV because a gift of bullion from the king would 
both explain the presence of gold coins dating to this time period, as well as justify certain 
passages in Livy and Polybius on Rome/Egypt relations.238 Either explanation, that of Mouritsen 
or that of Meadows, suggests that, in his attempt to synthesize his sources, Livy has conflated his 
                                                 
236 Mouritsen acknowledges Dominic Rathbone’s help (2011a: 121 n. 4). 
237 I am specifically thinking of the silver bowls dedicated to Zeus Eleutherios in Athens (cf. Zelnick-Abramovtiz 
2005: 83-6 and 121-22). Meyer (2010) has argued that this list concerns metics rather than freedmen and 
freedwomen. Zelnick-Abramovitz (2013: 95-105) defends the interpretation that this list concerns slaves.  
238 Meadows (1998). For his thoughts on Livy, 27.10.11, see (1998: 133 n.59).  
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knowledge of the manumission tax of his own time with descriptions of dedicatory practices 
from archaic Rome.  
 To understand whether Livy is projecting expectations of the collection of manumission 
tax based on his experience of the first century, it is necessary to review what the collection of 
this tax was like in the Imperial Period. Writers during the first century BCE, and later, depict 
those who collect the vicesima as diligent and insistent.239 Furthermore, a bilingual inscription 
from second century CE Athens describes a certain Philtos as a public slave whose official 
position was that of a collector of the vicesimae libertatis. Apparently even in Athens keeping 
track of the manumission of Roman slaves was a full-time job, or at least a job that a public slave 
considered worth commemorating.240 To reconstruct how Republican Rome was equally capable 
of looking at manumission for a consistent source of revenue, I turn to Livy’s description of 
slaves and the census. 
 Livy describes Cato assessing the worth of slaves as part of his duties as a censor, a duty 
that I argue is indicative of the care with which the second century Republic examined slaves, 
and therefore manumission. According to Livy, one of the reasons why Cato’s censorship was so 
notorious was that he systematically overvalued all luxury items, including those slaves who 
were young and who had fetched a high price.241 This combination of youth and expense 
suggests that Livy imagines Cato as overvaluing slaves whom Romans prized for their beauty. 
This testimony also establishes that Livy thought that, in the early second century, the state saw 
and recorded the value of all slaves. On the other hand, this testimony also reveals the extent to 
which disciplinary power, in second century Rome, was not anonymous and standardized, but 
                                                 
239 Cicero discusses the revenue of this tax alongside others (Ad Atticum 2.16.1, see Conclusion Section 2). Petronius 
describes those who collect the vicesima as happy to argue about the correct worth of a slave (58.2, 65.10 and 71).  
240 SIA VI 8 = CIL III 555 7287. See Zelnick-Abramovitz (2013: 57) for discussion. 
241 Plutarch recounts the same episode but does not include slaves in the catalogue of luxury items: Life of Cato the 
Elder, 18.2-3.  
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dependent upon particular personalities. For Livy records Cato contributed to his public image 
by how he challenged, and successfully changed, the value of the property that he assessed. 
in censibus quoque accipiendis tristis et aspera in omnes ordines censura fuit. ornamenta et 
vestem muliebrem et vehicula, quae pluris quam quindecim milium aeris essent, deciens pluris 
in censum referre iuratores iussi; item mancipia minora annis viginti, quae post proximum 
lustrum decem milibus aeris aut pluris eo venissent, uti ea quoque deciens tanto pluris, quam 
quanti essent, aestimarentur, et his rebus omnibus terni in milia aeris adtribuerentur. 
 
Tax officials were instructed to assess at ten times their market value decorative articles, 
women’s dresses, and carriages worth more than 15,000 asses. Slaves under twenty years of 
age who had fetched 10,000 asses or more since the last lustrum he likewise ordered to be 
assessed at ten times their market value. All these items were to be taxed at a rate of three 
asses per thousand.  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 39.44.1-3. trans. J.C. Yardley. 
 
Livy’s description of the exceptional way that Cato assessed the worth of these slaves suggests 
that the historian assumed that it was normal for the censor and the slave-owner to agree on the 
price of the slave. Livy also makes clear that slaves’ value was an important part of calculating 
how much a Roman owed the state in taxes.242 Since the state monitored slaves while they were 
slaves, it is reasonable to assume that it turned its gaze upon them when they were manumitted 
so that it could collect tax.  
 Livy’s dramatic rendering of how the proceeds from the vicesima funded key defenses 
during the second Carthaginian war suggests that the Romans conceived of taxing manumission 
as consistently profitable.243 Unfortunately, the garbled nature of Livy’s account of the vicesima 
prevents us from knowing how the Romans did store and spend this revenue. However, the 
historian’s description makes clear that the state’s gaze upon manumission did more than simply 
police the boundary between Roman and non-Roman: this gaze was also profitable, extracting 
value from the transition from slave to free.  
                                                 
242 For the census and tributum, see Northwood (2008). For this particular passage and issues of tributum, see 
Fraccaro (1956: 479-80) and Briscoe (2008: 363-4).  
243 See also Ad Atticum, 2.16.1 = Shackleton Bailey 36.1. I discuss that passage in Conslusion Section 2. 
Chapter 2: See like a state: The state and Roman manumission 
 87 
4. Romulus’ asylum and manumission 
 Even though Romans describe Romulus as a divinely born monarch, his particular 
founding of Rome valorizes the city as an inclusive and egalitarian civic body, two values that 
are essential to, as well as complicate the practice of, Roman manumission. More specifically, I 
argue that Livy’s and Plutarch’s descriptions of slaves as men who joined Romulus’ new polity 
indicate that earlier Romans thought that Romulus’ asylum demonstrated the strengths of Rome’s 
open citizenry. Furthermore, Dionysius’ description of slaves as pointedly excluded from the 
asylum is indicative of an opposing school of thought on the value of former slaves as Roman 
citizens. This emphasis on the difference between the accounts of Romulus’ asylum is similar to 
T.P. Wiseman’s emphasis on the difference in the first century accounts of the secession of the 
plebs. Wiseman also suggests that that these differences in the accounts were connected to the 
demands of the moment.244 The story of Romulus’ asylum provided a way for all Romans, both 
those who were and who were not slave-owners, to think through the benefits to the Roman state 
of making manumitted slaves citizens.245  
a. Overview of the Romulus’ asylum story and its sources 
 While a variety of Greek and Roman writers reference Romulus and his asylum, the most 
detailed accounts survive in the works of Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch. These writers emphasize 
that they are not inventing this story; indeed, Plutarch explicitly credits his version of the story to 
both Fabius Pictor and Peparethos. Plutarch’s references suggest earlier Romans judged the story 
of the asylum as an important part of their history, a judgment that surely influenced why later 
                                                 
244 Wiseman (2009: 63-68). 
245 Cf. Wiseman, “Romulus’ refuge was a symbol of equality: all comers were welcome, whatever their background. 
Of course that idea was ideologically contentious, and pejorative descripotions of the ‘infamous asylum’ and the 
rabble it attraced are not hard to find.” (2009: 77).  
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writers such as Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch retold the story with important similarities.246 All 
three writers agree that at some point in the founding of Rome, Romulus set aside a particular 
space within Rome to be a haven for outsiders who wished to join the Romans. Livy and 
Dionysius further elaborate that this space was the inter duos lucos on the Capitoline.247 But the 
three writers disagree on a number of other details about this story, including the chronology of 
the asylum in relation to foundational events such Remus’ death.248 Significantly, the historians 
also disagree over whether or not Romulus granted haven to slaves as part of his asylum. I argue 
that the writers’ disagreement over slaves in the asylum is connected to how they thought 
through contemporary concerns about manumission.249   
b. The asylum and the worth of manumission 
 Dionysius’ disdain for slaves is so apparent in his description of Romulus’ asylum that it 
makes sense to start with his account to see how ancient authors could use this story to think 
through the issues of manumission. The details about the asylum that Dionysius provides in his 
story are especially significant for his project, since he himself writes that Greeks and barbarians 
manipulate stories about Rome’s origins to denigrate Romans. Indeed, he specifically mentions 
in his preface that one of the ways that Greeks and barbarians slander Romans is by depicting 
Rome ascending to power entirely through blind fate, since the city was originally a collection of 
nomads, a heterogeneous mix in which not even all men were free. For Dionysius, the idea that 
                                                 
246 In Romulus (3.1). For Fabius Pictor, cf. BNJ 809 F4a and FRH 1 F 4b. For Peparethos, cf. BNJ 820 F 1.  
247 Ab Urbe Condita 1.8.5. Unfortunately, Livy provides an unclear description of where exactly these groves were. 
For the debate over the emendation of this line, see Wellesly (1974). Heyworth (2011) provides a map with a 
probable location of the inter duos lucos. Purcell (1993: 146 n.87) provides an alternate location of the asylum. See 
also Dench (2005: 18-20). Dionysius’ account is much less precise, cf. 2.15.4.  
248 Plutarch writes that Remus participated in establishing the asylum (Life of Romulus, 9.3), while Livy and 
Dionysius write that Romulus created the asylum after Remus’ death. Wiseman (2009: 81-98) analyzes how only 
Dionysius records that Romulus distributed land among his followers as evidence that Dionysius took his account 
from Varro.  
249 See again Wiseman (2009: 77). Wiseman argues that Strabo’s (5.3.2), Juvenal’s (8.273-5), Justi’s (38.7.1), and 
Minucius Felix’s accounts of the asylum all conform to   
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Romulus’ asylum included slaves is so obviously political that he argues that Greek historians 
only repeated such slander to please barbarian kings.250 Dionysius’ history of the asylum appears 
all the more histrionic when juxtaposed to Livy’s account, as that Roman writer willingly 
included slaves as among Rome’s founders.  
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses his preface to justify his authority as an historian of 
ancient Rome. One of the tools that he uses to create his own authority is to undermine the 
authority of other historians. Specifically, Dionysius claims that many of the other accounts of 
early Rome are motivated by an animus towards the Romans. One of the ways that other 
historians reveal their vindicitiveness is through their description of the early Roman community 
as consisting of vagabounds and slaves.  
ἔτι γὰρ ἀγνοεῖται παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὀλίγου δεῖν πᾶσιν ἡ παλαιὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων πόλεως 
ἱστορία, καὶ δόξαι τινὲς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἀκουσμάτων τὴν ἀρχὴν 
λαβοῦσαι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐξηπατήκασιν, ὡς ἀνεστίους μέν τινας καὶ πλάνητας καὶ βαρβάρους 
καὶ οὐδὲ τούτους ἐλευθέρους οἰκιστὰς εὐχομένης, οὐ δι’ εὐσέβειαν δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν 
ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἐπὶ τὴν ἁπάντων ἡγεμονίαν σὺν χρόνῳ παρελθούσης, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτοματισμόν 
τινα καὶ τύχην ἄδικον εἰκῆ δωρουμένην τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν σμάτων τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσαι 
τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐξηπατήκασιν  
 
For to this day almost all the Greeks are ignorant of the early history of Rome and the great 
majority of them have been imposed upon by sundry false opinions grounded upon stories 
which chance has brought to their ears and led to believe that, having come upon various 
vagabonds without house or home and barbarians, and even those not free men, as her 
founders, she in the course of time arrived at world domination, and this not through reverence 
for the gods and justice and every other virtue, but through some chance and the injustice of 
Fortune, which inconsiderately showers her greatest favours upon the most undeserving.  
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antitiquities, Preface 4.2, trans. E. Cary.  
 
Dionysius then goes on to explain that other historians are motivated to slander the early Romans 
because they want to argue that the Romans’ dominance of the Mediterranean is merely the 
                                                 
250 Preface 4.2-3. Dionysius’ account appears even more conspiratorial when juxtaposed with the other surviving 
Greek accounts of the origins of Rome. Wiseman’s review of the evidence points out that the Greeks only began to 
write about Romulus in the fourth century, but that this account differs significantly from the accounts of first 
century authors. Overall, Greek writers appear to have been more interested in the story of Aeneas (cf. Wiseman 
1995: 42-63). On the other hand, Dionysius may have had some knowledge of now lost Greek histories that did 
make such derogatory claims about the founding of Rome.  
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result of chance. In contrast, Dionysius sees the Romans’ dominance as connected to the 
Romans’ virtues and practices.  
In his retelling of the founding of Rome, Dionysius not only preserves the class 
distinctions among the men who were the citizens who joined Romulus, but he only mentions 
slaves when he catalogues the founders’ property: 
ἦν δὲ ἐν τούτοις πολὺ μὲν ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἐν πόλει κινουμένῃ τὸ δημοτικὸν γένος, ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ 
τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου γνώριμον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Τρωικοῦ τὸ εὐγενέστατον δὴ νομιζόμενον, ἐξ οὗ 
καὶ γενεαί τινες ἔτι περιῆσαν εἰς ἐμέ, πεντήκοντα μάλιστ᾽ οἶκοι. ἐχορηγεῖτο δὲ τοῖς νεανίσκοις 
καὶ χρήματα καὶ ὅπλα καὶ σῖτος καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ ὑποζύγια ἀχθοφόρα καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πόλεως 
ἦν κατασκευῇ πρόσφορον. 
 
Among these, as is likely to happen when a city sends out a colony, there were great numbers 
of the common people, but there were also a sufficient number of the prominent men of the 
best class, and of the Trojan element all those who were esteemed the noblest in birth, some of 
whose posterity remained even to my day, consisting of about fifty families. The youths were 
supplied with money, arms and corn, with slaves and beasts of burden and everything else that 
was of use in the building of a city. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 1.85.3, trans. E. Cary. 
 
Such distinction between slaves and Romulus’ followers suggests that Dionysius did not 
conceive of the slaves present at the founding of Rome as possible ancestors to the present 
Romans.251 Indeed, Dionysius is even more emphatic that none of Romulus’ followers were 
slaves in his description of the asylum. This place, according to Dionysius, accorded amnesty to 
any fugitives in Italy, but on the condition that they were free men. 
ἔπειτα καταμαθὼν πολλὰς τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πόλεων πονηρῶς ἐπιτροπευομένας ὑπὸ 
τυραννίδων τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχιῶν, τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ἐκπίπτοντας τῶν πόλεων συχνοὺς ὄντας, εἰ 
μόνον εἶεν ἐλεύθεροι . 
 
Secondly, finding that many of the cities in Italy were very badly governed, both by tyrannies 
and by oligarchies, he undertook to welcome and attract to himself the fugitives from these 
cities, who were very numerous, paying no regard either to their calamities or to their fortunes, 
provided only they were free men.  
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 2.15.3,trans. E. Cary. 
 
                                                 
251 Cf. Juvenal, Saturae 8.269 ff. See Dench (2005: 18-20) and Bremmer and Horsfall (1987: 38ff). My own 
argument about the importance of this founding follows Gabba’s (1991: 148-158) argument that Dionysius is 
particularly interested in framing the events of the Roman monarchy as having explanatory power for the present. 
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This erasure of slaves at the founding of Rome connects to Dionysius’ concerns about slaves in 
present day Rome. Dionysius complains that now Romans are too lenient in their grants of 
manumission and suggests that the Romans ought to only manumit slaves who are truly moral.252 
Dionysius appears to have written his account of Romulus’ retinue in order to align with his own 
judgment that only a small number of slaves have the ability to transform themselves into 
capable and moral members of society. In other words, Dionysius uses Romulus’ asylum in order 
to think through his own thoughts on contemporary manumission and Roman expansion.  
Livy disagrees with Dionysius over the details about slaves in the story of the asylum. 
Livy explicitly judges the asylum as a source of Rome’s strength. Indeed, Livy insists that 
Romulus accepted any, and all, comers as citizens into his new polity and that this blanket 
acceptance was beneficial to new state’s power. Furthermore, unlike Dionysius’ description of 
Rome beginning with a carefully maintained hierarchy, Livy describes the initial Roman 
citizenry as an undifferentiated mass, with no distinction between former slaves and citizens.253 
But rather than being a weakness, this lack of distinction is a strength. Livy even writes that it 
was only after the motley crew of slaves and freemen arrived that Rome became a strong city: 
Eo ex finitimis populis turba omnis sine discrimine, liber an servus esset, avida novarum 
rerum perfugit, idque primum ad coeptam magnitudinem roboris fuit. Cum iam virium haud 
paeniteret consilium deinde viribus parat. 
 
A motley mob from the neighboring peoples flocked to the spot, with no distinction made as to 
whether they were free or slave, and all eager for a new start in life. These men were the 
beginning of the real strength of the city.254 
                                                 
252 Roman Antiquties, 4.24. For connection to the lex Aelia Sentia, see Mouritsen (2011a: 32-33). For more on this 
passage, see Chapter 3 Section 3b.  
253 As a narrator, Livy refers to the asylum myth to stress Rome’s humble origins (2.1.4). In a speech, Camillus 
refers to the asylum to emphasize Rome’s connection to that particular place (5.53.9). Later, Livy discusses the 
Greek origins of the word asylum, 35.51.2. Ovid paints a similar picture of Romulus’ asylum, Fasti 3.430-2. Cf. 
Dench (2005: 18-20).  
254 Livy’s insistence that the strength of the city began with the inclusions of these men has echoes with a reliquia of 
Cato’s Origines (Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 18.21.1). This echo is significant for manumission because it is tentatively 
further evidence that already in the second century Romans were using the asylum to think through the benefits of 
manumission. Unfortunately, in the cover-text, Gellius does not provide enough context to establish definitely that 
Cato is referring to the asylum, despite insistence from Schröder (1971: 175). Cf. the commentary in FRH 5 F 117. 
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Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.8, trans. P.T. Luce. 
 
For Livy, slaves, just as their free counterparts, had the ability to transform themselves into 
Romans, specifically Romans who had the ability to help Rome grow. In this way, Livy’s 
description of how slaves were among Romulus’ followers connects with Livy’s description of 
Vindicius’ manumission: if a slave was loyal enough to the Roman state, he gained his 
freedom.255   
c. The asylum, manumission, and the Roman state 
 For Livy, Romulus’ new city provided citizenship to slaves, thereby making Romulus a 
kind of manumittor, but he is a manumittor without the state’s gaze. For while Romulus’ asylum 
was not an act of manumission in a literal sense, nonetheless the story does emphasize that he 
was willing to trust and elevate men that other leaders had disregarded. Significantly, Romulus’ 
amnesty does not integrate slaves into the communities of their slave-owners, but rather allows 
them to participate in the creation of a new polity, along with other men generally deemed 
untrustworthy by prevailing cultural norms. Since Rome as a state does not yet exist, Livy does 
not write as if the state’s gaze was either organizing or disciplining, these men. The lack of the 
state’s organizing and disciplining gaze contributes to the lack of distinction between the 
followers of Romulus who used to be slaves and those who used to be citizens of the surrounding 
communities because without state representatives, or even men who temporarily take up the 
state’s perspective, there was little distinction among Romulus’ followers. As such, the story of 
Romulus’ asylum differs from manumission, as manumission, for slave-owners and for the state, 
is very much about the accepting of their own slaves into their own communities. Nonetheless, 
the description of how any man was able to join Romulus in his project, regardless of his 
background, has implications for how the Romans granted citizenship to their slaves because 
                                                 
255 For Vindicius, see Section 5 below.  
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Romulus’ use of slaves could function as an exemplum, especially since Livy himself explains 
that the lack of boundaries was a source of strength for the future Roman state. Both Dench and 
Wiseman read the story of Romulus’ asylum as an example of an indiscriminating and 
welcoming refuge. Dench and Wiseman also argue that for the Romans to valorize the asylum 
was to participate in a political discussion about which people were welcome at Rome.256 
 In contrast, Dionysius takes up the state’s gaze when surveying Rome’s beginning. The 
Greek historian’s careful catalogue of what property the Romans brought with them is the result 
of an ordering gaze. This gaze surveyed the Romans’ equipment, but then organized the details 
into a list that explains the purpose of the expedition. In a way, the gaze that Dionysius casts 
upon Rome’s founders is quite similar to the census, since he not only takes note of the rank of 
these men, but also what property they owned.257 When Dionysius looks upon Rome’s founding, 
he utilizes assumptions of his own experience of Rome, where the distinction between slave and 
free was essential. For Dionysius, after the founders arrive from the neighboring towns, they 
look upon their slaves with the same disciplining gaze. Dionysius naturalizes the state’s gaze, 
imagining it as preceding the existence of the Roman state itself.  
5. Vindicius and manumissio vindicta 
 While the story of Romulus’ asylum affirms the ability of slaves to integrate into the 
Roman state at the same level as free born citizens, the story of Vindicius raises the question of a 
slave’s loyalty in order to emphasize the divide between slave-owners and the Roman state. In 
the two elaborate versions of this story that survive, Livy and Plutarch praise Vindicius for 
choosing his loyalty to the newly formed Roman Republic over his loyalty to his master. In 
                                                 
256 Dench (2005: 3) writes, “…the myth of the asylum is strikingly uniterested in the legal procedures of 
manumission or enfranchisement, and within a Roman context [it is] an unusually impersonal, collective and 
potentially even popularist descent-myth…”. Cf. Wiseman (2009: 77).  
257 For the state’s gaze and the census, see Section 6d. below.  
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Dionysius’ version of the story, Vindicius does the right thing and collects his reward from the 
state, all while failing to act in a noble manner. Regardless of the different ways the writers 
describe Vindicius, the story makes clear that even though slave-owners own their slaves, 
nonetheless, the slaves should be loyal to the Roman state at the expense of their owners. The 
story of Vindicius highlights how the Roman state was not a tool of slave-owners, but rather a 
force that has its own concerns and interests. Furthermore, like the story of Romulus’ asylum, the 
story of Vindicius is a narrative by which Romans thought through the values and questions of 
manumission, rather than being simply an aetiological explanation of the names of one of the 
Roman methods of manumission. However, aetiology is an important aspect of the Vindicius 
story as well. More specifically, the prominent role that the state plays in the ritual of the 
manumissio vindicta has a parallel to the state’s prominence in the Vindicius’ story. The Romans 
assigned prominence within manumissio vindicta in part through the use of the festuca staff, a 
ritual instrument that was so closely associate with the act of manumission that referring to the 
festuca was shorthand for manumission.  
a. Overview of the Vindicius story and sources 
  While Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch differ in the level of detail that 
they provide for this story, and furthermore disagree with each other about the importance of this 
story, all three writers agree on the following in their accounts: While serving as one of the first 
consuls of the new Republic, Lucius Iunius Brutus was unaware that two of his sons, Titus and 
Tiberius, had joined a conspiracy to restore Tarquin Superbus to the throne. However, the slave 
Vindicius overhears Titus and Tiberius plotting with other members of the Vitelli and Aquilii. 
Specifically, Vindicius hears how the conspirators had written a letter to the exiled Tarquin. 
Vindicius then alerts the Roman authorities to the presence of this letter, which incontrovertibly 
demonstrates that these men, including Brutus’ sons, are guilty. Brutus refuses to let his love for 
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his family transform into mercy for traitors and proves his loyalty to the new government by 
overseeing the execution of his own sons. Because of his loyal service to the Roman state, 
Vindicius gets the reward of freedom and Roman citizenship.  
 The three writers are divided on how important this grant of freedom was. Both Livy and 
Plutarch assert that Vindicius’ manumission was the first example in Roman history in which a 
slave gained Roman citizenship with his freedom. As a result, these two writers further explain 
that Vindicius’ name was the origin of the vindicta in the phrase manumissio vindicta. 
Furthermore, Livy and Plutarch explain that it is because Vindicius gained his citizenship in his 
manumission that even now the Romans grant citizenship along with freedom in manumissio 
vindicta.258 In contrast, while Dionysius mentions the grant of freedom, he says nothing about 
how Vindicius’ name connects to manumissio vindicta.259 Dionysius omits this aspect of the 
story because according to him, at the time of Vindicius’ freedom, manumission was already 
connected to enfranchisement. In Book 4 of his history, Dionysius explains that King Servius 
Tullius had decreed that manumission was now connected to enfranchisement.260 
 On the one hand, since Vindicius’s story revolves around an eavesdropping slave who 
then reflects on what to do with his secret information, this story can easily be another piece of 
evidence for T.P. Wiseman’s argument for the close connection between Roman myth and the 
stage.261 Eavesdroppers are common in Roman comedy, and they are prone to reflexive 
monologues during, and after, learning secrets, and so it seems quite possible that at some point 
                                                 
258 Livy 2.5.10 and Plutarch Life of Publicola, 7.5.  
259 Roman Antiquities, 5.13.1.  
260 4.22.3-4. For more on this story, see Section 6b below.  
261 See Wiseman (1994: 10-18), (1995: 133-138) and (2008: 180-182). Keaveney (2003 and 2006) attacks the 
general idea that many Roman myths were performed on the stage. Kragelund (2002) supports Wiseman. Lendon 
reads this very idea as evidence of Wiseman’s moral failings (2009: 47 n.20).   
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Vindicius was a character on the Roman stage.262 On the other hand, the stories among the three 
different authors are different enough that it seems unlikely that they had adopted it from a single 
source. However, such a question also needs to take into consideration the three writers’ roles as 
authors.   
b. Vindicius’ loyalty to the state and his loyalty to his owners 
 As authors, the three writers had some control over their narratives, and they exercised 
this control in writing about the importance of Publicola. Plutarch and Dionysius’s rendition of 
Vindicus’ story glorifies Publicola.263 For the stories of the two Greek writers, Publicola is 
essential, since he is the one who initially believes Vindicius’ accusation against the Vitelli and 
Aquilii. Publicola then incites a mob of Romans to storm the house of the conspirators to find the 
concealed epistle. In contrast, Livy makes no mention of Publicola; he instead describes 
Vindicius alerting anonymous authorities after the conspirators had handed off the incriminating 
letter to foreign envoys. While Plutarch and Dionysius specify that it was the Aquillii who 
owned him, Livy does not, leaving open the possibility that in Livy’s version Vindicius was 
Brutus’ own slave.264 But because Livy makes no mention of Brutus owning Vindicius when he 
rewards the slave at the end of the story, it seems unlikely that Livy understood the story in that 
way. The writers also exercised their own, individual control over the narrative in their depiction 
of Vindicius himself. The three writers disagree with each other on the question of what kind of 
man earns his freedom by betraying his master.265    
 For Livy, Vindicius displays no hesitation about turning over his rebellious masters to the 
state, since the historian writes that the slave had suspicions even prior to hearing the young men 
                                                 
262 For an example of eavesdropping in Roman comedy, see Mostellaria, 157-312. For more on that passage, see 
Chapter 4 Section 3b.  
263 Contra Kleijwegt, who over emphasizes the similarities of accounts (2009: 320). 
264 Plutarch, Life of Publicola, 7.1. Dionysius: 5.10.4.  
265 Livy includes the stories of other slaves who turn informant: 22.33.2, 26.27.4, 27.3-5, 32.26. Cf. Fabre (1981: 
49).  
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discussing revolt. Vindicius anticipates their betrayal. He then quickly and intelligently acts, 
waiting to secure a letter so that his evidence will not simply be hearsay.  
 
nam cum pridie, quam legati ad Tarquinios proficiscerentur, cenatum forte apud Vitellios 
esset, coniuratique ibi remotis arbitris multa inter se de novo, ut fit, consilio egissent, 
sermonem eorum ex servis unus excepit, qui iam antea id senserat agi, sed eam occasionem, ut 
litterae legatis darentur, quae deprehensae rem coarguere possent, expectabat. Postquam 
datas sensit, rem ad consules detulit. 
 
The impending plot naturally required detailed discussion, in the course of which one of the 
slaves overheard them. This fellow had guessed even before what was afoot but was waiting 
for the moment when the envoys would be given the letter, which when seized would be proof 
of what was going on. When he saw that it had indeed been handed over, he reported the 
matter to the consuls.  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 2.4.5-6, trans. T.J. Luce. 
 
By having Vindicius procure a letter, Livy also sidesteps Roman expectations that in order for a 
slave’s testimony to be considered trustworthy, the slave must first be tortured.266 Indeed, for 
Livy, Vindicius’ dedication to the Republic makes him practically a citizen and, therefore, 
unworthy of torture. This depiction of Vindicius as a proto-citizen also allows Livy to entirely 
sidestep the question of what Vindicius might owe his owners, even though they are traitors, as 
well as sidestep any claims that these owners might try to exert over him in court.  
 For Plutarch, Vindicius believes in and uses the Roman hierarchy for the greater good. 
Plutarch imagines that Publicola was particularly willing to listen to and trust his subordinates. 
When Vindicius tells Publicola about the conspiracy, Publicola believes the slave, but in order to 
persuade the other Romans, Publicola has to procure the letter. Significantly, Vindicius knew 
that Publicola was a trusting man. For after Vindicius overhears the plot, he is initially at a lost 
for what to do, but then he decides to turn to Publicola because of his reputation for kindness and 
willingness to listen to subordinates.267 This detail makes Vindicius appear appropriately 
deferential to the Roman hierarchy. Furthermore, in Plutarch’s version there is an extended trial 
                                                 
266 For an overview of the legal sources on the torture of Roman slaves for evidence, see Gardner (2010: 430-2). See 
also Buckland (1970: 86-88). 
267 Life of Publicola, 4.3-4. 
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sequence, and so the biographer includes the detail that the accused Vitelli and Aquillii 
attempted to assert their ownership over Vindicius.268  
 Dionysius uses Vindicius’ petition of Publicola in order to depict a slave who is more 
concerned with his own life and safety than he is with the good of the Republic. According to 
Dionysius, Vindicius wanted to go to the consuls, but he doubted that Brutus would be able to 
put aside his feelings for his sons. Instead, he goes to Publicola. But rather than trusting in this 
man’s honesty, Vindicius asks the Roman leader swear an oath that what he will reveal will 
bring him no harm:  
…οὔσης ὡς ἀπεσταλμένος ὑπὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπὶ χρείαν τινά, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑπάτους ὤκνησεν 
ἐλθεῖν δεδιώς, μὴ συγκρύψαι τὸ πρᾶγμα βουλόμενοι διὰ τὴν εὔνοιαν τῶν συγγενῶν τὸν 
μηνύσαντα τὴν συνωμοσίαν ἀφανίσωσιν, ἀφικόμενος δ᾽ ὡς Πόπλιον Οὐαλέριον, ὃς ἐν τοῖς 
πρώτοις τέτταρσιν ἦν τῶν τὴν τυραννίδα καταλυσάντων, δεξιώσει καὶ δι᾽ ὅρκων τὸ πιστὸν 
παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ λαβὼν ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ μηνυτὴς ὧν τ᾽ ἤκουσε καὶ ὧν εἶδε γίνεται. 
 
…he hesitated to go to the consuls, lest, in their desire the keep the matter quiet out of 
goodwill for their kinsmen, they might do away with the one who gave information of the 
conspiracy, but went to Publius Valerius [Publicola], one of the four who had taken the lead in 
overthrowing the tyranny; and when this man had given him assurance of his safety by 
offering his hand and swearing oaths, he informed him of all that he had both heard and seen. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 5.7.4-5, trans. E. Cary. 
 
Dionysius depicts Vindicius as a reluctant and nervous witness. Such a man is unlikely to make 
good use of the money and civic rights that come with his reward. This dispiriting depiction of a 
slave is consistent with Dionysius’ antipathy towards slaves generally.269   
 By eliding that Vindicius indeed betrays his owners, all three writers attempt to avoid a key 
question about the relationship between slave-owners and the state: do they owe their loyalty to 
their owners because they themselves are outsiders, and it is their owners who are connected to 
                                                 
268 Life of Publicola, 7.1-2.  
269 For Dionysius, slaves and Romulus’ asylum, see Section 4 above. For his diatribe against Roman manumission, 
see Chapter 3 Section 3b.  
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the Roman state?270 Or do slaves owe their loyalty directly to the Roman state because they are 
part of Roman society? Patterson’s theory would demand the first explanation, as for him social 
death is in part predicated on how the social rejection of the slaves makes them into appendages 
of their owners.271 But the story of Vindicius suggests that the Romans saw slaves as having 
unmediated relationship with the Roman state, one in which the state looked upon their work, 
and evaluated their loyalty to itself, rather than their loyalty to their owners. Enslavement did not 
hide slaves behind their owners; the state still surveiled them, a condition that signals the 
importance of turning to Foucault. Foucault’s thoughts on the disperse centers of power elaborate 
why slaves could, and did, have relationships with the Roman state that had the potential of 
being in conflict with their slave-owners, even if most of the time the state and slave-owners 
embarked on similar projects of disciplining slaves. However, since Livy and Plutarch imply that 
slaves owe the Roman state loyalty, they cast them as members of Roman society. Slaves are 
under the disciplining gaze of state, even though the state has no obligation to represent them 
like it does the slave-owners. The story of Vindicius points to the state as the subject worthy of 
loyalty. The story also presents the state, not the owner, as that which has the power to transform 
the slave’s life from unlivable to livable.272 
c. Vindicius, citizenship, and manumission 
 By exalting loyalty to the state over loyalty to a slave-owner, the story of Vindicius does 
not address why it is that Roman citizens, through their own initiative, had the authority to 
change slaves into citizens. However, both Livy and Plutarch take the time to note explicitly that 
Vindicius’ manumission was the origin of manumissio vindicta. Why would both writers assert 
                                                 
270 Kleijwegt notes the absence of this question in Livy’s account (2009: 324). While I agree with Kleijwegt that 
Livy’s Vindicius story is a defense of freedmen’s standing in Rome, I disagree with his pairing of this story to 
Augustus’ antipathy towards freedmen.   
271 For Patterson and his theory of slavery as social death, see Chapter 1.  
272 For Butler and the unlivable life, see Chapter 1 Section 5b. For other examples of the Roman state rewarding the 
loyalty of slaves, see Livy, 22.33.2 and 32.26.14. Cf. the anonymous slave of Zeuxippus, 33.28.11-15. 
Chapter 2: See like a state: The state and Roman manumission 
 100 
this claim when they knew that in this aspect manumissio vindicta greatly differed from 
Vindicius’ manumission? For significantly, while the Roman state freed Vindicius without the 
consent of his masters, in manumissio vindicta, the slave-owner must be present and willing in 
order to free the slave. In other words, the motivations and details of Vindicius’ manumission 
appear to have nothing in common with manumission vindicta, other than the grant of 
citizenship. This discrepancy is particularly significant because both Plutarch and Livy have a 
unitarian conception of Roman history. Kurt Raaflaub and Timothy Cornell define a unitarian 
conception of history as one in which the time spanning from the archaic past to yesterday is 
singular. Time organized in this way is subject to the influence of a single, originary event.273 
Both Plutarch and Livy approached even small details within contemporary practices as having 
an intimate connection to antiquity. I argue that Livy and Plutarch understood manumissio 
vindicta as demanding three aspects that needed explanations that the story of Vindicius’ 
freedom provides. First, the story of Vindicius explains why it is that slaves are permitted to be 
citizens at all. Second, Plutarch and Livy found an explanation necessary because no other 
peoples in the Mediterranean consistently enfranchised their slaves upon manumission. Third, I 
further hypothesize that the two writers understood the story of Vindicius as the origin not only 
of the name of this type of manumission, but also the ritualized movements and instruments used 
in that practice. While neither writer reveals what sources they used for this narrative, it is 
possible that the aetiological core of the story is quite old. Indeed, the story perhaps dates to a 
time when the Romans needed to explain to themselves why their manumission practice differed 
from those of the surrounding peoples.  
 After explaining that the young aristocrats failed in their counter-revolution, Livy provides 
the following description of Vindicius’ manumission: 
                                                 
273 Raaflaub (2005: 10) and Cornell (2005: 59).  
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praemium indici pecunia ex aerario, libertas et civitas data. ille primum dicitur vindicta 
liberatus. quidam vindictae quoque nomen tractum ab illo putant; Vindicio ipsi nomen fuisse. 
post illum observatum, ut, qui ita liberati essent, in civitatem accepti viderentur. 
 
The slave was rewarded with a grant of money from the treasury, with freedom and with 
citizenship. He is said to have been the first slave to have been freed vindicta. Some think the 
word vindicta derived from his name, which they say was Vindicius. Thereafter those who 
were freed in this manner were regarded as having been received into Roman citizenship.  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 2.5.9-10, trans. T.J. Luce. 
 
By relating how his sources describe Vindicius as the first freedman, Livy gives the details of 
this manumission explanatory importance for understanding how manumission currently works 
in Rome. He then elaborates on the precise results of Vindicius’ manumission, as the historian 
explains that all slaves who are freed according to the process of manumissio vindicta become 
citizens. The implication of this description is that Livy knows that there are other types of 
manumission after which a slave is freed, but does not become a citizen, and that the true 
significance of Vindicius’ manumission was that he became a citizen. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Livy’s language has a legalistic tone to it: Daube notes that the phrase “qui ita 
liberati essent, in civitatem accepti viderentur” shares many similarities with jurists’ descriptions 
of manumission.274 It is therefore entirely possible that Livy used both legal texts and earlier 
aetiological narratives when he composed his own version of Vindicius’ manumission.  
 Plutarch similarly takes Vindicius’ manumission as the model for current Roman practices, 
albeit he adds certain legal details about Vindicius’ status as a citizen. Unsurprisingly, since he is 
writing a biography of Publicola, Plutarch credits Vindicius’ manumission specifically to 
Publicola.275 But a consequence of this attribution is that Publicola appears as Vindicius’ 
substitute slave-owner, thereby making Vindicius’ manumission more like manumissio vindicta. 
In Plutarch’s account, there is less emphasis on the state’s power to manumit a slave. Since 
                                                 
274 Daube (1946: 75). Cf. Watson (1975: 89). For Livy’s legal language, see also Crawford (1996: 29). 
275 Importantly, Plutarch’s biographies serve the dual purpose of attempting to recreate the past and attempting to 
impart moral pedagogy, see Beneker (2012), Pelling (2004), and Zadorojnyi (2011).  
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Publicola has a status similar to Vindicius’ owner, Plutarch’s description of Vindicius earning his 
freedom through loyalty appears more similar to the language of loyalty that slave-owners often 
used to justify the manumission of their slaves: 
ἀξίαν ἀπολαβὼν τῆς προθυμίας χάριν ἧς οἰόμενός τι δεῖν ἀπολαῦσαι τὸν Οὐινδίκιον 
ἐψηφίσατο πρῶτον ἀπελεύθερον ἐκεῖνον ἐν Ῥώμῃ γενέσθαι πολίτην καὶ φέρειν ψῆφον ᾗ 
βούλοιτο φρατρίᾳ προσνεμηθέντα. τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις ἀπελευθέροις ὀψὲ καὶ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον 
ἐξουσίαν ψήφου δημαγωγῶν ἔδωκεν Ἄππιος ἡ δὲ παντελὴς ἀπελευθέρωσις ἄχρι νῦν οὐινδίκτα 
λέγεται δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον, ὥς φασι, τὸν Οὐινδίκιον. 
 
He [Publicola] thought that Vindicius ought to share, and therefore had a decree passed which 
made him, first of all freedmen, a citizen of Rome, and entitled him to vote with any curia in 
which he chose to be enrolled. Other freedmen received the right of suffrage in much later 
times from Appius, who thus courted popularity. And from this Vindicius, as they say, a 
perfect manumission is to this day called "vindicta."  
Plutarch, Life of Publica, 7.4-5, trans. B. Perrin. 
 
Plutarch also takes the unusual step of describing Vindicius’ manumission as complete, 
“παντελής,” and that therefore all manumissions like Vindicius’ are similarly complete. Plutarch 
does not explain what it means for a manumission to be complete; but given the importance of 
Vindicius gaining citizenship in the story, presumably that is what Plutarch is highlighting. 
Further, the description of Vindicius’ manumission as complete implies that there are imperfect 
types of manumission, likely those that do not grant citizenship to the freed slave. As a Greek, 
especially a Delphic priest, Plutarch was well acquainted with that type of manumission, but here 
he appears to express a preference for the Roman method.276  
Notably, Plutarch writes about manumissio vindicta at a time when it was the only form 
of manumission that granted citizenship immediately. Testimony from Ulpian points to how in 
the later Empire, the Romans no longer used manumissio censu.277 While manumissio testamento 
granted citizenship, it was not immediate: the slave-owner announced his or her intentions to free 
a slave in his or her will, but this freeing did not occur until after the slave-owner died. 
Furthermore, once the owner was dead, the freed slaves were still vulnerable to legal challenge 
                                                 
276 For the manumissions at Delphi, see Hopkins (1978: 133-171) and Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005: 64-9). 
277 1.8. See Buckland (1970: 440). 
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by inheritors, including challenges that could rescind their manumission.278 Evidence from the 
Imperial Period points to how at that time there was another form of manumission called 
manumissio inter amicos.279 This form of manumission did not grant citizenship status upon 
completion, since the Dositheum Fragment explicitly states that slaves manumitted in this way 
are not citizens, that they are “non esse liberos”.280 A slaved freed through manumissio inter 
amicos could gain citizenship later, but the process of manumissio inter amicos itself did not 
grant citizenship.281 For a writer like Plutarch in the Imperial Period, manumissio vindicta was 
distinct in immediately granting citizenship.  
In addition to being a biographer, Plutarch was an antiquarian fascinated by the ritualistic 
details that made up Roman life and religion, as evidenced by his work The Roman Questions. 
Plutarch’s and Livy’s aetiological accounts of manumissio vindicta connect with the origin of the 
ritualized instruments and movements that the Romans imagined as being synonymous with that 
type of manumission. Comparable examples are the etymologies of the word manumissio by 
later Latin writers, in which they connect the phrase manu mittere to the practice of slapping a 
slave upon manumission.282 These authors were undeterred by the lack of actual antiquarian 
evidence that archaic Romans had slapped slaves when they freed them. They instead implicitly 
appealed to the idea that movements preceded names. So when Plutarch describes the 
                                                 
278 Owners could and at times did place requirements in their wills that slaves had to fulfill to obtain manumission, 
requirements that slaves did not always fulfill, cf. Buckland (1970: 492-4).  
279 Fragmenta Dositheina, 4 and 5. 
280 Fabre explicitly states that these slaves are not citizens: “l’eslave libére informellement n’accède pas à la libertas 
pleine, c’est-à-dire la citoyenneté” (1980: 56). Cf. Buckland (1970: 444-5) and Mouritsen (2011a: 85-86).  
281 cf. Pliny Epistulae, 7.16.4 and see Mouritsen (2011a: 189 n. 313) for comment. Notably, in his taxonomy of 
manumission, Cicero excludes inter amicos, suggesting that under the Republic, it was not valid; see Section 7 
below. 
282 Sextus Pompeius Festus 158.10-22 and Isidorus 9.4.48. Harper (2011: 468-474) surveys the Latin sources and 
convincingly argues that there is no indication that the alapa was a Republican practice. For more on the 
development of manumission in the Imperial Period, see the Conclusion below.  
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movements involved in the process of manumission, I argue that he is seeing the movement of 
the staff as intimately bound up with the entire process of manumission.283  
d. Manumissio vindicta and the festuca  
 There is a strong and persistent connection between the manumissio vindicta and the 
festuca staff. The story of Vinidicius is, in part, an aetiology that explains the complex 
relationship of the slave-owner, slave, and state within the process of manumissio vindicta. For 
just as how it was the Roman state rather than Vindicius’ owners who freed him, so too in 
manumissio vindicta, it is a citizen participant other than the slave-owner who initially 
recognizes the slave as a free person and who has to convince both the slave-owner and the state 
that the slave in question should go free. In other words, both the ritualized practice of 
manumisio vindicta and the story of Vindicius grant the role of liberator to people other than the 
slave-owner, specifically people closely associated with the state. The ritualized movements of 
manumissio vindicta function to make memorable, and honor, a slave-owner’s request that a 
slave should now be treated a citizen. At the same time, the movements and instruments of the 
manumissio vindicta operate such that they remind the participants that the power of 
manumission does not lie within the slave-owner, but rather within the Roman state.  
Plautus reveals that Republican Romans used the festuca, a type of ceremonial staff, to 
manumit slaves. However, only the writers of the Imperial Period provide descriptions of how 
the Romans performed manumissio vindicta. Because of the intervening centuries, it is 
dangerous to assume that these writers had the same process in mind. Indeed, Gaius in particular 
is aware that Roman practices had the potential to change over time. Unsurprisingly, this jurist 
provides slightly different descriptions of how the movement of the festuca was part of 
                                                 
283 See Plutarch’s description of the κάρφος in Section 5d below.  
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manumissio vindicta. I argue that Bourdieu’s conception of the habitus explains both the 
tendency of such ritualize practice to change overtime while still retaining its power.  
 Plautus’ writing proves that festuca was such an integral part of manumission in the late 
third and early second century that the festuca could represent the entirety of the manumission 
through synecdoche. In the Miles Gloriosus, the slave Palaestro is describing to the soldier 
Pyrgopolinices a woman who has the potential to be his lover. Since Pyrgopolinices has never 
met the woman, he questions Palaestro about her. Indeed, his first question is the status of the 
woman, whether or not she is free and what kind of free woman she is: 
PYRG. Quid ea? ingenuan an festuca facta e serva libera’st? 
PAL. Vah, egone ut ad te ab libertina esse auderem internuntius, 
qui ingenuis satis responsare nequeas quae cupiunt tui? 
 
PYRGOPOLINICES: What woman is she? Freeborn? Or by the staff was she made free from 
being a slave? 
PALAESTRO: Oh, could I, as a messenger, dare to tell you that she is a freedwoman, 
Since you are scarcely able to answer all the freeborn women who want you?  
Plautus, Miles Gloriosus, 961-3, translation my own. 
 
Since Pyrgopolinices readily agrees to Palaestro’s description of women, it is clear that, for 
Pyrgopolinices, there is a strict hierarchy of free women: those who were originally slaves are 
lower than those who were born free. His description of manumission as “festuca facta e serva 
libera’st?” reflects this hierarchy, emphasizing how this woman is free only by virtue of a crude 
instrument. Plautus’ emphasis on a phallic object like the festuca in Palaestro’s frank discussion 
of sex raises the possibility that the actors incorporated sexualized gestures into their 
performance.284 This line is also another example of Plautus’ use of his elastic Greek setting for 
humor, as the line prompts his audience to laugh at why the supposed Greek, Pyrgopolinices, 
makes use of a specifically Roman custom when thinking about manumission.  
                                                 
284 Marshall argues that it is possible that Plautus’ performers used something similar to oversized phallus from the 
Greek costumes (2006: 64-6). 
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 Pluatus makes a similar joke in the Curculio when the slave Planesium demands her 
freedom in the following way: 
Em istoc verbo vindictam para: 
si amas, eme, ne rogites, facito ut pretio pervincas tuo. 
bene vale.  
 
Go, and with that word, prepare the staff. If you love me, buy me, don’t negotiate, make it so 
that you prevail with your price. Farewell! 
Plautus, Curculio, 212-213, translation my own. 
 
The problem with this line by itself is that it is not clear if Plautus refers to the vindicta as a 
physical object to the process of manumissio vindicta.285 I argue that Plautus is referring to the 
physical staff used in manumissio vindicta for two reasons. First, Plautus uses the staff as a 
synecdoche of manumission in the Miles Gloriosus. Second, as a physical object in this setting, 
the vindicta becomes a double entendre, and given the sexualized nature of Roman comedy, why 
would Plautus pass up a double entendre?286 For the speaker, Planesium, is a slave of pimp 
Cappadox. Furthermore, in these lines, she is addressing her paramour, the adulescens 
Phaedromus. As a double entendre, her words are not only a command for Phaedromus to 
prepare for her manumission, but also for him to prepare his own private “staff” for her loving 
attention. However, while Plautus’ testimony reveals that when he wrote in the third and second 
centuries, the festuca was synonymous with manumission, he does not indicate how the Romans 
used it or what it was.  
 Similarly, the Greek antiquarian Plutarch demonstrates that in the Imperial Period the 
Romans considered this instrument vital for manumission, but he also does not clarify what it 
                                                 
285 The Oxford Latin Dictionary interprets this line as referring to the process of manumission, (Glare 2012: vindicta 
1). Lewis and Short interpret it as referring to the staff (Lewis and Short 1879: vindicta I). There is a similar 
ambiguity in Cicero’s list of the three types of manumission (Topica 10, see Section 7 below). Cf. Fabre (1981: 18). 
286 Fontaine (2010: 118) notes how Curculio, 689-90, includes the comparison of a turgid penis to a taut catapult 
spring. See also Fontaine (2007). For the intersection of Roman sexuality and comedy generally, see Richlin (1992). 
Williams (2010: 36-39) has a number of excellent case studies of the intersection of Roman sexuality and slaves on 
the stage. Both Williams (2010: 36 n. 126) and Richlin (1992: 1-31) note the importance of puns for the Roman 
discussion of sex.  
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was. Both Plutarch’s Greek rendering of festuca and the Roman antiquarian Varro’s philological 
discussion of it fail to articulate what kind of instrument it was. Plutarch renders festuca as 
κάρφος, a word with a wide range of meanings that includes sticks of cinnamon and the twigs 
that birds use to build nests.287 However, in his use of κάρφος, Plutarch does explain how the 
Romans used this instrument in manumission: 
Ῥωμαῖοι δέ, οὕς ἄν εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαιρῶνται, κάρφος αὐτῶν λεπτὸν ἐπιβάλλουσι τοῖς 
σώμασιν.  
 
And on the other hand, the Romans, whenever they announce certain people as free, they take 
up their staff and lay it upon the slaves.  
Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta, 550b, translation my own. 
 
Although Plutarch does not mention manumissio vindicta by name in this passage, since he 
emphasizes here the immediate process of a slave becoming free, it is almost certain that he is 
thinking of the same process that, in the Publicola, he described as “complete manumission.” Of 
course, in Plutarch’s description, κάρφος could still mean a piece of straw, as it is entirely 
possible to touch someone with a piece of straw.288 Varro explains that festuca was a type of 
stalk. 
Rastelli ut irpices serrae leves; itaque homo in pratis per fenisecia eo festucas corradit, quo ab 
rasu rastelli dicti. Rastri, quibus dentatis penitus eradunt terram atque eruunt, a quo rutu 
ruastri dicti. 
 
Rastelli ‘hay-rakes’, like harrows, are saw-toothed instruments, but light in weight; therefore a 
man in the meadows at haying time corradit ‘scrapes together’ with this the stalks [festucas], 
from which rasus ‘scraping’ they are called rastelli. 
Varro, Lingua Latina, 5.31, 134, trans. R.G. Kent.289   
 
This agrarian association is fruitful for R.G. Nisbet, who is interested in creating the proper 
symbolic meaning for the festuca in the context of manumission.290 Plutarch’s Greek account of 
the festuca provides the important detail that a slave must be touched by the festuca to be 
                                                 
287 Cinnamon: Herodotus, 3.111. Bird’s nest: Aristophanes, Aves, 643. Cf. LSJ κάρφος.  
288 A position that Grimm (1854: 127) was willing to entertain, much to Nisbet’s surprise (1914: 1-2). 
289 With the exception of festucas, all the Latin in the English translation is Kent’s own. De Vaan finds no 
etymology for festuca (2008: 216). 
290 Nisbet (1914).  
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considered free, while Varro’s Latin account points to how the term was used outside the setting 
of manumission. The jurist Gaius provides more details about how the festuca was in 
manumission itself.  
 Although jurist Gaius does not describe the process of manumissio vindicta, he does 
describe two processes, the adsertio libertatis and the vindicatio’, that appear to be connected to 
the process of manumissio vindicta. Adsertio libertatis was a process in which one Roman 
claimed a particular person was a slave while the slave in question asserted that he or she was in 
fact a free person. Most of the details of this procedure come from late antiquity, but there are 
two pieces of evidence that suggest that some form of this procedure dated from an early period 
in the Republic. The more tentative evidence is that of Livy and Dionysius. Both historians 
describe Appius Claudius, one of the decemviri of the fifth century, as misusing adsertio 
liberatatis in order to enslave a plebeian woman, a hubristic act that culminates in his own 
downfall.291 The more authoritative evidence is from Polybius’ account of the fourth century 
treaty between Rome and Carthage. In order to prevent the Romans and the Carthaginians from 
enslaving each others’ citizens, the treaty included provisions which sought to ensure that people 
who claimed to be unjustly enslaved had legal avenues to correct this injustice.292 Given these 
two testimonies to the antiquity of the procedure, it is possible that the Romans used elements 
from the procedure of adsertio libertatis when they created the legal process of manumission, 
most especially the role of the adsertor. Since slaves, along with women and men who were not 
Roman citizens, could not represent themselves in the Roman court, the adsertor was the person 
who advocated on behalf of the person who claimed to be enslaved wrongfully. Since this role 
appears quite similar to the role that the man who vouches for the freedom of the slave in cases 
                                                 
291 Livy: 3.47-58, Dionysius: 11.28-46.  
292 Polybius, 6.24.6-7.  
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of manumissio vindicta, W.W. Buckland uses the same term to describe the role within 
manumissio vindicta.293  
 According to Gaius, in his time, the festuca was an integral part of the legal process named 
vindicatio. A vindicatio is a dispute about who owns a specific piece of property, in which two 
men agree to abide by the decision of a magistrate.294 Because authors like Plautus make plain 
that the festuca was used in manumissio vindicta and because of the similarity between the 
names manumissio vindicta and vindicatio, Buckland, Mouritsen, and Tondo have used Gaius’ 
description of vindicatio for evidence about the practice of manumissio vindicta.295 An additional 
reason to assume that the process of vindicatio was similar to manumissio vindicta is that Gaius 
uses a slave as his example of a disputed property. To clarify, Gaius is not describing a 
procedure that is only for disputes over slaves. Rather, Gaius is describing a procedure that the 
Romans used for any dispute over any type of moveable property; he is simply using a slave as 
an example.296 For remember, Gaius’ text is a book that introduces the practice of law.297  
Qui vindicabat, festucam tenebat; deinde ipsam rem adprehendebat, velut hominem, et ita 
dicebat: HUNC EGO HOMINEM EX IURE QUIRITIUM MEUM ESSE AIO SECUNDUM 
SUAM CAUSAM; SICUT DIXI, ECCE TIBI, VINDICTAM INPOSUI, et simul homini festucam 
inponebat. Adversarius eadem similiter dicebat et faciebat. Cum uterque vindicasset, praetor 
dicebat: MITTITE AMBO HOMINEM. 
 
If the property at issue is indeed moveable and carried or lead into court, in this way. The 
claimant would hold a rod [festuca]; then he would take hold of the actual property, for 
instance a slave, and say “I declare that this slave is mine by quiritary right in accordance with 
my case. As I have spoken, see, I have placed the rod [vindicta]”, and at the same time he laid 
the rod on the slave. When each of them had made this claim the praetor would say: “Both of 
you, let go the slave.”  
Gaius, Institutiones, 4.16, trans. Gordon and Robinson, modified. 
 
Afterwards, the two men state their reasons for why the property justly belongs to them. Then the 
                                                 
293 Cf. Buckland Manumissio vindicta (1970: 441-2) and adsertores literatis (1970: 655-658). 
294 The male pronouns are explicit. While Roman women did manumit slaves, jurists such as Gaius are describing 
and constructing a legalistic world of and for men.  
295 Buckland (1970: 451), Mouritsen (2011a: 11-12), Tondo (1967: 2-8 and passim.). 
296 For Gaius’ interest in moveable property, see 2.40-61. Cf. du Plessis (2015: 81). For Patterson on Roman 
property law, see Chapter 1 Section 4a.  
297 For Gaius as a pedagogue of law, see Gordon and Robinson’s introduction to their translation of Gaius (1988) 
and Ibbetson (2015: 29).  
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magistrate makes his decision. In this passage, Gaius himself only describes the instrument as a 
festuca, but in the formula that he ascribes to this legal process, he notes that the instrument is 
called a vindicta. In both Gaius’ words and in the words of the formula, the word used to 
describe the motion of the instrument towards the slave is impono, a movement that appears to 
correspond to the motion that Plutarch describes as ἐπιβάλλουσι.298 As a result of this similarity, 
along with others, it is logical to use the Gaius’ description of vindicatio as the basis for a 
reconstruction of manumissio vindicta. 
 Having reviewed the vindicatio, I turn to the reconstructed manumissio vindicta. 
Manumissio vindicta appears to have included five aspects: 1) the slave is the property, the slave-
owner is the defendant, and a witness is asked to be the adsertor. 2) The defendant and the 
adsertor perform the movements with the festuca that Gaius describes. 3) The adsertor then 
states his reasons for why the slave should be considered free, according to some sort of formula. 
4) The defendant waives his right to defend his right to the property. 5) Since the defendant 
offers no defense, the magistrate is obligated to grant freedom to the slave. It is important to note 
that steps 3) through 5) are reconstructed in large part through the assumption that the Romans 
initially created the legal process of vindicatio, and only later adopted it as a legal tool for 
manumissions.299 Prior to examining fully the role that festuca plays in manumissio vindicta, it is 
first necessary to both look at Gaius’ own description of the instrument as well as other writers’ 
descriptions of the movements within this ritual.   
 In addition to describing how the festuca functions within the process of vindicatio, Gaius 
also provides a history of the festuca which suggests, but does not prove, that this instrument was 
something more magisterial than a piece of straw: 
                                                 
298 Cf. ἐπιβάλλουσι in De Sera Numinis, 550b. See above Section 5c above.  
299 Buckland (1970: 451), Mouritsen (2011a: 11-12), Tondo (1967: 2-8 and passim.). 
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festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco, signo quodam iusti dominii, quando iusto dominio 
ea maxime sua esse credebant, quae ex hostibus cepissent; unde in centumviralibus iudiciis 
hasta proponitur.  
 
Nevertheless, they used a festuca in place of a spear, which once was the sign of proper 
ownership, when they trusted in those things most certainly to be his according to proper 
ownership, specifically those things they took from the enemy. For the spear was used in the 
courts of the centumviri.   
Gaius, Institutiones, 4.16, trans. Gordon and Robinson.  
 
Gaius’ explanation that the festuca is a replacement for a spear suggests that the festuca was a 
staff or rod.300 On the one hand, this interpretation of Gaius’ writing makes sense, as it sensible 
that a Roman, when presented with a staff in a law court, would connect that staff to a spear; 
such a substitution is an example of the ritual sense that Bell describes, that is, a type of aesthetic 
sense of what is appropriate in a ritual setting.301 Of course, the substitution also makes sense in 
either a Freudian or Lacanian framework, that is, a framework in which phallic-like objects are 
associated with authority.302 Such a framework would also explain the sexual connections in 
Plautus’ use of the festuca. While Gaius’ description is in part an assertion of his juristic 
authority through his antiquarian knowledge, his explanation of how the festuca used to be a 
spear also points to how the Romans themselves were somewhat aware of the mutable nature of 
their practices. In other words, Gaius suggests that the Romans were not completely unaware of 
the improvisational nature of their practices; that is, at times, they thought about their practices 
similar to Bourdieu’s habitus.303 
 In Gaius’ description of vindicatio, the festuca distinguishes the adsertor from the 
defendant.304 For note how Gaius writes that the adsertor who holds the festuca and then touches 
the slave with this staff: “Qui vindicabat, festucam tenebat…et simul homini festucam 
                                                 
300 Buckland (1970: 451), Nisbet (1914). Watson (1975) and Mouritsen (2011a) follow them. 
301 Bell (2009: 80). See also Chapter 1 Section 6.  
302 There is an important difference between these frameworks: for Freud, there is a close connection between the 
penis and the phallus, whereas for Lacan, the phallus’ power resides in a realm completely separate from biology. 
See Lacan (1981: 315-6).   
303 For Bourdieu’s habitus, see Chapter 1 Section 6.  
304 Tondo notes that the slave-owner has a passive role (1967: 32-33). Cf. Mouritsen (2011a: 11).  
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inponebat.” In contrast, the defendant merely touches the slave with his hand. Indeed, the 
defendant touches the slave after the vindicator while not touching the festuca. The two men then 
lift their hands from the slave at the same time. As a result, in the description of manumissio 
vindicta based on Gaius’ account, the festuca visually distinguishes the roles of the two men: the 
man holding the festuca is the one asserting that the slave should be free, while the one who does 
not hold the festuca is the slave-owner. Such a visual distinction established for the collected 
witnesses, that is, those who looked upon the action with the state’s gaze, who in this ritual 
practice had the authority to grant the slave freedom: the man holding the festuca.  
 On the other hand, testimony from two other jurists from the second and third centuries 
suggest that in at least some manumissions, the slave-owner or the presiding official used the 
festuca at some point during the process. Ulpian describes the instrument used in manumission 
not as a festuca, but as a vindicta. That this word stands for the instrument rather than for the 
abstract process of manumission is clear from Ulpian’s use of the verb impono: 
Potest et servus sine dolo malo in libertate morari, ut puta testamento accepit libertatem, quod 
nullius momenti esse ignorat, vel vindicta ei imposita est ab eo, quem dominum esse putavit, 
cum non esset, vel educatus est quasi liber, cum servus esset.  
 
It is even possible for a slave to remain in freedom without bad faith, as in the case of one who 
accepted freedom during a contested will, since during the moment he knows nothing of it. Or 
the vindicta has been placed upon him by a man whom he thinks to be his master, when he is 
not. Or he was raised as if a freeman when he was a slave. 
Digest. 40.12.12.2 = Ulpianus 55 ad ed, translation my own.  
 
According to Ulpian, the slave-owner at some point during manumissio vindicta holds the 
festuca and places it upon the slave.305 In contrast, the jurist Paulus suggests that the magistrate 
holds the festuca during some part of the ceremony when he asserts that an imperator does not 
need a festuca in order to manumit a slave:  
Imperator cum servum manumittit, non vindictam imponit, sed cum voluit, fit liber is qui 
manumittitur ex lege augusti.  
                                                 
305 The jurist Tyrphonus provides similar details. Digest. 49.17.19.4 = Tryphonus 18 disp.  
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When an imperator manumits a slave, he does not place the festuca, but when he wishes, the 
man who is manumitted under the law of Augustus becomes free.  
Digest, 40.1.14.1 = Paulus 16 ad plaut, translation my own.306 
 
With these additional testimonies about the process of manumissio vindicta, there is the 
possibility that these authors are either describing different steps of the same process or they are 
giving accounts of different ways of preforming manumissio vindicta. Possibly the Romans used 
the festuca either in different ways over time or in different ways at the same time.307 But clearly 
the Romans required at least one of the participants to touch the slave with a festuca in order for 
the manumissio vindicta to be done properly. 
 I argue that Bourdieu’s habitus in part explains the varied accounts in the sources.308 For 
the habitus, the collective repository of movement and words, does not demand that movements 
and words be repeated precisely in order to create a powerful practice. Despite Roman insistence 
on repetition and perfection in ritual, as evidenced by their repeating rituals until they are 
properly done, they were nonetheless free to change their rituals, especially if, in the moment, 
some new movement or word appeared to the practitioners to compliment their own experiences 
of that moment. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s emphasis on the importance of iteration to habitus has 
important connections to Butler’s discussion of the importance of reproduction to subjection.309 
The obvious objection to this position is that the Romans themselves do not write as if they had 
this freedom. But a corollary to Bourdieu’s emphasis on innovation within practice is that a key 
part of practice is the forgetting of practices’ own past, since it is only by forgetting that practices 
have a history that it is possible to imagine that they are natural and intuitive.310  
                                                 
306 Cf. Monier (1953: 198). 
307 Cf. Harper’s description of how in the Imperial Period one movement associated with manumission, the vertigo, 
was eventually replaced by the alapa (2011: 468-470).  
308 For more on the connection of Bourdieu’s thought and manumission, see Chapter 1.  
309 See Chapter 3 Section 2a.  
310 Bourdieu (1977: 78-9).  
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 The festuca was a ritual instrument that served as a focal point for the state’s gaze. By 
using this instrument, the performers of the manumissio vindicta marked their motions and words 
during this time as distinct and of a more lasting register than the motions and words of their 
daily lives. As Gaius explains, the festuca associated the proceedings of the manumission to the 
Roman courts, since Romans such as Gaius viewed the instrument as a connection to the court of 
the centumviri. The use of the festuca also asserts that the slave-owner cannot complete the 
manumission on his own, that he must ensure that the manumission is completed according to 
the norms established by the Roman state.  
 That ancient writers provide different accounts of who held the festuca does not diminish 
its importance to the state’s gaze; instead, these differing accounts suggest that it was the 
presence of the festuca rather than a particular set of people that empower the manumissio 
vindicta to free the slave. The festuca coordinated the recognition of the slave as a freedperson. 
The state’s gaze is also present in manumissio vindicta in order to discipline the participants. 
Both the magistrate and the adsertor are witnesses who ensure that the slave-owner is not doing 
anything untoward. Nonetheless, within manumissio vindicta, the two men perform very 
different actions. On the one hand, the magistrate primarily observes, being almost as passive as 
the slave in question.311 On the other hand, the adsertor makes movements and speaks words that 
parallel the slave-owner: they both touch the slave, they both say formulaic words about the 
status of the slave. Significantly though, it is an adsertor, not the slave-owner, who claims the 
slave is free. In effect, the adsertor, a representative of the state, claims to recognize the slave as 
both a free person and a citizen prior to the completion of the manumissio vindicta. The 
magistrate, also a representative of the state, judges this claim to be valid. Just as how in the 
story of Vindicius, it was the state who recognized Vindicius as free rather than his masters, so, 
                                                 
311 Cf. Tondo (1967: 23-51).  
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too, during the manumissio vindicta, it was the representatives of the state who first recognized 
the slave as free, rather than the slave-owner. In both the story of Vindicius and the ritual of 
manumissio vindicta, it is the state’s gaze that initially recognizes the slave as free, not the 
owner.  
e. Manumissio vindicta gone wrong: Cicero and the state’s gaze 
 The importance of the state’s recognition of the slave’s new status is perhaps most 
evident in Cicero’s treatment of his freedman Chrysippus. Cicero’s vindictive attempt to revoke 
Chrysippus’ freedom not only points to the separate interests of the slave-owners and the Roman 
state, but also how necessary witnesses to manumission were to ensure that the process 
proceeded as the law intended. Since Cicero had not properly observed the legal procedures 
when he manumitted Chrysippus, he instead presided over an undisciplined manumission. After 
the fact, Cicero took advantage of this disorganization to advance his interests as a private slave-
owner, albeit by resorting to subterfuge.  
 In a letter that he wrote to Atticus in November 50 BCE, Cicero complains that two of his 
freedmen had run away from his son, including a certain Chrysippus whom Cicero derides as 
only somewhat literate.312 Chrysippus’ flight so wounds Cicero that he wishes to harm this man, 
even though he does not know where he is: Cicero wants to rescind his freedom. The minor 
problem that Roman slave-owners did not legally have the power to take back freedom appears 
not to have stopped the great lawyer for long, since Cicero simply looked for a precedent for 
authorizing re-enslavement because of procedural errors during the act of manumission itself.313 
                                                 
312 Through this description, Cicero’s ill-will is apparent. In earlier works, Cicero writes that Chrysippus worked 
with Tyrannion to improve the library of Cicero’s son (Epistulae ad Q. Fratrem 3.4.5 and 3.5/6.6, see Treggiari 
(1969: 257-8). Cf. Cicero’s freedmen Tyrannion and Dionysius who at times acted as librarians (Yarrow 2006: 40-
1).  
313 For the legal methods of enslavement, see Buckland (1970: 397-405). 
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Cicero believed that he had found a possible candidate for such a precedent and asked Atticus if 
he agrees: 
Itaque usurpavi illud Drusi, ut ferunt, praetoris in eo qui eadem liber non iuraret, me istos 
liberos non addixisse, praesertim cum adesset nemo a quo recte vindicarentur. Id tu, ut 
vidbitur, ita accipies; ego tibi adsentiar.  
 
So I have followed the precedent of Drusus the Praetor, so they say, in the case of the slave 
who would not retake the oath after manumission, and have denied giving them their 
freedom—all the more easily since there was nobody there by whom they were competently 
represented [vindicarentur]. You will react to this as you think proper and I shall assent to your 
judgment.  
Cicero, Ad Atticum 7.2.8 = Shackleton Bailey 125.8, trans. Shackleton Bailey, modified.314 
 
While a later letter reveals that Atticus did support Cicero’s plan, since nothing else is known 
about Drusus’ case, how faithful or expedient Cicero’s reading of that case is is open to 
question.315 But it is possible to risk a reconstruction of Cicero’s interest in Drusus based on the 
reasonable assumption that Cicero had manumitted these men while he himself was a 
magistrate.316 As a magistrate with imperium, Cicero had the authority to oversee cases of 
manumissio vindicta. As mentioned above, manumissio vindicta required both the participation 
of a magistrate and the slave-owner.317 So when Cicero writes to Atticus that these men had been 
freed without proper representation, it is possible that he is claiming that the actual event of their 
manumission had consisted of himself functioning as both adsertor libertatis and magistrate.318 
In short, Cicero asks Atticus if it is a good idea to pronounce Chrysippus a runaway slave, rather 
                                                 
314 Watson reads this passage as Cicero quoting Drusus in oratio obliqua in the clause “me istos liberos non 
addixisse” (1967: 192). Shackleton Bailey more reasonably argues instead that this clause is subordinate to “ut 
ferunt” (1968: 288-9). 
315 Ad Atticum, 7.5.3 = Shackleton Bailey 128.3. 
316 Cicero was, resentfully, a proconsul of Cilicia from 51 to 50 (cf. Ad Atticum 5.2), and so it is logical to assume 
that he manumitted Chrysippus during this time. However, Cicero does not mention when he manumitted 
Chrysippus; the first mention of him is in 54 and it is unclear if he was a slave or a freedman at that time (Ad Q. 
Fratrem 3.4.5).  
317 For the reconstruction of manumissio vindicta, see Section 5d above. Watson cites this specific incidence for the 
importance of the adsertor libertatis (1967: 191-2). 
318 Arrangio-Ruiz first explained this confusing passage (1938: 15-33). Shackleton Bailey’s explanation of Cicero’s 
legal strategy for attacking Chrysippus places more emphasis on an oath of loyalty that Chrysippus owed Cicero 
(1968: 288-9). Watson’s interpretation emphasizes Cicero’s attempt to play both the adsertor libertatis and 
magistrate (1967: 191-2). Watson’s view prevails in Mouritsen’s account (2011a: 55), while Treggiari (1969: 257-8) 
and Fabre (1981: 54) consider the oath an equally important part of Cicero’s stratagem. 
Chapter 2: See like a state: The state and Roman manumission 
 117 
than a disloyal freedman, by admitting that Cicero himself had not followed all the procedures 
involved in a proper manumission. 
 By conducting Chrysippus’ manumission alone, Cicero attempted to avoid the state’s 
gaze from settling on his own actions, even though as a magistrate he himself was entrusted to 
look upon manumissions as the state’s representative. Without the gaze of witnesses to discipline 
Cicero, and to recall the when and where of the manumission itself, Chrysippus’ freedom was 
vulnerable to Cicero’s post hoc machinations. Cicero’s gaze upon this long past, and completed, 
manumission is not entirely that of the state, as he has neither fully abstracted Chrysippus’ 
manumission nor even made it anonymous, or properly bureaucratic. Cicero’s rant to Atticus 
makes clear that he wants to punish Chrysippus not because of abstract reasons, but because of 
deeply personal ones, an urge to punish quite separate from the state’s motivations.319 
That Chrysippus’ absence personally wounded Cicero goes against Foucault’s description of the 
impersonal aspect of the disciplining gaze.320 Rather, Cicero’s anger points to the need for 
Butler’s description of how the trajectories of power are connected to our psychic interiorities.321 
Furthermore, Butler’s comment on the connection between the sense of triumph and social death 
possibly illuminate the origins of Cicero’s rancor.322 Cicero refuses to recognize Chrysippus as a 
freedman and, instead, views the man as his own slave, even though the state—through Cicero’s 
own words as a magistrate—has recognized Chrysippus as a freedman.  
 Cicero’s perfidy towards Chryippus distracts from the impotency of his plan. In his letter 
to Atticus, Cicero gives no indication that he has any idea where Chrysippus is or what he is 
                                                 
319 Cicero’s complaints about Chrysippus’ loyalty explains the rationale for Augustus’ introduction of the accusatio 
ingrati liberati as part of the lex Aelia Sentia (cf. Mouritsen 2011a: 53-6). Since little enough is known about the law 
itself, it is equally unclear if this law had any Republican precedent. Given his other problems with his freedman 
Hilarus, Cicero likely did not have formal legal recourse.   
320 For Foucault, since the viewers within the panopticon are interchangeable, their particular motives are of no 
importance (1995: 202).      
321 See Chapter 1 Section 5a. 
322 See Chapter 1 Section 5b and also Chapter 3 Section 2a. 
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doing, and so it would matter little if Cicero successfully rebranded Chrysippus as a runaway 
slave.323 What this incident does make clear is that the freedman escaped the gaze of his former 
owner, who then attempts to take up the state’s gaze in order to punish him. That Cicero has to 
toggle between the gaze of the slave-owner, who evaluates Chrysippus worth in terms of his past 
loyalty as a slave and future prospects as a client freedman, and the gaze of the state, which is 
concerned only with whether the manumission was performed correctly, further demonstrates the 
conflicting values and fields of vision behind, and within, the gazes of Roman slave-owners and 
the Roman state. Manumissio vindicta, rather than being a simple process of a slave-owner 
making public his or her decision to free a slave, was instead a practice intimately involved with 
the state in order to generalize the new recognition of the slave as free.  
f. The Roman state and manumissio vindicta 
 To review: in the aetiological stories about the origins of manumissio vindicta, it is the 
state, rather than the slave-owner, who has the authority and receives the credit for freeing the 
slave. Likewise, the movements and instruments associated with manumissio vindicta—as 
reconstructed by its supposed similarities to vindicatio—suggest that in the ritual itself, the slave-
owner did not have a prominent role; instead, the representatives of the state, both the adsertor 
and the magistrate, are more significant. The prominence of these roles, possibly, also explains 
why Cicero took up the role of the magistrate rather than adsertor when he freed his own 
freedmen. I argue that the state’s prominence in both the stories and the ritual is indicative of the 
state’s stake in manumission. That is, these stories and rituals contain clues for reconstructing the 
state’s view of manumission. 
 The hypothesis of the legal dodge in the development of the laws around Roman 
manumission further strengthens my argument that the Roman state had interests in manumission 
                                                 
323 Chrysippus and his anonymous companion were not the only two slaves to escape Cicero; cf. Ad Atticum, 6.1.13. 
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that were separate from the interests of individual slave-owners and slave-owners collectively. 
The idea of the legal dodge also combines nicely with Bourdieu’s description of habitus, as the 
idea of the dodge is that because intention and application of law are separable, people can use a 
law in ways contrary to its orginal intention. The phrase legal dodge refers to the repeated use of 
a law for purposes contrary to its original intention or even stated purpose.324 Like Bourdieu’s 
habitus, the legal dodge suggests that contrary-to-intended usage can persist through iteration. 
Charles Appleton, W.W. Buckland, M. De Visscher, and Alan Watson argue that the Romans 
initially used legal procedures such as adsertio libertatis to claim that their slaves were already 
citizens and that the official laws permitting and regulating manumission came later.325 That is, 
they argue that Roman slave-owners initially had to use a legal dodge in order to free their 
slaves, since the Roman state did not originally have a fully schematized and rationalized method 
for transforming slaves into citizens. M. Wlassak and Henri Lévy-Bruhl argue against the legal 
dodge hypothesis. They instead posit that slave-owners never needed to deceive the state because 
they always had the ability to transform slaves into citizens; albeit slave-owners required the 
presence of governmental officials in order to do so.326  
 The theory of Roman manumission beginning as a legal dodge is a good articulation of 
the divide between the Roman state and Roman slave-owners. In the example of the legal dodge, 
slave-owners appear to want to free their slaves, but the state prevents them. The conflict 
between the state and slave-owners is, in part, the clash between manumission in an abstract and 
summarized form—the form that is topic of legal discourse, a type of knowledge that Scott 
                                                 
324 See Watson (1975: 90-1). 
325 Appleton (1889), Buckland (1970), and Watson (1975 and 1987). Specifically, De Visscher claims that the 
Romans originally used these procedures for the end of mancipio and then adopted them to end slavery (1946). 
326 Wlassak (1907), Lévy-Bruhl (1934). Jolowicz attempts to strike a middle ground (1952: 137). I am inclined to 
support the idea that manumission initially began as a legal dodge, but I will not elaborate why here because 
Buckland, the preeminent scholar on Roman slave law, summarized the discussion thusly: “The opposite conclusion 
has also been inferred from the same evidence.” (1970: 443).  
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points out is amenable for state’s records—and manumission as turning a point in the 
relationship between a slave and a slave-owner, that is, a personalized type of knowledge that is 
impossible to summarize. As Cicero’s experience shows, the state’s gaze is not concerned with 
the emotional bonds that could exist between slave and slave-owners, even if slave-owners such 
as Cicero attempted to use the state’s gaze to pursue emotional closure. In short, Cicero 
attempted to deceive the state’s gaze after the fact, to manipulate the role of the state’s gaze as 
the recorder of manumission. Cicero attempted to use the state’s disciplinary power to punish 
Chrysippus even though he was no longer a slave.  
 The relationship among Chrysippus, Cicero, and state means it is dangerous to assume 
that the legal history of Roman manumission was a narrative of slave-owners wanting to free 
their slaves in opposition to the state’s law. Significantly, my reading of the Vindicius story and 
the prominence of the state in the manumissio vindicta suggests that the Romans were quite 
capable of thinking that it was the state, rather than the slave-owners, that wanted slaves to be 
freedpeople. Dionysius’ account of King Servius’ establishment of manumission also takes this 
perspective, as the king himself frees and enfranchises the slaves. He then defends this action 
against the angry slave-owners. 
6. Ma(r)king new citizens: Servius, the census, and manumissio censu 
 While Livy and Plutarch’s account of the origins of manumission stress how Vindicius 
had to choose, actively, to be loyal to the Roman state, Dionysius instead writes that Servius 
Tullius mixed manumission with enfranchisement through fiat, as he simply enrolled a number 
of slaves in the census. Like Romulus, Servius is also a foundational figure. While the Romans 
credited Romulus with the creation of the physical city, they credited Servius with the creation of 
fundamental religious and legal practices. In the case of Dionysius, that includes crediting 
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Servius with the creation of manumission. Dionysius’ omission of slave agency from this origin 
story is not surprising, as within his history Dionysius overall disdains the moral potential of 
slaves. But even though Dionysius erases slave agency by attributing all the action to Servius, 
the historian nonetheless continues the theme central to Livy’s and Plutarch’s account of 
Vindicius: it is the slave’s loyalty to the state, rather than to the slave-owner, that is necessary for 
manumission. But while there are important thematic similarities between the two accounts, 
Vindicius’ story is quite different from that of Servius’: Servius sees, and thinks, like a state. For 
him, manumission is not about individual slaves, but about slaves generally and how this policy 
spefically can strengthen Roman power and simultaneously align geographical borders with civic 
identities.  
 While Dionysius depicts Servius as considering manumission abstractly, he himself is not 
abstract. Because of the connection of this action to the character of Servius, it is necessary to 
consider how the king’s background plays a role in how the ancients thought through why 
Servius was interested in, and reformed issues like, manumission.327 While Vindicius’ 
manumission is singular and specific to his own past deeds, in contrast, Dionysius writes Servius 
as approaching manumission at the level of policy, despite the process’s close connection to his 
own life.328 Both Livy and Dionysius recount stories in which Servius was born to a woman who 
had been enslaved. While Dionysius shows no interest in determining what Servius’ status had 
been when he was born, Livy, on the other hand, explicitly doubts in the probability that Servius 
had been a slave. Livy’s doubts points to how there were different versions of Servius’ 
childhood. Furthermore, these different versions of Servius’ childhood suggest that just as the 
Greeks and Romans used Romulus’ asylum in order to think through how Roman political 
                                                 
327 For my historiographical methodology of approaching Servius, see Section 2d.  
328 For Vindicius’ manumission, cf. Section 5c. 
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inclusion relates to questions of manumission, so too did they use Servius to think through 
questions about Roman social mobility. While the Romans did not imagine Servius as a literal 
founder of Rome like Romulus, he was still a founding figure, in regards to Roman religious 
traditions and political structures. As a result, it is important to examine Servius’ own life in 
order to understand why and how the ancient writers attributed to him the invention of 
manumission through census.  
a. Manumission and Servius the slave 
 The Romans liked thinking with Servius. In the version of Claudius’ speech to the Senate 
preserved on the Lyons tablet, the Emperor recounts how Servius was a foreigner, but 
nonetheless achieved Roman kingship in order to persuade the senate to accept provincials into 
the Senate.329 In other words, Claudius uses Servius as an exemplum of a successful foreigner in 
Rome; Claudius used the figure of Servius to think through the connections of the past to the 
present, as well as what is possible and what ought to be done. It would be logical to assume that 
the Romans similarly used Servius’ status as a slave to think through contemporary questions. 
On the one hand, they did credit Servius with creating a number of festivals and religious 
practices that were either specifically or closely associated with slaves.330 On the other hand, the 
Romans specifically did not turn to Servius’ life in order to explain other aspects of slavery. 
Ancient writers consistently avoided describing Servius as ever having been manumitted. There 
are a number of possible explanations for this omission, including simply that the Romans could 
                                                 
329 ILS 212 = CIL XIII 1668. Tacitus’ version of the speech omits any mention of Servius (Annales, 11.23-5). Griffin 
(1982: 408-9) discusses this omission. Malloch (2011: 339-340) provides a discussion and extensive bibliography 
on the comparison of the two speeches. 
330 Servius is credited with founding the Compitalia (Roman Antiquities, 14.3; Pliny Naturalis Historia, 36.204), the 
Paganalia (Roman Antiquitites, 4.15.3), and the Ides Augustae (Plutarch, Questiones Romanae, 100), all festivals in 
which slaves play a prominent role, cf. Thomsen (1980: 250-252). Servius is also credited with founding a temple to 
Fors Fortuna, a site where archaeologists have unearthed a series of bronze figurines wearing pillei, cf. Richard 
(1987: 209). 
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not reconcile a just, and successful, reign with a man who was initially a slave.331 Indeed, such 
discomfort with the idea that a slave ruled Rome appears to have been a factor in Livy’s retelling 
of Servius’ birth and childhood. Livy asserts that other writers describe Servius as slave, thereby 
providing evidence that at least some Romans thought of Servius as a slave, or at least thought it 
was possible that he was a slave. Relatedly, Dionysius ambivalently retells stories of Servius’ 
childhood. Since Dionysius also describes Servius as the originator of Roman manumission, his 
retelling of Servius’ birth is an important place to look for clues for how the historian understood 
this servile background as influencing the king’s decisions about the Roman citizenry.  
 Livy and Dionysius tell roughly the same story of Servius’ birth: when the Romans 
sacked the city of Conriculum, they seized a pregnant woman who had been the wife of the 
leader of Conriculum, a man who died defending his city.332 Because this captive had certain 
outstanding qualities, she was given to the Roman Queen Tanaquil.333 But while Livy insists that 
Tanaquil promptly freed this woman, Dionysius writes that the woman gave birth while still a 
slave. The question of this woman’s status is connected to the way these two writers’ different 
conceptions of slavery and Roman success, demonstrating that the ancients used Servius’ 
background in order to think through issues that pertained to manumission.   
 Livy tells his readers that it is implausible that Servius was born a slave and was a slave 
in his youth. Prior to describing the fall of Corniculum, Livy notes that there are some who 
believe that Servius himself had been a slave, but that he instead follows another account:  
Hic quacumque de causa tantus illi honos habitus credere prohibet serva natum eum 
parvumque ipsum servisse. Eorum magis sententiae sum…. 
 
…it is difficult to believe that he was the son of a slave and as a youth was himself a slave. I 
am more inclined to follow those who give this account. 
                                                 
331 Cf. Mouritsen on the stain of slavery in Roman life (2011a: 10-35).  
332 For an extensive comparison of the two different versions of the birth, see Fromentin (2002: 56-60). See also 
Fromentin (2003).  
333 For more on the women captives of Romans, see Allen (2006: 180-6).  
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Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.39.5, trans. T.J. Luce.  
 
In other words, Livy describes Servius as the son of a freedwoman, rather than the son of a slave 
woman. Nonetheless, Livy does not use either the word, or even the concept of, manumission to 
explain how Servius’ mother was freed. Instead, he writes that queen Tanaquil freed her on 
account of her nobilitas, a process that allows the historian to depict the woman more as a 
dignified prisoner of war rather than a woman whom the Romans could have relegated to a life 
of drudgery and misery.334 Livy then notes how his version of the story explains why there are 
those who believe that Servius had been slave, as there are people who ignore how Servius’ 
mother had already been freed when she gave birth to him: 
…fortunam matris, quod, capta patria in hostium manus venerit, ut serva natus crederetur 
fecisse. 
 
Whatever the reason for it, the honour accored to Servius was so great that it is difficult to 
believe he was the son of a slave and as a youth was his himself a slave. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.39.6, trans. T.J. Luce.  
 
Livy is interested in the question of Servius’ status as a baby and as a youth, but does not fully 
commit himself to any particular version of this story. What Livy’s provocations do suggest is 
that the historian was interested in preserving Roman hierarchies. While Livy does not name any 
writers who assert that Servius was born a slave, his narrative contains men who do. The sons of 
the former king Ancus and the sons of the former king Tarquin Superbus refer to Servius as a 
slaveand furthermore assert that this background made him unfit to be king.335 Although Livy 
does not condemn these attacks because they degrade Servius, by both attributing such thinking 
to ignoble people and by asserting that such attacks are not true, Livy discredits as ignoble these 
slanderous attacks on an innovative king. By providing his readers with the more plausible of 
                                                 
334 1.39.5. 
335 Sons of Ancus: 1.40.2-4. Tarquin Superbus: 1.47.10. 
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Servius’ origins, Livy aligns himself, and his readers, against those who slander Servius as a 
slave. 
 In a way, Livy’s description of Servius matches the values of his version of Romulus’ 
asylum: Rome does well when the citizenry is more concerned about merit and loyalty to the 
state than about background.336 But Livy’s rendition of Servius’ birth also contradicts the values 
of the asylum story, since in the case of Servius, Livy cannot conceptualize that one of Rome’s 
great leaders was born a slave. For Livy writes that Servius intended to “give freedom to his 
homeland,” a plan that Tarquin’s assassination interrupted.337  
 In contrast, Dionysius asserts that Servius was born when his mother was a slave, a 
background that Dionysius appears to reference implicitly when he describes how Servius at 
times champions the poor and excluded.338 According to the Greek historian, the woman, whom 
he reports was named Ocrisia, named her child Servius specifically because she was a slave 
when she gave birth to him.339 Dionysius then explains to his Greek readers that the Latin 
adjective servius has the same meaning as the Greek δουλίος.340 In essence, Dionysius uses folk 
etymology as evidence for the reconstruction of Servius’ birth. But even though the historian 
provides numerous pieces of evidence that suggest that Servius had a servile background, 
Dionysius shows no interest in the question of Servius’ exact social standing at the time of his 
birth, despite the historian’s own antipathy towards slaves. What Dionysius does make clear is 
that he prefers the story of Servius’ birth to Ocrisia and human father over accounts of possible 
                                                 
336 Cf. Fromentin (2002: 54).  
337 “liberandae patriae consilia agitanti intervenisset.” 1.48.9. Accius likewise had attributed noble intentions to 
Servius (see Cicero, Pro Sestio, 123). For analysis of the positive tradition around Servius, see Ridley (1975) and 
Richard (1987).  
338 Although Dionysius, like Livy, writes that Servius designed the voting system to favor the wealthy (Roman 
Antiquities, 4.21.1, cf. Ab Urbe Condita, 1.43.10), his other accomplishments, such as the reordering of the Roman 
body and the construction of the Severan walls, depict him as considering all of Rome’s people.  
339 4.1.2. In other traditions she is Ocresia. On the spelling, and her role in Etruscan legends, see Ridley (1975), 
Thomsen (1980).  
340 Roman Antiquities, 4.1.3. In contrast, Plutarch describes Orcesia as an αἰχμαλώτος (Roman Questions, 100).  
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divine origins. Likely, Dionysius’ disdain for the supernatural story prompted the historian not to 
investigate the natural story too closely.341 While Livy draws attention to Servius’ precise status 
in order to dismiss the possibility that he had been manumitted, Dionysius simply avoids the 
question altogether.   
 Although Dionysius and Livy use very similar details in their reconstruction of Servius’ 
life, the two historians attach very different values to the question of whether or not he was born 
a slave. On the one hand, Livy is at pains to assure his readers that there is only an indirect 
connection between Servius and slavery. That is, even though Livy explains that this king’s 
name means “slave-like,” nonetheless, he had never been a slave; as a consequence, Servius was 
never manumitted. On the other hand, Dionysius uses the etymology of Servius’ name without 
any sort of concern that connecting Servius to slavery might be slanderous. Indeed, Dionysius’ 
positive review of Servius’ reign suggests that he does not have any intention to slander this 
man. Furthermore, while Dionysius does include the detail about Servius’ servile origin, the 
historian does not make any connection between this past and the king’s reforms on 
manumission. Instead, Dionysius portrays the king as ordering these reforms only for the good of 
Rome.342  
b. Dionysius on Servius and manumission 
 Dionysius’ discussion of Servius’ decision to enfranchise manumitted slaves consists of 
three sections. The first section is a description of Servius’ decision to make former slaves 
citizens as an extension of how previous kings had enrolled foreigners as Romans. In the second 
section, Servius gives a speech, in oratio obliqua, in order to defend this promotion of former 
slaves from complaining patricians. Servius’ speech begins with philosophical and historical 
                                                 
341 In 4.2.1 and 4.2.4, Dionysius makes it clear that he does not stand by the story of Servius’ divine birth.   
342 For Servius generally, see Thomson (1980). For Dionysius’ use of Servius, see Gabba (1991: 157). 
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arguments about humanity, but concludes by arguing that combining manumission 
enfranchisement will increase Rome’s military power. The third section consists of Dionysius’ 
evaluation of Servius’ reform, after which he contrasts it to how the Romans practice 
manumission in his own day.343 In that third section, Dionysius conceives of Servius’ practice of 
manumission as a kind of exemplum that ought to guide current Roman practices. 
 Because Dionysius does link the census to the enactment of the originary act of 
manumission, it might appear that the historian is explaining the origin of manumissio censu. 
However, the Dionysius himself does not make the connection between the census and Servius’ 
manumission of the slaves. Instead, Dionysius is interested in Servius’ action for its ability to 
provide relevant moral guidance on how to free slaves who become citizens. In other words, 
even though this account resonates with how Imperial jurists write that during the Republican 
period it was possible for slave-owners to register and free their slaves with censor, Dionysius 
himself does not assert that Servius originated manumissio censu.344 
 Rather than using Servius’ invention of the census as an aetiology of manumissio censu, 
Dionysius instead connects manumission to the census in order to think through two different 
questions. The first question is why the Romans were so successful in their conquests. Since this 
question is closely connected to Dionysius’ status as a Greek writer, I return to it in Chapter 3.345 
The second question concerns the relationship of slaves, foreigners, citizens, and the Roman 
state, a question which for Dionysius is closely related to Servius’ role as a bringer of order, the 
bearer of the state’s gaze. The Romans, as well as Greek writers, described Servius not simply as 
a reformer, but as a reformer who created the initial categories of the Roman army and society as 
                                                 
343 First section: 4.22.3-4; second section: 4.23; third section: 4.24.  
344 Ulpian 1.8 and Gaius 1.17. Ulpian writes as if this practice was extinct in his own time. Gaius is less precise. Cf. 
Buckland (1970: 440).  
345 Chapter 3 Section 3b. 
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well as the boundaries that allowed for these categories to have meaning.346 For Dionysius, 
Servius’ use of the census to enfranchise former slaves is a continuation of this role. 
 According to Dionysius, Servius does not simply make all former slaves citizens. Instead, 
he offers them the choice to either become citizens or return to their homelands:  
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ξένους ὑποδεχόμενοι καὶ μεταδιδόντες τῆς ἰσοπολιτείας φύσιν τ᾽ ἢ τύχην 
αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἀπαξιοῦντες, εἰς πολυανθρωπίαν προήγαγον τὴν πόλιν. ὁ δὲ Τύλλιος καὶ τοῖς 
ἐλευθερουμένοις τῶν θεραπόντων, ἐὰν μὴ θέλωσιν εἰς τὰς ἑαυτῶν πόλεις ἀπιέναι, μετέχειν τῆς 
ἰσοπολιτείας ἐπέτρεψε. 
 
For they [the previous kings], by receiving foreigners and bestowing upon them equal rights of 
citizenship without rejecting any, whatever their birth or condition, had indeed rendered the 
city populous; but Tullius permitted even manumitted slaves to enjoy these same rights, unless 
they chose to return to their own countries. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 4.22.3-4, trans. E. Cary. 
 
By asking the slaves to either be with Rome or against it, Servius solidifies the border between 
being Roman and non-Roman. In essence, Dionysius depicts the king as using enfranchisement 
to resolve the conflicting identities of former slaves: those who choose to stay after Dionysius’ 
decree were former slaves ready to make sacrifices for Rome, while those who choose to return 
home no longer had any claims to be any sort of Roman. Dionysius also downplays this 
transformation of the slaves by describing it as a continuation of the earlier practice of permitting 
foreigners who live in Rome to become Roman citizens. In this way, the combination of 
enfranchisement with manumission is not so much about the liberty of slaves, but rather is about 
realigning Rome’s physical borders with the boundaries of the citizen body.347 Thinking about a 
realignment of borders was more than an academic interest for Dionysius; as a resident alien in 
Rome, he was aware the tension between the physical boundaries of a space and the boundaries 
of a collective identity.348  
                                                 
346 Livy on Servius’ divisions of the military and society: 1.42-3. Dionysius on Servius’ restructuring of Rome: 4.15-
22.  
347 Cf. Ando’s work on the intersection of territory and Roman citizenship (2015: 7-28).  
348 I further discuss Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ status as a resident alien in Chapter 3 Section 3b.  
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c. Comparing Vindicius and Servius in Dionysius 
 The desire of Dionysius’ Servius to adjust the boundaries of Roman territory and the 
Roman citizenry so that they perfectly align has values diametrically opposed to the values in the 
story of Vindicius. Since Dionysius is the only writer to assert that Servius originated Roman 
manumission, I compare the two stories in Dionysius with an aim to further draw out the writer’s 
thoughts on manumission. The Vindicius’ story values flexible and porous boundaries, as it 
suggests that Rome can easily accept as Roman those who prove their worth to the state 
regardless of their background. In contrast, the Servius story values impassable boundaries: 
Servius manumits the slaves in order to align Rome’s physical border with the borders of its 
citizenry. Another way that the two stories differ is in regards to the slaves’ agency. Vindicius’ 
manumission and enfranchisement were rewards for his own activities, so while he himself did 
not have the authority to grant himself these gifts, nonetheless, it was clear that he himself played 
an important role in securing his own citizenship. In contrast, Dionysius attributes the policy of 
combining manumission with enfranchisement entirely to Servius, the leader of the state: the 
slaves have no agency.  
 But while the two accounts differ in regards to slave’s agency, they nonetheless present 
the state and slave-owners as having antagonistic interests when it comes to manumission. 
Specifically, both stories depict the slave-owners as having an interest to continue the 
enslavement while the state has an interest in freeing the slaves. In the Vindicius story, the 
conspirators have an interest in continuing their enslavement of Vindicius in order to prevent his 
testimony. Likewise, in Dionysius’ depiction of Servius’ manumission practices, the slave-
owners initially reject his policy of combining enfranchisement with manumission.349 As a result 
                                                 
349 “ἀχθομένων δὲ τῶν πατρικίων ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι καὶ δυσανασχετούντων…” The πράγμα in question is Servius’ 
decision to treat former slaves as plebeians (4.23.1). 
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of this hostility, Servius gives a speech defending his decision. Notably, only one of the 
rationales take up the perspective of a slave-owner; the rest instead consider manumission from 
the viewpoint of the Roman state. Because this speech is indicative of Dionysius’ own 
perspective on Roman manumission, I examine the rataionales in detail in Chapter 3 Section 3b. 
The significant result of this speech is that Dionysius downplays the potentially personal nature 
of this grand gesture. That is, Dionysius could have easily have explained this mass manumission 
as Servius’ attempt to consolidate power against the patricians, which is how Appian explains 
Sulla’s enfranchisement of more than 10,000 slaves.350 Instead, the historian describes the king 
as concerned only with the good of the state, rather than his own fortunes.  
 In other words, even though Dionysius is concerned with Servius’ servile background, he 
nonetheless writes Servius as seeing manumission from the perspective of the state. That is, this 
Servius is not concerned with specific examples of manumission, but he is concerned with 
conceiving it as an iterative and widespread practice that demands regulation through 
bureaucratic enforcement, specifically the bureaucratic enforcement of the census. Servius’ 
imperial vision, unconcerned with the feelings of the patricians, is similar to the diffused gaze of 
the actual practice of the census. For while the Roman state entrusted the censors to count the 
population, theirs were not the only eyes at work in the census. The census was a public affair, 
which drew the eyes of the Roman public. The public’s gaze upon the Roman men, who were 
declaring the nature of their family and property, was a gaze that was itself an impetus for these 
men to provide the proper count.  
                                                 
350 Appian Bellum Civile, 1.100. CIL I2 2.722 mentions a libertus of Sulla, cf. Keaveney (1982: 141). For more on 
this passage, see the Conclusion Section 2.  
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d. The state and manumissio censu 
 While Dionysius’ account of Servius’ manumission through the census does not contain 
an explicit aetiology of manumissio censu, nonetheless, there are important connections 
concerning state power between that account and the practice of manumissio censu. This 
congruence of the values and interests of gazes within Dionysius’ account of Servius and the 
ritualized practice of manumissio censu does not mean that Dionysius’ story is any more 
authoritative than the aetiology of manumission within the story of Vindicius. Rather, the 
similarities between the story of manumissio censu and the practice of manumissio censu suggest 
that the story articulates concerns that the Romans were thinking through while practicing 
manumissio censu.     
 What exactly the census entailed, most especially which people the census counted, is a 
matter of scholarly controversy.351 However, ancient writers do assert that in addition to counting 
people, the census also counted property, including land and that which in Roman law is called 
moveable property.352 The purpose of counting and evaluating the worth of this property was so 
that the Roman state could both assign the household to the proper order as well as extract the 
proper amount of tributum.353 Livy’s retelling of how Cato purposefully overvalued the worth of 
a number of slaves suggests that the censors had a wide range of discretion in monetizing the 
property that they surveyed.354 In other words, it seems possible that the censors, possibly in 
                                                 
351 A simple account of the debate is that, on the one side, there are “low counters,” such as Brunt (1971), who 
defends Beloch’s position that the reason the count in the Augustus census was so high is that it included women 
and children. On the other side, there are “high counters” such as Lo Cascio (1994) and Kron (2005), who argue 
instead that Augustus’ high count included regions previously excluded. Hin offers up a new defense of the so-
called “middle count” position (2013: 286 ff.).  
352 Gellius mentions farm equipment (6.11.9). Livy mentions clothing, jewelry, transport, and slaves (39.442-3). 
Cicero also mentions slaves (Leges 3.7, Flaccus 80). Cf. Northwood (2008: 260).  
353 Cf. Northwood (2008).  
354 Livy 39.44.1-3. I discus this passage in greater detail in Section 3b above, cf. Northwood (2008: 260-1). 
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normal circumstances in dialogue with the slave-owners, assigned a price to slaves when taking 
the census.  
 Like the census itself, the precise steps of manumissio censu require reconstruction. As 
with all reconstructions, care is needed, especially since unlike either manumissio vindicta or 
manumissio testamento, it appears that during the Imperial period the Romans no longer used 
manumissio censu.355 The process did continue until the late Republic because when Cicero 
writes of the three different types of manumission, he includes manumissio censu.356 A 
reconstruction of the process is as follow: first, the slave tells the censor that he is a citizen.357 
Second, the owner agrees. Third, the censor writes down the slave as a citizen among the others 
on the rolls.358 In other words, in manumissio censu it is the gaze of the Roman state, not the 
slave-owner, that both plays the prominent role and has the power to free the slave. 
 By gaze of the Roman state, I do not simply mean the gaze of the censor, but rather a 
decentralized gaze that included the espials of other Romans. The act of taking the census was a 
public affair: for the Romans complained about the incongruity between the wealth that other 
Romans declared and the wealth needed to support other Romans’ spending habits.359 As a 
result, the power of the census to compel citizens to report their family, and their property, 
truthfully depended on how the census was public knowledge. That is, to be counted in the 
census was to be visible, for both the censor and the body politic to see the former slave.360  
                                                 
355 While Gaius writes as though it was still in practice, the testimony from other jurists puts this in doubt, cf. 
Buckland (1970: 440).  
356 De Oratore 1.183. 
357 The masculine gender is purposeful, since I believe that the censors only counted male citizens in the census, cf. 
Kron (2005).   
358 For the relative unimportance of the presence of the slave-owner in this process, see Buckland (1970: 439-441). 
359 Publius Scipio Aemilianus complained that Tiberius Claudius Asellus spent more on one prostitute than his entire 
declared value of his Sabine farm (Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 6.11.9 = ORF 128; cf. Northwood 2008: 260).  
360 I leave aside the question of the relationship between visibility and the written record of the census.    
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 The example of manumissio censu, therefore, reveals that it was the gaze of the state and 
the anonymous public that had the power to free the slave through recognition rather than the 
slave-owner. Just as the incongruity of the prominence of the state and the supposed power of the 
slave-owner in the case manumissio vindicta is connected to the hypothesis that manumissio 
vindicta began as a legal dodge, so too has Alan Watson argued that manumissio censu was not 
originally intended as a process to free slaves.361 Watson argues that when the Romans did not 
have access to laws that allowed them to manumit their slaves, they purposefully misused 
already extant laws in order to achieve their desired ends.362 In the case of the census, such a 
dodge would have meant declaring that the slave in question was already a citizen even though 
he was not. As in my discussion of manumissio vindicta, whether such a development actually 
occurred is outside the scope of my argument.363  
 Instead, my argument is that the process of manumissio censu encouraged Roman 
citizens to take the perspective of the Roman state, rather than the perspective of an individual 
slave-owner. More precisely, manumissio censu calls upon the censor specifically, and 
whichever Romans happen to be present at this particular manumission, to look upon a specific 
example of manumission abstractly for the good of the Roman commons. Furmore, the Romans 
used the state’s gaze in a similar fashion in the first century BCE: because the reformed cura 
annonae distributed grain to all citizens for free, the state had a higher stake in identifying which 
people were freedmen whose manumission had been completed properly.364 Significantly, such 
concerns are the same ones expressed through Servius’ gaze, as Dionysius’ account of Servius 
emphasizes that he did not free and enfranchise these slaves because of their individual 
                                                 
361 Watson (1975: 90).  
362 Watson (1975: 90).  
363 See Section 5f above.  
364 For more on the cura annonae, see the Conclusion Section 2.  
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attributes. Rather, Servius enfranchised them for the good of Rome, a priority that during the 
Imperial Period the Romans attempted to cultivate in slave-owners through the regulation of 
manumissio testamento.365 
7. Manumissio testamento and the Roman state 
 Of the three methods of manumission, manumissio testamento would initially appear to 
be a process in which the state had no role, since a will is supposedly a guarantee that the 
deceased’s property will be handled according to his or her wishes. However, the origins of 
Roman wills demonstrate that rather than being a practice within a non-governmental sphere, this 
process was closely interwoven with the Roman state. As a result, it is necessary to consider the 
working of the state’s gaze with manumissio testamento, as the state was a participant. Such a 
perspective helps makes sense of Augustus’ Lex Fufia Maninia, a law which sought to regulate 
the precise number of slaves that Romans could manumit in their wills. Although this law falls 
outside the Republican scope of this project, it provides context for Livy’s descriptions of 
Republican regulations of manumission, which I examined in Section 3. Augustus’ regulations 
also contextualize my analysis of how powerful Romans used manumission in the first century 
BCE in the Conclusion of my dissertation.  
 Jurists’ descriptions of the original types of Roman wills make clear that it was necessary 
for a representative of the state to be present, presumably in order to verify that the property was 
distributed in the proper way and, also, to record that this process had occurred at all. According 
to Gaius, originally there were only two types of wills, in comitiis calatis and in procinctu.366 
The first, in comitiis calatis, was highly formal: the paterfamlias went before the curia on one of 
only two days of the year in order to plead his case in front of the Pontifex Maximus. The second 
                                                 
365 For more on such refomrs, see the Conclusion Section 2.  
366 Gaius 2.101, cf. Jolocwicz (1952: 125-6). 
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was designed to allow for emergencies when citizens were in the army. The procedure in 
procinctu allowed a soldier to use three or four of his colleagues as witnesses to his will.  In both 
of Gaius’ descriptions of the two earliest forms of Roman wills, there was some sort of 
representative of the state: in the case of in comitiis calatis, the Pontifex Maximus along with the 
curia are the representatives, while in the case of in procinctu, the soldiers are the emergency 
substitutes. The second type of will further demonstrates the disperse nature of the state’s gaze, 
since in extremis soldiers were trusted to function as witnesses.  
 Likely the writers of the Twelves Tables only knew these two types of wills, a connection 
significant for manumission, because Ulpian asserts that the Twelve Tables had legislation 
around this process. Unfortunately, Ulpian neither cites the precise language of the law, nor even 
provides much context for why it was necessary for the Twelve Tables to guarantee that Romans 
could manumit slaves through a will:  
Ut testamento manumissi liberi sint, lex Duodecim Tabularum facit, quae confirmat.  
 
The law of the Twelve Tables asserts and confirms that those who were manumitted by 
testament are freedmen.  
Ulpian, Ad Sabinum, 1.9, translation my own. 
 
Possibly, Ulpian’s testimony about the Twelve Tables is an interpretation of some aspect of 
inheritance. Ulpian’s testimony is not good evidence that Romans in the fifth century saw a need 
to legislate about manumission.367 The Twelve Tables outlived the community of Romans who 
were its readers and writers, and its enigmatic imperatives passed into the hands of Romans who 
had different expectations for slaves and manumission as they were now conquerors of the 
Mediterranean. The references to a “second law” in two newer forms of wills, the mancipatory 
and praetorian wills, demonstrate that the Romans continued to experiment with new forms of 
                                                 
367 Watson appears to think that Ulpian is referring to the Twelve Tables’ rulings on statuliber, VII. 12 (Watson 
1975: 86). Crawford omits that section from his reconstruction of the Twelve Tables, likely because he reads this 
sentence not as testimony but as interpretation (1996: 555-723). No other sources make similar types of claims about 
manumission in the Twelve Tables.   
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wills after writing the Twelve Tables, suggesting the contexts for manumission in wills 
continued to change.368  
 Although the legal evidence for very early manumission through wills is unclear, 
Cicero’s discussion of manumission demonstrates that, by the first century, Romans understood 
manumissio testamento as an essential part of manumission. In his philosophical work, the 
Topica, Cicero uses the three types of manumission as an example of how definitions can include 
the enumeration of parts. That is, for Cicero, manumission is a good example of how a definition 
can include possible requirements, for which the fulfillment of merely one is sufficient:  
tum partium enumeratio, quae tractatur hoc modo: Si neque censu nec vindicta nec testamento 
liber factus est, non est liber; neque ulla est earum rerum; non est igitur liber;—tum notatio, 
cum ex verbi vi argumentum aliquod elicitur hoc modo… 
 
Sometimes there is an enumeration of parts, and this is handled in the following manner: so 
and so is not a free man unless he has been set free by entry in the census roll, or by touching 
with the rod, or by will. None of these conditions has been fulfilled, therefore he is not free.  
Cicero, Topica, 10, trans. H.M. Hubbel.  
 
In this passage, Cicero demonstrates how equivalent legal procedures can precisely describe the 
status of a person in question. For Cicero’s philosophical purposes, that these different processes 
produce the same legal result is sufficient to make them legally equivalent. But examples from 
the Imperial Period demonstrate that Romans knew that these different legal processes served 
different motivations and contexts. The result was, in a way, the opposite of what Cicero 
describes: rather than these types of manumission being equivalent, the Roman state saw them as 
separate and distinct.369  
 Unlike the other two forms of manumission, the Imperial Roman state sought to limit the 
number of slaves that slave-owners manumitted through manumissio testamento. In 2 BCE, 
Augustus passed the lex Fufia Maninia, a law that regulated the percentage of slaves that a man 
                                                 
368 Praetorian will: Gaius 2.118-9. Cf. Jolociwz (1952: 259). 
369 For more on changes to manumission in the Imperial Period, see the Conclusion Section 2.  
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or woman could manumit in their will. The percentage varied depending on the number of slaves 
he or she owned, with the following categories:  
1-2 slaves: law does not apply 
3-10 slaves: may manumit half, that is, up to five slaves 
11-30 slaves: may manumit a third, that is, up to ten slaves 
31-100 slaves: may manumit a quarter, that is, up to twenty-five slaves 
101-500 slaves: may manumit a fifth, that is, up to hundred slaves 
500+ slaves: may manumit only a hundred.370 
 
Since Augustus made no move to limit the ability of slave-owners to manumit their slaves 
through the other means, it is unclear how much impact this law had on how and why slave-
owners freed their slaves. Testimony from a contemporaneous author, Nicolaus of Damascus, 
suggests that intersection of slaves, wills, and extravagant wealth was a target for invective; the 
lex Fufia Maninia may have attempted to address such concerns. Nicolaus asserts that rich 
Romans included in their wills the demand that their favorite slaves fight to the death, although 
the historian admits that such requests were not legally valid.371 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
voices a similar concern about Roman funerals, exclaiming that Romans manumit slaves for the 
sole purpose of having freedmen and freedwomen at their funerals.372 Indeed, Gardner and 
Mouritsen take the position that Augustus’ reforms likely had little impact. Instead, Augustus’ 
reforms were more the assertion that slave-owners ought to manumit only those slaves with 
whom they can personally vouch as being worthy of manumission.373 In a similar vein, this law 
may be connected to fears about the ability of owners to translate the patronage of large number 
of freedmen and freedwomen into political power, similar to Appian’s description of Sulla’s 
                                                 
370 Gaius 1.42-6, Ulpian 1.24 ff. and Paul. Sent. 4.14. The law also required that the slaves to be freed be specified 
by name so that if the owner attempted to free more than the number of permissible slaves, those slaves who were 
listed after the permissible number were not freed, cf. Buckland (1970: 546-548). 
371 FrGH 90.78 = Athenaeus 153f-154a. Cf. Yarrow (2006: 199 and 208). At the time of this writing, the BNJ has 
not yet published their entry for Nicolaus.   
372 For this passage, see Chapter 3 Section 3b.  
373 Gardner (1991). See also Mouritsen (2011a: 34-5, 81, 83-4, 136-7 and 182-4). See Chapter 3 Section 3b below 
for scholarship on how this law intersects with Dionysius’ diatribe against Roman manumission.    
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Cornelii.374 Augustus reformed manumissio testamento in an attempt to change how slave-
owners saw manumission: rather than seeing only from the perspective of a property owner who 
had absolute freedom over his or her property, Augustus’ state attempted to force slave-owners 
to approach manumission as vigilant representatives of the state, ones who observed and 
assessed the viability of certain slaves as potential citizens.  
 As a reform about disciplining slave-owners, the Lex Fufia Maninia is similar to 
Augustus’ laws that attempted to restructure and reinforce the importance of the Roman family, 
and therefore is a law belonging distinctly to the Imperial Period and not the Republic.375 The 
law clearly demonstrates Roman anxiety about excessive use of manumission, a sentiment quite 
similar to Dionysius’ diatribe about manumission.376 Nonetheless, the law is important evidence 
for the changing relationship between the Roman state and manumission as well as the lengths to 
which Romans went in their attempts to regulate manumission. Such regulations sought to 
discipline slave-owners so that they would only free certain types of slaves.  
8. Conclusion 
 How the state looked at manumission complicates the notion that the Roman state was a 
tool that slave-owners used to ensure that they could do as they wished with their slaves. In other 
words, while it is easy to assume that the state represented the interest of slave-owners generally, 
such an assumption does not explain how power functioned within manumission. On the one 
hand, the Romans told stories in which the state, rather than the slave-owner, was the primary 
cause of manumission. On the other hand, during the ritualized practice of manumission, most 
especially manumissio vindicta and manumissio censu, it was the state’s representatives who had 
                                                 
374 For Appian on Sulla, see Section 6c above. For more on the Cornelii, see the Conclusion Section 2.  
375 Cf. Res Gestae 8.5, Treggiarri (2005: 144-5) and Severy-Hoven (2003).   
376 Dionysius’ dating of his history suggests that he wrote prior to the passage of the law (1.7.2). For more on the 
diatribe and the Lex Fufia Maninia, see Chapter 3 Section 3b.  
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prioritized roles, rather than the slave-owner. While it may be easy to assume that the state was a 
tool for Roman slave-owners and that therefore they simply turned to the state to ratify their 
decisions to manumit a particular slave, the evidence of how the state looked at manumission 
demonstrates that the state interests were separate from those of individual slave-owners. As a 
result, when slave-owners such as Cicero turned to the state to manumit their slaves, they did so 
cautiously and at times with a willingness to deceive the state’s gaze.  
 The tension between slave-owners and the state was in part the result of conflicting 
interests. The state taxed manumission: slave-owners and slaves paid the vicesima tax. Slave-
owners evaluated whether slaves were worthy of manumission based on their loyalty to 
themselves and their families. The state was concerned with whether slaves were loyal to Rome, 
as exemplified in the stories that Romans told about Vindicius.  
 The difference in how the state and slave-owners looked at manumission was not simply 
a matter of conflicting interests, but also a qualitative difference in their gazes. The state 
considered manumission abstractly, concerned not with the specific history of a particular slave, 
but whether or not a particular slave met general requirements as outlined in the law. Dionysius’ 
description of how Servius enfranchised manumitted slaves despite the protests of slave-owners 
articulates how slave-owners felt that grouping their own particular slaves in with all Roman 
slaves reduced their control over their own slaves. The state’s gaze had to look at not only the 
particular slave being manumitted, but also manumission as an iterative and generalized practice. 
I argue that this kind of abstraction of manumission follows Scott’s description of how 
summation is necessary for the creation of knowledge palatable for centralized states. In short, 
rather than documenting the precise relationship that a slave had with a slave-owner, the state’s 
witnesses instead looked to see if slaves remained slaves or became freedpeople, a general 
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category compatible throughout the Republic. By focusing on these details of the ritualized 
practice of manumission, the state gaze’s sees a summary of the relationship between a slave and 
slave-owner, just as Scott describes. 
 The state’s gaze also disciplined both slaves and slave-owners, evaluating the worth of 
slaves who were freed and shaping the values and priorities of slave-owners. Foucault’s 
examination of the panopticon points to how witnesses functioned in the practice of manumissio 
vindicta, since they were not only gazing upon the slave, but also upon the slave-owner. 
Foucault’s thoughts on the disperse nature of power elaborates how the power of this gaze was 
not inherent in these witnesses; instead, their gaze took up that role as part of the construction of 
the ritualized practice itself and was connected to the state’s policing of the border between 
Romans and non-Romans.  
 Even though the state’s role in manumission ought not to be underestimated, slave-
owners played a significant role in manumission. But it was not merely the relationship between 
the slave and the slave-owner that was important for manumission. The relationship among 
slave-owners was also fundamental because policing and documentation were necessary for the 
freedom that manumission granted to survive. In contrast to the state’s role in manumission, that 
of slave-owners’ was personal, that is, part of the life of the slave-owner and intimately 
connected to his or her goals and projects for a particular slave. The slave-owners’ stake in 
manumission was also public because by manumitting a slave, slave-owners were participating 
in a public sphere that was separate from the sphere of the state. During the fraught activity of 
manumission, slave-owners had to negotiate the surveillance, taxation, and documentation of the 
state, but they also had to negotiate the expectations and policing of other slave-owners.
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Chapter 3: Slave-owners and subjection 
1. Introduction  
 Knowing how to use manumission properly was part of being a Roman slave-owner, and 
so to become a Roman slave-owner meant adapting to how other slave-owners reflected on this 
practice. In Butler’s terminology, manumission was part of the subjection of Roman slave-
owners, since slave-owners became subjects with the power and agency to act according to their 
own interests in regards to the manumission of their slaves. In using the phrase “subjection,” I 
again return to Butler, not only as a way to draw together the insights of Foucault and Hegel, but 
also to bring to the forefront that when individual slave-owners manumitted their slaves, they did 
so while negotiating the expectations and gazes of other slave-owners. While there is some 
overlap between the state’s gaze and the surveillance of other slave-owners, I argue that there 
were various social pressures and expectations that lay outside the legal sphere that individual 
slave-owners had to confront and negotiate when they planned and practiced manumission. 
Roman slave-owners were concerned about how other slave-owners manumitted slaves, 
including what motivated other slave-owners to free their slaves. Dionysius of Halicarnassus and 
Plautus make clear that there were concerns that Roman slave-owners frivolously, if nonetheless 
legally, manumitted slaves. Such concerns fostered a discourse that justified some motives for 
manumission and excluded others. To perform manumission successfully and to be proper 
subjects in the culture of Roman slave-ownership slave-owners had to know how to justify 
manumission amongst themselves and in what contexts manumission was acceptable.  
 In Section 2 of this chapter, I argue that Butler’s terminology of subjects and subjection 
articulates how the external pressures of the culture of slave-ownership have internal 
consequences for individual Roman slave-owners. I use Butler’s thought to articulate the motives 
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of why slave-owners policed the practice of manumission among themselves, separate from the 
state’s policing. Indeed, in Plautus and in Cicero, the state’s role in manumission is either 
insignificant or invisible, thereby necessitating that the slave-owners themselves police what is 
and is not acceptable. In deploying Butler’s vocabulary on subjection, I build upon my argument 
of slavery as an unlivable life.377 I also find Butler’s thoughts on the psychic aspects of 
subjection and self-reflection to combine productively with the philosopher Rémi Brague’s 
description of Rome’s “secondarity” to Greece. From this combination of Butler and Brague, I 
argue that Roman slave-owners’ self-reflection on Roman manumission was refracted through 
Greek concerns and ideas about Roman manumission. Because I closely examine the works of 
Plautus and Terence, this methodological section justifies the ways in which I read Roman 
comedies, especially the concerns of slaves and slave-owners in the texts.  
 The two most extensive Greek discussions of Roman manumission were those of Philip 
V and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In Section 3, I argue that because Romans used Greek culture 
and expectations as a reference point for evaluating their own culture, therefore, the Greek 
perspective on Roman manumission provides a key for how the Romans reflected on their own 
practice. The Greek perspective is also important because while the Romans were not unique in 
the Mediterranean in being slave-owners, they were unique in their treatment of freedmen and 
freedwomen. The Greeks looked at Roman manumission as a practice that had the power to 
shape Roman political and military power. This Greek gaze is important because Greeks like 
Dionysius were participants in the Roman world and therefore participated in the discourse 
around the justifications for Roman manumission. Furthermore, the Greek gaze is important 
because the Romans referred to and integrated Greek evaluations of Rome and Roman practices 
into their reflective gaze. 
                                                 
377 For the “unlivable life,” see Chapter 1 Section 5b.  
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 I have two goals for Section 4: The first goal is to highlight similarities between Romans’ 
own evaluation of Roman manumission with those of the Greek writers in the previous section. 
Specifically, I read two parallels between the description of Roman manumission and political 
power in the works of the Greeks Philip and Dionysius and that of Plautus’ pimp Dordalus and 
the rustic slave Grumio. The second goal is to argue that the negative evaluations of 
manumission in these instances are not the values of the state, but are instead the values of slave-
owners, not the state. For, in the examples that I take from Plautus’ plays and Cicero’s letters, 
none of the manumissions violate any laws and yet they are provocative and worthy of censure. I 
explain the disapproval these manumissions merit as the result of the disciplining gaze of slave-
owners, which is to say, part of the disciplining of non-state actors.  
 In Section 5, I note how Romans frame the joys of manumission as familial, which is to 
say entirely separate from the gaze of the state, but contingent upon the approval of other family 
members. Cicero’s letters reveal that Tiro’s manumission was an event of great joy, and 
therefore worthy of representation, since both Cicero and Tiro himself wrote to Quintus about 
the event, each independently, thereby recreating the event in the virtual space of epistles. By 
recreating Tiro’s manumission, they sought to inform Quintus of the event, but they also framed 
the manumission as a topic for Quintus’ approval, a nod to the importance of his recognition.378 
Quintus’ prickly reply to their letters includes an allusion to Quintus’ manumission of Statius, a 
subtly caustic remark that I argue is evidence that Quintus aims to use this joyful moment in 
order to compete with his brother. In other words, while Roman slave-owners celebrated 
successful manumissions together, for them, manumission was a field over which questions of 
authority were at play.  
                                                 
378 Compare also Cicero’s discussion with Atticus about the formation of his freedman Dionysius’ tria nomina (Ad 
Atticum, 1.15.1 = Shackleton Bailey 90.1). For Dionysius the freedman, see Yarrow (2006: 41-3). 
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 The importance of familial approval rather than adherence to the law in the representation 
of joyful and successful manumissions does not simply appear in Cicero’s letters, but also in 
Roman comedies. I point out how the comedians, almost completely, severe manumission’s 
connection to the state when they have their characters perform manumission on stage. For the 
comedians represent manumission as a speech-act of the slave-owner, a simple and private affair 
at a remove from the world of courts and magistrates. On the one hand, this representation 
without the state is important for the demands of their particular genre. On the other hand, the 
result of this framing is that it downplays the importance of the state to manumission and, 
instead, frames the process as one entirely contingent on the approval of the slave-owner and the 
slave-owners’ family, thereby emphasizing the need for slave-owners to police themselves over 
the matter of manumission.  
2. Subjection, self-reflection, and secondarity 
 Because manumission was a practice that could only come to completion with the 
recognition of the Roman public, it is appropriate to approach it as a machination of social 
power. Nonetheless, a slave-owner’s decision to manumit a slave could be, and often was, a 
personal one, in that the slave-owner justified this reward by referring to how the slave built and 
maintained a personal relationship. I turn to Butler’s term subjection to chart how the Romans 
maintained manumission as a process that passed through the individual psyches and the 
recognition of the wider Roman public. Butler’s description of subjects and subjection draws on 
her readings of both Foucault and Hegel. From Foucault, Butler takes the description of power as 
part of the very conduit that allows for subjects to exist. But then Butler uses Hegel’s conflict 
between the lord and the bondsman as an articulation of two developments: first, the interplay of 
internal and external aspects of power; second, how the lord’s consciousness turns back on itself. 
Chapter 3: Slave-owners and subjection 
 145 
I use Butler’s account to analyze Roman slave-owners’ descriptions of manumission in the 
context of the lord’s failed self-reflection. I also argue that this Hegelian connection of self-
reflection to a backwards turn opens up a fruitful link to Brague’s description of the 
“secondarity” of Roman culture to Greek culture. In essence, I use Brague to describe that when 
the Romans reflected on their own culture and practices such as manumission, they did so using 
ideasand values that they understood as Greek.  
a. Subjects, subjection, and non-state discipline 
 Because in common English subjection implies subordination, it is, perhaps initially, 
awkward to describe Roman slave-owners’ experience of manumission as connected to their 
subjection. In Butler’s terminology, a subject is not the same as an individual or a person, but is 
rather a term that speaks to how people possess agency, albeit an agency that comes at the cost of 
subordination to social rules and expectations.379 Indeed, for Butler, to be a subject requires 
subjection, as for her subjection is “the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as 
the process of becoming a subject.”380 Furthermore, following Foucault, subjection is a process 
for all, not only for those at the bottom of a social hierarchy.381 Subjection is connected to 
individuals’ search for recognition and their necessary adaptation to distribution of power that 
preceded their arrival: 
Bound to seek recognition of its own existence in categories terms, and names that are not of 
its own making the subject seeks the sign of its own existence outside itself, in a discourse that 
is at once dominant and indifferent. Social categories signify subordination and existence at 
once. In other words, within subjection the price of existence is subordination.382  
 
                                                 
379 1997: 10.  
380 1997: 2. 
381 “Power is both external to the subject and the very venue of the subject.” (1997: 15), for Foucault cf. (1997: 16).  
382 1997: 20.  
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Therefore, to use Butler’s words, for Roman slave-owners to exist as Roman slave-owners, they 
had to go through the process of subjection, since only this process allows for the broader 
recognition of them as slave-owning subjects.   
 Rather than simply being an abstract description of power, Butler’s description of 
subjection raises questions about how a slave-owner’s decision to manumit a slave was 
connected to social norms and expectations. For Butler, subjection culminates in a subject who 
has an emphatically ambivalent relationship to power. For on the one hand, since subjection is 
the price to operate within a particular field, after the price is paid, the subject has the freedom to 
use the resulting power. The danger with this description is the possibility of describing power 
only ever in external opposition to the subject. Following Foucault, Butler highlights how a 
subject’s very formation depends on the reiteration of power.383 On the other hand, paying the 
price to enter the field alters the subject’s sense of value; that is, what the subject considers worth 
doing once the subject is in the field. Within the field, the subject can see which paths are 
precluded and which paths are inviting. By refusing to resolve this ambivalence in her 
description of subject formation, Butler describes subjects as unconstrained by “teleological 
necessity.”384 In the context of Roman manumission, Butler’s words refuse to describe particular 
examples of manumission as intrinsically motivated to replicate an ideal, but are instead sensitive 
to the contingencies of the current distribution of power, a distribution itself conditional upon the 
slave-owners’ own need for recognition.  
 I use Butler’s thought to articulate how slave-owners themselves underwent subjection in 
the process of achieving recognition as slave-owners. For Butler is also empathic about the 
importance of the iterative nature of this process, that is, how subjection is a process of 
                                                 
383 1997: 16.  
384 1997: 15.  
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reproduction: “The subject is precisely the site of such reiteration [one of power], a repetition 
that is never merely mechanical.”385 I argue that it is important to understand manumission as 
part of the subjection of slave-owners because this language articulates how other slave-owners, 
in addition to the Roman state, monitored and judged a particular slave-owner’s practice of 
manumission. Indeed, Butler writes that states rely on such extrajudicial policing, noting that 
“[t]he state draws upon non-statist operations of power and cannot function without a reserve of 
power that it has not itself organized.”386 By non-statist, Butler refers to both institutions and 
arrangements of power that exist outside the state, such as the family. I argue that there is 
evidence of Roman non-statist operations of power in the disciplining of manumission: first, 
Plautus’ characters condemn certain forms of manumission. Second, Dionysius complains about 
slave-owners manumitting unworthy slaves. Third, Cicero complains about his brother’s 
manumission of the slave Statius. In other words, even though a slave-owner’s decision to 
manumit a slave was, in an important sense, personal—because slave-owners were legally 
entitled to manumit slaves for emotional reasons, and also because of promises they made to 
slaves as part of their relationship—in an equally important sense, manumission was part of the 
dominant discourse with which slave-owners had to reconcile as part of becoming and being 
Roman subjects. Part of the price of acting as a slave-owner and joining the discourse of slave-
owners was making oneself vulnerable to comparisons against other slave-owners’ ideals of 
manumission. This cultivated vulnerability included sensitivity both to the condemnation of and 
competition with other slave-owners. For Roman slave-owners not only policed each to prohibit 
incorrect forms of manumission, but they also used manumission as events within the longer 
                                                 
385 1997: 16. 
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chronologies that constituted their relationships with each other. Manumission was part of 
Roman slave-owners’ rivalries with each other.387   
b. Self-reflection and the reflective gaze of slave-owners 
 In Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman, the truth of the development of independence 
resides with the bondsman rather than with the lord. The lord’s consciousness is the not site of 
truth for a number of reasons, one of which is the lord’s inability for self-reflection.388 I argue 
that Butler’s analysis of the stymied nature of the lord contextualizes what was at stake for 
Roman slave-owners when they missed the truth of their situation, as part of their self-reflection 
upon manumission: that their pretense to independence was a sham; they were dependent on 
slave-labor for much of their day to day activities, including writing and reading.389 Furthermore, 
I utilize Butler’s emphasis of reflection as a backward turn as an opportunity to set up Brague’s 
description of Roman secondarity to Greek culture. In other words, Roman self-reflection is a 
backwards turn that goes through Greek culture.   
 Butler’s reading of the struggle of the bondsman brings the bodies of these two figures to 
the forefront, a hermeneutical move that allows for an easy correspondence of the lord to Roman 
slave-owners and the bondsman to Roman slaves. However, this correspondence does not remain 
easy because Butler also highlights the importance of the psychic aspect of this relationship. 
Butler explains that the lord’s attempt at self-reflection is doomed because his domination over 
the bondsman depends on his misrecognition of what constitutes his body:   
                                                 
387 Hölkeskamp (1993), Lintott (1997), Mouritsen (2011b), and Rosenstein (1990a, 1990b and 1992) all use 
aristocratic competition to describe the causation and trajectories of Roman politics. Van Wees (2011) reviews the 
way in which competition has explanatory power in modern historiography and anthropology. Platts (2011) and 
John Patterson (2006: 184-264) discuss aristocratic competition was a way to explain Roman topography.   
388 For Hegel, the truth resides with the bondsman because of his experience of both the fear of death and the 
discipline of service; see Chapter 1 Section 2.  
389 Elite Romans were of course reliant on free and freed labor as well, but that is outside the scope of this 
investigation.  
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In a sense, the lord postures a disembodied desire for self-reflection one who not only requires 
the subordination of the bondsman in the status of an instrumental body, but who requires in 
effect that the bondsman be the lord’s body, but be it in such a way that the lord forgets or 
disavows his own activity in producing the bondsman, a production which we will call 
projection.390 
 
The lord’s consciousness is radically prescribed and limited, even though it participates in a 
dynamic interplay with the bondsman. For Hegel asserts that the lord desires self-reflection, but 
as Butler points out, the lord’s commitment to domination precludes his understanding of his 
dependence on the bondsman. Significantly, this self-reflection is distinct from recognition, as 
for Hegel, recognition is bound up with a confrontation with another. In this post-abolitionist 
age, the implications for the analysis slavery are practically intuitive: the slave-owner’s 
commitment to maintaining slavery creates a blindness to how slavery actually works, most 
especially its cruelty and violence, but also how slaves yearn to quit enslavement.391 While I 
think that Butler’s reading of Hegel does point in this direction, I argue that her description of the 
stymied lord’s self-reflection also articulates the productive aspect of Roman slave-owners’ self-
reflection: this failed self-reflection was part of the subjection of slave-owners. To become a 
slave-owner was to inherit and repeat this failed self-reflection: to disavow this failed self-
reflection was to invite the discipline of other slave-owners.  
 Drawing upon Butler’s description of subjection and self-reflection, I use the term 
reflective gaze to categorize how Romans, slave-owners and otherwise, looked at and evaluated 
their own practice of manumission as well as how other Romans practiced it. As the physical act, 
the slave-owner’s gaze is connected to the state’s gaze, since the state had a stake in evaluating 
whether a particular instance of manumission was performed correctly. But slave-owners had 
interests in manumission separate from those of the state; for example, slave-owners could face 
                                                 
390 1997: 35.  
391 For the overall merits of applying thinkers like Butler to issues of ancient history, see Batstone (2009). Examples 
of fruitfull application on issues of historiography are Batstone’s (1986, 1988, 1990), Gunderson’s (2000) works on 
Sallust. Ma (2000) demonstrates that this thought is similarly useful for questions of epigraphy.  
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the disapproval and disciplining of their fellow Romans, even if they performed manumission 
according to the letter of the law. One of the ways that the slave-owners’ gaze differed from the 
state’s gaze was how this gaze participated in the reproduction of the slave-owner as a Roman 
subject. Both children and foreigners, including slaves themselves, had to learn how to look at 
manumission as slave-owners, to internalize the expectations and values that surrounded this 
practice, as well as the physical movements that were appropriate in the practice of 
manumission. In this way, the slave-owners’ gaze was both coercive and productive; coercive in 
that it sought to prevent slave-owners from practicing certain kinds of manumission, and 
productive in that it was part of the process of producing proper slave-owners.  
c. Secondarity and Roman self-reflection  
 The Greek gaze on Roman manumission informs the Roman gaze on manumission 
because of how the Romans themselves positioned their own culture as second to the Greeks’. In 
his argument about European history, Brague uses the term secondarity to describe how the 
Romans imagined themselves as a people who adopted, rather than originated, the religious 
practices and philosophical ideas of Greece and Jerusalem. However, the term secondarity need 
not be bound to philosophical and theological descriptions of Rome. For example, Brague’s 
description of Rome’s secondarity in relation to Greece parallels Weibke Denecke’s phrase 
“reference culture,” which she uses to describe the relationship between Rome and Greece and 
also the one between Japan and China.392 It is therefore not surprising the Classicist Emma 
Dench uses secondarity to explain how the Romans positioned themselves as knowledgeable, not 
only of Greek values and practices, but also of those of Etruscans and other Italianite cultures.393 
My argument is that when the Romans evaluated the worth of their own practice of 
                                                 
392 Denecke (2013: 4-10).  
393 Dench (2005: 4, 12 et passim). 
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manumission, this self-reflective gaze included ideas based on how the Greeks saw Roman 
manumission.  
 Asserting that secondarity is essential to Rome need not run the risk of reducing the 
Roman state and people to mere transmitters, as part of Brague’s argument is to describe the 
challenges and rewards of the active acceptance of other cultures. Brague’s project of describing 
the functioning and importance of Rome’s secondarity in his book Eccentric Culture is, in part, a 
response to the work of political philosopher Leo Strauss. Taking advantage of an older tradition 
of the conflict between Greek and Judaic thought, Strauss had analyzed recurring tensions in the 
cannon of political thought as a conflict between the analytic thought from Athens and the 
prophetic revelation from Jerusalem.394 Brague finds this bipolar relationship unsatisfactory 
because such a tension between Athens and Jerusalem can only take place in a third location, 
which Strauss never defines. Brauge posits this third location as Rome. But for Brague, Rome is 
more than a place, it is also an attitude.395 Specifically, Brague writes that  
To be “Roman” is to perceive oneself as Greek in relation to what is barbarous, but also as 
barbarous in relation to what is Greek. It is to know that what one transmits does not come 
from oneself, and that one possesses it with difficulty, and only in a fragile and provisional 
manner.396  
Brague then elaborates that this Romanity is the “situation of secondarity in relation to a 
previous culture.”397 This transformation of Rome into an attitude is essential for Brague’s 
Catholic defense of the idea of Europe as the inheritor of Rome.398 For Brague’s larger project is 
to explain that Europe itself is the inheritor of Rome’s space as the site of the struggle between 
                                                 
394 Brague charts a genealogy of this pairing (2002: 25), but to me he appears to downplay Strauss’ influence on the 
origins of this project. Cf. Strauss (1989: 72-3). 
395 Out of concerns of space, I limit my discussion of Brague to his thoughts on Rome and Greece. Brague carefully 
asserts that his argument about this Roman attitude is itself not history, but rather an abstraction from the “givens of 
history” (2002: 35). For his evidence of Roman concerns about inferiority to the Greek, he looks at the arts and how 
the Romans at times disparage the Latin language itself (2002: 36-42).  
396 2002: 39-40.  
397 2002: 43.  
398 2002: 26-8 and 179-90. 
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Athens and Jerusalem.399 It is possible to reject this theological argument while keeping the 
emotional stakes bound up in the term secondarity, as Dench’s use of the term secondarity 
demonstrates.400 Brague’s emphasis on self-perception draws me to his term secondarity rather 
than the more neutral phrase “reference culture” because this description parallels my own 
argument about self-reflection. Furthermore, Brague’s framing of Romanity as a negotiation 
between Greekness and barbarity highlights how, since the beginning of Latin literature, Romans 
were negotiating and playing with how Rome and Roman life appeared to the Greeks. Plautus 
famously describes plays not as the result of his own writing (scripsit), but the result of making 
Greek comedies barbaric (vortit barbare).401   
 I use the term secondarity to describe how when the Romans looked at themselves and 
their practices, this reflective gaze included a Greek perspective. I also describe the adoption of 
this Greek gaze into their self-reflection as part of the subjection of Roman slave-owners. That 
the Romans, unique among the peoples of the Mediterranean, translated Greek literature in order 
to use it as the basis of their own literature points to the value that they placed upon Greek 
culture, especially in Roman comedy. The Roman comedians were quite conscious that they 
were adapting Greek comedies. As a result, using Roman comedies as evidence of Roman 
practices offers up a number of pitfalls, which the next section addresses. 
                                                 
399 Nonetheless, his terms are seperable from his larger argument see Dench (2005: 12, 27, 49). O’Brien, in my mind 
rightfully, argues that Brague’s overall project does not displace Europe from the center of history and is therefore 
best understood as an apologia for Eurocentrism (2005).  
400 Dench (2005: 12, 27, 49). Dench neither credits Brague, nor anyone else, with the term secondarity. In contrast to 
Dench’s position, Barchiesi argues that Roman uses of Greekness were so diverse that it is overall unprofitable to 
theorize about these uses as having any particular coherence (2009). That may indeed be the case. However, in this 
study, I only use secondarity to describe how the Romans adopted Greek perceptions of Roman practices, like 
manumission. For more on the variabilities of what was at stake in the Roman adaptation of Greekness and Greek 
literature, see Feeney (2016).  
401 Cf. “Demophilus scripsit, Maccus vortit barbare”, Asinaria, 11. 
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d. Slaves, slave-owners, and Roman comedy 
 I use descriptions and depictions of manumission in Roman comedy as evidence for how 
Roman slave-owners looked at manumission.402 This position requires defending: I articulate and 
defend three main assumptions that undergird my reading. The first assumption is that it is 
reasonable to approach Plautus and Terence as authors, even though they write of their own 
works as translations.403 The second assumption is that it is reasonable to use these plays for 
evidence about Roman thoughts and attitudes about Roman practices even though the plays star 
Greek characters and unfold in Greek settings. The third, more complex assumption, is that it is 
possible to use the surviving texts of Plautus and Terence in order to reconstruct, even only if 
partially, the contexts of the original performances of these comedies. Significantly, these 
contexts included slaves in the audience and on stage, two positions that suggest that slaves’ 
voices survive in the comedies. The plays, especially Plautus’, contain voices that speak to the 
lives of Roman slaves, but that in certain moments, these slave voices also speak the values of 
slave-owners. Likewise, the characters, such as parasiti, also at times speak the values of slave-
owners, even though they are neither slaves nor slave-owners. As a result, I use a combination of 
characters’ voices as evidence for how slave-owners evaluated each others’ manumissions, as 
well as how they conceived of manumission as a familial event. 
 Although now unremarkable, the assumption that both Plautus and Terence are authors 
was at one point quite radical. Eduard Fraenkel argued in his influential book Plautinisches im 
Plautus that Plautus was more than a mere translator because his process of “translating” Greek 
comedies included adding or subtracting characters, changing plots, as well as writing Latinate 
                                                 
402 For more on Plautus, see Chapter 2 Section 5d above. Potter raises the important questions about using comedies 
as texts for history, but he gives little attention to Plautus (cf. 1999: 45). Leigh is more attuned both to the problems 
and possibilities of Plautus for history (2004). 
403 Plautus’ prologues make clear that he translated three of Menander’s plays and one of Diphilus’. Terence 
translated four of Menander’s plays and two of Apollodorus’. See Fontaine for an overview of the Greek plays 
behind Plautus’ other works (2014: 517).  
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puns and jokes specifically targeted at a Roman audience.404 Terence enjoyed the same freedom 
when he wrote, and he was quite willing to attack other Roman comedians for hewing too 
closely to the original Greek.405 Also like Plautus, Terence had to entertain Romans with Roman 
jokes. One solution to this pressure was to turn to Roman sources rather than Greek ones, hence 
the accusation that he stole a scene from one of Plautus’ plays.406 
 Even though all Roman comedies are set in Greek locales with Greek characters, I argue 
that Plautus’ and Terence’s plays contain Roman thoughts about Roman manumission. While the 
characters may have Greek names, rather than being “proper” Greeks, they inhabit a thoroughly 
elastic setting that is stretched between Greece and Rome.407 Plautus, in particular, takes 
advantage of this elastic setting in two different ways. First, he sometimes projects onto this 
supposed Greek slavery expectations and practices that are actually part of Roman slavery. The 
most obvious example of this is Dordalus’ description of his manumission of a slave as an 
addition to the citizenry.408 Plautus’ second method is to describe Greek slavery as a practice that 
functions along the inverse of the values and expectations of Roman slavery. For in Plautus’ 
plays, slaves have holidays, throw parties for each other, and act as patrons to the women whom 
they surreptitiously manumit.409 While Plautus’ second method does contain insights into the 
                                                 
404 Fraenkel (1922). In their preface, translators Devikosky and Muecke point out that Fraenkel’s work still directs 
the exploration of Plautus (2007: xi). See also Petrides (2014).  
405 Eunuchus, 7-8. Cf. Brown (2013: 20). 
406 Specifically, that he has stolen a scene from Plautus’ rendition of Diphilus’ Synapothneskontes. Adelphoe, 6-14.  
407 Gratwick therefore entitles the setting of all Plautus’ plays “Plautopolis” (1993: 15). Leigh’s work on comedy 
and history demonstrates that Terence’s plays also interact with contemporary Roman affairs and concerns (2004).  
408 See Section 4a below.  
409 Slave holidays: Stichus, 421-22 and Persa, 28-9. Party: Stichus, 661 ff. Slave as patron to a freedwoman: 
Pseudolus: 1310a-b. Donatus reads the Greek location of the plays as giving the playwrights certain freedoms, 
asserting that the Romans had outlawed the depiction of Roman slaves being cleverer than Roman owners (Ad 
Eunuchum, 57). The question of the influence of the Greek setting on Plautus’ representation of slaves is, in a sense, 
a variation of the question of Greek influence on Roman comedy. As such, the question of the Greekness of Plautus’ 
slaves is a question that goes back to Fraenkel (2007: 159-172). In his approach to the overall question of how 
Plautus blends Greekness and Romannes, Segal uses slavery as an example (1967: 31-4). McCarthy, Spranger, and 
Stewart all cite the importance of Greekness for understanding slaves in Plautus. McCarthy frames it as the conflict 
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values of Roman slave-ownership, in this chapter, I focus on the examples and comments on 
manumission that are part of his first method. In comparison with Plautus, Terence writes about 
slaves and slavery infrequently. He similarly uses these two methods, albeit he rarely projects the 
inverse practices of Roman slavery onto Greek slavery.410 As with Plautus, in this chapter, I 
focus Terence’s description of a definitively Roman manumissions, such as in his Adelphoe.  
 While Romans in the first century approached some comedies as readers, Plautus’ and 
Terence’s wrote in order that actors—actors who included slaves—would speak these words as 
characters in a performance.411 A logical way to conceptualize the relationship between these 
texts and the performance of these texts is that the actors, having been assigned to a specific role 
or combination of roles, memorized the lines assigned to that character. However, recently C.W. 
Marshall has argued that this assumption hides how theater was a collective endeavor that 
included complex and fruitful exchanges between the playwright and actors. This interaction 
could have been as simple as the actor consulting with the playwright about changing the script. 
A more radical suggestion is that the actors improvised lines during the performance of the plays, 
prompting the playwright to alter the manuscript after the play.412 Testimony from Cicero points 
to how Roman audiences expected actors to improvise.413 Such theories about improvisation, 
combined with the ancient accounts of Plautus’ base and Terence’s servile backgrounds, suggest 
that the Roman theater contained voices of those who used to be slaves and those who were 
                                                                                                                                                             
between Greek naturalism and Roman frace (2000: 5-6). Building upon Fraenkel, Spranger complicates the idea that 
Plautus reflects the Hellenic world (1984: 54-63). Stewart also builds on Franekl (2012: 14-16).  
410 Terence describes the slaves taking a holiday in the Eunuchus, 277-9. Furthermore, Terence, like Plautus, writes 
of slaves as being married (Adelphoe, 972-3).  
411 For slaves as actors: Asinaria, 2 and Cistellaria, 782-5.  
412 Marshall (2006). Marshall places more emphasis on the troop as a collaboration, although he builds on Vogt-
Spira’s interpretation that places Plautus’ individual scenes in the context of Atellan farce and mime (Vogt-Spira 
1995 and 1997). Slater argues for a different kind of improvisation, in which Plautus’ literariness, in a Hegelian turn, 
absorbs and overcomes Italic performance traditions (1985). For the relationship of these different theories, see 
Petrides (2014).  
413 “nam illud ipse actor adiungebat amico animo” Cicero, Pro Sestio, 121. Cf. Marshall (2006: 275).  
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currently enslaved.414 An important consequence of this reconstruction of Roman theater is that 
the discussion and depiction of manumission within the comedies included the perspectives of 
Roman slaves. 
 While the comedies include the voices of slaves, many of Plautus’ and Terence’s 
characters speak as slave-owners or as people who are not slave-owners but nonetheless share 
values of slave-owners, including slave-owners’ evaluation of manumission. That a variety of 
characters do adopt the perspective of slave-owners does not imply that this perspective 
completely dominated Roman comedy. Instead, such adoption indicates that because there were 
advantages to thinking like a slave-owner, as well as acting for the benefit of slave-owners, 
Romans did not have to be slave-owners in order to bear the slave-owners’ gaze. In some 
instances, slaves have clearly internalized the values of slave-owners. For example, in the 
Mostellaria, the slave Grumio attacks his fellow slave Tranio for not being sufficiently loyal to 
their owners.415 Through disciplining Tranio, Grumio demonstrates his commitment to the 
subjection of slave-ownership. More complex are examples in which a figure such as Curculio 
attacks pimps for being improper slave-owners. As a parasitus, Curculio does not own slaves, 
but is rather in a subordinate relationship to powerful men, a subordinate relationship that makes 
him similar to, but distinct from, a slave.416 Such a similarity could imply that his attack on 
pimps comes from the perspective of those who lack power, rather than policing pimps for not 
following the standards of the powerful.417 I am sympathetic to such a reading, but because a 
                                                 
414 Such is the conclusion of Richlin’s article (2014). Because Richlin focuses on Plautus and takes advantage of his 
fondness of servi callidi, adapting her argument to include Terence is not easy. However, Spranger uses both Plautus 
and Terence in his analysis of Roman slavery (1984). Suetonius describes Terence as a Carthaginian slave (Vita 
Terenti, 1). Aulus Gellius writes that Plautus “worked the mills” (Noctes Atticae, 3.3.14). In Plautus’ plays, this 
demeaning work is a punishment reserved for slaves (e.g., Pseudolus, 709). For an opposing view of Richlin’s 
inclusive model for the audiences of and voices in Roman comedy, see Fontaine (2010) and Stewart (2012).   
415 I examine this episode in detail in Section 4a.  
416 I examine this episode in detail in Section 4a.  
417 Richlin draws out parallels between slaves in Plautus and other stock characters, such as parasiti (2014: 185-6). 
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moneylender later echoes Curculio’s attack on pimps as slave-owners, I am inclined to read 
Curculio’s rant as him disciplining pimps using the values of slave-owners.418 In other words, 
while Roman comedies include the traces of slaves’ voices and experiences, the comedians were 
also playing to the values of the other audience members, such as the slave-owners and freeborn 
non-slave-owners. As a result, the comedies provide a number of examples of the judgment of 
slave-owners on manumission, including the dangers of bad manumission. 
 That Roman comedies included the voices, complaints, and fantasies of slaves raises the 
question of how slave-owners related to slave characters who were working towards their 
freedom. Related to this question is why slave-owners would permit the plays to contain the 
viewpoint of slaves. McCarthy argues that the hierarchical nature of Roman society made it easy 
for slave-owners to sympathize with the slave characters. For both the slave characters on the 
stage and the slave-owners in the audience had to deal with powerful men who were absent, 
absent minded, or needlessly cruel. That is, the slave-owners in the audience read their own 
struggles with officials, and other authorities, as analogous to the slave characters’ struggles 
against their owners.419 As a result, for slave-owners, the manumissions on the Roman stage 
were analogous to generic social advancement. In other words, as part of their subjection, slave-
owners had the tools in order to obfuscate their discovery of the truth of manumission, even 
when watching it performed in Roman theater. Rather than simply presenting the slave-owners’ 
view of the world, the comedies contain the conflicts that ran through Rome.420 
                                                 
418 For the simple reason that I read Plautus making this moneylender unsympathetic because of the abusive way that 
he wields his power. For more, see Section 4a.  
419 McCarthy (2000).  
420 I return to this idea of the comedies as continuations of conflicts within Roman society in Chapter 4. In contrast, 
Stewart argues that it is important to approach Plautus with the assumption that Roman slave-owners have 
effectively silenced slave voices (2012: 12).  
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 By adopting Greek comedy and combining it with a variety of Italic performance 
traditions, Plautus and Terence wrote texts that contain clues for how Romans thought about 
their own practices, including manumission. Their work also shows that they responded to Greek 
thoughts on Roman manumission. First, I examine how the Greeks thought about Roman 
manumission and what conclusions they drew.   
3. The Greek gaze and Roman manumission 
 Although the Greek writers who elaborated the most extensive analyses of Roman 
manumission were separated by two hundred years, both Philip V and Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus understood Roman manumission as playing an essential role in the expansion of 
the Roman state. This is not to say that the two Greeks were of the same mind of the worth of the 
Roman approach. While Philip cites the liberality of Roman manumission as an example for the 
Larisaeans of Thessaly to follow, Dionysius complains that contemporary Romans do not take 
proper care in selecting which slaves to manumit, that they follow a slipshod approach that 
results in many ignoble freedmen with Roman citizenship. Dionysius concludes his diatribe on 
Roman manumission with a call for the Romans to reform manumission. Dionysius himself was 
not a Roman, despite his mastery of archaic Roman history, and so his call upon the Romans 
speaks how his Greek text is both outside and within the Roman worlds.  
 Although Dionysius’ relationship to Rome is complex, trying to determine Philip’s 
relationship to Rome is harder because the scarcity of evidence of the context of his writing 
about Rome in the third century. Indeed, there are two competing narratives about the 
intersection of the Greeks and Romans in the third century. The first narrative tells a story in 
which the Romans had minimal contact with the Greeks until the third century. In this narrative, 
the third century unfolds with an unprecedented Roman interest in the Greeks, as evidenced by 
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Roman cultivation of Greek talent such as Livius Andronicus.421 The second narrative asserts 
that the connection between the Greeks and Romans is older than the third century, that the 
Greeks and Romans were always in contact with each other. Material evidence shows that 
Romans and other Italians traded for and valued Greek pottery; Greeks as old as Hesiod wrote of 
legends containing figures with Italian connections.422 But according to both narratives, during 
the third century, the Romans examined themselves, their practices and their institutions with the 
Greeks in mind. The Greek gaze was part of how the Romans reflected on themselves. As a 
result, the Greek gaze played in a role in how the Romans recognized themselves, including their 
slaves and their practices, including manumission.    
a. Philip V: In his own words and in Livy’s 
 H.G. Lolling discovered the inscription that included Philip V’s comments on the 
Romans in 1882, prompting great interest in what exactly Philip V’s comments can reveal about 
the Roman world and the Greeks’ relationship to it.423 But this interest has not translated into 
respect for the king’s worth as a witness. More bluntly, Theodore Mommsen, A.J. Toynbee, and 
Edward Togo Salmon refuse to accept Philip’s description of Rome as a place so inclusive of 
freedmen.424 The rhetorical context of Philip’s description means that the king was intent upon 
persuading the Larisaeans; he was not intent upon accurately representing Roman practices. 
Philip wanted to convince the Larisaeans that social inclusivity, particularly the inclusion of 
                                                 
421 Gruen’s account is perhaps the best articulation of this version (1992). Cf. Dench (2005: 28).  
422 Cf. Hesiod on Latinos, Theogeny, 1013. Momigliano is perhaps the most ardent advocate of this position: “There 
is no time and no place in which the Romans were free of Greek influences.” (1984: 438, trans. Wiseman 1995: 43). 
Wiseman agrees with Momigliano (1995: 43). See also Momigliano (1969a: 450ff.), (1969b: 31ff.), and (1989). Cf. 
van Berchem (1966: 739ff) and Bayer (1972: 305ff), whom Raaflaub cites in his more agnostic assessment of the 
question (2005: 15 n.75). Likewise, Forsythe reviews the evidence of Greek influence in Roman archaeology 
without pressing the point as to the degree of Greek influence (2005: 31-35 and 41-45). However, both Feeney and 
Cornell are resolute that early Roman culture only makes sense when viewed in conversation with Greek culture, 
Feeney in terms of literature (2015: 9) and Cornell in terms of history (1995: 86-92).  
423 Lolling (1882: 61-76). Throughout the rest of Section 3, I refer to Philip V as Philip. 
424 Mommsen (1908: 49-56), Toynbee (1965: 278-9), and Salmon (1969: 69). See also Syll. 2 (1960: 514 n. 24, 25 
and 26). 
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freedmen, leads to a stronger state. Philip’s emphasis on social inclusion is all the more radical 
when contrasted with the practices of his Thessalian audience. For the Thessalians owned 
penestai, helot-like slaves who had little hope of social advancement. While the king identifies 
this inclusion as a way in which the Romans differ from the Greeks, he also believes that the 
Greeks can change to become more like the Romans. Philip’s letter demonstrates that, already in 
the third century, the Greeks were seeking to understand what made the Romans different from 
other peoples in the Mediterranean. Philip, like Dionysius, argued that one of the key differences 
was manumission. But Philip’s Greek gaze did not remain that of an outsider appraising and 
analyzing Rome. As a Roman historian, Livy utilizes Philip’s Greek gaze to assert that the 
Romans are not barbarians, but instead a people worthy of Greek respect. While Livy’s Philip 
does not mention manumission, the historian’s depiction of the king is a demonstration of how 
the Romans appropriated the Greek gaze in their self-reflection. Livy’s Philip is an example of 
Roman secondarity to the Greeks and demonstrates how Roman evaluation of Roman practices, 
such as manumission, occurred against a backdrop of Roman appropriation of Greek evaluation 
of Roman practices.  
 In the first letter that Philip wrote to the Larisaeans in 217 BCE, he ordered them to admit 
into their citizenry a number of soldiers.425 This command apparently rankled the Larisaeans 
because the inscription bearing the names of these new citizens was later defaced, an act likely 
indicative that the Larisaeans had rescinded their decree. Philip then wrote his second letter to 
the Larisaeans, commanding them to both rewrite the inscription and re-invite these men to be 
                                                 
425 IG IX 2 517.10 ff. It is likewise important not to forget Philip’s amanuensis; for the ἐπιστολογράφος in the courts 
of Hellenistic kings, see Welles (1934: xxxviii). For how this letter intersects with the history of Greek 
epistlography, see Ceccarelli (2013: 308-9). Habicht’s reading of the stone dates the first inscription to 217 (1970); 
Walbank’s biography of Philip uses the previously accepted date of 221 (1940: 35 and 295-99).  
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citizens.426 In order to convince the Larisaeans that his command is reasonable, Philip uses Rome 
as an example of how inclusivity leads to strength, claiming that the Romans permitted their 
freedmen to become magistrates and colonists:  
…ὧν καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοί εἰσιν, οἳ καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ὅταν ἐλευτερώσωσιν προσδεχόμενοι εἰς τὸ 
πολίτυεμα καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων μεταδιδόντες καὶ διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου οὐ μόνον τὴν ἰδίαν 
πατρίδα ἐπηυξήκασιν, ἀλλά καὶ ἀποικίας σχεδὸν εἰς ἑβδομήκοντα τόπους ἐκπεπόμφασιν. 
 
…the Romans are among such people, and when they free their slaves, they receive them into 
the franchise and give them magistracies, and on account of this practice they have not only 
increased their own fatherland but they have sent out colonists to nearly seventy locations.  
IG IX 2 517.30-34 = Syll. 2 543, translation my own.  
 
With this context in mind, it is therefore questionable whether as an author Philip was concerned 
about how accurately he described Roman practices: he instead wants to ensure that the 
Larisaeans enfranchise these men and no longer resist his orders. This letter is evidence that he 
expected the Larisaeans to believe his description of Rome as an inclusive society, but only to 
the extent that the Larisaeans would then follow his commands to change their stance towards 
the inclusion of foreigner soldiers within their own polis. Philip’s gaze upon Roman 
manumission is evaluative and acquisitive; he looks at the Romans in order to find ways to 
improve Greek practices, specifically the practices of the Larisaeans of Thessaly.  
 In this context, Philip’s implicitly contrasts the social mobility of Roman freedmen with 
the Thessalian practice of owning penestai. This contrast has passed without comment in 
previous investigations of the inscription.427 While the exact details of who the penestai were and 
what role they placed in Thessalian society is ambiguous, ancient Greek writers were consistent 
in comparing them Spartan helots.428 The implication of this comparison is that the Thessalians 
                                                 
426 IG IX 2 517.26-9. 
427 Cf. Mommsen (1908: 49-56)), Toynbee (1965: 278-9), and Salmon (1969: 69). See also Syll. 2 (1960: 514 n. 24, 
25 and 26). 
428 Cf. Plato, Laws ,776 c-d and Aristotle, Politics, 1264a35. For the representation of penestai in these passages, 
and all other references to penestai, see Ducat (1994). In general, Northern Greece deserves more attention for how 
they practiced slavery, as their practices differed from those of the Athenians, cf. Alexianu (2008).   
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exercised collective ownership over the penestai.429 Such an arrangement suggests that Larisa, 
along with the rest of Thessaly, was highly stratified, with minimal social mobility or acceptance 
of outsiders.430 Philip’s brief description of Roman manumission highlights practices that are in 
direct conflict with the values of the Thessalian control of penestai. In the context of this letter, 
Philip defines the Romans by their manumission practices, and in doing so, he contrasts these 
practices to those of the Greeks, specifically the Larisaeans. In other words, since both Philip and 
the Larisaeans were slave-owners, it makes sense that they would be interested in how a strange 
people liked the Romans treated their slaves.431 Nonetheless, when the king conceives of the 
Romans in this letter, he does not see a people whose values are inimical to that of the Greeks. 
Instead, for him the Romans are a people who use better social practices in order to accumulate 
more power.432  
 Centuries after Philip’s letter to the Larisaeans, Livy depicted Philip looking enviously at 
the Romans and their practices. The close similarities between this story and a story about 
Pyrrhus of Epirus complicates any attempt to create a direct link between Philip’s representation 
of himself and how Livy depicts him. I instead argue that these stories represent how Romans’ 
self-reflection used the Greek gaze in order to explain the purpose and rationales of Roman 
practices such as manumission. These stories and themes emphasize that while the Romans may 
be second to the Greeks in terms of culture and literature, the Romans surpass the Greeks in 
political and military organization, a superiority that becomes particularly apparent when Greek 
                                                 
429 Ducat (1994).  
430 Such is Ducat’s assessment. I see a similar picture of Thessaly in the works of Helly (1995 and 2004). Mili urges 
caution about relying too much on this picture for explaining Thessalian society, but nonetheless concedes the 
importance of Thessalian oligarchy (2015: 59). 
431 The treatment of slaves was an area of Greek ethnography, cf. Herodotus on the Persians’ treatment of slaves 
1.137.1.  
432 Livy describes Philip as overseeing forced migration of Thracians and sponsoring programs to increase the 
populations (39.24.3-4). Possibly these programs reflect the interest in population growth and assimilation that he 
displays in this letter. For migration, see and Walbank (1940: 243-4) and Oetjen (2010: 245-6). For the family 
programs, see Walbank (1940: 224 n.5) and Briscoe (2008: 304).     
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kings look upon the Romans for the first time. This trope of Greeks recognizing the superiority 
of Roman organization is therefore parallel to Philip’s letter, as there the king recognized the 
superiority of Roman manumission. 
 As a Greek writer in the Imperial Period, Plutarch reproduces these Roman concerns in his 
biography of Pyrrhus. In part, the biographer conceptualized Pyrrhus’ invasion of Italy as an 
originary event that demonstrates how it is the Romans who have political power, but it is the 
Greeks who have the authority to judge what is and is not barbarian. Plutarch describes Roman 
organization [τάξις] as beguiling the Greek king: 
δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐγγὺς εἶναι καὶ πέραν τοῦ Σίριος ποταμοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσεν, 
προσίππευσε τῷ ποταμῷ θέας ἕνεκα: καὶ κατιδὼν τάξιν τε καὶ φυλακὰς καὶ κόσμον αὐτῶν καὶ 
τὸ σχῆμα τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐθαύμασε, καὶ τῶν φίλων προσαγορεύσας τὸν ἐγγυτάτω, ‘τάξις 
μέν,’ εἶπεν, ‘ὦ Μεγάκλεις, αὕτη τῶν βαρβάρων οὐ βάρβαρος, τὸ δὲ ἔργον εἰσόμεθα.’ 
 
Learning that the Romans were nearby and encamped on the other side of the river Siris, he 
rode to the river so that he might see. And looking down upon their order, garrisons and 
discipline and the planning of their encampment, he was amazed and spoke to the companion 
who was nearest “O Megacles, now that we see their works, this order of these barbarians is 
not barbaric.” 
Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, 16.4-5, trans. B. Perrin.433 
 
Plutarch finds this comment so essential to understanding the relationship between the Romans 
and Pyrrhus, and thereby the Greeks in general,  that he repeats this anecdote in his Life of 
Flamininus.434  
 But Roman organization inspiring wonder in Greeks is not simply a trope of later writers 
like Plutarch. Instead, Plutarch’s depiction Pyrrhus belongs to a Greek tradition of Greeks being 
amazed at Rome and Roman practices.435 Strabo reports that Erastosthenes described the 
                                                 
433 For a reader-reaction analysis of this scene, with particular attention to Greek and Roman relations in the Second 
Sophistic, see Mossman (2005). Mossman also notes how Pyrrhus’ appreciation of the Romans is a virtue for 
Plutarch (1992: 97-8). For the politics surrounding the memory of Pyrrhus, see Erskine (2001: 157-161). 
434 Flamininus, 5.4. 
435 Pyrrhus is also an important figure in the Roman tradition as well, with Pyrrhus being a key figure in Ennius’ 
Annales. Cicero reports how Ennius valorized Pyrrhus to be a worthy foe for the Romans. See, especially, Cicero, 
De Divinatione 2.56, 116 = Warmington Fragment, 174. Cf. Welsh (2011).  
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Romans as “administrating their state amazingly.”436 Likewise, the entire enterprise of Polybius’ 
history is a diachronic and synchronic explanation of how Rome amassed the amazing ability to 
conquer the world in less than a century, a feat so awesome that Polybius assumes that it is 
obvious that anyone would be fascinated by this story.437 Of course, not all Greek evaluations of 
Roman practices were positive. Nicolaus’ description of Romans requiring slaves to fight to the 
death contains amazement that this people permitted such a practice.438 As a result, when a 
Roman such as Livy writes about Greeks gazing and assessing Roman practices, he is adapting 
to Roman self-reflection the ideas and values that Greeks made of Romans.  
 The Roman reflective gaze adopted how the Greeks gazed at Roman practices. Livy 
writes of Philip’s first sight of the Roman army and includes the following anecdote: 
ac subiecta cernens Romana castra, admiratus esse dicitur et universam speciem castrorum et 
discripta suis quaeque partibus cum tendentium ordine tum itinerum intervallis et negasse 
barbarorum ea castra ulli videri posse. 
 
It is said that as he looked down on it and gazed with admiration on the appearance of the 
camp as a whole and its various sections marked off by the rows of tents and the roads crossing 
each other, he exclaimed, “No one can possibly take that for a camp of barbarians.”  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 31.34.4-9, trans. Roberts. 
 
Livy writes that the Roman military, and by extension other institutions and practices like 
manumission, is so great that it strikes awe into the Greek king. Livy appropriates Philip’s own 
gaze in part to justify the triumph over the Greeks and, also, to explain the importance of Roman 
practices.439 
 Livy’s use of Philip’s gaze on Rome demonstrates how the Roman reflective gaze used 
Greek practices, as a reference point for understanding the importance of Roman practice such as 
manumission. But, while Philip originally wrote for a specifically Greek readership, later Greek 
                                                 
436 “οὕτω θαυμαστῶς πολιτευομένους.” Strabo, 1.4.9.  
437 Polybius 1.1.5-6. Champion (2000 and 2004) explores how Polybius negotiated the Romans’ difference from the 
Greeks in his history. Allen explores Polybius’ relationship to the Romans through the lens of hostageship (2006: 
201-223).  
438 FrGH 90.78 = Athenaeus 153f-154a. For more on this passage, see Chapter 2 Section 7.  
439 Cf. Polybius on Roman camp arrangements (6.27.1-41.2). See Champion (2004: 70-5 and 93). 
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authors, such as Dionysius and Plutarch, wrote expecting Roman readers of their works. Livy’s 
and Plutarch’s retelling of similar stories demonstrates how the Greek and Roman writers used 
similar stories to pose different questions.440 Plutarch’s description of Pyrrhus’ wonder at Roman 
order connects to Plutarch’s own status as a Greek looking at and investigating Rome.441 In 
contrast, Livy’s description of Philip is a Roman writer using the Greek gaze to emphasize, and 
internally evaluate, the glory of Rome. During, and after, the Roman conquest of Greece, the 
Greek gaze did not become identical to the Roman one, but it did become part of the Roman 
world. As such, the Greek gaze on Rome was available for writers, such as Livy, to use for their 
own descriptions and evaluations of Roman practices and strengths. I argue that Dionysius’ 
comments on manumission are connected to his negotiation with Greekness and Romanness. For 
Dionysius knows that, as a Greek, his gaze on manumission has value to the Romans, and 
therefore chooses his words carefully.  
b. Dionysius of Halicarnassus: His own words and Servius’ 
 As part of his historical narrative, Dionysius writes that king Servius Tullius began 
Roman manumission through fiat.442 Dionysius also includes a speech by the king, followed by a 
diatribe, in which the historian writes in his own voice. The king’s speech and the historian’s 
diatribe are examples of how the Greek writer looked at Roman manumission. Indeed, questions 
of Greekness and Romanness are important ones for Dionysius’ investigation into and evaluation 
of manumission, since one of his stated aims of his history is to prove that Romans are Greeks. 
Since no Greeks practiced manumission like the Romans did, the historian therefore needed to 
explain how the principles behind Roman manumission are properly Hellenic. In doing so, 
                                                 
440 Nissen argues that Livy’s passage is Polybian (1863: 128). Briscoe agrees and argues that the Pyrrhus story 
developed from the story about Philip (1973: 1 and 140-1). Toynbee (1965: 437 n.3) and Mossman (2005: 513 n. 
58) are open to the possibility of a communis locus for the two stories. 
441 Pelling argues that Plutarch’s scholarship on Rome is in part motivated by the desire to understand how the 
Romans became the kind of people who were able to conquer the Mediterranean (1986).    
442 For more on this story, see Chapter 2 Section 7.  
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Dionysius not only asserts that Greeks should accept and enjoy Roman dominion, but he also 
builds up the authority and worth of the Greek gaze on Rome. Since Dionysius himself was an 
active participant in the Roman literary world, it is logical to assume that he anticipated that 
Roman readers would use his Greek gaze in the Roman Antiquities in order to reflect on their 
practices and principles. As a consequence, his diatribe on Roman manumission ought to be read 
as participating in a debate on Roman manumission that lead to the reforms of manumission in 
Augustus’ Lex Aelia Sentia. Unlike Philip V’s Greek gaze, Dionysius’ Greek gaze was of the 
Roman world and was, furthermore, part of how Roman slave-owners understood the importance 
of their manumission practices.  
 Because Dionysius is the only ancient writer to assert that Servius reformed 
manumission, I examine how Dionysius positioned his history in the Roman world of the first 
century, as well as the related question of how he approached his sources, in order to consider 
why the historian chose this variant aetiology of Roman manumission. In order to prove that the 
Romans were Greeks in Book 1, Dionysius cites over fifty authors as part of his theses that the 
Romans originally came from the East and that Latin is merely a dialect of Greek.443 But in the 
later books, including Book 4, Dionysius does not typically name his sources. In his preface, he 
indicates that his research included visiting Roman libraries and listening to the oral histories of 
Roman families.444 Perhaps this story of Servius’ reformation of manumission originally 
belonged to one of those families. Perhaps it existed as an aetiloogical account in some     
scholar’s manuscript. In either case, the Servius story likely had a complex relationship to the 
Vindicius’ story. Whether or not the Romans themselves originated the Servius story, Dionysius 
                                                 
443 Cf. Schultze (1986: 129) and Musti (1970). For Dionysius’ argument that Latin is a form of Greek, see Stevens 
(2006) and Marin (1969).  
444 1.7.2-3. Cf. Gabba (1991: 85-90). See Wiseman (2009: 81-98) for an argument that Dionysius took his account of 
Romulus’ asylum from Varron. See also Chapter 2 Section 4a.  
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retells the story from Greek perspective on Roman manumission, albeit a perspective that the 
author intends to be palatable for Roman readers. 
 Dionysius’ perspective on the Romans and Roman practices was Greek, but it was a 
Greek perspective from within the Roman world, and therefore one sensitive to the expectations 
of a Roman audience, as C.E. Schultze shows. Dionysius’ works reveal that he was very much 
part of the literary milieu in Rome: his treatise on Thucydides is dedicated to Q. Aelius Turbo, a 
Roman acquaintance to both Varro and Cicero.445 That Dionysius had the Romans in mind when 
writing his history is not immediately apparent, since he presents himself as the first Greek to 
document thoroughly the origins and practices of Rome.446 But while an educated Roman reader 
may not find any new information in Dionysius’ work, he or she would be intrigued by the new 
theories and interpretations that Dionysius applies to Roman history.447 This is not to say that 
Romans would have only been interested in Dionysius for his Greek perspective, since his 
accounts of conflict and unification in early Rome offered parallels ripe for moralizing and moral 
thinking about the recent civil wars and Augustus’ rise.448 Dionysius’ text anticipates that Roman 
readers will utilize it for Roman ends, and so Dionysius’ Greek gaze on Rome is in a way 
domesticated. While Dionysius does not challenge Rome’s authority, his diatribe on 
manumission challenges the Romans to follow through on the very Roman principles that he 
himself articulates. In other words, even though he is not a Roman, Dionysius participates in 
                                                 
445 Cicero: Pro Ligario, 1, 10 and 21. Cf. Schultze (1986: 122). For libraries and Roman politics, see Casson (2001), 
Dix (2000), and Yarrow (2006: 38). For comparison, see Erskine on the library of Alexandria (1995). 
446 In order to present himself as authoritative and original, Dionysius either denigrates or highlights the limited 
scope of the works of the Greek historians Antigonus, Hieronymus of Cardia, Polybius, Silenus, and Timaeus, as 
well as works of the Roman historians Quintus Fabius and Lucius Cincius (1.6.1). Cf. “οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀκριβὴς 
ἐξελήλυθε περὶ αὐτῶν Ἑλληνὶς ἱστορία μέχρι τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς χρόνων, ὅτι μὴ κεφαλαιώδεις ἐπιτομαὶ πάνυ βραχεῖαι” 
(1.5.4). The best analysis of Dionysius’ audience is Schultze (1986). See also Momigliano (1975: 22-50) and (1978), 
as well as Marincola (1997: 17). Yarrow discusses the audiences of historians at the end of the Republic (2006: 82-
5).  
447 Schultze (1986: 139). 
448 Schultze (1986: 139). Cf. Gabba (1991: 3-4, 67-68) 
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discussions on Roman practices. Since Dionysius’ gaze on Roman manumission is 
simultaneously that of an insider and an outsider, he is writing from a porous place between 
Greekness and Romanness.  
 Dionysius’ text plays with the porosity between Greekness and Romanness in the figure 
of Servius. In addition to foreshadowing Dionysius’ own thoughts on and complaints  about 
manumission, Servius’ speech allows Dionysius to depict the king as Greek even though the 
historian is highlighting how this king instituted a practice contrary to how the Greeks practiced 
manumission. The king argues that numerous kingdoms have passed from slavery to freedom 
and freedom to slavery, a restatement of the succession of worldwide hegemonies that is a theme 
of Greek historiography, including Dionysius’ own history.449 In other words, Servius has the 
advantage of Dionysius’ own Greek ideas, even though Servius is a Roman king.  
 Additionally, Servius appears as a Greek because of the philosophical arguments that he 
makes: 
Πρῶτον μὲν θαυμάζειν, ἔφη, τῶν ἀγανακτούντων, εἰ τῇ φύσει τὸ ἐλεύθερον οἴονται τοῦ 
δούλου διαφέρειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῇ τύχῃ: ἔπειτ᾽ εἰ μὴ τοῖς ἤθεσι καὶ τοῖς τρόποις ἐξετάζουσι τοὺς 
ἀξίους τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς συντυχίαις, ὁρῶντες ὡς ἀστάθμητόν ἐστι πρᾶγμα εὐτυχία καὶ 
ἀγχίστροφον, καὶ οὐδενὶ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ τῶν πάνυ μακαρίων μέχρι τίνος αὐτῷ. 
 
…he said he wondered at those who were displeased at his course, first, for thinking that free 
men differed from slaves by their very nature rather than by their condition, and, second, for 
not determining by men’s habits and character, rather than by the accidents of their fortune, 
those who were worthy of honors, particularly when they saw how unstable a thing good 
fortune is and how subject to sudden change, and how difficult it is for anyone, even of the 
most fortunate, to say how long it will remain with him…. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquites, 4.23.1, trans. E. Cary, modified. 
 
Servius argues that enslavement does not reflect slave’s internal character, since enslavement is 
the result of external chance. Notably, this dichotomy of internal character and external chance is 
                                                 
449 Servius on vicissitude of enslavement: 4.23.1-2. Dionysius on the succession of empires: 1.2, cf. Gabba (1991: 
192-4). Herodotus’ statement on growth and decline seems particularly resonant because of Croesus’ enslavement 
(1.3-4). For the succession of empires in Greek historiography generally, Momigliano (1975). Caygill investigates 
how the succession of empires was important to Momigliano’s thought on the uniqueness of Greek historiography 
and his own political theology (2011).  
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a veritable trope of Stoic ethics.450 On the one hand, this stance does make Servius appear 
somewhat sympathetic to slaves.451 On the other hand, by having Servius recite a formula of 
Greek philosophy, Dionysius depicts the Roman king as a participant in Greek culture. 
Furthermore, the story of this speech is itself an exemplum of the importance of the Greek art of 
rhetoric, since through this speech the king successfully convinces the patricians to adopt his 
practice of combining manumission with enfranchisement.452 
 In addition to making Servius appear Greek, Dionysius also has the king deploy two 
arguments that speak to the patricians as Roman slave-owners. The king points out that 
enfranchising slaves will benefit slave-owners individually, since both the former slaves and 
their children become their clients. Dionysius’ Servius also argues that enfranchising former 
slaves will also benefit the Roman state because only enfranchised men can join the Roman 
military.  
τελευτῶν δὲ τὸν περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰσηγήσατο λόγον τοὺς μὲν ἐπισταμένους 
ὑπομιμνήσκων, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀγνοοῦντας διδάσκων, ὅτι πόλει δυναστείας ἐφιεμένῃ καὶ μεγάλων 
πραγμάτων ἑαυτὴν ἀξιούσῃ οὐδενὸς οὕτω δεῖ πράγματος ὡς πολυανθρωπίας, ἵνα διαρκέσῃ 
πρὸς πάντας τοὺς πολέμους οἰκείοις ὅπλοις χρωμένη, καὶ μὴ ξενικοῖς στρατεύμασι 
καταμισθοφοροῦσα συνεξαναλωθῇ τοῖς χρήμασι: καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔφη τοὺς προτέρους βασιλεῖς 
ἅπασι μεταδεδωκέναι τῆς πολιτείας τοῖς ξένοις. 
 
He concluded by speaking of the advantage that would result from this policy, reminding those 
who understood such matters, and informing the ignorant, that to a state which aimed at 
supremacy and thought itself worthy of great things nothing was so essential as a large 
population, in order that it might be equal to carrying on all its wars with its own armed forces 
and might not exhaust itself as well as its wealth in hiring mercenary troops; and for this 
reason, he said, the former kings had granted citizenship to all foreigners.  
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquties, 4.23.4, trans. E. Cary. 
 
                                                 
450 Seneca gives the most elaborate articulation of this position; however, it is clear that the argument is older. 
Seneca: Epistulae, 47.10-13; cf. also Cicero Paradoxa Stoicorum, 5.33-4 and De Officiis, 1.41. For earlier Stoic 
arguments, see Garnsey (1996: 131-3). Mouritsen places this speech in the context of various apologia for slaves by 
slave-owners (2011a: 53).  
451 For Servius’ various connections to the religious life of Roman slaves, see Chapter 2 Section 5a.   
452 Schultze argues that there are three types of speeches in Dionysius: populist arguments for reform, conservative 
arguments against reform, and moderate arguments on “reasonableness of change” (1986: 131). Servius’ speech 
appears to begin in the first category but then shifts to the third by the end.  
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In addition to these military reasons, Servius also claims that combining manumission with 
enfranchisement will benefit Rome financially.453  
 Servius’ argument that there are political and military merits to liberal manumission are 
clearly similar to those of Philip, but what this similarity indicates for Dionysius is not. For just 
as Philip argues that the liberality of Roman manumission, as indicated by the status of freedmen 
as magistrates and colonists, makes the state strong, so too does Dionysius’ Servius argue that 
liberal manumission will increase the size of Rome’s army, thereby increasing Rome’s potential 
for conquest. This similarity speaks to how Dionysius, like Philip, sees manumission as a 
practice in which Greeks and Romans differ. Such a different practice, therefore, has the 
potential to explain why the Romans were so successful in their military affairs that they 
conquered the Greeks. Significantly, the two Greeks came to this same conclusion despite having 
different experiences of Roman conquest at the respective time of their compositions. For 
Philip’s comments are from outside Rome, at time when the Romans were fighting Greeks, while 
Dionysius’ comments are from within the Roman world after it is the undisputed master of the 
Mediterranean.454 The similarities of the two men’s comment invite the idea that this explanation 
of Roman manumission circulated throughout the Greek world. But Dionysius complicates the 
“Greekness” of this idea because he voices this analysis of the political benefits of Roman 
manumission through the mouth of a Roman king. In doing so, Dionysius positions this analysis 
of Roman manumission as the result of Roman self-reflection, not that of external Greek inquiry. 
Put another way, Servius’ speech is a Greek interpretation of Roman self-reflection on 
manumission. 
                                                 
453 4.23.5. 
454 For Dionysius’ search for the cause of Rome’s dominance, see Gabba (1991: 193 and 201-208). 
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 Dionysius constructs Servius’ speech in order to make his own comments on Roman 
manumission appear more authoritative. Dionysius’ diatribe on manumission immediately 
follows the king’s speech and has similarities of form and content. Both Servius and Dionysius 
address a Roman audience and both conclude with calls for the Romans to change: Servius asks 
that the Romans accept his reforms, while Dionysius asks that the Romans return to following 
Servius’ instructions on how to practice manumission properly.455 For Dionysius is ardent that 
the current way that Romans are manumitting slaves is not working.  
 Dionysius has a number of complaints about contemporary Roman manumission, 
including how slaves who earn their money through ignoble means—whether with or without 
their owners’ knowledge are able to purchase their freedom.456 He is also incensed that there are 
slave-owners who manumit slaves solely so that these new citizens might collect government-
sponsored grain.457 And according to the historian, other slave-owners manumit slaves for 
entirely frivolous reasons, such as increasing the stature of those who attend their funerals.458 
Dionysius concludes his complaints by noting that these problems are so bad that many people 
condemn it in the following way:  
εἰς τούτους μέντοι τοὺς δυσεκκαθάρτους σπίλους ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποβλέποντες οἱ πολλοὶ 
δυσχεραίνουσι καὶ προβέβληνται τὸ ἔθος, ὡς οὐ πρέπον ἡγεμονικῇ πόλει καὶ παντὸς ἄρχειν 
ἀξιούσῃ τόπου τοιούτους ποιεῖσθαι πολίτας. 
 
Most people, nevertheless, as they look upon these stains that can scarce be washed away from 
the city, are grieved and condemn the custom, looking upon it as unseemly that a dominant city 
which aspires to rule the whole world should make such men citizens. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 4.24.6-7, trans. E. Cary 
 
Such people are indistinguishably Greek or Roman, since they look at Roman manumission not 
from the perspective of citizens or conquered, but as a practice of a world hegemony. From this 
                                                 
455 Servius’ call to the Romans as a successful act of persuasion: 4.23.7. Dionysius’ own call for specific reforms: 
4.24.7-8. Dionysius’ own diatribe fits into Schultze’s category of a call for reasonable reform. For Servius’ speech 
as a call for reasonable reform, see above.   
456 4.24.4. 
457 4.24.5. For more on grain and manumission, see Conclusion Section 2.  
458 4.24.6. Cf. Satyricon, 42.6 and 65.10. See also Section 4a below.  
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porous space, Dionysius constructs a way to look at Rome that justifies his judgment on Roman 
manumission even though he himself is not a Roman. In other words, Dionysius constructs his 
Greek gaze on Rome as being equally valuable in assessing Roman manumission as that of a 
Roman. 
 From that space of within and without, Dionysius’ diatribe participates in the Roman 
debate on manumission and articulates the Greek aspect of the Romans’ self-reflective gaze. 
Debates from the first century CE make clear that Roman slave-owners themselves had similar 
concerns as Dionysius.459 Likewise, Dionysius’ preface indicates that he feels as though there are 
Greek critics of Rome whom his history confronts and contradicts.460 Possibly these anonymous 
Greek critics targeted Roman manumission, a particularly vulnerable practice because it differed 
so greatly from Greek practices. For just as Philip’s letter to the Larisaeans occurred in a context 
in which the Larisaeans owned penestai and would have compared Roman manumission to their 
treatment of the penestai, the assumed Greek audience of Greek historiographies of Rome would 
have compared Roman manumission to the Greek manumission with which they were familiar.  
 Whether or not Dionysius himself was content occupying this porous space is unclear. 
Schultze argues that Dionysius coveted Roman citizenship and that his diatribe against slaves is, 
in part, the result of his annoyance that mere slaves have become citizens, but that he himself has 
not.461 If the historian was so motivated, it is further evidence the extent to which learning to 
appreciate manumission was part of the subjection of Roman citizens. For despite his 
complaints, Dionysius is careful not to argue that manumission ought to be abolished. Instead, he 
                                                 
459 Tacitus records a debate in which senator attempted to legalize the re-enslavement of freedmen and freedwomen 
(Annales, 13.26-7). Cf. Mouritsen (2011a: 55). See also Chapter 2 Section 7 on Augustus’ reforms of manumissio 
testamento.  
460 More specifically, Dionysius might have had in mind historians of the Mithridatic court, such as Metrodorus, cf. 
Alonso-Núñez (1982), Gabba (1991: 190-2,) and Yarrow (2006: 138-145).  
461 Schultze cites an inscription form Imperial Era Halicarnassus as evidence that one of Dionysius’ descendants was 
a Roman citizen. Schultze therefore argues that this descendant had Roman citizenship because Dionysius was 
ultimately successful in his bid to become a Roman (1986: 141).  
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takes up the viewpoint of a Roman slave-owner and contemplates how the practice could be 
improved in order to better Rome. While Dionysius may be jealous that former slaves are 
Romans and he is not, he is nonetheless eager to demonstrate that he understands how important 
manumission is to being a Roman slave-owner.462 Whereas Philip looked at Roman 
manumission and found a valuable practice for making Greeks strong enough to resist the 
Romans, Dionysius looked at Roman manumission and saw a foreign practice that he needed to 
understand in order to participate in Roman discourse, and perhaps even become a Roman 
himself. Dionysius’ comments on Roman manumission were in conversation with Romans 
reflecting on manumission, including what made certain manumissions bad.  
4. Slave-owners and disciplining bad manumission 
 Plautus’ plays provide a number of references to and commentary on manumission done 
legally, but still inappropriately. While as a comic Plautus is more concerned with provoking 
laughter than providing explicit models to emulate or avoid, I read his comments on 
manumission as Plautus finding laughs in the values and discomfort of Roman slave-owners. By 
joking about the lived experience of manumission, Plautus deploys his jokes within the field of 
the slave-owners’ reflective gaze, not the gaze of the state. His jokes are in part reminders to 
slave-owners of the stakes of manumission, that even if they themselves were practicing 
manumission correctly, they nonetheless face consequences from their neighbors if they either 
freed the wrong type of slaves or freed them for the wrong reasons. In other words, Plautus’ 
jokes about manumission were also part of the subjection of slave-owners, since they provided 
warnings of the costs of performing manumission badly and reiterated how the Roman public, 
not just the Roman state, scrutinized manumission. Furthermore, I argue that the words of 
                                                 
462 Compare how Plutarch depicts the enslavement and manumission of Tyrannion (Life of Lucullus, 19). For that 
manumission, see Christes (1979: 107-15), Treggiari (1969: 119-21), and Yarrow (2006: 39-40). See also Chapter 2 
Section 5e above.  
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Plautus’ characters show the playwright playing with the language and concepts of Roman 
manumission similar to the language and conceptions articulated by the Greeks Philip and 
Dionysius, specifically that Roman manumission is a practice that strengthens Roman political 
power. I conclude that the Greek gaze shaped the secondarity of Plautus’ reflective gaze on 
manumission. Thus, this secondarity was bound up in the aspects of the subjection of Roman 
slave-owners that survive in Plautus’ works.  
 From Plautus’ stylized comments on manumission, I turn to Cicero, whose fraternal tiff 
with Quintus over the manumission of Statius I use as a case study in how slave-owners engaged 
each other in non-state policing. In two separate letters to his friend Atticus, Cicero makes clear 
that he finds Quintus’ manumission of Statius unwise and upsetting, while simultaneously 
asserting his authority as a family member in the matter. What upsets Cicero is that Statius’ 
manumission makes Quintus vulnerable to attacks from an anonymous Roman public, a concern 
that he expresses directly to Quintus in a letter. Cicero’s epistolary confrontation is a 
demonstration of how improper manumission prompted other slave-owners to take disciplinary 
action over perfectly legal manumissions.  
a. Plautus  
 Plautus’ characters describe how manumission can go badly because of the improper 
behavior and motives of the slave-owner. Their complaints also allude to the stakes of Roman 
manumission proceeding correctly. In doing so, Plautus’ characters use language and ideas that 
parallel Philip and Dionysius’ comments and concerns about Roman manumission. First, 
Dordalus describes manumission as a potential source of political strength in a way similar to 
Philip. Second, both Grumio and Dionysius are concerned that slave-owners allow selfish and 
frivolous motives guide their decision-making process, rather than considering whether a slave 
has demonstrated his or her loyalty and has therefore earned Roman citizenship. In addition to 
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demonstrating the Greek nature of Roman reflection on manumission, that is, its secondarity, 
these examples also characterize how the surveillance of manumission was connected to non-
state discipline. Plautus’ characters point to how the incorrect performance of manumission left 
slave-owners vulnerable to a variety of charges, including acting like a decadent Greek or being 
an irresponsible slave-owner. Furthermore, Plautus’ plays suggest that for some Roman citizens, 
specifically pimps, the possibility of enacting a proper manumission was out of their reach, 
precluded by their marginal status. 
 When the pimp Dordalus frames his manumission of a slave woman as an increase of the 
Athenian citizenry, Plautus engages in a projection of specifically Roman concerns about 
manumission into the Greek world. Dordalus’ comment is also evidence that Plautus is playing 
with the Greek perception of Roman manumission, since his line of thought parallels the ideas 
and language of Philip and Dionysius. In the Persa, the pimp Dordalus frames a personally 
financially profitable manumission as a virtuous increase in the citizenry: 
DO. sumne probus, sum lepidus civis, qui Atticam hodie civitatem 
maximam maiorem feci atque auxi civi femina? 
 
DORDALUS: Am I not an upright citizen? Am I not a fine citizen, who today  
Has made the great Attic citizenry greater and added a woman citizen? 
Plautus, Persa, 474-5, translation my own.463 
 
Even though Dordalus claims to be helping the Athenian citizenry, his comments provoke 
laughter because he is describing a pointedly Roman aspect of Roman manumission: how former 
slaves become citizens. There is also comedic fricition in Dordalus’ description of Lemniselenis 
as both a woman and a citizen. Furthermore, that this line could have provoked Roman laughter 
is suggestive of a peculiarly Roman anxiety about manumission, specifically that slave-owners 
can manipulate the make-up of the citizenry through manumission.464 Dordalus is an 
                                                 
463 For more on Dordalus specifically, see Fayer (2013: 274-281).  
464 Such anxiety could spur legislative action, see Chapter 2 Section 3a.  
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uncomfortable reminder that by distributing this power to all Roman citizens, the Romans had 
empowered even pimps such as Dordalus to modify the citizenry through manumission. When 
Dordalus says that his manumission has “made the great citizenry greater,” he equates the 
quantitative increase in the size of the citizenry through manumission with a qualitative increase 
in the citizenry’s strength, the same line of thought in Philip’s and Dionysius’ comments on 
Roman manumission. 
 I find the parallels between Dordalus’ comment and that of Philip as indicative that the 
secondarity of Romans’ reflective gaze meant that this gaze included the adaptation of the values 
of Greeks in their assessment and analysis of Roman practices. In his comment, Dordalus 
describes his manumission as the addition of a woman citizen, “auxi civi femina.” In his letter to 
the Larisaeans, Philip frames the Romans’ political strength as, in part, due to how they 
enfranchise former slaves as citizens, describing Roman manumission as the Romans “increasing 
their fatherland (τὴν ἰδίαν πατρίδα ἐπηυξήκασιν).”465 I do not mean to suggest that Plautus is 
responding directly to Philip’s description of Rome. Rather, my argument about Plautus’ 
adoption of the Greek gaze explains why there are more general parallels between Dordalus’ 
equation of manumission as a strengthening of the citizenry with that of King Servius in 
Dionysius’ history. Dionysius expresses similar concerns about the connection of manumission 
to political strengthen when he writes that King Servius says that manumission will help the 
Romans cultivate a large citizen body.466 Furthermore, Dionysius’ concern that the Romans now 
misuse manumission because of the freedom afforded to them, specifically that they might to 
manumit as they please, also has parallels in Plautus’ comedy. 
                                                 
465 See Section 3a above for more.  
466 See Section 3b above for more.  
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 The slave Grumio complains that his owner Philolaches does not consider manumission 
seriously, prompting the slave to accuse Philolaches of acting like a Greek. I read this derogatory 
use of pergraecor as a way for Plautus to project Roman concerns about manumission into a 
Greek setting. In the Mostellaria, when the rustic slave Grumio accuses both his fellow slave 
Tranio and their master Philolaches of acting like Greeks, it is in part because they manumit 
women in a thoroughly sympotic setting.  
[GRUMIO:] Corrumpe erilem adulescentem optumum; 
Dies noctesque bibite, pergraecaminei, 
Amicas emite, liberate: pascite 
Parasitos: opsonate pollucibiliter.  
 
[GRUMIO:] You corrupt our master, the best young man. Both of you drink day and night, 
and acting like Greeks, you buy girlfriends and then free them, you suffer flatterers and you 
feast too sumptuously. 
Plautus, Mostellaria, 21-24, translation my own. 
 
This joke is in part metatheatrical, since the audience can laugh at how this supposed Greek uses 
a word that means to act like a Greek as an insult. This insult is also clearly a Plautine addition, 
for while Grumio’s moralizing concerns about revelry and feasting have numerous parallels in 
Greek New Comedy, no Greek comedian could have used a word similar to pergraecor.467 
 Grumio’s concern that Philolaches manumits slaves while partying parallels Dionysius’ 
complaint that the Romans now manumit their slaves for frivolous reasons is another indication 
of the secondarity of Roman concerns about Roman manumission. Recall that Dionysius had 
specifically complained that there are Romans who manumit slaves, simply to ensure that there 
would a better class of people at their funerals: 
οἱ δὲ διὰ διὰκουφότητα τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ κενὴν δοξοκοπίαν. ἔγωγ᾽ οὖν ἐπίσταμαί τινας ἅπασι 
τοῖς δούλοις συγκεχωρηκότας εἶναι ἐλευθέροις μετὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν τελευτάς, ἵνα χρηστοὶ 
καλῶνται νεκροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ ταῖς κλίναις αὐτῶν ἐκκομιζομέναις παρακολουθῶσι τοὺς πίλους 
ἔχοντες ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς…. 
 
                                                 
467 Plautus is the only author to use this word. Gruen analyzes pergraecor in the context of Greco-Roman relations 
(1990: 124-157).  
Chapter 3: Slave-owners and subjection 
 178 
And others owe their freedom to the levity of their masters and to their vain thirst for 
popularity. I, at any rate, know of some who have allowed all their slaves to be freed after their 
death, in order that they might be called good men when they were dead and that many people 
might follow their biers wearing their liberty-caps. 
Dionysius of Halicarnauss, Roman Antiquities, 4.24.5-6, trans. E. Cary.468 
 
Dionysius’ explicit concern, which is only implicit in the complaint of the Latin speaking Greek 
slave Grumio, is that the slave-owners have not considered all the implications of the 
manumission and that he manumits his slave without the proper motive.469  
 Grumio’s grumbles about the sympotic setting of manumission also anticipate Petronius’ 
Trimalchio, who during his dinner manumits a slave, merely so that it cannot be said that he was 
injured by a slave. In this instance, Petronius uses Trimalchio to satirize the degree to which 
some Romans turn their management of slaves into a performance.470 In one of his didactic 
letters, Seneca lodges a similar complaint about decadent Romans and provides Lucilius with 
numerous strategies for how to be a humble and inconspicuous slave-owner.471 The comparison 
to these Imperial writers is useful because these other works highlight how Grumio’s complaint 
is also an example of how the slave-owners’ gaze had disciplining authority over manumissions 
performed entirely legally, that is, ones that the state’s gaze judged acceptable.  
 Plautus’ plays provide comments on manumission that are examples of how the slave-
owners’ gaze reflected on manumission, in part, to police its propriety. For while the state’s gaze 
was concerned with whether the manumission was done legally, slave-owners evaluated 
manumission by subtler standards; they evaluated both actual and hypothetical examples of 
                                                 
468 For more on this passage, see Section 3b above.  
469 In contrast, Segal interprets Plautus as using pergraecari to label all pleasurable activities that are in opposition 
to Roman severity (1968: 33-42).  
470 Memorably, Trimalchio states that he manumits a slave who fell on top of him so that it might not be said that he 
was wounded by a slave (Satyricon, 54.1). Furthermore, like Dionysius, Petronius describes a woman freeing slaves 
for the express purpose of having a more prestigious retinue at her funeral (65.10). While the topic of Petronius and 
manumission has attracted much recent attention (cf. Brunet 2008, Garrido-Hory 2008, Gonzáles 2008, 
Grosdemouge 2008, and Hidalgo de la Vega 2008,) my thoughts on how Trimalchio frees his slaves is still primarily 
influenced by Rosati’s work on theatricality in Petronius (1999).  
471 Epistula ad Lucilium, 47.  
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manumission. Indeed, Gruimo’s complaint is indicative of these standards, since he implies that 
while his owner Philolaches may have manumitted these hypothetical women entirely according 
to the law; nonetheless, he fails to act as a proper Roman slave-owner, since he initiated process 
while carousing. Instead, such a manumission means that Philolaches is acting like a Greek, 
which in this instance connotes a people who lack moral fortitude, even if they have an enviable 
culture. Indeed, the standards for manumission within the slave-owners’ gaze can be so high that 
it effectively judges certain types of legal manumission as always lacking in propriety, such as 
the manumissions that pimps conduct. 
 I argued above that Dordalus’ humorous framing of his manumission as an increase of 
the Athenian citizenry depended on the discomfort of slave-owners, as his comment forced them 
to reflect upon how the Roman practice of manumission entailed empower even men such as 
pimps with the ability to create new citizens. That Plautus wants his audience to condemn 
Dordalus is especially clear when the pimp states that his motive for manumitting the anonymous 
woman in question is only an incentive for her to be a more enthusiastic prostitute. The audience 
is primed to hate Dordalus in this scene because he bought the anonymous girl while aware that 
she is a freeborn citizen: 472 
DO. Ne sis plora; libera eris actutum, si crebro cades. 
 
DORDALUS: Don’t wail. You will quickly be a freedwoman, if you lie down often.  
Plautus, Persa, 656, translation my own. 
 
This line establishes that Dordalus is not interested in evaluating whether this slave has proved 
her loyalty to him, and thereby earned her freedom properly.473 While being a willing prostitute 
can be construed as a form of loyalty to Dordalus, Plautus so relentlessly characterizes Dordalus 
                                                 
472 653-4.  
473 Following Richlin’s line of argument, is possible this negative depiction of Dordalus is meant to include slaves’ 
evaluation of him as a disloyal slave-owner (2014). For the relationship between prostitutions on and off the stage, 
see Duncan (2006).  
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as greedily obsessed with profit, that it seems unlikely that this line deviates from Plautus’ 
project of depicting the pimp as entirely focused on money.474 In short, Dordalus’ own 
description of this hypothetical manumission presents his action to the audience as failing the 
expectations for a proper manumission.  
 Similarly, in the comedy Curculio, two different characters use pimps’ handling of 
manumission as evidence of their untrustworthiness. These accusations are part of a larger 
pattern in Plautus’ work of pimps as objects of contempt and worthy of violence.475 This 
comment is evidence that in the gaze of Roman slave-owners, pimps’ manumissions remained 
suspect, even if conducted legally. The first accusation about pimps’ handling of manumission 
comes from the titular Curculio, a parasitus, who engages in diatribes throughout the play. In 
this instance, Curculio has become incensed about pimps and argues that one of the reasons that 
they are untrustworthy is how they handle manumissions. 
CU. Egon ab lenone quicquam 
mancupio accipiam, quibus sui nihil est nisi una lingua, 
qui abiurant si quid creditum est? alienos mancupatis, 
alienos manu emittitis alienisque imperatis, 
nec vobis auctor ullus est nec vosmet estis ulli. 
 
CURCULIO: Should I take this title from a pimp? 
One of those who has nothing but a tongue, 
Who deny what they owe? Some people you sell, 
Others you manumit and yet others still you command,  
But you have no guarantor nor do you truly own anything.  
Plautus, Curculio, 494-8, translation my own. 
 
Curulio’s complaint about pimps is that they appear very similar to respectable slave-owners, but 
lack the actual social cache to justify their appearance of authority. For of course Romans would 
consider nothing wrong with commanding, selling, or manumitting people, and indeed, any 
remotely successful Roman man would engage in all three activities. But Curculio, like the 
                                                 
474 E.g. 685-91.   
475 Segal (1968: 81) writes, “The Plautine pimp is always punished.” Segal argues that Plautus is primarily interested 
in pimps as agelasts, that is, figures who block fun (1968: 79-91). In contrast, I read Plautus as in part reflecting a 
contempt for pimps that was acceptable among Romans. Cf. Fayer (2013: 244-68) and McGinn (1998 and 2004).  
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character Lyco, notes that pimps do all three things without also engaging in the same pursuit of 
respectability like successful Romans do, since pimps are persistent liars and as a result have 
isolated themselves to the point that no one will vouch for them.476 That Curculio’s main reason 
for distrusting pimps’ manumission is their status on the margins of society is evident by his 
exclamation that pimps do not have any guarantors or even the proper authority to own their own 
property.  
 The other character who disparages pimps’ manumission is the moneylender Lyco. He 
echoes Curculio’s concern that pimps engage in manumission too frequently, but also adds the 
charge that they abandon these new freedmen and freedwomen:  
LY. Faci’ sapientius 
quam pars lenonum, libertos qui habent et eos deserunt. 
 
LYCO: You act more wisely than most pimps, who have freedmen but abandon them.  
Plautus, Curculio, 547-8, translation my own.  
 
Lyco does not charge pimps with breaking or even skirting the law. Instead, he suggests that they 
do not follow through on the duties that they owe their freedmen and freedwomen as patrons.477 
Lyco’s comments, combined with those of Curculio, suggest that in Plautus’ world, pimps, as 
pimps, were incapable of performing manumission correctly.  
 Under the gaze of slave-owners, pimps’ manumissions might be legal, but they 
nonetheless do not follow all the standards that slave-owners demanded of each other for a 
proper manumission. Cicero’s quarrel with his brother Quintus over the manumission Statius 
suggest that Plautus’ examples reflect a lived Roman experience, that is, that Romans understood 
legal manumissions as events worthy of debate, criticism, and reproach if done incorrectly. The 
parallels between the comments of Plautus’ characters and that of the Greeks Philip and 
                                                 
476 For the importance of subordinate voices in Plautus, see Chapter 3 Section 2d above.  
477 Again, following Richlin’s argument, it is possible that Lyco’s attack on pimps as manumittors includes a slave’s 
perspective (2014).  
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Dionysius points to how Roman secondarity to Greece included how the Romans evaluated 
Roman manumission. In other words, Plautus did more than translate Greek plays into Latin, he 
also made accessible to Romans Greek evaluations of Roman manumission.  
b. Statius, Cicero, and Quintus 
 Cicero’s laments about Quintus’ manumission of Statius is an example of how Roman 
slave-owners monitored each other and evaluated the propriety of each other’s manumissions, 
not just their legality.478 Unlike Cicero’s manumission of his slave Chrysippus, there is no 
indication that Cicero thought that either Quintus or Statius did anything to skirt the law, but 
nonetheless, the Roman lawyer found Quintus’ decision to manumit Statius highly 
objectionable.479 While Cicero does not detail his objections about Statius’ manumission, in a 
letter to Quintus, Cicero lays out a series of complaints about how the freedman is unworthy of 
the power that he has because of Quintus’ status as governor of Asia.480 In this letter, Cicero’s 
concerns about Statius do bleed into the political sphere, but in the two letters that Cicero sends 
to Atticus detailing his initial grief and anxiety about Statius’ manumission, Cicero frames this 
misfortune as a family affair, outside the concern of the state. Cicero’s complaints are a 
demonstration to Atticus of Cicero’s own internalization of the subjection of the values of slave-
owners regarding manumission. While Plautus’ characters had performed their understanding of 
bad manumission on the stage, Cicero performs this recognition of bad manumission in the 
virtual space that his letters create.  
 Cicero had written about Statius’ manumission in June of 59, but it is in a letter to Atticus 
from the following month that Cicero demonstrates the extent to which Quintus’ decision 
                                                 
478 In this chapter, I refer to Marcus Cicero as Cicero and Quintus Cicero as Quintus. While terribly unfair to 
Quintus, this method is very convenient.  
479 For the Chrysippus episode, see Chapter 2 Section 4e.  
480 Ad Fratrem Quintum 1.2.3.  
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wounds him as a family member.481 Cicero frames Quintus’ decision as a familial concern in two 
ways. First, he juxtaposes his other political problems to the molestius of Statius’ manumission. 
Second, Cicero deploys a quote from Terence:  
Multa me sollicitant et ex rei publicae tanto motu et ex his periculis quae mihi ipsi intenduntur. 
Et sescenta sunt, sed mihi nihil est molestius quam Statium manu missum:  
‘ne meum imperium - ac mitto imperium - non simultatem meam  
Reveri saltem!’ 
 
I have many things on my mind, arising from the grave political crisis and these dangers that 
menace me. They are legion, but nothing distresses me more than Statius’ manumission:  
“That my commands- no, leaving aside my command - that my displeasure should count with 
him for nothing.” 
Cicero, Ad Atticum, 2.19.1 = Shackleton Bailey 39.1, trans. Shackleton Bailey, modified.482 
 
This quote is from the beginning of Act II of the Adelphoe, when the senex Demipho believes 
that his son Antipho has married without his blessing.483 Cicero’s deployment of this quote lays 
out the possibility of an analogy between the family in the play and Cicero’s own family. 
Specifically, by mouthing Demipho’s words, Cicero sets himself up as the offended father figure 
and Quintus as the reckless son. Cicero’s use of a Terentian quote about marriage frames Statius’ 
manumission as a family affair in the private and virtual space generated by Cicero’s 
correspondence. By virtual space, I mean that Cicero uses this letter to create a non-physical 
place in which he can perform for Atticus, his intended reader.484 
 Three months after writing to Atticus about how Statius’ manumission is a problem, 
Cicero writes to Quintus himself in part to complain about Statius’ character generally and about 
Quintus’ recent decision to manumit him specifically. But while in his letters to Atticus, Cicero 
had framed his judgment of Statius’ manumission as a familial concern, when writing to Quintus, 
                                                 
481 Ad Atticum 2.18.4 = Shackleton Bailey 38.4.  
482 Shackleton Bailey notes that this letter was also written in the summer of 59, but after Cicero had seen the ludi 
Apollinares (1978: 388).  
483 Phormio, 232-3.  
484 Cicero often uses his letters in order to perform physical actions for distant readers, e.g., hearing the reader’s 
laughter (Ad Atticum, 1.1.1 and 1.17.11) and embracing the reader, (Ad Familiares, 3.11.1-2). I adopt the term 
“virtual space” from Whitmarsh’s description of “virtual communities” in antiquity. See his discussion of how he 
adapted the term (2015: 205-214).  
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Cicero notes the public nature of the manumission. In effect, Cicero writes that through 
manumitting Statius, Quintus has disappointed an anonymous Roman public and that as a result 
he risks a loss of stature and influence. Cicero cites how numerous people have come to him 
asking for recommendations to Statius, altercations that Cicero frames as slights to Quintus, 
since presumably these people ought to have asked for recommendations to Quintus himself, 
rather than to his freedman.485 Cicero then elaborates that Statius’ manumission is a legitimate 
complaint that other Romans can use to attack Quintus’ character:486 
Atque hoc habeto (nihil enim nec temere dicere nec astute reticere debeo), materiam omnem 
sermonum eorum qui de te detrahere velint Statium dedisse; antea tantum intellegi potuisse 
iratos tuae veritati esse non nullos, hoc manumission iratis quod loquerentur non defuisse.  
 
Please realize that all the grist to the mills of your would-be detractors has been furnished by 
Statius. Previously it could only be thought that some people might have been annoyed by 
your strictness, but after his manumission that those who were had got something to talk about. 
Cicero, Ad Fratrem Quintum, 1.2.3 = Shackleton Bailey 2.3, trans. Shackleton Bailey. 
 
On the one hand, Cicero’s emphatic plea to his brother to change his ways is an example of how 
slave-owners’ surveillance of each other prompted them to discipline each other.487 On the other 
hand, judging the effectiveness of this specific disciplining action is a much harder task, since 
Quintus’ response to Cicero does not survive. What the surviving letters do reveal is that Quintus 
continued to trust, and use, Statius. Indeed, Quintus appears to have aided Statius’ entry into the 
collegium Lupercus.488 But perhaps Quintus did react to and absorb Cicero’s criticisms in his 
treatment of Statius. Or perhaps Quintus simply ignored what his brother said. Slave-owners’ 
surveillance of each other was diffuse and constant, but in contrast to the powers of the state, 
their ability to discipline each other was limited, often limited to persuasion. As such, slave-
owners such as Quintus could reject the disciplining power that resulted from this surveillance.   
                                                 
485 Ad Quintum 1.2.3 = Shackleton Bailey 2.3. Cf. Mouritsen (2011a: 102).  
486 Cf. Cicero’s attacks on Sulla’s freedman Chrysogonus, Pro Roscio Amerino, 26. For more on Chrysogonus, see 
Conclusion Section 2.  
487 Mouritsen asserts Cicero’s letter to Quintus as an episode that “illustrates the effectiveness of peer pressure in 
regulating the behavior of the elite” (2011a: 102). 
488 Ad Atticum 12.5.1 = Shackleton Bailey 242.1.  
Chapter 3: Slave-owners and subjection 
 185 
  Despite Cicero’s numerous negative assessments of Statius, he maintained a relationship 
with the freedman over the years. Cicero writes of doing large financial transactions with Statius, 
and he even corresponds with him in order to learn about the affairs of his nephew.489 Cicero 
appears to have known that Quintus’ relationship with Statius was strong, since when Quintus 
learns of Tiro’s manumission, Quintus writes that he hopes that Cicero gets the same kind of joy 
from his relationship with Tiro that Quintus has received from his relationship with Statius.490 At 
this later date, Quintus has transformed his manumission of Statius into an exemplum of a proper 
manumission. In other words, because the gaze of slave-owners evaluated manumissions, in part, 
through recourse to specific examples, examples of proper manumission were important enough 
that slave-owners contested and debated what was a good manumission.  
5. Manumissions, families, and fraternal rivalries 
 Because the comedians include manumissions as part of the on stage action of their plays, 
it is logical to assume that the comedians would be a useful source to combine with the jurists’ 
descriptions of the words and movements associated with manumission. But the comedians’ 
representation of manumission is practically incompatible with that of the jurists: the jurists 
emphasize the need for state representatives and ritualized movements, in addition to the use of 
specific words, while the comedians present manumission as a speech-act of the slave-owner.491 
By discarding the state’s role in manumission and elevating the role of the slave-owner, the 
comedians make manumission compatible with the familial concerns and domestic settings of 
their comedies. I therefore argue that in the plays of Plautus and Terence, the characters reflect 
on manumission not through the gaze of the state, but instead through the gaze of slave-owners. 
                                                 
489 Cicero pays HS 110,000 to Statius (Ad Atticum, 15.15.1 = Shackleton Bailey 393.1). Cicero relies on Statius for 
news of his nephew (15.19.2 = 396.2 and 15.21.1 = 398.1).  
490 I examine this letter in detail in Section 5b below.   
491 For more on the jurists and their representation of manumission, see Chapter 2 Section 5d and 6d.  
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The comedians present manumission as the purview of slave-owners and their families alone, 
thereby implying that only other slave-owners have the ability to surveil and police 
manumission.492 Another consequence is that the comedians are able to focus on manumission as 
an event of great joy. But while great, this joy is not pure, but rather an event that is the product 
of familial politicking. More specifically, both Plautus and Terence include on-stage 
manumissions that are the result of fraternal rivalries, a common theme all the more intriguing 
because fraternal rivalry undergirds Quintus’ congratulations of Cicero’s manumission of 
Tiro.493 
 Tiro’s recent manumission gives Quintus the chance to allude to his own manumission of 
Statius. By drawing lines of equivalency between Tiro and Statius, Quintus both indirectly 
refutes Cicero’s charges that manumitting Statius was unwise and reaffirms his own standing as 
a slave-owner who had successfully found and cultivated a slave to be so loyal and temperate 
that the slave has earned manumission. In other words, Quintus frames his own manumission of 
Statius as an exemplum towards which Cicero’s manumission of Tiro can reach, effectively 
defining himself as a slave-owner superior to his brother. The representation of Tiro’s 
manumission in Quintus’ letter, therefore, suggests that Roman slave-owners not only surveilled 
each other for the purpose of disciplining cases of bad manumission, but also for the purpose of 
competing with each other over cases of proper manumission. 
a. Plautus and Terence 
 The comedians present manumission as a speech-act entirely separate from the legal 
sphere, hence why they take no concern for issues such as magistrates, witnesses, or ritual 
                                                 
492 In Section 4a above, I analyzed a number of passages in Plautus that play with slave-owners’ responsibility to 
discipline each others’ manumissions. 
493 Not that all Roman fraternities were the same. See the Clodii’s united front against Cicero, Bannon (1997: 96-
99). Furthermore, Bannon points to how fraternal rivalry could spur brothers to success: see her comments on the 
relationship between Scipio Africanus and Scipio Asiagenus in Livy, 28.4.2 (1997: 121-2). For competition among 
the Roman aristocracy more generally, see Rosenstein (1990). For more on competition, see Section 2a above.  
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instruments. By speech-act, I mean an utterance that has constative power, that is, the power to 
make something happen.494 In the comedies, although manumission is a speech-act that gains 
authority through the use of legalistic phrases, the judicial tinge to these formulae is the only 
remnant of the court and the state in the process of manumission. By separating manumission 
from the law courts, the comedians are able to make manumission a family affair, which is to say 
a size appropriate to the familial scope of Roman comedy.495 Because the plays are grounded in 
the world of the family, the characters gaze at manumission not as the Roman state but as slave-
owners. From this perspective, the slave-owner has complete control over the process of 
manumission and is concerned with how the granting of manumission is part of the personal 
relationship between the slave-owner and slave. By making manumission a speech-act, the 
comedians present manumission to their audience as an inherent power of slave-ownership, 
rather than a power dependent on a negotiation with the state. This framing of a manumission as 
a familial event also allows the comedians to present manumission as the object, and result, of 
rivalries between brothers, further evidence for how the subjection of slave-owners included the 
competition with other slave-owners over manumission.  
 The only manumissions that occur on stage in the plays of Plautus and Terence are those 
of the of servi callidi, clever slaves.496 That only servi callidi are manumitted on stage indicates 
the degree to which the comedians are concerned with manumission only to the extent that it 
connects to the narrative and character types of their plays. Furthermore, the importance of the 
                                                 
494 Austin originated the idea of the speech-act; I take the word “constative” from him (1962: 3). Searle builds upon 
this idea (1969). Classicists such as Ma (1999) and Yarrow (2006: 16) use this idea; it is they who place the dash 
between “speech” and “act,” cf. Searle (1969: 1-20).  
495 The familial nature of the comedies is in part emphasized through the sets, which were backgrounds that for most 
part depicted entrances to private homes (Marshall 2006: 49-56). 
496 I exclude recognition scenes as onstage manumission. The comedians frame such recognition scenes as occasions 
that imply that the characters had never truly been slaves in the first place and therefore were incapable of 
manumission. I also exclude characters such as Phoenicium, who are manumitted during the course of the play but 
whose manumission occurs offstage (Pseudolus, 1310a-b). For the comedians on manumission, see Appendices A 
and B. 
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narrative to the manumission of the servus callidus is evident by how only a minority of servi 
callidi are manumitted at the end of comedies. Plautus ends only two of his comedies with the 
performance of the manumission of a servus callidus, and Terence only one, the Adelphoe.497 
 Messenio’s manumission in Plautus’ Menaechmi in particular reinforces the idea that 
manumission is a personal attribute of the slave-owner because the play establishes how 
Messenio’s first manumission was invalid, a development that places even more importance on 
how it is only Messenio’s true owner who can manumit him. Messenio’s first manumission did 
not count because his true owner, the Syracusan Menaechmus, did not perform it; instead, his 
owner’s twin brother did, the Epidamnian Menaechmus (for, to further confuse matters, both 
brothers have the same name). Messenio had misrecognized Epidamnian Menaechmus for his 
true owner and had therefore risked his life to save him. After this rescue, Messenio then asks 
this Menaechmus to free him. The confused man insists that Messenio is not his slave, but 
eventually agrees to free him regardless: 
MEN: mea quidem hercle caussa liber esto atque ito quo voles. 
MES: nemp’iubes? MEN: iubeo hercle, si quid imperi est in te mihi. 
MES: Salve, mi patrone. ‘quom tu liber es, Messenio,  
gaudeo.’ 
 
EPIDAMNIAN MENAECHMUS: By god, for my sake be free and go where you will. 
MESSENIO: You really command that?  
EPIDAMNIAN MENAECHMUS: By god, I command it, if that authority over you is in me.  
Plautus, Menaechmi, 1029-1030, translation my own.498 
 
While this Menaechmus voices his doubts about his authority to do as Messenio wishes, he 
nonetheless uses the proper legal language in manumitting him, “be free” (liber esto).499 Notably, 
in this scene, only Messenio and Menaechmus are on stage; there are no witnesses to Messenio’s 
                                                 
497 The two Plautine plays are Epidicus and Menaechmi. The Rudens ends with the thwarted possibility that the slave 
Gripus will be manumitted.  
498 In the surviving manuscript, context is the only thing that determines which Menaechmus is speaking, as both 
parts are labeled as “MEN.”  
499 Cf. Daube on the phrase “qui ita liberati essent, in civitatem accepti viderentur” in Livy, 2.5.10 (1946: 75). See 
also Chapter 2 Section 5c above.  
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fraudulent manumission.500 Plautus emphasizes how this lack of witnesses makes Messenio’s 
freedom vulnerable, for when Messenio attempts to persuade his true owner, the Syracusan 
Menaechmus, that he is free, the slave’s cause appears hopeless when his owner simply denies it. 
Instead of recognizing Messenio’s freedom, Syracusan Menaechmus becomes agitated, even 
saying that he would rather be sold into slavery himself than free Messenio.501  
 However, Syracuasan Menaechmus soon eats his words, as his new-found brother 
persuades him to free Messenio. By staging Messenio’s manumission in this way, Plautus frames 
manumission as an object of fraternal negotiation, since Messenio gains his freedom as the result 
of Epidamnian Menaechmus’ intervention: 
MEN: optumum atque aequissumum orat, frater: fac caussa mea. 
MEN: liber esto. 
 
EPIDAMNIAM MENAECHMUS: He asks for the best and most proper thing, brother. Do it 
for my sake.  
SYRACUSAN MENAECHMUS: Be free.  
Plautus, Menaechmi, 1147-1148, translation my own.502 
 
The Syracusan Menaechmus says the same words as the Epidamnian Menaechmus, but because 
the words come from the mouth of the true owner, Messenio becomes truly free. Because he is 
the only rightful owner of Messenio, it is Syracusan Menaechmus’ speech-act that makes 
Mesenio a freedman, affirming the importance of the personal relationship between the slave and 
the slave-owner in the slave-owner’s gaze. The power of his speech-act depends on the authentic 
and personal relationship between the slave and slave-owner. Furthermore, Syracusan 
Menaechmus accepts his brother’s framing of his manumission as a personal favor, a framing 
that positions manumission as a familial concern.  
 Similarly, in his Adelphoe, Terence makes manumission both a speech-act and an event 
                                                 
500 Cf. Moore (1998: 30). 
501 1041.  
502 Gratwick (1993: 242) cites Watson (1971: 48 n.5) to argue that this scene included an alapa. For the late date of 
the alapa, see Harper (2011: 468-474). For more on the alapa, see Chapter 2 Section 4c. 
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within the complex rivalry between the brothers Demea and Micea. At the beginning of the play, 
Micea had charged that Demea was miserly. During a monologue in the final act, Demea 
declares that he has become frustrated by the limitations of being a scrooge and now resolves to 
be generous, a transformation he describes largely as spurred by a rivalry with his brother, whom 
Demea understands to be popular because of his life of leisure and his clementia.503 As soon as 
Demea concludes his monologue, the slave Syrus enters, prompting the senex to promise, “You 
yourself are scarcely a crude [inliberalem] slave, I’d like to do you a good turn.”504 To prove his 
dedication to his new generosity, Demea then pressures his brother to free Syrus and the woman 
whom Syrus calls his wife.505 Regardless of whether or not Demea’s resolution is sincere, the 
senex here frames his decision to help Syrus as part of his plan to become a generous person, 
which is to say, Syrus’ manumission is directly connected to the rivalry between these two 
brothers.506   
 By making manumission a simple speech-act, Terence is able to keep the comedy moving 
quickly and also make Syrus’ manumission a plot point in Demea’s self-transformation. 
DE. Postremo hodie in psaltria ista emunda hic adiutor fuit, 
Hic curravit: prodesse aequomst: alii meliores erunt. 
Denique hic volt fieri MI. vin tu hoc fieri?  
 AE. cupio. MI. Si quidem, 
Tu vis, Syre, eho accede huc ad me: liber esto. 
 SY:Bene facis. 
Omnibus gratiam habeo, et seorsum tibi praeterea, Demea. 
 
DEMEA: Finally today he was a help in procuring this woman. He ran here; equally, he was 
useful. There were other, greater things too. And finally, he himself wants to be free. 
MICEA: And also you want this?  
AESCHAENIUS: Yes.  
MICEA: If that’s what you want. Syrus, come to me here: be free! 
SYRUS: Well done. I give thanks to all of you, and a separate one to you, Demea.  
Terence, Adelphoe, 970-1, translation my own.507 
                                                 
503 “facilitate nil esse homini melius neque clementia," 861. 
504 “Servom haud inliberalem praebes te et tibi // lubens bene faxim.” Adelphoe, 886-887 
505 Demea even offers to pay for the manumission of this Phrygia, 974-6.  
506 Demea’s self-stated transformation may or may not be sincere. See Traill for an overview of the various 
interpretations (2013: 326-9).  
507 Ashmore (1908: 312) notes that the “tu” in the first clause addresses Aeschinus. 
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According to Terence’s text, Micea performs the manumission through the declaration “be free!” 
Commentators Ashmore and Gratwick read Micea’s command “come to me” (accede huc ad me) 
as indicating some physical motion similar to the ones that the jurists describe in their accounts 
of manumission.508 Importantly though, Terence’s text does not describe Micea either hitting 
Syrus or using a festuca. Instead, the legal phrase “liber esto” represents the entire practice of 
manumission; the legal phrase is a speech-act, and no ritualized movements are necessary. 
Terence utilizes his ritualistic sense in order to construct a representation of manumission, a 
representation that is in dialogue with the Roman expectations of the movements, instruments, 
and words that constituted manumission.509 Micea’s words are all that it takes to make Syrus 
free: the slave-owner is the only authority over Syrus because Terence has swept the state aside. 
However, Micea is not the sole cause of Syrus’ manumission. As the slave himself notes, Demea 
is the reason that he is free, and it is Demea who had provided Micea with the proof that Syrus 
was a slave worthy of manumission by listing his accomplishments from the play. Syrus reminds 
the audience and readers that it was not Micea who was the cause of his manumission, but rather 
Demea, whom the audience knows was motivated in part through his fraternal rivalry. 
 In their plays, Plautus and Terence depict manumission as a fraternal concern, a topic 
which brothers see as important enough that they consider it worthwhile to exert influence over 
each other. I further note that this framing of manumission as a familial topic removes 
manumission from the state’s sphere. True, both Plautus and Terence incorporate legal language 
into their manumissions, but by making manumission a speech-act, they eliminate the need for 
magistrates and ritual instruments.510 A consequence of this privatization of manumission is that 
                                                 
508 Ashmore (1908: 312), Gratwick (1987: lemma to line 970).  
509 For Bourdieu and Bell on the sense of ritual, see Chapter 1 Section 6 above.  
510 “Liber esto” is the phrase used in XII Tables 4.2, cf. Crawford (1996: 631-2).  
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the comedians make manumission into topic worthy of competition, a process that the conflict 
between Cicero and Quintus suggests was indicative of actual Roman practice.  
b. Tiro, Cicero, and Quintus 
 The evidence of Tiro’s manumission survives in a short, undated letter from Quintus to 
Cicero. In this letter, Quintus reveals that he had learned of Tiro’s manumission from two 
sources: a letter from Tiro and another letter from Cicero himself. Because Quintus is responding 
to Cicero’s own letter, Quintus provides little detail about Tiro’s description of his manumission, 
there being no point in describing this event to a man who participated in it. Instead, Quintus’ 
words testify to his prioritization of Cicero’s description and understanding of the manumission 
at the expense of Tiro’s own description. Cicero and Tiro both wrote to Quintus, in part, because 
while the ritualized practice of manumissio vindicta had made Tiro legally a Roman, for him to 
become a freedman required the recognition of men like Quintus, who had not participated in the 
manumission itself. Quintus, being both a slave-owner and the patron of the freed slave Statius, 
participates only in Cicero’s joy of Tiro’s manumission, not the joy of the freed slave. While 
some of Quintus’ participation comes from his fraternal sympathy with his brother, Quintus’ 
words do have an adversarial tone. For just as manumission was a practice at which Roman 
slave-owners could fail, thereby risking discipline, so too was manumission a practice in which 
slave-owners could excel and therefore compete with each other.  
 Quintus’ letter to Cicero references Cicero’s and Tiro’s own representation of Tiro’s 
manumission, raising the question of why both men had written to him about this event and what 
was at stake in their separate descriptions of the manumission. That Tiro wrote to Quintus 
independently of Cicero perhaps gives the false impression of the degree to which Tiro’s life was 
separate from that of Cicero’s. For after his manumission, Tiro nonetheless continued to serve as 
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Cicero’s courier and eyes on the ground for various assignments.511 Instead, Tiro’s letter to 
Quintus is further evidence of how deeply embedded Tiro was in Cicero’s own relationships with 
his family and friends. After manumission, Tiro remained the lawyer’s subordinate adjunct.512 
Quintus therefore writes about Tiro with his own relationship to the slave in mind.   
mihi crede, tuis et illius litteris perlectis exsilui gaudio et tibi et ago gratias et gratulor. 
 
Trust me, when I finished reading both his letter and yours, I jumped with joy! I thank you and 
congratulate you! 
Cicero, Ad Familiares, 16.16.1 = Shackleton Bailey 44.1, translation my own.  
 
Whether Tiro’s own letter to Quintus was entirely concerned with his manumission is a matter of 
guesswork. Likely, Tiro had included this news along with some logistical question or financial 
request request.513 Nonetheless, such a description was Tiro’s own and therefore was an example 
of a freedman’s self-representation of his manumission. Although Quintus mentions Tiro’s 
representation of his own manumission only for the sake of juxtaposition to Cicero’s news, 
Quintus implies that Tiro had written about this event with great joy, just as Cicero had. In 
Quintus’ evaluation of the event, Cicero’s testimony is sufficient, rendering Tiro’s account 
superfluous rather than as a bearer of the true joy of manumission. Just as Hegel’s lord fails in 
his self-reflection on his relationship with the bondsman, so too does Quintus fail to represent 
Tiro’s joy of manumission because Quintus considers Cicero’s joy to be all that matters. But this 
                                                 
511 Courier: Ad Atticum, 15.18.1. Eyes on the ground: Ad Atticum, 15.15.4. For more on Tiro after his manumission, 
see Treggiari, although Tregiarri’s attempt to correlate Tiro’s manumission to his age is fraught (1967: 261-2). 
McDermott reviews the evidence of Tiro’s age to try and argue that Tiro was Cicero’s bastard son, but this argument 
is mainly a scandalized reaction against ancient evidence that asserts their relationship was sexual (1972). 
Unfortunately, McDermott’s speculation gets Shackleton Bailey’s full endorsement (1977: 344-5). For a more 
nuanced approach to sexuality, Tiro and Cicero, see Williams (2010: 273-4). 
512 Book 16 of Ad Familiares contains three letters from Quintus, one to Cicero and the other two to Tiro, and two 
letters from Cicero’s son to Tiro. Similarly, a letter from Curius to Cicero concludes with best wishes for Tiro (Ad 
Familiares, 7.29). See also Mouritsen (2011a: 45-8).  
513 Because these few words are the only reference to Tiro’s letter, firmly establishing the immediate context of 
Tiro’s description of his own manumission to Quintus is impossible. A wider context makes clear that Quintus and 
Tiro did have something of one-on-one relationship: Quintus at times explicitly requested news from Tiro (cf. Ad 
Fratrem Quintum, 3.1.10 = Shackleton Bailey 21.10). Furthermore, even Quintus’ letter of congratulation about 
Tiro’s manumission includes logistical items (Ad Familiares, 16.16.2 = Shackleton Bailey 44.2). 
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failure is not simply the result of Quintus’ inherent status a slave-owner; rather, Quintus is 
responding to and manipulating the expectations connected to the subjection of slave-owners.  
 In his description of Tiro’s manumission, Quintus references Statius, thereby alluding to 
Statius’ manumission, because such a deployment allows Quintus to appear more accomplished 
and experienced than Cicero. In other words, Quintus congratulates Cicero while at the same 
time competing with him. In his response to Cicero’s description of Tiro’s manumission, Quintus 
highlights his relationship with own freedman Statius in order to set a standard to which Cicero’s 
manumission of Tiro can attempt to reach. Because of Cicero’s emphatic disagreement with 
Quintus about the propriety of Statius’ manumission, the commentator Shackleton Bailey asserts 
that Quintus cannot possibly have forgotten how his brother disciplined him over Statius. 
However, Shackleton Bailey provides no explanation for why Quintus alludes to that rancorous 
affair.514 While to modern readers it may appear strange that brothers would compete over an 
issue such as manumission, Cicero’s letters reveal that friendships among Roman men included 
competitions amid deeply personal and intimate affairs, such as mourning.515 Furthermore, 
Cicero’s letters reveal that he frequently instructed Quintus on how to conduct his affairs, 
ranging from his governorship to his familial responsibilties.516 Since Cicero and Servius 
Sulpicius Rufus compete with each other over grief, it is not surprising that Quintus is competing 
with Cicero over manumission, sarcastically highlighting the very virtues in Statius that Cicero 
                                                 
514 Shackleton Bailey poses his reading as a rhetorical question, “Did Cicero remember, and was he not meant to 
remember, his own violent disapproval of Statius’ manumission six years previously?” (Shacketlon Bailey 1971: 
131 = Shackleton Bailey 1977: 346). In her otherwise very insightful reading of this letter, Beard provides no 
comment on the allusion to Statius’ manumission (2002: 132-4). 
515 Wilcox (2012: 55).  
516 Cicero on Quintus’ governorship: Ad Fratrem Quintum, 1.1. and 1.2. Cicero on Quintus’ duties to his wife: Ad 
Atticum, 11.8.2 = Shackleton Bailey 219.2. Cicero on Quintus’ duties to his son: Ad Fratrem Quintum, 2.4.2. 
Intiguingly, Plutarch records that it was one of Quintus’ freedmen, with the rather eyeraising name of “Philologus,” 
who betrayed Cicero to Athony (Life of Cicero, 48.1). Cf. Philogonus, a freedman of Quintus, whom Cicero 
mentions in Ad Fratrem Quintum, 1.3.4. 
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had attacked years before.517 Quintus’ elaboration of Cicero’s joy about Tiro includes a 
comparison of the two slaves. Quintus explains that while both slaves have similar fidelitas and 
frugalitas, only Tiro has more skills at letters and the valuable virtue of humanitas: 
si enim mihi Statii fidelitas et frugalitas est tantae voluptati, quanti esse in isto haec eadem 
bona debent additis litteris et sermonibus et humanitate, quae sunt iis ipsis commodis potiora! 
  
For if Statius’ loyalty and temperance have given me such pleasure, for you there must be 
something similar, since in that man there are those same goods, as well as greater qualities: 
his learnedness, style and humanity! 
Quintus, in Cicero, Ad Familiares, 16.16.2 = Shackleton Bailey 44.2, translation my own. 
 
By describing Statius has having the virtues of fidelitas and frugalitas, Quintus alludes to, and 
partially refutes, Cicero’s attacks on Statius years earlier. For Cicero had then charged that 
Statius reached beyond his station as a freedman, a charge which implied that Statius had neither 
sufficient modesty about his own limited authority, nor sufficient loyalty to Quintus.518 By 
asserting that Statius and Tiro are similarly loyal and temperate, Quintus implies that because 
Cicero’s decision to manumit Tiro is worthy of much praise, so too was Quintus’ decision to 
manumit Statius. For Quintus’ remark is also a reminder that Quintus has preceded Cicero, 
thereby establishing himself as having the authority of a successful patron of a loyal freedman, a 
patron worthy to judge Cicero’s manumission of Tiro. Quintus’ congratulation is also an attempt 
to one up his elder brother.  
 This cynical reading of Quintus’ words of congratulations makes sense in the context of 
the brothers’ relationship. For the Ciceros’ fraternity was hardly one of easy intimacy and 
affection. In December of 48, Quintus began denouncing Cicero to Julius Caesar. The direct 
cause of this betrayal appears to have been Cicero’s decision to lend money to Pompey rather 
                                                 
517 Wilcox notes how Cicero engages in an eristic consolation with Servius (2012: 51-56).  
518 For Cicero’s invective against Statius, see Section 4b above.  
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than his brother.519 Doubting that this breakdown had only one cause, Shackleton Bailey 
highlights a prolonged tiff between Quintus and Atticus in 61 as precedent to the nadir of 
Quintus and Cicero’s relationship in 47, as well as Cicero’s attacks against Statius.520 While 
Cicero often praised his brother, their relationship was not a source of consolation and strength 
like his friendship with Atticus.521 Cicero’s various successes in the public sphere would have 
made his freshman status as the patron—not just of any slave, but of slave who is learned and 
trusted—a tempting tool for Quintus to use and leverage his own seniority as a patron of valued 
freedman.522 
 Since Quintus was a human being, and therefore a complex and contradictory creature, in 
this letter, he is also expressing genuine feelings of happiness about Tiro’s new freedom. Quintus 
was persistently concerned about Tiro’s health and success, admired Tiro’s talents, and valued 
his company.523 But Quintus feels all of these emotions from the standpoint of a slave-owner, 
and as a slave-owner, Quintus’ happiness about Tiro’s freedom is channeled through his 
relationship with Tiro’s owner. Hence why Quintus only briefly mentions Tiro’s own description 
of the manumission and instead engages Cicero. Quintus had paid the costs of the subjection of 
slave-owners, and he now works to maintain the resulting status through his competition with 
Cicero. This subjection explains not only Quintus’ concerns in this letter to Cicero, but also the 
                                                 
519 Ad Atticum, 11.5.4, 11.8.2 and 11.10.1 = Shackleton Bailey 216, 219 and 221. Cf. Shackleton Bailey (1971: 179-
181).  
520 1971: 183-4. Shackleton Bailey’s account makes the brothers appear quite independent of each other. Bannon’s 
portrait of their relationship is a good counterpoint, highlighting how involved they were in each others’ finances, 
politics, and childrearing. For whatever reason, Bannon excludes two of Quintus’ letters to Tiro as part of her 
account (1997: 101-16). 
521 Shackleton Bailey harshly notes while Cicero wrote to Atticus and Brutus after the death of Tullia, he did not 
write to Quintus (1971: 184). Bannon emphasizes the role of the civil war in the deterioration of their relationship 
(1997: 116).  
522 Cicero lectured Quintus both on his marriage (Ad Atticum, 1.5.2 = Shackleton Bailey 1.2) and on his 
gubernatorial duties, the latter in the form of a public letter (Ad Fratrem Quintum, 1.1 = 1.1). 
523 Quintus’ two letters to Tiro are full of praise for the freedman’s abilities and desire for his help (Ad Familiaries, 
16.26 = Shackleton Bailey 351 and 16.27 = 352). Cicero reveals that Quintus specifically asks for Tiro to write to 
him (Ad Fratem Quintum, 3.1.10).  
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language and ideas in his letters to Tiro. In these letters, he uses the language and images of 
slavery to command and belittle Tiro while simultaneously praising him.524 Furthermore, despite 
Quintus’ praises and genuine affection, likely Quintus did not see Tiro as unique. Cicero’s 
description of Atticus’ scribe Alexis—who was likely similarly enslaved and then manumitted—
includes Alexis performing similar duties as Tiro’s, as well as an explicit comparison between 
the two men.525 If, as a slave-owner, Cicero saw Tiro as a slave and compatible with other slaves, 
why would Quintus look at Tiro in a more intimate or humanizing fashion?   
6. Conclusion 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that the Romans understood the state as having interests in 
manumission distinct from those of slave-owners. In this chapter, I laid out groundwork for how 
manumission was connected to the subjection of slave-owners. Mastery of the nuances of 
manumission were necessary for slave-owners, both to avoid censure and to be able to compete 
against other slave-owners. Because of this importance, the Romans reflected on how 
manumission connected to Rome’s power. Rome’s secondarity to Greece complicated this self-
reflection, as the Romans adapted Greek interest in and explanations of Roman manumission. 
 Returning to Butler’s thoughts on subjection, Hegel’s insistence that the lord sees the 
bondsman as an extension of his body explains why when Roman slave-owners reflected on 
manumission, they focused on slave-owners and what manumission meant to them. Cicero was 
concerned about what Statius’ manumission meant for Quintus. Upon learning of Tiro’s 
manumission, Quintus imagined and empathized with, Cicero’s joy. If the comedies are any 
guide, then these fraternal concerns were hardly unique: Plautus and Terence both depict 
manumission as the result and object of familial feeling and machination. And, indeed, 
                                                 
524 Beard explores how the language of slavery shapes Tiro’s relationship with the brothers Cicero (2002: 133-40). 
525 Cicero praises’ Alexis’ handwriting: Ad Atticum, 7.2.3 = Shackleton Bailey 125.3. Cicero describes Alexis as 
Tiro’s counterpart for Atticus, Ad Atticum, 12.10 = 247. 
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manumission meant quite a bit to slave-owners, since the proper performance of manumission 
was necessary, not just because there were legal and non-state penalties for failure to obey 
certain norms, but also because manumission was a topic over which slave-owners rivaled each 
other as part their endless competitions for dominance.    
 Roman slave-owners’ self-reflection failed to find the truth of manumission because 
instead of finding slaves, they instead only found themselves. Such misrecognition is at the heart 
of Patterson’s identification of slavery as social death. But as I hope this chapter shows, rather 
than being isolated or shunned, slaves were intimately bound in the social fabric of Rome. 
Instead, I read the slave-owners’ failure of self-reflection as part of how they render slave life 
unlivable. This failure explains why even after Tiro’s manumission, the man whom he praised 
for numerous virtues, Quintus write to Tiro as a slave, using the virtual space of his epistles to 
evoke violent fantasies of corporeal punishment.526 Tiro was a freedman, but in Cicero’s familial 
network, manumission could not erase the memory of Tiro as a slave. Manumission allowed Tiro 
to advance, but he did not advance enough. Quintus still reveled in his superiority over the 
former slave. 
 In the next chapter, I explore how the Romans’ attachment to such psychic superiority 
limited the possibilities of freedmen and freedwomen to integrate into Rome. Specifically, I 
connect Butler’s description of subjection to W.E.B. Du Bois’ description of psychological 
wages, in order to articulate the psychic benefits that freeborn Romans received from racializing 
slaves. Significantly, while such racialization was connected to the practice of slave-ownership, I 
argue that both slave-owning and non-slave-owning Romans alike benefited and participated in 
the racialization of slaves. As a result, the negotiation of manumission, race, and Romanness is 
                                                 
526 Ad Familiaries, 16.26 = Shackleton Bailey 351. Cf. Beard (2002: 133-140).  
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separate from the subjection of slave-owners because it is an area in which freeborn Romans 
who did not own slaves had much at stake.
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Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and 
the psychological wages of freeborn Romans   
1. Introduction 
 In order to be free, freedmen and freedwomen required that all Romans, even those who 
did not own slaves, recognize their manumissions. As a result, non-slave-owning Romans 
mattered for the practice of Roman manumission. This recognition from freeborn Romans did 
not come easily. Classicist Henrik Mouritsen argues that while the Romans were quite capable of 
conceiving of slavery as a temporary condition, nonetheless Roman society attached a stigma to 
enslavement that persisted after manumission. Mouritsen calls this stigma macula servitutis, the 
stain of slavery, a term that he takes from the Roman jurist Modestinus. Mouritsen applies the 
term to freedmen throughout Roman history as part of his synchronic account of Roman 
freedmen.527 However, this macula servitutis was not simply an issue of law, but as Mouritsen 
shows, reflected the barriers and antagonism that former slaves faced in society generally. In this 
chapter, I ask how manumission mattered to Romans who did not own slaves. More specifically, 
I seek to answer how macula servitutis functioned in the relationship between Romans who did 
own slaves and those who did not and how the relationship between these two groups of Romans 
shaped the practice and experience of manumission.  
 In Section 2, I argue that the stigma of the macula servitutis strengthened the bond among 
freeborn Romans, a bond particularly important to slave-owners as it prevented possible 
solidarity between slaves and poor Romans. The macula servitutis was a combination of methods 
and tools that the Romans used to recognize and mark slaves. That is, it was a circular system: 
the Romans whipped slaves because slaves were the kind of people deserving of being whipped, 
                                                 
527 Digest, 40.11.5 and Codex Iustini, 7.16.9, 10.32.2. Mouritsen (2011a: 12-13). 
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and once the slaves had the scars, they were marked as bodies worthy of whipping. This system 
of punishment and differentiation has important connections to Butler’s description of 
subjection. Through the macula servitutis, freeborn Romans were able to differentiate 
themselves from the ambiguous servile body. Punishment, most prominently whipping and 
crucifixion, was a tool for the construction of the macula servitutis. This differentiation was 
important to freeborn Romans because they collected a psychological wage from their 
superiority over freedpeople and therefore needed to distinguish themselves from freedpeople. I 
take the term psychological wage from sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois, who used the term to 
describe the benefits reaped by white workers at the expense of Black workers.528 The historian 
David Roediger has elaborated upon the implications of Du Bois’ term for the study of 
whiteness. Indeed, Roediger’s influence over Du Bois’ term has been so successful that Paul C. 
Taylor attributes to Du Bois the term “psychic wage,” rather than “psychological wage.”529 For 
Roediger, Du Bois’ psychological wage has important connections to the psychoanalytical work 
of Frantz Fanon and Joel Kovel.530 Given this history, there are racial undertones to using the 
term “psychological wage,” undertones that are useful for my larger argument. For I argue that 
racialization was another tool that the Romans used to construct macula servitutis and that this 
racialization was connected to the psychological wage that freeborn Romans collected. 
Furthermore, Du Bois’ term has important parallels and intersections with Butler’s work on the 
                                                 
528 I do not capitalize white because, as James Baldwin writes, “white is a metaphor for power.” (2011: 158). I 
capitalize Black because, as Joel Olson writes, “The terms [Black and white] are not symmetrical. Black [as a racial 
identity] is a cultural identity as well as a political category, and as such merits capitalization like American Indian, 
Chicana or Irish American.” (2004: xix).  
529 Cf. Taylor (2011: 440). 
530 2007: 14. Specifically, Fanon (1967) and Kovel (1970). For further uses of psychoanalysis to the study of 
American racism, see Roediger (2010). 
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psychic life of power, as both thinkers are interested in the tracing the trajectory of power 
through material, social, and psychological worlds.531  
 In Section 3, I demonstrate that the comedians conceived of two types of enslaved 
characters. The first type are enslaved freeborn people. The comedians describe these characters 
as being inherently worthy of freedom. The second type of enslaved characters are slaves, whom 
the comedians describe as having to act a certain way in order to be worthy of freedom. The 
distinction between these groups is not incidental, but rather fundamental to the progression of 
the comedic plot. The recognition of the true status of enslaved citizens saves them from sex 
work and reunites them with lost families, while slaves had to prove their loyalty to their owners 
in order to be worthy of manumission. That the comedians also conceived of enslaved citizens 
differently from slaves is also evident in their vocabulary: while both enslaved citizens and 
slaves yearn for libertas, only slaves look for and work for manumissio. I argue that the 
playwrights’ production of this fundamental difference between enslaved citizens and slaves—a 
difference in which freeborn citizens have inherent value while slaves do not—is one form of the 
psychological wage paid to freeborn Romans, regardless of whether or not they owned slaves. 
For the Roman plays reiterated that freeborn citizens, unlike slaves, are inherently worthy of 
freedom. 
 The performances of comedies contain clues to how the Romans struggled with 
constructing a discreet servile body that they could use in opposition to the body of the freeborn. 
Manumission not only complicates this distinction between slave and free, but also threatens to 
undermine the psychological wages paid to the freeborn. I argue that the comedians’ creation of 
a strict difference between two types of enslaved characters occurred in conjunction with visual 
markers of servility. While the particular time and place greatly influences the performance of a 
                                                 
531 Roediger stresses the material aspect in Du Bois’ account is not to be ignored (2010: 24).  
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particular play, the ubiquity of New Comedy means that writers and artists from other periods 
and places provide evidence that ought to be read alongside the works of Plautus and Terence in 
order to reconstruct the visual aspect of these performances for Republican audiences. That the 
Romans were aware of a lack of a persistent visual distinction between slave and free in 
everyday life is most evident in Seneca’s famous anecdote about the Senate’s debate on marking 
slaves. Seneca reports that one senator proposed requiring all slaves wear a white ribbon to 
indicate that they were slaves. He withdrew this proposal after another senator pointed out that 
such a plan would allow slaves to know their true numbers.532 Similarly, in her review of the 
slave characters in the figurines, masks, wall paintings, and other visual arts depicting New 
Comedy, Kelly Wrenhaven notes that while slaves are closely associated with the grotesque, so 
too were other groups, such as barbarians and the poor.533 The servile body in the Roman 
imagination was ambiguous, part of a continuum of peoples who were distinct from the bodies of 
proper Romans. Nonetheless, as Pollux’s testimony shows, ancient audiences expected that they 
would be able to read the bodies of slave characters on the stage as servile. Since the bodies of 
slaves characters were distinctly servile, onstage performances of manumission did not challenge 
the superiority of the freeborn over slaves and former slaves. Section 4 includes a case study on 
red hair and how the comedians used visual aspect of masks to mark certain characters as slaves.   
 In Section 5, I analyze Livy’s description of the volones as a reflection and production of 
the psychological wages paid to Romans who did not own slaves. The volones were a group of 
slaves whom the state recruited to fight against Hannibal. As a reward for their fighting, Livy 
writes that they earned their freedom. Livy’s description of the volones and the painting 
                                                 
532 De Clementia, 1.24.1. Seneca does little to establish the authenticity of this event. Nonetheless, the anecdote is 
instructive for how Roman slave-owners felt about slaves. Cf. McKeown (2007b). See also Bradley (1986) and 
Watts (1982).  
533 2013: 135-7. 
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depicting their victory at Beneventum in 214 point to how Roman memory and memorialization 
intersected with the macula servitutis. Livy’s account of the volones’ memorialization also 
intersects with the Romans’ memory of the Gracchi, since the commander who lead and freed 
the volones was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the great-uncle of the Tiberius who died while 
plebeian tribune in 133. Notably, although Livy records that the volones earned their freedom, he 
also insists that the slaves were cowardly and inept fighters. I place this cowardice in the context 
of Rome’s citizen army, and argue that this assertion the slave soldiers could not be brave was 
another psychological wage to the Roman freeborn, a way for the Romans to claim the triumph 
of the volones’ victory without giving them any credit. I clarify that Livy understands the volones 
to be fighting and living with a different relationship to freedom through a juxtaposition to his 
description of the cowardice and enslavement of Roman soldiers. While Livy describes the 
fighting ability of the volones as inherently suspect, he frames the cowardice and ineptitude of 
freeborn Roman soldiers as exceptional. This exceptionality of cowardice is important to Livy, 
as it justifies the Roman state’s reluctance to ransom prisoners of war, since cowardly soldiers 
have questionable status as Roman citizens. Nonetheless, when Livy does describe the freeing of 
Roman soldiers, he does not describe them as going through manumission, even though they use 
clothing closely associated with manumission. Notably, even though these men appear visually 
similar to new freedmen, Livy leads his readers to interpret these ambiguously servile bodies as 
indicative of the restoration of freedom to those worthy of it, rather than the achievement of 
freedom through manumission.    
2. The servile body and psychological wages in Rome 
 I use Mouritsen’s thoughts on punishment as groundwork for my own analysis of how 
race intersected with the Roman practice of slavery and manumission. Mouritsen’s definition of 
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macula servitutis details how this stigma related to the Romans’ idea that slaves’ bodies were 
ambiguous and hard to distinguish visually from the bodies of Romans. Mouritsen argues that 
punishment shaped the Romans’ expectations of the servile body, both in the material world and 
in their collective imagination. That is, scars of punishment were clues that Romans read on a 
body in order to designate a person as a slave. However, these scars were only clues, not 
definitive markers, because the body of the slave existed in the Roman imagination on the 
continuum of the ambiguous servile body. This continuum recalls Butler and Foucault’s 
comments on how power is always grounded in and constitutive of the body. Because these scars 
were permanent, Mouritsen posits punishment as a way in which the stigma of slavery continued 
into the lives of freedmen. Turning to the sociologists Omi and Winant, I use the term 
racialization to describe how the Romans read the servile body on the comedic stage through the 
lens of race. Like the scars of punishment, race was not a definitive marker of slavery. However, 
it was a visual clue that a particular person could be a slave. In the Roman imagination, both 
punishment and race were visual clues that the body of a particular person was on the continuum 
of the servile body. Both signs of punishment and race were visual markers that the Romans 
could use to separate the freeborn from slaves.  
 I argue that the Romans used these visual markers of slave’s bodies as part of the 
psychological wages to freeborn Romans. In order to foster a superiority of freeborn Romans 
over slaves and former slaves, the Romans had to distinguish between the former slaves and 
freeborn Romans. Du Bois coined the term psychological wages to describe how racism 
undermined possible alliances among American workers. I argue that the phrase psychological 
wage illuminates a similar relationship between Roman slave-owners and freeborn Romans who 
did not own slaves. In short, this psychological wage united Roman slave-owners with non-
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slave-owners in their superiority over slaves, even though Romans who did not own slaves did 
not reap the material benefits of slavery that slave-owners did. I use the phrase psychological 
wage to describe the benefits that freeborn Romans reaped from the representation of freeborn 
Romans and the degradation of slaves in both Roman comedy and historiography.    
a. Macula servitutis and the ambiguous servile body 
 Although the servile body in antiquity was ambiguous, nonetheless the ancients created 
the servile body in opposition to the citizen body. In the Roman imagination, the corporeal 
division between the slave and free was fundamental, and they relied on evidence of slaves’ 
bodies and minds in order to identify slaves as servile. These marks were neither temporary nor 
coterminous with enslavement and therefore continued to mark freedwomen and freedmen as 
former slaves after manumission, what Mouritsen names macula servitutis. Importantly, 
freedmen and freedwomen suffered from this stigma despite often being visually very similar to 
Roman citizens. I review Mouritsen’s description of how the punishment of slave’s bodies was 
vital to the differentiation between the free and the slave as a prelude to my own argument that 
racialization was another tool for the construction of macula servitutis. 
 The ambiguity of the visual boundary between slaves and citizens caused problems for 
the Romans, as it meant that the boundary was porous. In the Introduction above, I noted the 
anecdote from Seneca about the Senate’s fear of inadvertently unifying slaves by requiring them 
to wear white ribbons. Suetonius provides a similar story that points to the ambiguous 
appearance of the slave’s body. In his de Rhetoribus, Suetonius writes that in the port of 
Brundusium two men dressed up a slave boy as a Roman citizen in order to avoid paying import 
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tariffs. Somehow their evasion was uncovered.534 Strangely, Suetonius reports that the courts 
ruled that by dressing the boy as a citizen, the men had effectively manumitted him. Suetonius 
frames this story as a historical example that was a topic for students of rhetoric, pointing to how 
the Romans grappled with how important appearance and fashion were to marking the 
ambiguous slave body as servile.535 That Suetonius believes that the courts ruled that the boy was 
manumitted suggests that he thinks that the need to preserve the visual boundaries between 
slaves and freeborn Romans was more important than identifying the true social status of the boy 
in question.  
 Mouritsen argues that one way in which the Romans attempted to resolve the ambiguity 
of the servile body was through punishment. First, slaves were vulnerable to the threats of certain 
punishments that the Romans prohibited from using against citizens. These punishments 
included whipping, torture, and crucifixion.536 Second, punishment physically and visually 
marked slaves as servile. The scars of punishment were therefore visual clues that the Romans 
used to identify men and women as either slaves or former slaves.537 In other words, the Romans 
read scars of punishment as possible evidence that a person had been a slave, even if now they 
are free. Importantly, Mouritsen does not argue that scars were synonymous with the servile 
body. The story of Coriolanus’ scars indicates that the Romans were quite capable of reading 
scars as evidence of military heroism.538 Nonetheless, scars and other vestiges of punishment are 
important to Mouritsen’s description of Roman slavery, since he posits that the continuous 
                                                 
534 “Venalici cum Brundusi gregem venalium e navi educerent, formoso et pretioso puero, quod portitores 
verebantur, bullam et praetextam togam imposuerunt; facile fallaciam celarunt. Romarn venitur, res cognita est, 
petitur puer, quod domini voluntate fuerit liber, in libertatem.” De rhetoribus, 1. 
535 “Veteres controversiae aut ex historiis trahebantur, sicut sane nonnullae usque adhuc, aut ex veritate ac re, si 
qua forte recens accidisset; itaque locorum etiam appellationibus additis proponi solebant.” De rhetoribus, 1.  
536 2011: 25-27. See also Hengel (1977: 51-62) and Fitzgerald (2000: 32-41). 
537 2011: 27-28. 
538 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 2.23.4. Plutarch, Life of Coriolanus, 15.1. Cf. also Marcus Sergius (Livy, 7.104-5, 28).  
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practice of enslavement must include the cultivation of radical differences between the enslaved 
and the free.539 Mouritsen points out that the Romans, while often explicitly accepting the 
contingent nature of enslavement, simultaneously conceptualized and acted upon the 
conceptualizations of slaves having distinctly different minds and bodies from Roman citizens. 
The scars of punishment provided visual clues that the division between slave and free was 
warranted. In Section 4, I argue that the visual motifs of the servile body provided the Roman 
audience with visual proof that the on-stage manumissions were no real threat to the superiority 
of freeborn Romans over slaves. Here, I argue that the Roman theater racialized the hair of 
servile bodies in order to mark slaves as distinct from citizens.  
b. Macula servitutis and racialization  
 I propose an addition to Mouritsen’s thesis on macula servitutis and the servile body: 
when reading a body, the Romans similarly paid attention to race for evidence that a person was 
servile. In his conclusion to his history of freedmen in the Roman Empire, Duff writes that  
The profuse intermixture of race, continuing without interruption from 200 BC far into the 
history of the Empire, produced a type utterly different from that which characterized the 
heroes of the early Republic. Instead of the hardy and patriotic Roman with his proud 
indifference to pecuniary gain, we find too often under the Empire an idle pleasure-loving 
cosmopolitan whose patriotism goes no further than applying for the dole and swelling the 
crowds in the amphitheater.540 
 
Duff utilized theories that posit race is a stable and biological human attribute that has the power 
to cause historical processes, even ones as complex as the fall of the Roman Empire. Such 
theories are not just racist in the extreme, but unscientific at their core. I posit race as something 
that needs to be explained within the context of ancient Rome. That is, I reject race as a 
biological category and, instead, begin with the idea that race is constructed, which is to say, it is 
contingent on material and social factors. In doing so, I follow sociologists Omi and Winant, 
                                                 
539 2011: 17.  
540 1928: 205-6.  
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from whose work I take the terms race and racialization. While in Duff’s work, Roman 
manumission resulted in the assimilation of races ontologically distinct from the Roman people, I 
instead argue that racialization of slaves was one strategy, among others, that freeborn Romans 
used in order to maintain their hierarchy over slaves and former slaves.541 In other words, 
racialization was only one of the tools, along with punishment, that the Romans used to make an 
alliance between slave-owners and non-slave-owners against slaves.  
 Classicist Denise McCoskey argues that to ignore race entirely in antiquity is to promote 
a range of mistaken impressions, including that the Greeks and Romans themselves ignored race 
entirely.542 While emphasizing that the ancients did not think about race in the same way that 
moderns do, McCoskey, nonetheless, argues that race is a meaningful lens through which to 
view the ancient world, including how the Greeks and Romans thought about people from 
outside their own societies. McCoskey herself highlights the ideas and vocabulary of Omi and 
Winant as a possible starting point for a meaningful and productive exploration of race in 
antiquity.543 For while Omi and Winant are emphatic that their ideas are intended only for the 
modern world, nonetheless their vocabulary has the potential for framing the Greeks and 
Romans’ discussion of race in their own historical context, including the context of ancient 
slavery and manumission.544 However, the idea that Roman manumission intersected with the 
Roman practice of race is not new: Patterson had persuasively argued in 1982 that what he 
                                                 
541 Cf. Duff on the consequences of Roman manumission: “How different would Roman society have appeared if 
masters had only given freedom in gratitude for good service and only sold it those who had increased their 
peculium by honest means! The influx of Oriental blood would not have been so overwhelming, and further, the 
slaves freed in such circumstances would on the whole been men of good character, who had loyally served their 
masters and who might be expected to prove good citizens…The vast throngs of idle and worthless freedmen that 
left their curse upon Rome would never have issued from the bonds of servitude. The indigenous stock would not 
have been ousted from its predominance….” (1928: 209). 
542 McCoskey (2012: 9). Cf. Gruen (2013a and 2013b). 
543 McCoskey (2012: 2-3 and 24).  
544 2015: 112-3.  
Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans 
 210 
termed racial antipathy shaped how and why certain Roman slaves achieved manumission.545 As 
a result, to ignore the question of the intersection of race and slavery in ancient Rome is to ignore 
Patterson.   
  Omi and Winant’s definition of race combines a concern about the social and the 
experiential, without ignoring the corporeal. For Omi and Winant, because an important aspect 
of race is the body, race is therefore visual:546 
Race is a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to 
different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race invokes seemingly biologically 
based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human 
features for purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical 
process….547  
 
This definition of race is broader compared to that of Hannaford. In contrast to Omi and 
Winant’s emphasis on the body, Hannaford instead insists that race is an idea about lineage, 
specifically how lineage explains physical differences among various peoples. Through this 
narrower definition, Hannaford proclaims that neither the Greeks nor the Romans ever developed 
the idea of race.548 However, Dench’s work on the Romans and Isaac’s work on ancient racism 
demonstrate both that the Romans took their own lineage seriously and they were quite capable 
of identifying and degrading others based solely on their physical appearance.549  
 Omi and Winant build upon their definition of race with the term racialization.  
Racialization is the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified 
relationship, social practice or group. Racialization occurs in large-scale and small-scale 
ways, macro- and micro-socially.550 
                                                 
545 Patterson (1982: 177-8). More specifically, Patterson argues that because beauty and sexuality played an 
important role in how slaves were able to win approval and therefore manumission, the Romans’ racist thoughts on 
beauty influenced which slaves were able to achieve manumission.   
546 Omi and Winant on the visual aspect of race: “…there is a crucial and non-reducible visual dimension to the 
definition and understanding of racial categories. Bodies are visually read and narrated in ways that draw upon an 
ensemble of symbolic meanings and associations.” (2015: 111). 
547 Italics by the authors. The underlining is my own (2015: 110).   
548 Hannaford (1996: 17-86). 
549 For the importance of lineage to Greek and Roman identity, see Dench (2005: 222-297). Isaac carefully 
delineates hatred based on one’s physical appearance and lineage from other types of hatred, including the hatred of 
outsiders (2005). See also McCoskey and Talbot’s review of Isaac (2006).   
550 2015: 111.  
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I argue that the Romans racialized slavery only to the following extent: they understood various 
racial markers, including such things as hair color and skin color, as indicative that this person’s 
body was part of the ambiguous servile body, that is, a body in opposition to the ideal citizen 
body. A person’s race was not proof that they were a slave, but it did indicate that they could be 
a slave. Roman comedians took advantage of this racialization in their performances. As I 
demonstrate in Section 4, in the context of the masks of New Comedy, red hair was closely 
associated with slaves. As a result, slaves in Roman New Comedy remained visibly slaves even 
after they achieve manumission. I read the intersection of manumission and race as indicative of 
how manumission and race intersected in Roman society writ large. That is, the racialization of 
slaves mattered to the relationship between slaves and freeborn Romans who did not own slaves. 
For because slavery was racialized, slaves whom the Romans considered racially distinct from 
themselves remained visually marked even after their manumission. For such slaves, 
racialization was another form of macula servitutis. For freeborn Romans, such racialization 
provided a psychological wage through the establishment of their superiority over Romans who 
gained citizenship and freedom through manumission, rather than through birth.   
c. Psychological wages and Du Bois 
 I approach the relationship between slaves and freeborn Romans who did not own slaves 
by asking why there were so few alliances between freeborn Romans and slaves against slave-
owners. In other words, I ask why and how did freeborn Romans helped maintain the superiority 
of slave-owners over slaves. To answer this question, I turn to Du Bois, who asked a similar 
question about the relationship between white workers and Black workers during American 
Reconstruction.  
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 Du Bois posits that a certain psychological wage was fundamental to the relationship 
among American capitalists, white workers and Black workers. Specifically, Du Bois argues that 
this psychological wage provided white workers with just enough compensation that they allied 
with capitalists rather than with Black workers. This psychological wage depended as much upon 
the degradation of Black workers as the preferential treatment of white workers. In other words, 
this psychological wage was the psychic twin to the material differences between the lives of 
Black workers and the lives of white workers.  
 It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a low 
wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. They were given 
public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. They were admitted freely 
with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and the best schools. The 
police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent on their votes, treated them with 
such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and while this 
had small effect upon the economic situation, it had great effect upon their personal treatment 
and the deference shown them. White schoolhouses were best in the community, and 
conspicuously placed, and they cost anywhere from twice to ten times as much per capita as 
the colored schools. The newspapers specialized on news that flattered the poor whites and 
almost ignored the Negro except in crime and ridicule.  
 On the other hand, in the same way, the Negro was subject to public insult; was afraid 
of mobs; was liable to the jibes of children and the unreasoning fears of white women; and was 
compelled almost continuously to submit to various badges of inferiority. The result of this 
was that the wages of both classes could be kept low, the white fearing to be supplanted by 
Negro labor, the Negroes always being threatened by the substitution of white labor.551  
 
I cite Du Bois’ passage in full to make clear that Du Bois did not understand this wage as the 
result of any particular justification that white workers gave to themselves for why they were 
superior. Instead, Du Bois’ list of the various social, judicial, and economic practices that 
cultivated this psychological wage make clear that he sees it as the result of material 
circumstances and diverse social practices. Du Bois also concludes this passage by pointing out 
how this arrangement benefited different whites in different ways: while workers reaped the 
benefit of a sense of superiority through the degradation of Blacks, white capitalists reaped 
profits from low wages of all workers. Furthermore, just as white capitalists were invested in the 
                                                 
551 1998: 700-01. 
Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans 
 213 
defense of this system in order to protect their material wages, so too were white workers 
invested in the defense of this system in order to protect their psychological wages.  
 I argue that the macula servitutis was a psychological wage to freeborn Romans, thereby 
preserving Roman hierarchy by incentivizing freeborn Romans to ally with slave-owners rather 
than slaves. For while many Romans owned slaves, there were many free Romans who did not, 
therefore raising the possibility that slaves could ally with freeborn Romans against the wealthy. 
Roman writers such as Livy and Sallust reveal their fear of this possibility in their descriptions of 
rebel leaders recruiting slaves to their cause.552 Importantly, this psychological wage was not 
simply the result of the slave-owners imposing a false consciousness on other Romans: because 
both the servile body and servility itself existed on a continuum, non-slave-owning freeborn 
Romans were following their own interests in distinguishing themselves from slaves and former 
slaves.553 Furthermore, to follow Du Bois closely, I emphasize that this psychological wage was 
only a psychic twin to the material differences in the lives of slaves and freeborn Romans. 
Consequently, just as how white workers were invested in protecting the material advantages that 
they had over Black workers, so too were freeborn Romans invested in protecting the material 
advantages that they had over slaves. In the rest of this chapter, I argue that both Roman 
comedies and histories preserve strategies that freeborn Romans used to distinguish themselves 
form slaves and former slaves. Such differentiation was necessary in order to create the 
conditions that they might collect their psychological wage.  
3. Manumission, language, and the Roman stage  
 In Roman comedy, the enslavement of children threatens the stability and continuity of 
freeborn families, but the comedians conclude the plays by reuniting these families, thereby 
                                                 
552 Livy on Herdonius recruiting slaves: 3.15. Sallust on Catiline recruiting slaves: Bellum Catilinae, 56.4. See also 
Diodorus on the relationship between slaves and poor Sicilians in Section 6 below.  
553 Cf. Hopkins on the superiority of free Romans over slaves (1978: 112).  
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assuring the freeborn families in their audiences of their importance. Pirates, runaway slaves, and 
anonymous figures at markets capture and enslave children—usually girls—who remain lost 
during their adolescence and appear as enslaved characters in the play. The plays conclude with 
the liberation of this enslaved character through the recognition of the true status of their birth. I 
use the word “liberate” purposefully because the playwrights never describe these acts as 
examples of manumission. Possibly, the playwrights expected their audiences to imagine these 
actions as vindications of free status.554 Instead, the playwrights only use variations of the 
adjective liber, the noun libertas, and verb libero to describe what happens to these men and 
women. For the sake of convenience, I call this cluster of words the language of liberation. The 
playwrights also use the language of liberation to describe the manumission of servi callidi, 
meretrices, and even figures such as the lorarii. But Plautus and Terence only use variations of 
the noun manumissio and verbal phrase manu emitto to describe the freeing of slave characters 
such as servi callidi and meretrices. Also for the sake of convenience, I call this cluster of words 
the language of manumission. In other words, the playwrights describe both groups as longing 
for liberty, and so both groups use the language of liberation to describe that goal. But characters 
who are freeborn simply require the proper recognition of their status, and so the comedians only 
describe their freedom with the language of liberation. In contrast, those who are “true” slaves 
can only achieve liberation through manumission, and so the comedians describe their freedom 
through both the language of manumission and the language of liberation. 
 I argue that this distinction is more than a linguistic curiosity, that it reflects how the 
Romans thought about the freeborn and slaves on the stage as having radically different 
relationships to freedom because of their birth. Significantly, this distinction implies that 
freeborn men and women did not go through manumission. Furthermore, this linguistic 
                                                 
554 See Chapter 2 Section 5d.  
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distinction between liberation for freeborn people and manumission for slaves compliments 
important plot distinctions between these two groups of characters. For a common plot point in 
Roman comedy is that the recognition of her status as freeborn saves a woman just prior to her 
needing to partake in sex work. In other words, the comedians present these women as being 
enslaved, but lacking the proper recognition of their freedom. In contrast, slaves have to earn 
their freedom, of which manumission is a part. The implication is that these slaves can only 
become free if they act a certain way.  
 By presenting freeborn families as units capable of withstanding the vicissitudes of 
fortune, including the threat of enslavement, the plays of Plautus and Terence pay a 
psychological wage to the freeborn, non-slave-owning Romans in their audiences: the 
playwrights assure them that their status as freeborn is important enough that they simply have to 
exist in order to deserve freedom. In contrast, slaves can only gain their freedom by successfully 
navigating the demands of their owners and other Romans.  
a. The language of liberation and freeing the freeborn on the Roman stage 
 Rather than using the language of manumission to describe freedom for enslaved, 
freeborn people, Plautus and Terence use the language of liberation to describe how proper 
recognition attests to the true status of freeborn men and women. At the same time these 
comedians use this language of liberation, they also take great care to ensure that by the end of 
play all the freeborn who were enslaved are freed. Notably, these enslaved, freeborn people do 
not need act a certain way to be worthy of freedom. Because in the world of the comedies 
everyone who is born in a freeborn family is worthy of freedom, these enslaved, freeborn people 
simply require the proper recognition.555 The comedians were aware of the importance of this 
                                                 
555 Spranger notes that in Roman comedy there is an innate difference between freeborn citizens and slaves (1984: 
27-8). For a different perspective, see Reduzzi Merola (2008).  
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recognition and used it as a plot point that further emphasizes the distance not only between 
enslaved, freeborn people and slaves but also the distance between men and women. For the 
comedians frequently use the plot line that the act of recognizing that a woman is freeborn saves 
her from performing sex work.  
 In the comedic world of Plautus and Terence’s plays, pirates, runaway slaves, and 
strangers often abduct boys and girls, but the boys encounter significantly less danger than the 
girls. Indeed, none of Terence’s characters who were abducted during childhood are boys. Out of 
his hundreds of characters, Plautus only writes of three freeborn men as having been abducted 
when they were children.556 Two of these men who were taken as children are Agorastocles of 
the Poenulus and the Syracusan Menaechmus of the Menaechmi. Freeborn families adopted both 
these characters as sons, in turn allowing them to grow up to become respected and prosperous. 
In other words, at the beginning of the plays, neither Menaechmus nor Agorastocles required 
saving from enslavement as they are already free citizens.  
 In contrast, Tyndarus of the Captivi most certainly requires saving, since he begins the 
play both as a slave and as a prisoner of war. As the title suggests, that play is particularly 
focused on the issue of captivity. Because of this emphasis, Tyndarus is not a good example of 
either a slave or a captured, freeborn man, as Plautus creates an exceptional history for this 
character in order to blur the distinction between the freeborn and the slave. Tyndarus was born 
to a freeborn family, but their untrustworthy slave Stalagmus stole him and sold him into slavery. 
The senex Hegio bought him as a companion for his son Philocrates, and as a result, Tyndarus 
received an education worthy of a citizen. Tyndarus’ appearance and actions on the play also 
defy the expectations that surround comedic slaves: because he is of a similar age to Philocrates, 
the adulescens who is his owner, Tyndarus is therefore younger than other slaves, whose bearded 
                                                 
556 Because I emphasize capture during their youths, I exclude the capture of Philocrates in the Captivi.  
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masks on stage marked them as older men.557 Also, while slave-owners in Roman comedy 
frequently threaten slaves with beatings and torture, Tyndarus actually experiences torture. 
Unfortunately for Tyndarus, the other characters only fully recognize that he is a citizen after he 
suffers torture.558 But despite Tyndarus’ exceptional history and acts, during the Captivi, 
Tyndarus’ ultimate freedom nonetheless falls into a larger pattern about the difference between 
freeborn people and slaves: Plautus only describes Tyndarus’ freedom using the language of 
liberation, rather than manumission.559 Tyndarus, by virtue of being freeborn, does not need 
manumission. 
 Likewise, Plautus and Terence use the language of liberation to discuss the freedom of 
eleven women characters who had been abducted in childhood. Appendix A contains all the 
instances in which characters refer to these women’s freedom. In all these examples, the 
characters use the language of liberation rather than the language of manumission to describe the 
freeing of these women. I argue that the playwrights’ use only the language of liberation to 
describe the freeing of these women is indicative that the Romans saw these women as 
inherently worthy of freedom.  
 That the Romans saw these women as automatically deserving freedom is further 
reiterated through the way that Plautus Terence use this secret background as a plot point. In all 
eleven examples, the recognition of these women’s true status removes them from circumstances 
in which they are practicing, or might be forced to practice in the near future, some sort of sex 
work. In other words, these women’s birth status provides them with a type of protection that 
                                                 
557 For more on Tyndarus’ appearance, see Section 4b. 
558 998-1006. For violence against hostrages, see Allen (2006: 52-7).   
559 Captivi, 1010-4.  
Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans 
 218 
saves from a life of sex work.560 The Persa provides the best examples of the kind of protection 
that being a freeborn woman provides. For in this play, Plautus offers up a variation of the 
recognition plot: a servus callidus pretends that an anonymous freeborn woman is a slave and 
sells her to a pimp.561 After the sale is completed, the clever slave arranges the revelation of the 
woman’s true background, resulting in her freedom, because her ontological status as freeborn 
overrides the pimp’s claim to her as a slave.562 Unsurprisingly, there are variations on this plot 
throughout Plautus and Terence’s plays. In Plautus’ Epidicus, Epidicus hires a freewoman to 
pretend to be a slave in order to trick a solider into buying her.563 In the Poenulus, Collybiscus 
pretends to want to buy a slave from the pimp, a ruse intended to gather proof that the pimp has 
been purposefully hiding this woman from the adulescens Agorastocles.564 Likewise, in 
Terence’s Heautontimorumenos, Syrus deceives Menedemus into thinking that Antiphila is an 
enslaved, but rich, captive.565 Antiphila is, in fact, a freeborn woman. 
 That the comedians took such care to save freeborn women from sex work reiterates the 
importance of the freeborn family as a unit. True, the comedians present women from a range of 
legal and social statuses as prostitutes, including freeborn women.566 However, the comedians do 
not describe freeborn prostitutes as active family members, but rather as having very weak or 
non-existent family connections. This individualism marks such women as outside the purview 
of a respectable family. In contrast, long lost daughters remained within the purview of families, 
most especially the purview of their fathers. Such fathers were concerned about their daughters’ 
virginity, something that enslavement directly threatened since slaves have no right not to be 
                                                 
560 Telestis in the Epidicus is a flute-girl, an occupation that in ancient Greece was closely associated with sex work. 
See Goldman (2015). 
561 Saturio recognizes, and liberates, his daughter the anonymous virgo in Persa, 741.  
562 Cf. Duckworth (1952: 151-160) and Stewart (2012: 132). 
563 “[FIDICINA] plus iam sum libera qunquennium,” Epidicus, 498. 
564 Poenulus, 557-562. 
565 Heautontimorumenos, (608-9). 
566 Witzke (2015). See also Duncan (2006) and Fayer (2013).  
Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans 
 219 
raped by their owners. By avoiding the language of manumission, the comedians avoid implying 
that these women’s enslavement was at times marked by rape.567 The language of liberation 
freed these women from associations of rape.    
b. The language of manumission and freeing slaves on the Roman stage 
 In contrast to the enslaved freeborn, slaves can only ever become free on stage 
conditionally. That is, it is not enough for a slave to be, he or she must act a certain way in order 
to be worthy of manumission. I include both men and women in this category, for while the 
comedians are primarily concerned about the manumission of slave men, they also provide 
detailed examples of how loyalty was connected to the manumission of slave women, most 
especially meretrices. Fitzgerald, McCarthy, and Stewart have argued that slaves’ loyalty and the 
performance of loyalty was essential to Roman manumission, most especially for Roman slave-
owners.568 But the attendance of non-slave-owning Romans in the theatrical audience poses a 
different question of loyalty and manumission: what does slave loyalty mean to a Roman who 
does not, and likely never will, own a slave? I argue that by making loyalty a condition to 
manumission, the Roman comedians implicitly reaffirm the distinction of slaves from freeborn 
Romans. In other words, the mere act of going through manumission makes the slave bear the 
macula servitutis. As a result, the comedians’ language of manumission ends up being both a 
promise for the potential advancement of slaves, but also marks them as excluded from the 
citizen families who stand at the center of the plays. 
 In Appendix B, I collect all the instances of language of manumission in Plautus and 
Terrence’s complete plays, and I argue that, in each instance, the comedians use this language to 
                                                 
567 I certainly do not imply that the comedians rejected depicting the rape of freeborn women. However, in the plays 
in which men do rape freeborn women, the comedians were careful to conclude the plays with the erasure of such 
rape through the marriage of the rapist to the raped woman. Although she studies Greek New Comedy, Lape’s 
analysis of the use of rape for the most part applies to Roman New Comedy, Lape (2004) and (2010).  
568 Fitzgerald (2000), McCarthy (2000), Stewart (2012).  
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describe freedom for a slave character, rather than an enslaved citizen. I read this distinction as 
indicative that the Roman audiences associated manumission with the process of slaves 
becoming worthy of freedom. In other words, the process of manumission made a slave free, but 
was also a reminder of their servile past. This reminder was a benefit to freeborn Romans, who 
used slaves’ experience of manumission as a way to exclude them from their own group.   
 In the Mostellaria, Plautus makes the manumission of a slave explicitly contingent upon 
her loyalty to her owner. Furthermore, because this relationship is between lovers, Plautus 
frames manumission as part of an erotic relationship. Prior to the beginning of the play, the 
adulescens Philolaches has fallen in love with the meretrix Philomatium, who is a slave. 
Philolaches then buys Philomatium and frees her, the cost of which causes the financial crisis 
that motivates the play’s plot.569 In Act I, Philolaches spies on Philomatium in order to see how 
she handles herself as freedwoman, in particular whether she proves herself loyal to him in a 
long conversation with the old nurse Scapha. Although the nurse encourages Philomatium to 
understand her relationship with Philolaches purely in utilitarian terms, Philomatium expresses 
nothing but love for Philolaches.570 These declarations so please the young man that he exclaims 
to himself and the audience: 
PHILOL. Divi me faciant quod volunt, ni ob istam orationem te liberasso denuo et ni Scapham 
enicasso. 
 
PHILOLACHES: May the gods do what they will if I don’t free you again because of that 
speech and if I don’t destroy Scapha.  
Plautus, Mostellaria, 222-3, translation my own.  
 
                                                 
569 20-24.  
570 Scapha: 209-212. Philomatium professes her devotion: 239-40.  
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By secretly observing how Philomatium uses her newfound freedom, Philolaches asserts that a 
former slave, such as her, has to act in a certain manner in order to be worthy of being free. 
Specifically, she must act loyally to her former owner, after he has declared his love for her.571  
 The comedians also demonstrate that loyalty was necessary for manumission, even if 
loyalty itself was insufficient grounds for manumission. In all three of the manumissions that 
occurred on stage, the slave in question had some lucky break that distinguishes him from other 
slaves. In Terence’s Adelphoe, Syrus is loyal to the family, but a major cause for his 
manumission is Demea’s resolve to become a generous person.572 In the two examples from 
Plautus, the slaves in question had the luck to participate in reuniting a family. Messenio from 
the Menaechmi helps reunite the two long-lost twins.573 Likewise, the eponymous Epidicus helps 
reunite Periphanes with his lost daughter Telestis. The manner in which Epidicus asks for his 
freedom from his owner is practically impudent, but Periphanes judges his actions as evidence of 
Epidicus’ worth.574 Epidicus ends his play with his freedom. 
 The importance of a slave’s loyalty to an owner is evident from Gripus of Plautus’ 
Rudens. Gripus also has the luck to participate in the reunification of a family, but because he 
lacks loyalty, he fails to convince his owner to grant him manumission. The slave of Daemones, 
Gripus, is a man with outsized ambitions. In a soliloquy, Gripus explains that he not only wants 
to be free, but also to become a king.575 That is, this slave is not content with equality, he nurses 
a dream of dominating everyone, including his former owner. Gripus’ outsized dreams mean that 
he is incapable of acting as a slave worthy of the freedom of a freedman. Upon finding a box on 
                                                 
571 This scene also allows Philomatium to demonstrate that she knows how to act like a matrona, cf. Perry (2014: 8-
42). My thoughts on this section of the play have also been shaped by Bartolo Natoli’s talk Inversion and Instability: 
Gendered Humor in Plautus’ Mostellaria, at the Classical Association of the Mid West and South, Boulder CO, 
2015.  
572 For more on this manumission, see Chapter 3 Section 5a.  
573 For more on this manumission, see Chapter 3 Section 5a. 
574 Epidicus, 675 ff. 
575 Rudens, 906-937. 
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the beach, Gripus is eager to present his find to his owner, so that he might ask for his freedom. 
When he does present the box to Daemones, Gripus’ greed overwhelms what little sense his has, 
for he attempts to contradict the proof that the freeborn woman Palaestra provides to demonstrate 
that the box belongs to her.576 Gripus’ bluster in this situation results in Daemones never taking 
the slave’s request for manumission seriously, although, as Roberta Stewart points out, as a 
crafty owner, Daemones does not thoroughly rule out the possibility of manumission either. 
Gripus ends the play still enslaved, and given what the audience has learned of his relationship to 
his owner, there is simply little chance that, in the world of the story, Daemones will ever 
manumit Gripus.577 
 Because the comedians’ distinction between enslaved citizens and slaves works itself out 
at both the level of language and of plot, I suggest that this distinction was important not only to 
the comedians, but also to their audiences. More radically, I argue that this distinction was part 
of the payment of psychological wages to freeborn Romans. Attending the theater, they saw 
stories in which the playwrights took it as a given that freedom was essential to freeborn family 
members.578 They listened to language in which the freedom of freeborn citizens was 
distinguished from the manumission of slaves. In doing so, the comedies cultivated the 
superiority of freeborn Romans over both slaves and former slaves, a superiority that depended 
on the audience understanding that there was a root distinction between freeborn Romans and 
slaves. In the next section, using red-haired masks as a case study, I show that the Romans 
performed this distinction visually.   
                                                 
576 Rudens, 1410-11. Herodotus describes Cyrus as becoming king despite being raised a slave (cf. Herodotus 
1.110). Diodorus describes the slave Eunus becoming the king in Sicily, replete with diadem. See also Diodorus’ 
description of Eunus (34/35.2.8) and Salvius (36.4.4).   
577 Cf. Stewart (2012: 132-144).  
578 For more on the audience of Roman comedies, see Chapter 3 Section 2d. 
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4. Manumission, masks, and the Roman stage 
 I argue that the Romans’ ideas of the servile body undermined the egalitarian potential of 
manumission on the Roman stage as part of the psychological wage paid to freeborn Romans. 
Prior to analyzing how Roman manumission intersected with the Romans’ ideas on the servile 
body the stage, I first gather evidence to integrate the evidence about masks from Greek New 
Comedy into the reconstruction of how the Romans used masks in the production of Plautus’ and 
Terence’s plays. These Greek sources, which span from the time of Menander to the late Roman 
Empire, point to how Plautus and Terence’s own plays make reference to the physicality of the 
characters’ masks in a way that suggests a correspondence between this later evidence for masks 
and the Romans’ texts. For example, in Pseudolus, Harpax describes the titular servus callidus in 
part by referencing his red hair, a description that corresponds to Pollux’s description of slave 
masks. 
 Pollux’s catalogue of slave masks is evidence of how ancient audiences read comedic 
slave masks in conversation with the masks of freeborn citizens. Eschewing an overly rigid and 
inflexible structuralist account of these masks, I instead follow the work of Classicist C.W. 
Marshall, who argues that the sophisticated performers in Rome used these masks as tools to 
evoke particular associations amongst the audience. In short, the masks do not reveal everything 
about a particular character, despite Pollux’s seeming enthusiasm to associate each mask with a 
particular stock type. Pollux’s catalogue is, instead, important evidence that audience members 
assumed that they could recognize a slave character by sight on the stage.  
 Although this visual recognition of slaves was not based on a single physical factor, a 
survey of the predominance of red hair in the representation of slaves on the Roman stage is 
suggestive of the overall trend in Roman expectations. Viewers such as Pollux recognized certain 
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masks as slaves only through the juxtaposition to other masks, most importantly the masks of the 
citizen family members. One way of distinguishing a slave mask from family members was 
through red hair. But the comedians, being comedians, played with this distinction: some 
freeborn family members also had red hair. While this detail complicates the representation of 
slaves on the Roman stage, it does not undermine Plautus and Terence’s association of red hair 
with slave’s bodies. However, the small number of examples of slave masks with red hair in the 
remains of material culture suggest that hair color was only one visual strategy for identify 
certain characters as slaves.   
 I argue that a slave’s visual distinction was necessary for the freeborn members of the 
audience because this distinction was necessary for the maintenance of their superiority over 
slaves and former slaves. In other words, that ancient audiences could recognize slaves and 
former slaves by sight undermines the egalitarian potential of manumission in these comedies. 
On the stage, freedmen and freedwomen remained visually distinct from freeborn peoples, 
facilitating the freeborn Romans’ cultivation of superiority at the expense of former slaves. 
a. Pollux and slave masks 
 Julius Pollux was a sophist whose reputation eventually earned him the chair of rhetoric 
at Athens under the Emperor Commodus.579 He was the author of a work known as the 
Onomasticon. Unfortunately, this book is itself lost; what survives of it today is the work of an 
anonymous epitomizer.580 The epitomizer’s role in the creation of the surviving text complicates 
ascribing all the details in the text to Pollux himself, since certain incongruities suggest that the 
epitomizer intervened and rearranged parts of the list. The epitomizer seems to have preserved a 
                                                 
579 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, 20. Also, Lucian may be specifically targeting Pollux’s lexigraphical 
pomposity in Lexiphanes.  
580 Della Corte (1975).  
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great deal of Pollux’s own language. For the sake of convenience, I refer to the author of this list 
as Pollux.  
 The question of how Pollux assembled his list is connected to what kind of relationship 
the masks have with New Comedy. Did Pollux copy the list from another author? Or did he write 
his list after inspecting the masks of a nearby theater troop? Is the list meant to be a complete 
representation of all the masks in New Comedy? Wiles suggest that he adopted a list from 
another author but that the list was not exhaustive.581 If one believes that Pollux took his list from 
an authoritative writer such as Aristophanes of Byzantium, it is easier to believe that this list was 
intended to be exhaustive.582 Webster maintains that Pollux intended his list to be representative 
of the entire range of masks in New Comedy, but is agnostic about the source. Webster also 
maintains that the masks are intimately connected to the performance of the particular stock 
characters that make up New Comedy.583 On the other hand, the surviving visual evidence of 
comedic masks does not demonstrate that Pollux’s list was representative of the range of possible 
comedic masks, in part because very few visual representations survive of slave masks with red 
hair.584 Based on my own survey of the visual evidence, I am inclined to agree with Marshall, 
Poe, and Wrenhaven that Pollux’s list is not an exhaustive catalogue of all the masks in New 
Comedy.585 For Pollux’s list suggests a preponderance of red hair on comedic slave masks, even 
though there are very few examples of masks with red hair in the evidence from material culture. 
I read Pollux’s list, not as a guide to the attributes expected of the mask of a particular comedic 
character, but rather as evidence for how ancient audience members put the physical attributes of 
                                                 
581 (1991: 77-8 and 148). 
582 Wiles defends Pollux’s list as having its roots in an Aristotlean investigation of comedic types but does not assert 
that the list was exhaustive (1991: 77-8 and 148). 
583 This idea motivates Webster’s cataloguing of all the representations of comedic masks across all types of 
material culture. His students Green and Seeberg present the culmination of his work (Webster et al., 1995).  
584 Although they focus on issues other than slave hair, Poe (1996), Marshall (2006), and Wrenhaven (2013) defend 
this position that Pollux’s list is not comprehensive.  
585 Cf. Marshall (2006: 130). 
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these masks into conversation with each other and how these audiences understood racialization 
in the context of on-stage manumissions.586 
 Although a Greek writing about Greek New Comedy, Pollux is a valuable source for the 
reconstruction of Roman masks and how they operated in the performance of Roman comedy. 
There is so little evidence that Plautus and Terence expected their actors to wear masks that for 
many years Classicists argued that masks were foreign to Roman comedy. However, the 
argument of continuity is perhaps the strongest reason to believe that the actors on the Roman 
stage did indeed wear masks. The argument of continuity consists of two points: First, two of the 
three types of performances that significantly influenced Roman comedy, Italian palliatia and 
Greek New Comedy, used masks. Second, later Roman comedies used masks, and the Greeks 
and Romans of the Imperial Period make numerous references in literature and visual art to 
comedic masks. In short, because the comedic performances before and after Plautus and 
Terence included the use of masks, it is reasonable to assume that these playwrights expected 
their performers to wear masks similar to the ones of Greek New Comedy, that is, the types of 
masks that Pollux describes.587 Therefore, because Pollux’s list is evidence for how a Greek 
audience member reacted to the masks on stage, his list is also valuable for theorizing how 
Roman audience members reacted to comedic masks.588  
 That Pollux understood slave masks were visually distinct from other comedic masks is 
evident by how he organizes his list, as he groups slave masks as outside the two binaries of 
gender and age. By assigning slaves a category distinct from the other four categories of masks, 
                                                 
586 Cf. Marshall (2006: 130). 
587 A number of passages from Cicero, Festus, and Donatus put so much emphasis on the public recognition of a 
performer on stage or the ability of a performer to use facial expressions that Hoffer (1877) argued that the Romans 
did not use masks. Gow had refuted Hoffer’s argument (1912). Nonetheless, for many years Hoffer’s position 
survived. For further bibliography, see Marshall (2006: 126 n.1).  
588 Wiles correctly notes that the aesthetics of a Greek masks had different connotations in the Roman world. 
However, his structuralist account relies too heavily on the idea that Rome was the reverse of Greece (1991: 140-4).  
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Pollux affirms how these slave characters that use these masks are the characters that are 
excluded from the freeborn family, which consists of old men, young men, old women, and 
young women. Pollux arranges his forty-four different masks in the following order: 
Old men:   Webster numbers 1 – 9 
Young men:   Webster numbers 10 – 20 
Slaves:   Webster numbers 21 – 27 
Old women:   Webster numbers 28 – 30 
Young women:  Webster numbers 31– 44589 
 
Significantly, the only masks in Pollux’s slave category are the masks of slave men.  
 At the beginning of each category Pollux announces the names of the different masks that 
he reviews in that section. At the beginning of the section of the slave masks, he describes this 
section as including the following: 
Τὰ δὲ δούλων πρόσωπα κωμικὰ πάππος, ἡγεμὼν θεράπων, κάτω τριχία ἢ κάτω τετριχωμένος, 
θεράπων Μαίσων, θεράων Τέττιξ, ἡγεμὼν ἐπίστειστος.  
 
The slave-masks in comedy are the Pappos (21), the leading servant (22), the downwards-
haired (23), the curly-haired servant (24), servant Maison (25), servant Tettix (26), and the 
leading wavy-haired (27). 
Pollux, Onomasticon, 4.148-9, trans. Webster et al.  
 
Importantly, even though Pollux titles this section as concerning the masks of slaves (τὰ δὲ 
δούλων πρόσωπα), this list nonetheless contains masks that he explicitly, and implicitly, 
describes, not as slaves, but as servants or lowly people. While not all masks of slaves, all the 
masks in this list are of men whose bodies are servile, especially when in juxtaposition to the 
masks of the young and old men. For Pollux explains that the Pappos mask is not the mask of 
slave, but of a freedman, “The Pappos is the only slaves’ [θεραπόντων] mask with white hair, 
and it indicates he is a freedman.”590 Furthermore, Pollux includes on this list two masks that 
other writers indicate where closely associated with cooks, Maison and Tettix.591 As J.C.B. Lowe 
                                                 
589 The most detailed commentaries on Pollux’s list are Wiles (1991: 74-80), Webster et al. (1995), and Poe (1996).  
590 “ὁ μὲν πάππος μόνος τῶν θεραπόντων πολιός ἐστι, καὶ δηλοῖ ἀπελεύθερον.” 4.144 
591 Maison: Festus’ testimony on Aristophanes of Byzantium’s text On Masks makes clear that the Maison mask was 
associated with cooks: “Maeson persona comica appellatur, aut coci, aut nautae, aut eius generis. Dici ab inventore 
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shows in his analysis of cooks in New Comedy, while the Romans assumed that the theatrical 
cocus was a slave, the Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries did not. Instead, these 
Athenians could and at times had to assume that theatrical cooks (μαγείροι) were citizens, in part 
because their work had ritual importance.592 However, this association was not permanent: 
Athenaeus illustrates how the Tettix is a foreign character with a quote from a play by Philemon 
in which a slave-owner complains that his cook does not speak Greek.593 Pollux’s list of slave 
masks is therefore not a list of masks that actors wore to indicate that a character was a slave. 
Instead, this is a list of masks with traits of the ambiguous servile body that audience members 
nonetheless recognized as slaves through the juxtaposition with other masks.  
 I read Pollux’s list as evidence for the broad distinctions among masks that interested an 
ancient audience member. As a sophist, Pollux prided himself on his knowledge of Greek 
culture. In addition to reading comedy, attending performances of New Comedy was necessary 
for such knowledge as well as the authority that came with such knowledge. Because Pollux 
creates a category for the mask of slaves—even though not all the masks in this category were 
used by slave characters—I argue that Pollux’s list demonstrates that ancient theater goers were 
invested in the visual distinction between freeborn characters and slave characters. In other 
words, whether or not the creators of the masks thought that there was a visual distinction 
between slave and freeborn, Pollux, as a theater-goer, thought it was necessary to discover one.  
b. Red hair and slave masks 
 In Pollux’s list of comedic masks, red hair is an attribute closely, but not exclusively, 
associated with slaves. I use the English word red-haired to refer to the following Greek and 
                                                                                                                                                             
eius Maesone comoedo, ut ait Aristophanes Grammaticus.” (134M). Tettix: Athenaeus explains that Tettix was a 
cook in 659a.  
592 Lowe (1985).  
593 Athenaeus, 659b. 
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Latin words: πύρρος, rufus, and rutilus. I also use red-haired to refer to Greek and Latin words 
derived from those words, such as πυρρόθριξ and rufulus. None of these words have an exact 
correspondence with each other, as the ancients were aware.594 Furthermore, none of these words 
correspond to the English conception of red-haired, as many of them apparently could refer to 
light or blond hair.595 For Greek and Roman writers, red hair was a bodily attribute that 
demanded explanation. Some of these explanations were racialized, as the authors associate red 
hair with northern peoples such as the Scythians and Germans. In the plays of Plautus and 
Terence, three different characters comment on the red hair of three different slaves. I argue that 
Roman audiences visually read the red hair on masks as indications of a character’s possible 
servility, that is, the macula servitutis. Red hair was in part a possible marker of the macula 
servitutis because the Greeks and Romans associated red hair with barbarians.  
 Pollux uses red hair to construct an ambiguous servile body. Out of his seven slave 
masks, Pollux describes five as having red hair.596 That is, Pollux uses some variation of the 
Greek word reddish (πύρρος) to describe each of these masks. Pollux describes the Tettix mask 
as having black hair. Significantly, Pollux appears to believe that his readers expect the Pappos 
mask to have red hair, as he offers an explanation of why the mask instead has white hair: he 
asserts that this white indicates that this slave is a freedman. That red hair was important to the 
slave masks is clear through Pollux’s description of the Pappos mask, since he clarifies that the 
purpose of this mask’s white hair is “in order to indicate that he is a freedman.”597 Pollux implies 
that this mask indicates a character who was a slave, but whose age has granted him the time to 
                                                 
594 Cf., Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 2.6.4-15. 
595 Cf. Varro, Lingua Latina, 7.5. 
596 Pollux explicitly describes the leading servant, the downwards haired, the curly haired, and the Maison masks as 
has having red hair. He implies that the leading wavy hair mask has red hair by likening it to the leading servant 
mask. 
597 “ὁ μὲν πάππος μόνος τῶν θεραπόντων, πολιός ἐστι, καὶ δηλοῖ ἀπελεύθερον.” 4.149. 
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pursue and obtain manumission. But while Pollux associates red hair with slaves and servants, he 
does not suggest that only slaves have red hair. Pollux describes the second Pappos as having red 
hair.598 This second Pappos is the second mask in Pollux’s list of Old Men. In other words, it is a 
mask associated with a freeborn family member. While Pollux closely associates red hair with 
slaves, not all slaves have red hair and not all those who have red hair are slaves.  
 Pollux’s association of red hair with the ambiguous servile body was part of a larger 
Greco-Roman discourse on red hair. Some ancient authors posit a strong connection between red 
hair and various northern races; that is, they racialize red hair. Other authors present more 
complex causes for red hair, as they see this hair color as the result of both environmental causes 
and lineage. I use both associations as evidence that for the Greeks and Romans, red hair was 
one possible physical marker of the macula servitutis. In addition to asserting that murex divers 
are red haired because of their exposure to the sun, the pseudo-Aristotlean author of the 
Problemata writes that “[a]nd indeed, all those in the north are red-haired and thin-haired.”599 
Likewise, Tacitus describes the Germans as having red hair, an attribute he explicitly attributes 
to their lineage: “they are all the same: tall, with blue eyes and red hair.”600 Other authors make 
clear that red hair was not a positive marker. In Aristophanes’ Frogs, the chorus includes red 
haired people as one of the groups misleading Athenians, along with others such as scoundrels 
and foreigners.601 Such a context suggests that there were negative associations with the red hair 
                                                 
598 “ὁ δ᾽ἕτερος πάππος …πυρρόθριξ.” 4.144. 
599 “Καὶ πάντες δ᾽οἱ πρὸς ἄρκτον πυρρότριχες καὶ λεπτότριχές εἰσιν.” 966b33. Cf. Hippocrates, Airs, Waters, 
Places, 20. 
600 “idem omnibus: truces et caerulei oculi, rutilae comae,” Germania, 4. 
601 “Τοῖς δὲ χαλκοῖς καὶ ξένοις καὶ πυρρίαις/ Καὶ πονηροῖς κἀκ πονηρῶν εἰς ἅπαντα χρώμεθα.” “The bronze coins 
and the foreigners and the redheads/ And the rogues and sons of rogues, we use these for everything!” Frogs, 730-1. 
Cf. Dench (2005: 242). 
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in New Comedy. For just as red hair was associated with slaves in Greek New Comedy, so too 
was it in Roman New Comedy.602 
 By making hair color the object of metatheatrical jokes, Plautus affirms the connection of 
hair color to character types, including the connection of red hair to slaves. In the Mercator, the 
senex Demipho vainly denies that his white hair has any bearing on his love for the young 
woman Pasicompsa. “Whether that hair on my head is white, red or black, I love.”603 But 
Demipho is very much wrong, for his white hair is a visual indication that he is a senex, and in 
New Comedy, lovesick senes never get the young women they desire. Instead, they embarrass 
themselves to such an extent that they make themselves worthy of punishment, which is what 
Demipho proceeds to do in this play.604 In contrast, if Demipho had black hair, then he would be 
an adulescens, which would make all the difference in his pursuit of Pasicompsa. For in New 
Comedy, the adulescens who pursues love, regardless of the cost, is laudatory and almost always 
achieves his goal. Because in the context of Demipho’s line white hair stands for senes and black 
hair for adulescentes, it is therefore reasonable to assume that the third type of hair, red, stands 
for slaves. That is, if Demipho did not have white hair or black hair then he would have red hair, 
making him a slave.   
 But while red hair was closely associated with slaves in Roman comedy, not all slaves 
had red hair. Indeed, both Plautus and Terence used red-haired masks to distinguish a particular 
slave from other slave characters. As a result, I argue that within the world of the plays, red hair 
functioned as a macula servitutis; not that all slaves were red haired, but that having red hair was 
                                                 
602 Fragments of red paint on figurines representing masked characters from New Comedy demonstrate that red hair 
was an important part of Greek New Comedy, see British Museum, GR 1926.3-24.96. Cf. Wrenhaven (2013: 135). 
Notably, one Menander’s recurring slave names was Pyrrhia, cf. Fragiadakis (1986: 367).  
603 “Si canum seu istuc, rutilumst sive atrumst, amo.” Mercator, 306. Plautus describes Demipho’s body in more 
detail in 639-40.  
604 Much like the senex Demaenetus in the Asinaria.  
Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans 
 232 
visual clue that a character could be a slave. Terence’s Phormio demonstrates that there was a 
connection between the red hair on slave masks and the construction of the slave’s body within 
the world of the story. After the prologue, the first character on the stage in the Phormio is the 
slave Davos, who initially appears alone. Davos talks to the audience on a number of his 
relationships, including his relationship to the slave Geta. At the end of this little speech, Geta 
then appears on stage and wonders: “If a redheaded fellow [rufus] were to look for me….”605 
Davos then speaks to Geta. Getas’ comment points to how the red hair of Davos’ slave mask is a 
detail that existed both visually as a stage prop and as a detail within the story world of the 
Phormio. The Roman audience must have made the connection between the slave mask that the 
actor playing Davos wore and the character Davos within the world of the play. If the Roman 
audience did not make this connection, the slaves’ subsequent conversation has no starting point. 
Furthermore, I suggest that it is reasonable to read Getas’ comment about Davos’ own red hair as 
evidence that Getas’ mask did not have red hair, thereby creating a visual distinction between the 
slaves Getas and Davos. 
 By using red hair as a detail that existed both visually on the mask and was part of the 
slave’s body in the world of the play, Plautus similarly used red hair to distinguish one slave 
character from another. In both the Asinaria and the Pseudolus, servile characters describe the 
callidus servus of that particular play as having red hair. Indeed, the cases are so similar that 
Marshall claims these passages as evidence that the same actor played the servus callidus in both 
plays.606 In both plays, the servus callidus assumes a disguise to deceive a visitor: in the 
Pseudolus, Pseudolus deceives the servant Harpax, and in the Asinaria, Leonida deceives the 
slave Libanus. Harpax describes Pseudolus as having “red hair, a big belly, stout calves and he is 
                                                 
605 “Si quis me quaeret rufus…” Phormio, 51.  
606 2006: 134.  
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blackish”607 Likewise, Libanus describes Leonida has having “a jutting jaw, red hair, a belly.”608 
In both cases the interlocutor provides even more details about the servus callidus, and none of 
them are complimentary. Since red hair is included on this list unattractive, and unusual, 
attributes, I argue that it reasonable to conclude that neither speakers had red hair. Pseudolus’ 
and Leonida’s red hair marked them not only as distinct from the families that owned them, but 
also from the slaves and servants that they deceived. 
 Somewhat counter-intuitively, that the Romans associated red hair with the servile body 
is evidenced through Plautus’ description of the freeborn Philocrates as having somewhat reddish 
hair. For Philocrates is the adulescens of the Captivi, a play in which Plautus plays with the 
distinction of free and slave. The play begins with both Philocrates and his slave Tyndarus as 
enslaved captives. The play’s prologue explains to the audience that, as part of a scheme for 
liberation, these two characters have exchanged clothes in order to convince their captors that 
Philocrates is actually Tyndarus and Tyndarus is actually Philocrates. In other words, just as in 
the Mnaechmi and the Amphityro, Plautus is playing with a confusion of identities.609 Unusually 
for Roman comedy, the slave Tyndarus is not middle-aged, but rather the same age as 
Philocrates the adulescens. This similarity anticipates Tyndarus’ liberation as a freeborn citizen, 
but it is also indicative of how Plautus wishes to exacerbate the confusion between Tyndarus and 
Philocrates. For Plautus also makes Philocrates an unusual adulescens, since Aristophantes, 
another adulescens, describes Philocrates as having “somewhat reddish hair.”610 As Marshall 
                                                 
607 “rufus quidam, ventriosus, crassis suris, subniger…” the description continues (Pseudolus, 1218). 
608 “macilentis malis, rufulus aliquantum, ventriosus…” the description continues (Asinaria, 400).  
609 Bloomer (2001) and Marshall (2006: 150-1). 
610 “subrufus aliquantum,” 648.  
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notes, Plautus blurs the visual boundary between Philocrates and Tyndarus by describing 
Philocrates as having the type of hair commonly associated with slaves.611  
 Roman comedians took advantage of the racialized connotations of red hair to mark 
certain masks as the masks of slaves. This visual distinction complimented the comedians’ 
frequent use of ethnic slave names: the name Syrus for a Syrian slave, Davos for a Phrygian 
slave.612 Furthermore, the ancients did not limit themselves to red hair in their depiction of slave 
bodies on stage. In some instances, they associated black skin with servile characters. The most 
famous example is the Mytilenean mosaic of a scene from Menander’s Samia. Created sometime 
in the fourth century CE, this mosaic labels as the cook the man wearing a mask colored to 
represent black skin and topped with material to represent hair styled as dreadlocks. The mask’s 
representation of black skin is all the more striking through its juxtaposition to the actor’s white 
hands.613 This depiction also evokes the Ethiopian maid from Terence’s Eunchus.614 Although 
the maid’s part was mute, nonetheless the Romans could have represented this character through 
a mask similar to the one in the Mytilenean mosaic. Because comedy was public art, these pieces 
of evidence point to how racialization was a project dependent on the participation of freeborn 
Romans. In other words, it was a project similar to that of manumission.  
 In order to become free, freedmen and freedwomen required the recognition of freeborn 
Romans who did not own slaves. The superiority of freeborn Romans over slaves and former 
slaves was an incentive for these Romans to recognize this freedom only while reaping some sort 
of benefit for themselves. The distinction between freeborn and former slaves allowed the 
freeborn Romans to risk little in recognizing these former slaves as free, as the freedom of 
                                                 
611 There is debate over what kind of masks both Tyndarus and Philocrates wore, see Leigh (2004: 84), Marshall 
(2006: 151), Moore (1998: 185-6), Wiles (1991: 139).   
612 For an explicit connection of the Davos name with this identity, see Apsis, 242. Cf. Fragiadakis (1986: 343-5). 
613 For discussion, see Webster et al. (1995: 469). The image is available in Charitonides et al. (1970: passim.) 
614 Eunuchus, 165.  
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former slaves was of a lesser quality. As such, the distinction between freeborn and slave was 
important, important enough that the Romans engaged in a variety of strategies to mark slaves’ 
bodies as distinct from their own, despite their lived experience of the heterogeneity of slaves’ 
actual bodies. The red hair on comedic slave masks was one such strategy to mark the bodies of 
slaves, even though not all comedy slave masks had red hair. 
5. Livy, manumission, and the volones 
 Just as the comedians distinguish between the manumission of slaves and the liberation 
of captured citizens, so too does the Roman historian Livy. I defend this position by examining 
in detail two separate, but related, accounts in Livy’s history: Tiberius Gracchus’ manumission 
of the volones and Titus Flamininus’ rescue of captured Roman soldiers. Livy emphasizes the 
volones’ servility both in their triumph over the Carthaginian forces and in his retelling of their 
celebration. Livy takes care to mark the volones with the macula servitutis through a number of 
details, including details that have correspondences to the depiction of slaves in ancient popular 
culture. I use these connections as evidence to argue that Livy’s account of the volones’ victory 
has the overtones of popular Roman values, even though this story is part of Livy’s larger 
narrative of the Romans’ resistance to Hannibal’s invasion, a narrative that Livy makes clear is 
drawn from aristocratic writers such as Polybius. These similarities take on more importance 
when combined with Livy’s description of the painting of the volones in the Temple of Liberty. 
As a painting in public space, the Roman public was free to interpret this painting by putting its 
images into conversations with stories about the volones. In other words, the Roman people read 
this painting through the lens of public memory. I argue that Livy’s account of this painting is 
not so much a description of the images, as it is a summary of an interpretation of the painting, 
an interpretation that I further argue was the negotiated result of the Romans’ need to distinguish 
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freeborn Romans from manumitted slaves. As a result, Livy’s depiction of the volones intersects 
with the priorities of Romans who did not own slaves, as this story emphasizes that former slaves 
are not as competent or deserving as freeborn Romans. 
 Livy again makes use of this dichotomy between freeborn Romans and slaves in his 
description of the soldiers that Flamininus returns to Rome. Flamininus won important victories 
in mainland Greece, including against Philip V. Flamininus also secured the release of thousands 
of Romans whom the Greeks held as slaves. Livy includes these men as part of the spectacle in 
Flamininus’ triumph and asserts that these men appeared in the tonsorial style of manumitted 
slaves, since they marched while sporting shaved heads. However, Livy is careful to ensure that 
his readers do not think of these soldiers as freedmen, but rather as Romans who use the symbols 
of freedmen to assert that they had regained their freedom.  
a. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus manumits the volones 
 Livy emphasizes the servility of the volones by attributing to them servile attributes and 
by using tools that were part of ancient popular culture. By popular culture, I mean the culture 
that people such as peasants, craftsmen, and slaves created.615 As a result, I argue that Livy’s 
description of the volones contains valuable evidence for what methods were available for 
freeborn Romans to distinguish themselves from former slaves. For in Livy’s account, even 
though the volones risk their lives to save Rome and thereby earn their freedom, they nonetheless 
remain servile, an attribute that complicated the celebration of Tiberius Gracchus’ leadership of 
the volones.  
 Livy makes clear that his account of the volones from 216 to 214 follows the same 
cohort, a narrative that takes up five different sections of his history. First, Livy details how the 
                                                 
615 For thoughts on searching ancient Greek popular culture in literary texts, see Kurke (2012: 2-15) and Forsdyke 
(2012: 6-16). Clarke (2003), Knapp (2011), and Toner (2015) ask similar questions about Roman culture.  
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Romans bought 8,000 slaves from slave-owners in order to train them as soldiers.616 Second, 
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus rallies the volones the day before the battle, an exhortation that 
includes a detailed plan for the volones’ manumission.617 Third, Livy describes the battle itself to 
explain how Gracchus’ virtues as a commander allow him to overcome the volones’ servile 
vices.618 The fourth section is the volones’ celebration of their victory and their new freedom. 
Livy explains that his source for the story of the volones’ celebration is a mural depicting the 
occasion in the Temple of Liberty on the Aventine. After this detailed description of the battle 
and the celebration, Livy does describe what happens to the volones in 212, that is, after 
Tiberius’ death.619 I consider this description Livy’s fifth section on the volones, as he is 
referring to the same soldiers who served under Tiberius at Beneventum. Livy continues to 
describe volones as participants in the Roman army after this dispersal, but he provides 
significantly fewer details on their fighting.620 In this section, I focus on Livy’s depiction of the 
cohort of volones under the command of Tiberius.  
 In the second section, which begins Livy’s description of the battle of Beneventum, the 
historian depicts Tiberius as both a judicious military commander as well as a judicious slave-
owner. According to Livy, Tiberius is aware that he has more power over these particular 
soldiers than a typical Roman commander. But Tiberius is careful with this power and ensures 
that he has the proper backing from the senate and the consul before he makes any extraordinary 
promises to the volones.621 For the night prior to the battle of Beneventum, Tiberius reveals that 
the volones will be able to secure their own freedom the next day.  
                                                 
616 22.57.11. 
617 24.14-15. For more on this section, see below.  
618 24.16. For more on this section, see below.  
619 25.20.4. 
620 Praetor P. Cornelius Sulla recalls the volones: 25.22.2-4. Terentius Varro commands the volones under the 
proconsul Livius Salinator, 28.10.11-12. Livius Salinator leads the volones 29.5.9. See Stewart (2012: 126-130).  
621 24.14.8-9.  
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qui caput hostis rettulisset, eum se extemplo liberum iussurum esse; qui loco cessisset, in eum 
seruili supplicio animaduersurum. 
 
Any of them bringing back the head of an enemy he would immediately declare a free man, 
but anyone who gave ground he would punish as a slave. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.14.7, trans. Yardley.  
 
Tiberius assumes that this command provides an incentive for the volones to fight well and to 
fight well on behalf of the entire army.  
 In the third section, Tiberius uses his cunning as a military leader and as a slave-owner to 
counteract the volones’ ineptitude in a way that corresponds to comic stories about slaves from 
ancient popular culture. According to Livy, the volones were not good soldiers in part because 
they were overly literal:  
…nec alia magis Romanum impediebat res quam capita hostium pretia libertatis facta. nam ut 
quisque hostem impigre occiderat, primum capite aegre inter turbam tumultumque abscidendo 
terebat tempus; deinde occupata dextra tenendo caput fortissimus quisque pugnator esse 
desierat, segnibus ac timidis tradita pugna erat.  
 
Nothing more impeded the Romans than the fact that the heads of the enemy had been made 
the price of liberty. The men all showed great spirit in dispatching an enemy, but the first thing 
they did after that was to waste time in the difficult task of severing the head in the confused 
melee. Then, their right hands fully employed holding the head, all the most intrepid gave up 
the fight, leaving the battle to the laggards and the faint-hearted. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.15.3-5, trans. Yardley. 
 
Specifically, the volones assumed that Tiberius’ command meant that as soon as they had killed 
an enemy soldier, they were to immediately bring the head of that soldier to him. If they did not 
do so, they would forfeit their chance for manumission. Livy implies that the volones interpreted 
the command in this way because they were not true soldiers for two reasons: first, they are 
foolish, they interpret Tiberius’ command too narrowly. Second, they are more focused on their 
own freedom than the collective well-being that comes with Rome’s military success. This 
individualism threatens to undermine the volones completely, except that Tiberius diagnoses the 
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problems and therefore issues a new command: if they win, he will free them all.622 For Livy, the 
volones’ misinterpretation of Tiberius’ command reflects badly on all of them.  
 Livy’s description of the volones’ literal interpretation of Tiberius’ command resonates 
with the depiction of slaves in Greek and Roman literature that are closely associated with, but 
distinct from, ancient popular culture. One such overly literal slave is the Aesop of the Life of 
Aesop, a Greek prose text, likely written sometime in the Imperial Period.623 The Life of Aesop is 
a fictional biography, likely the product of a man with sophistic training.624 Despite this 
authorship, the text does not simply present the views or concerns of an elite man during this 
time period because his work includes the retelling of popular, and authorless, stories. In one 
story, Aesop brings his owner Xanthus an empty oil flask because Xanthus had merely asked for 
an oil flask and not one full of oil. Similarly, Aesop prepares a dinner consisting of one lentil 
because the Greek word for lentil, φακός, is a collective noun.625 The degree to which the 
anonymous author modified these traditional stories for his own purposes is a question that needs 
to be asked of each story individually. Leslie Kurke and Sara Forsdyke point out that to assume 
these stories only represent the values of the elite is to miss how the author wrote the Life of 
Aesop against a cultural background in which Aesop was a narrative figure who belonged to 
everybody, including freeborn citizens who did not own slaves.626 In other words, that the stories 
and tropes within the Life of Aesop were part of a common, popular culture in the ancient world 
                                                 
622 24.15.8. 
623 Holzberg (1992).  
624 There is debate on the genre of the Life of Aesop. Jouanno (2005) argues that it is a comic biography. Wills 
(1997) argues for its connection to the gospel genre. Ruiz-Montero aligns it alongside texts such as the Life of 
Alexander and the Life of Homer, and insists on the hybrid status of the work (2014).  
625 Empty oil flask: 38. Lentils: 39-42. See also Aesop’s initial verbal skirmish with Xanthus: 24-5. For the 
philosophical connections of Aesop’s word games, especially the lentils, see Jouanno (2005: 420-1). See also Kurke 
on connections to Socratic thoughts on cooking (2012: 352). Notably, Aesop’s relationship with Xanthus begins 
with wordplay (24-5).  
626 Kurke (2012: 42-3 in particular, but also 22-43 generally). Forsdyke (2012: 83-4). Wills (1997) and Watson 
(2010) also argue this position by putting the Life of Aesop into conversation with the Gospels. Wills’ position 
suffers from relying on Nagy’s more tenuous arguments about Aesop and cultic activity (Nagy: 1979, cf. Kurke 
2012: 31).  
Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans 
 240 
explains the similarities of these stories to Livy’s description of the volones interpreting 
Tiberius’ commands literally.  
 Such stories about Aesop and the volones had appeal to both Greek and Roman, rich and 
poor, slave and free because these stories exaggerated a strategy that slaves used for 
simultaneously serving and resisting their owners, as evidenced in an anecdote by Plutarch. 
Plutarch recounts how Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi, eager to have his slaves speak as little as 
possible, realizes too late that some of his slaves have followed this instruction too well. 
Specifically, one slave truthfully answered that an honored guest had received Piso’ invitation, 
but omitting telling Piso that the guest had declined to come.627 Importantly, Plutarch’s anecdote 
is just as much a detail taken from a literary source as the stories about Aesop and the volones. 
However, unlike those other stories, Plutarch frames his anecdote as depicting a facet of the 
relationship between a slave and a slave-owner that was only slightly unusual and therefore an 
amusing bit of historical data.628 In contrast, the story of the volones as enthusiastic headhunters 
and the story of Aesop as the cook of a singular lentil take the premise of overly literal 
interpretation and exaggerate it for comedic effect. 
 Because of the comedic value in a slave’s overly literal interpretation, it is unsurprising 
that volones’ misinterpretation of Tiberius’ commands also has parallels in Roman comedy. 
These examples from Plautus’ comedy demonstrate that the public of the Roman Republic—that 
is, even those Romans who did not own slaves— was also familiar with a servile hermeneutic 
similar to the one in Livy’s description of the volones. In the Persa, Toxilius requests that his 
slave Paegnium hurry home as quickly as possible; Paegnium does indeed hurry home, but he 
                                                 
627 On Talkativeness 18 = Moralia 511d-e. Cf. Hopkins (1993: 19 n.31).  
628 See Potter on the analysis of anecdotes (1999: 59-60). 
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gets there quickly by abandoning his errands.629 Likewise, in the Pseudolus, the eponymous 
slave misinterprets his owner Calidorus’ commands through a creative literalism: Pseudolus 
argues that Calidorus’ lover Phoenicium is herself present in the wax tablet that bears her letter 
to Calidorus.630 Pseudolus also expresses surprise that Calidorus has carried (attuli) an 
accomplice to the scene of their scheme, prompting Calidorus to clarify “I meant to say ‘I lead 
him’” (‘adduxi’ volui dicere).631 However, Livy and Plautus’ examples differ in one important 
respect: while Plautus uses literal interpretation as a tool for the slave to have a joke at the 
owner’s expense, Livy uses the slaves’ overly literal interpretation in order to denigrate them. 
For Livy, the volones’ inability to understand the nuances of Tiberius’ command is further 
evidence that they are not good soldiers and, therefore, distinct from freeborn Roman soldiers. 
This distinction becomes even more apparent in Livy’s account of volones’ celebration of their 
victory.   
 According to Livy, despite the volones’ foolishness and cowardice, they nonetheless 
triumphed at Beneventum, giving grounds for Tiberius to manumit all of the volones.632 
However, Tiberius again searches for and creates a distinction between the cowardly volones and 
the brave volones. While many of the volones were inspired to fight all the more fiercely when 
they heard that their freedom was dependent on their collective victory over the enemy, others 
failed to live up to that standard. Instead, they shirked from fighting on the front lines and 
collectively fled Tiberius’ camp.633 To address the disparity in how the volones fought, Tiberius 
investigates each of his soldiers individually.634 After these investigations, Tiberius bifurcates the 
                                                 
629 Persa, 190-1. Cf. McCarthy (2000: 138-9).  
630 Pseudolus, 35-36. Cf. Stewart (2012: 167).  
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newly manumitted volones: on the one hand, those who were brave he permits to eat as Roman 
citizens at the banquet that celebrates their victory. That is, they eat while reclining. On the other 
hand, those who were cowardly must serve food to those reclining volones; they also must eat 
while standing up for that day and all remaining days during that campaign.635 Livy asserts that 
this banquet with the two groups of volones celebrating in very different styles is depicted on a 
painting in the Temple of Liberty on the Aventine Hill. As Livy explains, this location is 
particularly suited to such a display because Tiberius’ father had built the temple.636 Michael 
Koortbojian and Anna Clark argue that this location of this third century temple was also well 
suited to such a display because of the Aventine’s close association with the Roman plebeians.637  
 Significantly, even though Livy is explicit in attributing his story about Tiberius’ 
manumission of the volones to this painting, the historian does not specify whether he himself 
has seen this painting. While this question is to a large extent unanswerable, I argue that it is 
worthwhile asking because it highlights the question of how this painting relates to the story of 
the volones at the battle of Beneventum.638 Indeed, Gaetano De Sanctis and Karl-Wilhelm 
Welwei, wishing to have the battle and celebration come from a single source, argue that Livy’s 
description of the battle is based on a scene in the painting itself.639 To ask whether Livy saw the 
painting is also useful because it points to how Livy is constantly negotiating his control over his 
narrative, while also being constrained by his traditions and sources, even though he himself 
often skillfully hides these very negotiations. In this passage, Livy has hidden the negotiation to 
                                                 
635 24.16.12-13.  
636 24.16.19.  
637 Koortbojian (2002: 42-3) and Clark (2007: 257-8). Clark dates the construction of this temple to 246-238 BCE 
(2007: 299). With some reticence, Arena supports the date of the temple’s founding as 246 BCE (2012: 34). Arena 
is also skeptical that this temple had any plebeian associations (2012: 35-6). In contrast, Wiseman doubts that there 
ever was a temple to Libertas on the Aventine (1979: 92 n. 115).  
638 Note that doubting that Livy saw this painting is distinct from doubting that the painting existed. 
639 De Sanctis et al. (1917: 206 n. 117) and Welwei (1988: 9) make these claims. Koortbojian offers a logical 
rebuttal (2002: 36, especially n. 30).  
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such an extent it is unclear was what included in this painting. These details are open to debate 
because Livy has subsumed his description of this painting into his narrative analysis of it, 
resulting in a blurring of visual and non-visual details.640 Visual details include his account of 
men reclining outside while being served by men who also joined in the eating. 
pilleati aut lana alba uelatis capitibus uolones epulati sunt, alii accubantes, alii stantes qui 
simul ministrabant uescebanturque. digna res uisa ut simulacrum celebrati eius diei Gracchus, 
postquam Romam rediit, pingi iuberet in aede Libertatis quam pater eius in Auentino ex 
multaticia pecunia faciendam curauit dedicauitque. 
 
The slave volunteers dined wearing caps, or had fillets of white wool on their heads. Some 
were reclining and others standing, the latter serving food and eating at the same time. The 
event seemed worthy of a picture, and so on his return to Rome Gracchus had a painting of that 
festive made in the temple of Liberty which his father had had constructed and had dedicated 
on the Aventine.  
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.16.18-19, trans. Yardley. 
 
Because both the men reclining and the men standing wear pillei, visually these men have a 
close, but not absolute, association with freedmen.641 Livy does detail events in which freeborn 
citizens, rather than freedmen, wear the pilleus, prompting Karl-Wilhelm Welwei to suggest that 
Livy’s identification of these men as volones is completely independent of the painting.642 
Indeed, Livy includes a number details that are clearly not drawn from the picture, such as his 
assertion that Tiberius sponsored the creation of this painting.643 Possibly Livy drew that 
particular detail from an inscription or caption included with the painting.644 Or possibly this 
detail originates from a source completely separate from the painting itself, a source that also did 
the interpretative work of explaining why some men ate while standing and others ate while 
reclining. For while Livy’s account implies that it was obvious that this painting was of the 
                                                 
640 For this particular painting, see Feldherr (1998: 33-4).  
641 Livy’s words are “pilleati aut lana alba velatis capitibus” or “wearing the pilleus or white woolen bands on their 
heads.” While the connection of the pilleus and freedmen is common, I have found no other connection between 
white woolen headbands and freedmen, cf. Koortbojian (2002: 35 n. 21). For more on men other than freedmen 
wearing the pilleus, see Section 5b below.  
642 For example, 33.23.6. Welwei (1988: 9-10). 
643 24.16.19. 
644 When recounting the map of Sardinia that another Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus dedicates at the temple of 
Magna Matuta, Livy includes the inscription (41.28.8-10). Cf. Feldherr (1998: 23-4). 
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volones celebrating after the battle of Beneventum, Pliny’s account of Lucius Hostilius Mancius’ 
painting makes clear that the Romans were comfortable on relying on non-visual cues in order to 
interpret the narrative of a painting.  
 I argue that Pliny’s account of Lucius Hostilius Mancinus’ explanation of his own battle 
painting suggests that Livy’s account of the painting of the volones participated in a similar 
aesthetic, in which Romans interpreted paintings by relying on oral explanations. Lucius 
Hostilius Mancinus was a commander during the third Punic war. Discontent with his reputation 
after the war, Pliny the Elder writes that he used art as a way to increase his chances of winning 
the consulship, and so commissioned a painting of his winning battle. But rather than let the 
public interpret this painting on their own, Mancinus told the Roman public his own 
interpretation of his painting, thereby allowing him to recount the narrative of his victorious 
battle to an audience of Roman citizens:645  
Non dissimilem offensionem et Aemiliani subiit L. Hostilius Mancinus, qui primus 
Carthaginem inruperat, situm eius oppugnationesque depictas proponendo in foro et ipse 
adsistens populo spectanti singula anarrando, qua comitate proximis comitiis consulatum 
adeptus est.  
 
Also Lucius Hostilius Mancinus who had been the first to force an entrance into Carthage 
incurred a very similar offence with Aemilianus by displaying in the forum a picture of the 
plan of the city and of the attacks upon it and by himself standing by it and describing to the 
public looking at the details of the siege, a piece of popularity hunting which won him the 
consulship at the next election. 
Pliny, Natural History, 35.23, trans. Rackham. 
 
Pliny’s comments on Mancinus’ exegesis suggests that it was remarkable, but this remarkability 
appears to have been its connection to Mancinus’ resulting success in securing the consulship.646 
In Pliny’s mind at least, Mancinus’ audience were Roman citizens who were so impressed by his 
war stories that they subsequently voted him into office. Similarly, in the Satyricon, Encolpius’ 
                                                 
645 Beard places this painting in the context of Roman triumphs (2007: 179-180). Corbier (2007) and Carey (2003: 
138-156) explore how Pliny’s thoughts on painting connect with memory, but they focus on portraiture. See also 
Holliday (2002: 31ff).  
646 See Potter on the analysis of anecdotes (1999: 59-60).  
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description of the wall painting and other decorations at the entrance to Trimalchio’s house 
includes details drawn from the visual aspects of the paintings, inscriptions, and the verbal 
account of a nearby porter.647 I therefore argue that it is very likely that Livy’s assertion that both 
the men lounging and the men serving were volones was not based on the visual elements of the 
painting alone, but was an interpretation based on the painting, an interpretation that used 
information from outside of the painting. This position is very similar to T.P. Wiseman’s 
conclusion how the Roman annalists’ representation of monuments is intimately bound up with 
the politics and stories of the men within the monuments.648 The implication of Wiseman’s work 
for analyzing this painting is that it is impossible to separate Livy’s description of the volones’ 
celebration from the stories and memories of the Gracchi family. As a result, Livy’s description 
of the death of Tiberius is bound up with stories that stress the distinction between freeborn 
Romans and former slaves.   
 Livy details how Tiberius’ military success benefited him and how his death was ruinous 
for the volones in the fifth section of his story on the volones. According to Livy, after his victory 
at Beneventum in 214, Tiberius became consul again in 213.649 Livy also records that Tiberius 
died in 212, although the historian does not stand by any particular version of the consul’s 
death.650 However, Livy does elaborate how Tiberius’ death affected the volones. Livy writes 
that after Tiberius died the volones disbanded.  
ceterum super eam cladem quae in Lucanis accepta erat volonum quoque exercitus, qui vivo 
Graccho summa fide stipendia fecerat, velut exauctoratus morte ducis ab signis discessit.  
 
                                                 
647 For the visual descriptions and inscriptions, see 28.6 through 29.9. Speaking as Encolpius, Petronius includes the 
details drawn from oral explanation in his description of a wall-painting: “praetera grande armarium in Angulo vidi, 
in cuius aedicule erant Lares argentei positi Venerisque signum marmoreum et pyxis aurea non pusilla, in qua 
barbam ipsius conditam esse dicebant… iterrogare ergo atriensem coepi, quas in medio picturas haberent. ‘Ilada et 
Odyssian’ inquit ‘ac Laenatis gladiatorium munus.’” Satyricon, 29.8-9. 
648 Wiseman (1986).  
649 24.43.5. 
650 25.16.24-25.17.7. 
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To add to the defeat suffered in Lucania, however, the army of volunteer slaves deserted its 
standards. It had served with unswerving loyalty when Gracchus was alive, but felt that the 
leader’s death released it from its obligations. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 25.20.5, trans. Yardley. 
 
Despite the volones’ bravery at Beneventum, they nonetheless were not true Roman citizens, as 
their bravery was the result of their loyalty to Tiberius and his promise of freedom, not to the city 
of Rome and its citizens. In other words, the conclusion of Livy’s narrative about the volones 
completely undermines the distinction between the worthy and unworthy volones that Tiberius 
worked strenuously to maintain.  
 Because this conclusion to the story is so at odds with the celebration of the volones in 
the painting, I suggest that Livy is weaving together two separate traditions. On the one hand, he 
includes the stories around a painting that he says Tiberius sponsored, implying that Tiberius was 
so proud of this mass manumission that he himself emphasized his patronage over the volones in 
order to advance his reputation. On the other hand, Livy also implies that the volones are 
incorrigible cowards, not the type of men with whom Tiberius Gracchus would want to associate. 
While it is possible that this story originated as a way to discredit Tiberius Gracchus and his 
family, I argue that in the second century, the Gracchi themselves had reason to tell the story of 
the desertion of the volones in order to win political support from freeborn Romans, in particular 
poor freeborn Romans who did not own slaves.  
 The Tiberius Gracchus who died as plebeian tribune in 133 rallied freeborn Romans to 
his land reform efforts in part by disparaging slaves, a rhetorical move that demanded a 
renegotiation with his family’s close association with the volones. Appian paraphrases Tiberius’ 
first speech to an assembly of Romans (a contio) in the following way: 
…δημαρχῶν ἐσεμνολόγησε περὶ τοῦ Ἰταλικοῦ γένους ὡς εὐπολεμωτάτου τε καὶ συγγενοῦς, 
φθειρομένου δὲ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον εἰς ἀπορίαν καὶ ὀλιγανδρίαν καὶ οὐδὲ ἐλπίδα ἔχοντος ἐς 
διόρθωσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ δουλικῷ δυσχεράνας ὡς ἀστρατεύτῳ καὶ οὔποτε ἐς δεσπότας πιστῷ, τὸ 
ἔναγχος ἐπήνεγκεν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δεσποτῶν πάθος ὑπὸ θεραπόντων γενόμενον…. 
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[Tiberius Gracchus] delivered an eloquent discourse, while serving as tribune, concerning the 
Italian race, lamenting that a people so valiant in war, and related in blood to the Romans, were 
declining little by little into pauperism and paucity of numbers without any hope of remedy. 
He inveighed against the multitude of slaves as useless in war and never faithful to their 
masters, and adduced the recent calamity brought upon the masters by their slaves in Sicily…. 
Appian, Civil War, 1.9, trans. H. White.  
 
Although the historian Appian does not preserve the exact words of the speeches of this Tiberius, 
the resonances between his words and other sources suggest that Appian is drawing on sources 
closely associated with and sympathetic to the Gracchi.651 Appian reports that for this Tiberius, 
bravery in battle was vital to the distinction between slaves and freeborn Italians. Unfortunately 
for this Tiberius, his great-uncle Tiberius’ victory at Beneventum completely contradicts this 
stance, as there the volones fought bravely enough to warrant their freedom and to win a battle 
on behalf of Rome. Rather than attempt to contradict this story, or worse yet disown his 
connection to a successful commander, there was another solution: Tiberius could assert that his 
great-uncle was unique in his ability to overcome the volones’ natural servility and turn them 
into soldiers, a uniqueness that Livy’s own story emphasizes by demonstrating that once the 
commander dies, the volones reverted to their cowardly ways. The story of Tiberius Gracchus 
and the volones therefore nicely compliments the politics of Tiberius Gracchus the plebeian 
tribune, pointing to how manumission was a concern for freeborn Romans who did not own 
slaves.  
 The memory of the Gracchi was not just a concern for Roman aristocrats, historians, and 
politicians, but also many different segments of Roman society, for the Gracchi were the 
recipients of cult worship.652 I argue that the broad-stroke narrative similarities between the 
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus who lead the volones and the Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus who 
pushed for agricultural reform reflect how the Romans used similar stories to think through these 
                                                 
651 Cf. Appian, Civil War, 1.11, Plutarch, Life of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, 8.3, 8.7. For Appian’s depiction of 
the alliance between poor Romans and poor Italians, see Roselaar (2012: 235-246) and Stone (2015). 
652 Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 18.2, cf. Flower (2013: 100 n.68) and Flower (2006: 79-81).  
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men from the same family. In other words, it is not mere coincidence that the following narrative 
arc undergirds the stories of both Tiberii: a man gains an unusual amount of power because of 
his patronage to men normally marginalized or excluded from Roman politics, but his use of this 
power is short-lived because of his untimely death. That the Tiberius Gracchus who freed the 
volones had a great deal of power is not immediately obvious. But as Carlo Castello makes clear, 
this Tiberius is unique in third century Rome for individually freeing such a large number of 
slaves who belonged to the state, thereby making himself a strange but powerful sort of 
patron.653 Remember that Livy details Tiberius’ contingent of volones as initially numbering 
8,000 men.654 Examples from first century BCE Rome, such as Sulla and his Cornelii, point to 
the power of such mass manumissions.655 Furthermore, Livy’s story about how the volones 
disbanded rather than follow another leader indirectly casts Tiberius as the patron of these former 
slaves. To review: on the one hand, after a victorious battle, this Tiberius had the personal 
loyalty of several thousand soldiers. He won the consulship for a second time. Tiberius then died, 
dispersing his followers. On the other hand, the tribune Tiberius Gracchus gained the loyalty of 
the plebs through promises of land reform. He became a powerful plebeian tribune, but his death 
dispersed his followers, averting the possibility of further changes at Rome.656 The senators 
opposed to the Gracchan reforms prevented further changes in part by driving a wedge between 
freeborn Romans and former slaves. In other words, Roman aristocrats emphasized the benefits 
that freeborn Romans received in comparison to former slaves, enticing freeborn Romans to 
oppose any alliance with slaves and former slaves.  
                                                 
653 Castello (1989: 111).  
654 See above. Livy writes that 2,000 volones died at the battle of Beneventum (24.16.5). Valerius Maximus provides 
a different number of men, compare Castello (1989: 94-8).  
655 Appian, Bellum Civile, 1.100. Cf. Conclusion Section 2.  
656 Tiberius’ foes had also consistently labelled him rex prior to the assassination, cf. Bernstein (1978: 224). 
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 Five different ancient writers provide an anecdote about the aftermath of Tiberius’ land 
reforms that points to how Roman aristocrats reinforced the hierarchy of freeborn Romans over 
former slaves. According to Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, Plutarch, Polyaenus, and the 
anonymous author of de viris illustribus, after the death of Tiberius Gracchus in 133, Scipio 
Aemilianus addressed an assembly (contio) and asserted that senators had been right to murder 
this tribune.657 This assertion incited the assembly, and so he then derided them by indirectly 
calling them slaves, as he described them as stepchildren to Italy. While all five writers agree on 
this detail, they differ in their explanation of this insult. Significantly for the study of 
manumission, Valerius Maximus and the author of the de viris illistribus has Aemilianus 
elaborate, saying that such men are stepchildren to Italy because at one point they were his 
prisoners of war.658 In contrast, Velleius Paterculus writes that Aemilianus justified himself by 
referring to how frequently he heard the shouts of enemies.659 Although neither Plutarch nor 
Polyaenus record Aemilianus presenting any justification for his insult, and even though he 
himself points out that this jibe at freedmen is an extension of the stepmother invective, A.E. 
Astin, Aemilianus’ biographer, regards it as unwise to believe that Aemilianus did not use the 
“step-children” insult.660 Cicero’s comments in the Brutus point to the availability of many 
speeches from the second century and would explain the numerous attestations of Aemilianus’ 
                                                 
657 Astin collects these sources as items 50f through 51e in his appendix (1967: 265-6). Astin (1960) argues with 
Fraccaro (1912) on the authenticity and chronology of a number of these dicta, a debate that Beness helpfully 
summarizes and augments (2005 and 2009). Beness notes that since Astin’s publication, there is more acceptance of 
Plutarch’s authorship of the Apophthegmta Scipionis Minoris (2009: 69 n.36).  
658 De viris illustribus: ‘taceant’ inquit ‘quibus Italia noverca, non mater est’; et addidit, ‘quos ego sub corona 
vendidi. (58.8) = Astin 51c. For Valerius Maximus, see below. For the multiplicity of ways that the Romans related 
to prisoners of war, see Allen (2006).   
659 “hostium…armatorum totiens clamore non territus…” (2.4.4) = Astin 51b.  
660 Plutarch: Apophthegmata Scipionis Minoris, 22 = Moralia, 201e = Astin 51d. Polyaenus: 8.16.5 = Astin 51e. 
Astin (1960: 137), cf. Astin (1967: 234). Beard is more skeptical (2007: 140-1). For more on Valerius Maximus’ 
methodology, see Section 5b below.  
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bons mots.661 Therefore, Valerius Maximus’ evidence of Aemilianus’ thoughts on manumission 
needs to be taken seriously as evidence of the connection of manumission and the counterattack 
against Gracchan reforms.  
 Valerius Maximus quotes Aemilianus as using the stain of manumission to discredit those 
who disagreed with him.   
‘taceant’ inquit ‘quibus Italia noverca est’. orto deinde murmure ‘non efficietis’ ait ‘ut solutos 
verear quos alligatos adduxi.’  
 
He said: “Let them be quiet, for whom Italy is a step-mother!” Then when a rumble rose, “You 
will not make me fear men - set free from fetters - whom I myself lead in bound.”  
Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia, 6.2.3 = Astin 51a, translation my own.  
 
Valerius’ depiction of Aemilianus’ accusation is particularly significant because Appian writes 
that Tiberius had united his followers through their own hatred of slaves.662 Aemilianus takes 
these Romans’ hatred of slaves, and turns it against themselves: he accuses them of having in 
their midst former slaves, men who are unworthy of participating in Roman politics, but who are 
nonetheless drowning out their own, legitimate, voices. Aemilianus asserts that the former slaves 
in the audience do not have a proper relationship to Italy, as rather than being Italy’s children, 
they are instead her stepchildren through enslavement and conquest.663 This accusation builds on 
the stigmas against stepmothers and the vulnerability of the enslaved.664 Mouritsen notes that the 
Romans used shackles and the scars caused by wearing shackles were visual cues to a slave’s 
servile nature.665 In other words, these men’s shackled past precludes them from having a proper 
                                                 
661 Astin lists all the men whose speeches Cicero mentions in the Brutus (1967: 7 n.2). Astin collects all surviving 
words attributable to Aemilianus (1967: 248-269).  
662 Civil War, 1.9. Cf. Flower (2013: 98). 
663 That all five writers record that Aemilianus spoke of a mother Italy rather than a mother Rome indicates the 
degree to which this statesman considered Italia a unifying concept, notably at time significantly prior to the Social 
War. Dench analyzes this passage as part of the question of Roman lineage (2005: 253-4), but see also her thoughts 
on Italy, especially prior to the Social War (2005: 152-221). Cf. Bispham (2008: 54-6).   
664 Watson cites this dictum of Aemilianus as evidence for how the Romans constructed the stepmother as alien, in 
contrast to the natural mother (1995: 16 n. 53). I add, however, that this invective uses the stepmother relationship to 
discredit the metaphorical children, not the metaphorical mother, who is honorable Italy.  
665 Mouritsen in particular points to Horace, Epodes 4, Juvenal, 7.14-6 and Martial, 2.29 (2011a: 27-8).  
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relationship to Italy, and as a result, these men cannot question Aemilianus’ authority. 
Aemilianus is not disqualifying all criticism directed at him. Rather, he implies a division among 
those who oppose him. On the one hand, there are former slaves, whose criticism is worthless 
because of the macula servitutis. On the other hand, there are freeborn Roman citizens, whose 
criticism Aemilianus implicitly invites. But by asserting that all those who do criticize him are 
former slaves, Aemilianus pays a conditional compliment to freeborn Romans: they gain the 
satisfaction of knowing that this successful aristocrat takes their complaints seriously, as long as 
they do not align themselves with slaves and former slaves.  
 I argue that Livy’s account of how the volones dissolved upon Tiberius’ death similarly 
compliments freeborn Romans, as this story asserts that freeborn Romans can rejoice with the 
volones as victors over the Carthaginians, as long as they do not count the volones as proper 
soldiers and proper citizens. The similarities between this story and the stories about the plebeian 
tribune Tiberius Gracchus suggest that Livy is in conversation with stories about the Gracchi 
family writ large, including stories that were not confined to history books. For Livy’s account of 
the volones’ overly literal interpretation of Tiberius’ commands is a trope that was part of 
popular Roman culture. Freeborn Romans, most especially freeborn Roman men who were either 
soldiers or veterans, had reason to retell stories that disparaged the volones as inadequate 
soldiers. For in antiquity, it was a commonplace that slavery and soldiery were incompatible, as 
men in part justified their citizenship through participation in the military.666 The volones’ mere 
service as soldiers was in a sense a threat to the citizenship of all freeborn Romans, most 
especially if the volones won manumission through their military service. Indeed, Livy alludes to 
                                                 
666 Hunt (1997) demonstrates the extent to which this feeling guided historiography in Classical Athens. Polybius’ 
description of the mercenary revolt in Carthage after the First Punic War suggests that this sentiment continued past 
classical Athens. Polybius, 1.69.  
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this conflict between freeborn, but captive, soldiers and the volones in his initial description of 
the volones’ recruitment:  
octo milia iuuenum ualidorum ex seruitiis, prius sciscitantes singulos uellentne militare, empta 
publice armauerunt. hic miles magis placuit, cum pretio minore redimendi captiuos copia 
fieret. 
 
They bought and armed at state expense 8,000 sturdy young men from the slave population, 
asking them first on an individual basis if they were willing to serve. Such soldiers were 
preferred even though the Romans had the chance of ransoming their captives at a lower price. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.58.11-12, trans. Yardley. 
 
The soldiers in question are those that Hannibal captured at the battle of Cannae. When their 
delegation from Hannibal’s camp arrives at Rome, Livy reports that they struggled to argue that 
they were worth more to the Romans than these slave soldiers. The volones were a threat to the 
freeborn soldiers, especially as their ability achieve manumission meant that they could replace 
the captured soldiers as citizens. Livy’s denigration of the volones was part of the psychological 
wage paid not just to freeborn soldiers, but to freeborn Romans generally; this denigration was 
an assurance that freeborn were superior to slaves, even slaves who won their freedom on the 
battlefield.  
b. The appearance of manumission and Flamininus’ triumph 
 Livy’s denigration of former slaves such as the volones was important to freeborn Roman 
soldiers because they too had to prove their courage on the battlefield. However, freeborn Roman 
soldiers faced different expectations: while Livy recounts the story of the volones with the 
assumption they are both cowardly and incompetent, freeborn Roman soldiers had to live up to 
the expectation that they would rather die in battle than be captured. In this section, I examine 
how the Romans thought about and valued captured and enslaved Romans. This Roman value of 
military bravery was connected to another Roman practice, namely, the refusal to use state funds 
to ransom captured soldiers. This indifference to the fate of freeborn Roman soldiers is important 
to understanding the manumission of the volones: freeborn Romans knew that they could not rely 
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on the state to consider them worthy enough to rescue from enslavement, so why should they 
celebrate the state’s decision to manumit slaves? Livy dramatizes this anxiety of freeborn 
soldiers in his depiction of the debate on the soldiers captured at Cannae. Livy also dramatizes 
this anxiety in his depiction of Flamininus’ triumph of 194. This pairing of the two events is 
logical as the historian recounts how Flamininus went against Roman expectations and brought 
back soldiers whom the Greeks had enslaved, including those whom the Greeks had purchased 
from Hannibal during the second Carthaginian war. That is, Livy leaves open the possibility that 
men who were enslaved at the battle of Cannae marched with Flamininus in his triumph. In 
addition to Livy, Plutarch and Valerius Maximus write about these soldiers marching in this 
triumph. All three writers describe these men as visually indistinguishable from freedmen. 
However, none of the writers describe the soldiers as freedmen, instead describing them as 
Romans who regained recognition of their freedom. Possibly, the three writers assumed that their 
readers would realize that, rather than being slaves, these soldiers were undergoing the process of 
postliminum or some form of liberation similar to postliminum.667 In other words, just as the 
comedians do not use manumission to describe the freeing of captured citizens, neither do these 
writers describe enslaved Roman soldiers as being manumitted, even though they dress as 
freedmen. 
 Immediately after the historian explains the origins of the volones, Livy describes how a 
delegation of Roman soldiers came from Hannibal’s camp in order to make their cases before the 
Senate and the Roman people. An anonymous delegate pleads with the Roman people to raise 
the funds to ransom these soldiers. He points out that if the Senate was willing to raise money to 
buy slaves to be soldiers, which they were, then they should be willing to spend money to 
ransom freeborn soldiers.  
                                                 
667 For more on postliminum, see Chapter 1 4b.  
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octo milia servorum audio armari. non minor numerus noster est, nec maiore pretio redimi 
possumus quam ii emuntur; nam si conferam nos cum illis, iniuriam nomini Romano faciam. 
 
I am told that 8,000 slaves are being put under arms. Our number is no smaller than that, nor is 
the cost of our ransom greater than their buying-price. Costs I compare—for comparing 
ourselves with those people would mean insulting the Roman name! 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.59.12, trans. Yardley. 
 
In other words, the soldier understands that the Romans’ decision to recruit the volones is 
directly connected to a degradation of the value of freeborn Roman soldiers. Livy himself makes 
this point.668 While the emotions motivating this episode are unique to these captured freeborn 
Roman soldiers and this very unusual collection of slave soldiers, I suggest that hostility between 
these two groups was quite common. Livy merely heightens the stakes by clarifying the Senate’s 
preference for the volones over the captured soldiers.  
 While Livy suggests that the Senate unanimously refused to ransom the soldiers, he is 
explicit that this decision resulted from a range of motivations. Livy writes that some Romans 
considered it paramount to continue the tradition of refusing to ransom captives. In a speech, the 
senator Titus Manlius Torquatus makes the claim that these soldiers are not worthy of freedom 
precisely because they were captured. According to Torquatus, that the soldiers are captives 
proves that they do not truly love Rome. Furthermore, because they do not love Rome, they are 
nothing more than Hannibal’s slaves.   
liberi atque incolumes desiderate patriam; immo desiderate, dum patria est, dum cives eius 
estis: sero nunc desideratis, deminuti capite, abalienati iure civium, servi Carthaginiensium 
facti. 
 
You must long for your country while you are still free, with your rights intact, or rather while 
it is still your country, and while you are still its citizens. Your longing for it now comes too 
late; you have lost your status, forfeited your rights as citizens, become slaves of the 
Carthaginians. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.60.14-15, trans. Yardley. 
 
Torquatus’ logic is that because Roman soldiers who allow themselves to be captured are worthy 
of death, they must also be worthy of enslavement. Signficantly, Torquatus’ logic parallels that 
                                                 
668 22.58.11-12. See Section 5a above.  
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of Patterson’s description of slavery as social death.669 Because Torquatus does win the vote, 
Livy indicates the power among the Romans of the idea that capture had transformed these 
soldiers into slaves.  
 But while this idea was powerful, Livy suggests that it was a minority position. Livy does 
not depict either the senatorial audience or the citizen audience, who had appeared when the 
delegates make their way from Rome’s gates, as persuaded by this particular argument of 
Torquatus’ speech. Rather, Livy explains that many senators were concerned that they would set 
a bad military and financial precedent by ransoming these soldiers. Livy details the sympathy in 
Rome by describing how many of the senators, and the Romans who had heard the delegates’ 
speech, were primarily concerned about their enslaved relatives. Livy suggests that many 
Romans thought that these enslaved soldiers deserved freedom because they were Romans. 
…quamquam patrum quoque plerosque captivi cognatione attingebant, praeter exemplum 
civitatis minime in captivos iam inde antiquitus indulgentis, pecuniae quoque summa homines 
movit, quia nec aerarium exhauriri, magna iam summa erogata in servos ad militiam emendos 
armandosque, nec Hannibalem maxime huiusce rei… 
 
Most of the senators also had relatives amongst the prisoners, but after Manlius’ address they 
were concerned not only about the precedent—from early days, the state had shown little 
regard for prisoners of war—but also about the amount of money involved. They did not wish 
to see the treasury depleted (for they had already spent a large sum on buying and equipping 
slaves for service) and they also did not want any improvement in the finances of Hannibal…. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.61.1-2, trans. Yardley. 
 
While the Senate does agree to Torquatus’ motion to sacrifice these captured soldiers, they do so 
because they thought this sacrifice was necessary to preserve Rome. In other words, many 
senators and Romans continue to think of these captured soldiers as Roman and as worthy of 
freedom, despite being captured. The Romans’ value that soldiers ought to prefer death to 
capture was not an inviolable maxim, but rather an ideal worked through debate and experience. 
                                                 
669 See Chapter 1 Section 4a.  
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 Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, and Livy present similar portrayals of the captured soldiers 
in Flamininus’ triumph as well as going to similar lengths to note that while these men are 
dressed in the garb of freedmen, they are not the same as freedmen. The three different authors 
disagree as to how these soldiers appeared: Valerius asserts that they wore the pilleus, Plutarch 
that they wore the pilleus and had shaved heads, while Livy writes that they had shaved heads 
only. Even though this hat and hairstyle was closely associated with freedmen, the three writers 
write these details not as proof that these men completed manumission, but rather they are 
citizens using the symbols of manumission to express the restoration of their freedom. Unlike 
slaves, these captured soldiers did not have to prove themselves worthy of freedom, they instead 
had to regain it.  
 In 194, Flamininus marched in triumph in Rome because of his victories in mainland 
Greece against Philip V.670 Included in his triumph was a group of soldiers, now free, whom the 
Greeks had enslaved, presumably during the course of Flamininus’ own military actions. 
Valerius reports that this crowd of soldiers also included men whom Hannibal had sold to the 
Greeks during the second Punic war.671 In order for these men to re-integrate into Roman 
society, Valerius presents these men as wearing the pilleus, the hat closely associated with 
manumission.   
At Flaminini de Philippo rege triumphantis currum non unus, sed duo milia ciuium 
Romanorum pilleata comitata sunt, quae is Punicis bellis intercepta et in Graecia servientia 
cura sua collecta in pristinum gradum restituerat. geminum ea decus imperatoris, a quo simul 
et devicti hostes et conservati cives spectaculum patriae praebuerunt. illorum quoque salus 
dupliciter omnibus accepta fuit, et quia tam multi et quia tam grati exoptatum libertatis statum 
recuperaverant.  
 
                                                 
670 For this triumph, see Allen (2006: 1-4). For triumphs more generally, see Beard (2006), Künzl (1988), Versnel 
(1970), and Warren (1970). For triumphs and public memory, see Popkin (2016: 1-43).  
671 It is quite possible that Valerius’ source for this event was Livy. While Valerius was interested in historical 
anecdotes, he was not interested in the particularities of the past, and his proem makes clear that he does not see 
himself competing with Livy (1.1.1). Instead, he mined the past for stories that he makes universally applicable. Cf. 
Welch (2013), Bloomer (1992: 11).    
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But the car of Flamininus when he triumphed over king Philip was accompanied not by one 
individual, but by two thousand Roman citizens wearing caps of liberty. Captured in the Punic 
Wars and enslaved in Greece, Flamininus had been at pains to assemble them and had restored 
them to their former status. The general’s glory was doubled thereby: enemies by him defeated 
and citizens by him conserved offered a spectacle to the fatherland. Their salvation too was 
doubly agreeable to all, both from their number and because they were so grateful for the 
longed-for recovery of their freedom. 
Valerius Maximus, Dicta et fabula memorabilia, 5.2.6, trans. Shackleton Bailey.672 
 
As with Livy’s description Tiberius Gracchus’ manumission of the volones, the pilleus plays a 
key role in identifying these men as distinct from other soldiers in the writer’s visual spectacle.673 
But while Livy had asserted the pilleus identified the volones as former slaves of Roman citizens 
in the context of Tiberius’ painting in the Temple to Libertas, in this passage, Valerius asserts 
that the pilleus identifies Roman soldiers who had been slaves to Greeks. For notably, Valerius 
does not describe these men as slaves, but rather as citizens who wore the pilleus.674 In other 
words, Valerius draws attention to the tension between these men’s servile appearance and their 
status as Roman citizens. While their bodies bear the trappings of Roman freedmen, Valerius 
explains to his readers that this stylistic choice indicates not freedom newly won, but freedom 
restored.   
 In his Life of Flamininus, Plutarch draws attention to the same tension between these 
soldiers’ appearance and their ontological status. In his description of these enslaved soldiers, the 
biographer empathizes with them, asserting that their enslavement is an example of a reversal of 
fortune. For Plutarch, these men’s enslavement is unexpected and deserving of rectitude.  
…ἀεὶ μὲν οἰκτροὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς, τότε δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὡς εἰκός, ἐντυγχάνοντες οἱ μὲν υἱοῖς, οἱ 
δὲ ἀδελφοῖς, οἱ δὲ συνήθεσιν, ἐλευθέροις δοῦλοι καὶ νικῶσιν αἰχμάλωτοι…. 
 
The change in their lot made them pitiful objects always, but then even more than ever, 
naturally, when they fell in with sons, or brothers, or familiar friends, as the case might be, 
slaves with freemen and captives with victors. 
Plutarch, Life of Flamininus, 13.4, trans. B. Perrin.  
 
                                                 
672 For the emendation to geminum ea, see Briscoe (1998: 313).  
673 For Livy and the painting of the volones in the Temple to Libertas, see Section 5a above.  
674 Cf. Livy on Q. Terentius Culleo and colonists of Cremona and Placentia below.  
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Plutarch writes that these men suffered a pain because they were treated as slaves even though 
they are Roman soldiers, implying that the philosopher did not think of them as slaves who had 
to prove their worth in order to deserve manumission. Nonetheless, Plutarch makes these men 
indistinguishable from former slaves in his description of Flamininus’ triumph:  
…ὃ δὴ δοκεῖ πρὸς τὸν θρίαμβον αὐτῷ πάντων ὑπάρξαι λαμπρότατον. οἱ γὰρ ἄνδρες οὗτοι, 
καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς οἰκέταις ὅταν ἐλευθερωθῶσιν, ξύρεσθαί τε τὰς κεφαλὰς καὶ πιλία 
φορεῖν, ταῦτα δράσαντες αὐτοὶ θριαμβεύοντι τῷ Τίτῳ παρείποντο. 
 
This appears to have furnished his triumph with its most glorious feature. For these men 
shaved their heads and wore felt caps, as it is customary for slaves to do when they are set free, 
and in this habit followed the triumphal car of Titus.  
Plutarch, Life of Flamiminus, 13.6, trans. B. Perrin.675 
 
Unlike Valerius, however, Plutarch visually clarifies the spectacle for his readers by asserting 
that these men did not march in front of Flamininus’ chariot like captives, but behind him like 
triumphant soldiers.676 Also unlike Valerius, Plutarch needs to explain to his Greek readers that 
these men’s odd hairstyle and choice of chapeau meant that they were visually similar to Roman 
freedmen.  
 Plutarch was not alone in having to explain these details, as the historians Polybius and 
Livy also unpacked the visual messaging of men other than freedmen wearing the pilleus. In his 
account of Prusias II’s obsequious entreaty to the Roman Senate in 167, Polybius interpreted this 
king’s outfit through the eyes of a Roman, noting that the shaved head and wool hat were 
indicative of a Roman freedman.677 Notably, in Livy’s account of this scene, the Roman historian 
includes Polybius’ stylistic details and the explicit interpretation of Prusias II’s appearance as 
similar to a freedmen, thereby making it especially clear to his Roman readers why this king’s 
                                                 
675 Plutarch provides a similar but condensed description of Flamininus’ triumphant in Sayings of the Romans: Titus 
Quintus, 2 = Moralia, 197b. 
676 See Beard on the placement of captives before the chariot in a triumph (2006: 124 n.44). 
677 Polybius 30.18.3. Cf. Walbank (1979: 441).  
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appearance was so sycophantic.678 Likewise, Livy explains that when Quintus Terentius Culleo 
wore the pilleus at Scipio’s triumph, it was not because he was a freedmen, but in order to 
express his gratitude to Scipio Africanus.679 Livy does so again when he describes how the 
colonists of Cremona and Placentia marched behind the chariot of Gaius Cornelius in order to 
express their gratitude to him.680 Plutarch, Polybius, and Livy had to explain the meanings of 
these choice of hairstyle and hat because even though the men in question were dressed as 
freedmen, they themselves were not freedmen. Livy’s account of the men in Flamininus’ retinue 
appearing as freedmen therefore participates in his collection of men who only appeared as 
freedmen while wearing the pilleus.  
 For Livy, a spectacle results from the tension between the captured soldiers’ status as 
Roman citizens and their tonsorial appearance as newly manumitted freedmen. This tension is in 
part the result of the soldiers’ placement within the procession of Flamininus’ triumph. First 
come the prisoners of war, which include two sons of Greek monarchs. Then comes the 
Flamininus the conqueror. After him comes his soldiers, including the captured soldiers, grouped 
together through their lack of hair.681  
et hostiae ductae et ante currum multi nobiles captivi obsidesque, inter quos Demetrius, regis 
Philippi filius, fuit et Armenes, Nabidis tyranni filius, Lacedaemonius. ipse deinde Quinctius in 
urbem est invectus. secuti currum  milites frequentes ut exercitu omni ex provincia deportato. 
his duceni quinquageni aeris in pedites divisi, duplex centurioni, triplex equiti. praebuerunt 
speciem triumpho capitibus rasis secuti, qui servitute exempti fuerant. 
 
And before the triumphal chariot there were many prisoners and hostages of noble birth, 
including Demetrius, son of Philip, and Armenes the Spartan, son of the tyrant Nabis. Behind 
these Quinctius himself entered the city, his chariot attended by a large crowd of soldiers, the 
entire army having been brought back from the province. The distribution to these men was: 
250 asses for the infantry, double that for each centurion, and triple for each cavalryman. What 
provided a spectacular sight in the triumph was the men who had been bought out of slavery 
marching along with shaved heads. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 34.52.9-12, trans. Yardley. 
                                                 
678 Livy 45.44.9-12. 
679 30.45.5. For this passage, cf. Arena (2012: 32) and Holliday (2002: xvii and 96). 
680 33.23.6. For this passage, cf. Beard (2006: 239 n. 57).  
681 Livy includes the details of the procurement of these soldiers (34.50.3-7).  
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Livy imagines the ancient audience knowing to interpret the shaved heads of these captured 
soldiers not as signs that they are freedmen, but as signs that they are returning soldiers. 682 Like 
Plutarch, Livy provides a number of visual cues to indicate that even though these men appear 
servile, they are in fact Romans participating in the triumph with Flamininus, as they march 
behind the chariot. This passage comes at the end of an extensive catalogue of Flamininus’ 
triumph, which details all the treasures that he brought from Greece. Noticeably, these men with 
shaved heads do not march with the captives whom Livy describes, but with the soldiers who 
fought with Flamininus. Their placement in the triumph reverses their identification as captives 
of Rome and, instead, marks them as Roman soldiers participating in Rome’s triumph over the 
Greeks. On the one hand, this manipulation of the placement and movements that constitute a 
triumph, while in dialogue with expectations on how triumph ought to look, is emblematic of the 
the ritual sense that Bell describes.683 On the other hand, Livy’s careful placement of these 
soldiers points to the connection that Butler draws between the sense of triumph and social 
death:  
And can the sense of triumph be won precisely through the practice of social differentiation 
which one achieves and maintains “social existence” only by the production and maintenance 
of those socially dead?684 
 
For Livy, the maintenance of the freeborn Roman’s social existence required the use of the 
symbols of manumission without having to undergo manumission: they did not need to earn their 
freedom, they simply had to regain it.  
                                                 
682 See Briscoe (1981: 130) for more on the connection of shaved heads and recently manumitted slaves.   
683 “It is through a socially acquired sense of ritual that members of a society know how to improvise a birthday 
celebration, stage an elaborate wedding, or rush through a minimally adequate funeral. Of course, possession of this 
sense of ritual does not mean that members of a community always agree on how to do a ritual or what to make of 
it.” Bell (2009: 80). See also Chapter 1 Section 6.  
684 Butler (1997: 27). For more on this this quote, see Chapter 1 Section 5b.  
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 Even though Livy records some instances in which Roman citizens used the visual 
markers of manumission, he nonetheless treats the liberation of Roman citizens quite differently 
from manumission. Livy’s description of the volones depicts the former slaves as permanently 
servile, even though they earned their manumission on the battlefield. I suggest that this 
animosity is connected to the Romans’ need to maintain military prowess as a virtue of and for 
citizens, a virtue that the volones’ success at Beneventum challenged. Maintaining Roman 
military virtue was also challenging because of the high standards that the Roman set for their 
soldiers, most especially the belief in the shame of being captured. While the Romans expected 
soldiers to fight to the death rather than be captured, Livy nonetheless details Roman objections 
to this position and also suggests that captured citizens used the symbols of manumission in 
order to negotiate their return to life as Romans. However, Livy does not suggest that these 
citizens went through manumission. Instead, the historian is drawn to the friction between their 
appearance as former slaves and their true status as citizens. Former slaves and freeborn Romans 
are both free, but they are not the same.  
6. Conclusion 
 In the summary, written under the orders of Constantine Porphyrogennetos, of the first 
slave war on Sicily, there is a description of the emotional relationship between Sicilian slave-
owners and those free people too poor to own slaves in the immediate aftermath of the slaves’ 
uprising: 
Ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κακῶν ἐπισυμβάντων τοῖς Σικελιώταις, τούτοις ἅπασιν ὁ δημοτικὸς 
ὄχλος οὐχ οἷον συνέπασχεν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἐπέχαιρε προσεπιφθονῶν ἀνίσου τύχης καὶ 
ἀνωμάλου ζωῆς.  
 
When these great and countless evils were inflicted on the people of Sicily, the democratic 
mob had no sympathy when they witnessed the misfortunes of the masters. Quite the opposite: 
they were overjoyed. The common people were filled with envy because of the lives they were 
compelled to lead, so very different from those of the rich. 
Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 34/35.2.48 = Constantine Excerpt 4, p. 385, trans. Shaw. 
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While the exact connection between the epitomizer’s words and Diodorus’ words is complex, 
even more complex is the possible connection between Diodorus’ words and Posidonius’ words, 
whom the historian Diodorus likely used as his source for this war.685 And even though the 
connection between Posidonius’ words and the reality of the slave war is practically unknowable, 
this passage still suggests that slave-owners understood that a supportive relationship between 
themselves and free people was essential to the stability of slavery. I suggest that this passage is 
indicative of how the status quo of slavery depended, in part, on the free poor refusing to ally 
with slaves. Those freeborn poor who did not own slaves needed incentives to support slavery, as 
without such incentives, slaves were simply another indication of their inferiority to wealthy 
slave-owners. In this chapter, I have argued that the way in which Romans conceived and 
practiced manumission was part of the psychological wage paid to freeborn Romans because 
while manumission granted citizenship to slaves, this freedom was not equivalent to acceptance 
among freeborn Romans. Manumission both granted freedom to slaves, but also marked them as 
former slaves, allowing for freeborn Romans to maintain superiority over them.  
 The material and social benefits that freeborn Romans reaped from the exclusion of 
former slaves is reflected in Roman comedy, that these values are part of the comedies’ language 
and plot, as well as integrated into the visual spectacle of theater. While the comedians use the 
language of liberation to discuss the freeing of both slaves and captured freeborn people, by only 
using the language of manumission to discuss the freeing of slaves, the comedians reinforce the 
importance between these two different activities. This difference also registers as the level of 
the plots of the comedies, as slaves have to work to earn manumission, while enslaved, freeborn 
people require the recognition of their true status. Given this importance of distinguishing 
                                                 
685 For the epitomizers, Diodorus and the slave wars, see Urbainczyk (2008: 81-90). For Posidonius as a possible 
source for Diodorus’ description of the slave wars, see Matsubara (2003) and Dowden’s commentary on Posidonius, 
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between freeborn people and slaves, it is unsurprising that the ancients sought visual distinctions 
in the masks depicting freeborn people and the masks depicting slaves. Some of the 
distinguishing visual markers of slave masks included the racialized body parts, such as hair 
color. These markers undermined the inclusive potential of slaves’ manumissions, as racialized 
markers of servility meant that these former slaves were forever marked as slaves.  
 Like the comedians, Livy also touches upon the importance of excluding former slaves in 
his description of the volones. Even though the volones won a battle for their Roman owners, 
nonetheless Livy depicts them as cowards and inept fighters. Livy’s particular method for 
disparaging these slaves draws upon a theme from ancient popular culture, namely that slaves 
interpret commands in an overly literal way. While other writers depict this hermeneutic as a 
way for a slave to resist an owner’s will, Livy suggests that the volones do so because they are 
terrible soldiers. Livy again describes volones as terrible soldiers when he depicts them as fleeing 
after the death of their leader Tiberius Gracchus. The volones’ manumission has not made them 
into worthy citizens, just as in the comedies former slaves do not quite fit into lives of the 
freeborn families. Also like the comedians, Livy depicts the freeing of enslaved, freeborn 
soldiers differently than the manumission of slaves. Indeed, Livy maintains a distinction between 
these two processes even when freeborn soldiers use the same hair style and hats as freedmen. 
By distinguishing between the liberation of captured, freeborn soldiers and the manumission of 
slaves, Livy maintains the boundary between former slaves and freeborn peple.  
 My argument, that the Romans’ practice and conception of manumission was integrated 
into the disruption of potential alliances between poor freeborn Romans and slaves, rests on the 
separate argument that the distinct boundaries distinguishing slaves, freedpeople, and freeborn 
Romans were constantly policed. However, simply because the Romans policed these boundaries 
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does not mean that at times the boundaries were blurry or porous. Indeed, any boundary among 
humans is susceptible to humans crossing them. Nor does my argument about the importance of 
maintaining the hierarchical position of freeborn Romans over slaves mean that the Romans 
completely prohibited the advancement of slaves. The comments of Greek writers such as Philip 
V and Dionysius of Halicarnassus make clear that in comparison to the Greeks, Roman slaves 
enjoyed some form of inclusion and access to social advancement.686 Rather, I argue that the 
integration of former slaves into the Roman citizenry was a radical enough process that it was 
bound-up with the maintenance of Roman hierarchy generally. 
 Du Bois describes the psychological wages paid to white workers as the psychic twin to 
material, judicial, and social advantages that white workers had at the expense of Black workers. 
Likewise, I suggest that the denigrations of manumission and former slaves in the stories and 
performances that were part of the texts of Plautus, Terence, and Livy were psychic twins to the 
material, judicial, and social advantages that freeborn Romans had over former slaves. In the 
Conclusion, I examine how the changing fortunes of first century Rome created radically new 
contexts for manumission, as powerful Romans such as Julius Caesar renegotiated the material 
and social advantages that freeborn expected from their government. 
                                                 





 With the collapse of the Republic, manumission was no longer an entry point to Roman 
sovereignty, but manumission remained an integral aspect of upward social mobility. As a result, 
there was a renegotiation of how slaves, slave-owners, the state, and freeborn Romans related to 
manumission. Whereas the previous chapters examined manumission in the context of the 
Republic, this conclusion analyzes manumission in the first century through the lens of the 
Republic’s violent and uneven transformation into the Empire. Manumission was a historical 
process and therefore contingent on the political arrangements of the state, slave-owners, and 
freeborn Romans. As the institutions and processes that held up the Republic failed, the state’s 
relationship to manumission transformed because the state’s interest in manumission now had to 
coincide closely with the interests of a single, powerful slave-owner. In the new Empire, that 
single slave-owner was Augustus, whose familia Caesaris was fundamental to Imperial 
administration. But because the Empire’s birth in the ashes of the Republic was slow, the first 
century BCE includes many men, such as Sulla, who experimented with the power of 
manumission. 
2. Manumission between Republic and Empire 
 Augustus’ combination of his and the state’s interest in manumission was the elaboration 
of two techniques that Sulla had used during his dictatorship: control over mass manumission 
and the elevation of freedmen to high administrative positions. Mass manumissions were 
terrifying events because the man who manumitted large number of slaves appeared less as a 
citizen, and more like a king. Recall that according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, King Servius 
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manumitted thousands of slaves by fiat.687 Sulla was such a first century figure: he manumitted 
thousands of slaves who became known as the Cornelii. Furthermore, Sulla gave former slaves, 
such as his freedman Chrysogonus, a great deal of authority. Harriet Flower argues Sulla’s 
dictatorship marks a turning point in the Republic: when Sulla had power, he initiated political 
and cultural practices that become integral to the Rome Empire.688 Sulla’s freedmen, both the 
Cornelii and Chrysogonus, were models of how manumission could be a tool for centralizing 
power under one man. Orlando Patterson recognized and analyzed the important role that 
freedmen and slaves played in the Roman Empire in supporting one man rule. During the first 
century, a number of powerful Roman politicians, ranging from Sulla to Julius Caesar, 
manipulated manumission and the context of manumission in a way that anticipates Augustus. 
 The juxtaposition of Sulla to Licinius Nerva makes all the more apparent the importance 
of Sulla to Roman manumission during the collapse of the Republic. Just before the beginning of 
the first century, Licinius Nerva, the governor of Sicily, freed 800 slaves. Diodorus Siculus 
describes this mass liberation as one of the precipitating events of the second slave war of 104. 
Nerva freed these slaves because Nicomedes, the king of Bithynia, had successfully petitioned 
the Senate to decree that Romans had no right to enslave citizens of allied states: 
Τῆς δὲ συγκλήτου ψηφισαμένης ὅπως μηδεὶς σύμμαχος ἐλεύθερος ἐν ἐπαρχίᾳ δουλεύῃ καὶ τῆς 
τούτων ἐλευθερώσεως οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρόνοιαν ποιῶνται, τότε κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὢν στρατηγὸς 
Λικίνιος Νέρουας ἀκολούθως τῷ δόγματι συχνοὺς τῶν δούλων ἠλευθέρωσε, κρίσεις προθείς, 
ὡς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων τυχεῖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας. καὶ ἦσαν πάντες οἱ κατὰ 
τὴν νῆσον δουλεύοντες μετέωροι πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. 
 
The Senate then decreed that no person who was a free citizen of an allied state was to remain 
enslaved in a Roman province and that the governors of the provinces ought to take measures 
to see that such persons were set free. In compliance with this decree, Licinius Nerva, who was 
governor of Sicily at the time, established judicial hearings and immediately set about freeing 
slaves. Within a few days, more than eight hundred people obtained their freedom. The main 
consequence of these events was that all people who were in slavery on the island how had 
their eyes set on freedom.  
Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 36.3.2 = Photios, Library, 387-90, Trans. B.D. Shaw. 
                                                 
687 See Chapter 2 Section 6b. 




According to Photios at least, Diodorus is emphatic that this mass liberation enflamed the 
rebellious desire for freedom among the other slaves on Sicily. This comment also sets up a 
dramatic reversal: the re-enslavement of the former slaves. Diodorus goes on to explain that after 
this mass liberation, the local elites successfully pressured Nerva to re-enslave the slaves that he 
had just freed.689 Nerva agrees, causing the Bithynians, among others, to flee to the countryside 
rather than resubmit to their owners.690 For Photios, Nerva’s improper handling of the 
relationship between slaves and slave-owners is a key cause of a slave revolt. But Nerva is 
incapable of learning his lesson of the importance of treating slavery carefully. Photios recounts 
how during the siege of the Morgantina, Nerva again inserts the state inbetween slave-owners 
and their slaves: 
ὁ δὲ Σάλουιος, πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κατορθώματος συρρεόντων, διπλασιάσας τὴν 
ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἐκράτει τῶν ὑπαίθρων, καὶ πολιορκεῖν πάλιν ἐπεχείρει τὴν Μοργαντῖναν, 
κηρύγματι δοὺς τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ δούλοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. τῶν δὲ κυρίων ἀντιπροτεινόντων αὐτοῖς 
ταύτην, εἰ σφίσι συναγωνίσαιντο, εἵλοντο μᾶλλον τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν κυρίων, καὶ προθύμως 
ἀγωνισάμενοι ἀπετρίψαντο τὴν πολιορκίαν. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν 
ἀνατρέψας αὐτομολῆσαι τοὺς πλείστους παρεσκεύασε τοῖς ἀποστάταις.  
 
For this reason, Salvius [leader of the rebel slaves] made another attempt to take Morgantina 
by siege. He issued a proclamation in which he promised freedom to all the slaves in the city. 
But when their masters countered with the same offer of freedom to any slave who joined them 
in the fight to defend the city, the slaves chose the masters’ offer. Indeed, by their zealous 
efforts in the battle, these slaves helped repel the siege. When the Roman governor [Nerva] 
later rescinded these grants of freedom, most of the slaves ran away and joined the rebels.  
Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 36.4.8 = Photios, Library, 387-90. Trans. B.D. Shaw. 
 
Nerva remains a man who does not understand how to use his authority over manumission and 
liberation to maintain the hierarchy essential to Roman life. By wavering in his commitment to 
the slaves’ new freedom, Nerva incites the slaves to rebellion.691 Photios concludes his section 
on the second slave war by lamenting that “[a] great chaos and an Iliad of evils disrupted all of 
                                                 
689 Cf. Livy’s description of 214 BCE Sicily, during which Hippocrates and Epicydes free the slaves of Achradina in 
order to create a mob that would elect them as praetors, 24.32.9. See also Capozza (1966).  
690 36.3.3-4.  
691 In contrast, Livy describes Hannibal as promising freedom to loyal slaves, but also to give two new slaves to the 
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freedom, cf. 22.7.5, 22.52.2, 22.58.4, and 23.36.2. 
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Sicily, since not only slaves but also poor persons of free birth became implicated in every kind 
of brigandage and lawlessness.”692 Roman manumission stood at the intersection of slaves, slave-
owners, the state, and freeborn Romans. Diodorus illustrates how Nerva failed to balance the 
interests of all these groups, despite having extraordinary powers over slaves: first because of 
Rome’s treaty with Bithynia and second because of the siege of Morgantina.  
 In contrast, Appian describes Sulla as successfully using mass manumission to create a 
balance of power that supports his status as a dictator. But while Sulla used a variety of novel 
practices so that he might retire from political life, politicians in the generation that followed him 
used his techniques of manumission to centralize power for themselves. One of Sulla’s 
manumission techniques, to the extent that it is visible in the accounts of Appian, is that he used 
manumission as a way to bind slaves to himself personally rather than to the state:   
τῷ δὲ δήμῳ τοὺς δούλους τῶν ἀνῃρημένων τοὺς νεωτάτους τε καὶ εὐρώστους,  
μυρίων πλείους, ἐλευθερώσας ἐγκατέλεξε καὶ πολίτας ἀπέφηνε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Κορνηλίους ἀφ’ 
ἑαυτοῦ προσεῖπεν, ὅπως ἑτοίμοις ἐκ τῶν δημοτῶν πρὸς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα μυρίοις χρῷτο. 
 
To the plebeians he added more than 10,000 slaves of proscribed persons, choosing the 
youngest and strongest, to whom he gave freedom and Roman citizenship, and he called them 
Cornelii after himself. In this way he made sure of having 10,000 men among the plebeians 
always ready to obey his commands.  
Appian, Civil War, 1.100, trans. H. White. 
 
On the one hand, it is Appian who is explaining why Sulla acts in this manner. On the other 
hand, Patterson finds the same rationale in his study of how Roman emperors used slaves and 
freedmen in the Imperial bureaucracy. Patterson writes that, “As natally alienated persons with 
no other anchor in Roman society or as freedmen owing their status solely to the emperor, their 
[slaves’] interests were completely identified with his own and he could use them and abuse 
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them as he wished.”693 In other words, slaves’ lack of connection to Roman families made them 
dependent on the Emperor, the same analysis that Appian makes of Sulla’s Cornelii.  
 Appian suggests that these Cornelii are more bound to Sulla than they are to the Roman 
state, an analysis that provides a grounding for understanding the invectives that Cicero hurls at 
Sulla’s freedman Chrysogonus. According to Cicero, Chrysogonus was a close confidant of Sulla 
and was fundamental to the execution of the proscriptiones in 82.694 For Cicero, Chrysogonus is 
a villain of epic proportions, the orchestrator of murder and state-sanctioned theft. Cicero attacks 
Chrysogonus in his speech in defense of Sextus Roscius, who was charged for the murder of his 
father in 80. In that year, Sulla was no longer dictator, but he was an elected consul, that is, a 
man with considerable power.695 In Cicero’s speech Pro Roscio Amerino, Chrysogonus is a 
threatening figure precisely because he is a freedman with a powerful patron.696 Chrysogonus’ 
authority and power is not like that of proper Romans, who have to manage their own reputations 
through their familial and social histories. Chrysogonus’ power comes without the negotiations 
that aristocratic Romans make because of Sulla’s extraordinary imperium.  
Sulla began a renegotiation of the intersection of manumission with slaves, slave-owners, 
and the state that outlasted his time as dictator, as men, like Pompey and Julius Caesar, continued 
it. This renegotiation did not follow a direct path: Roman men who sought to use manumission 
as a tool for greater power faced resistance from Roman senators. In both 66 and in 59, Roman 
senators halted potential changes to Roman manumission that would have strengthened the 
power of freedmen and made it easier to manumit slaves. According to Asconius, when Gaius 
Manilius was plebeian tribune in 66, he proposed changing freedmen’s voting districts, thereby 
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prompting a riot. In his commentary on Cicero’s Pro Milone, Asconius reveals that Manilius 
aimed to redistribute freedmen throughout all thirty-five Roman tribes. In doing so, Manilius 
would overturn the practice, which the Romans deemed traditional, of assigning all freedmen to 
the four urban tribes. Indeed, Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes that this practice dates to the 
reign of King Servius.697 In her analysis of the voting districts of Rome, Lily Taylor agrees with 
Asconius that more than tradition was at stake.698 Asconius frames the conflict as one between 
Manilius, the reckless reformer who represents slaves, freedmen, and plebeians, and Domitius, 
the wise conservative who represents the senators:   
Nam eo tempore cum C. Manilius tribunus plebis subnixus libertinorum et servorum manu 
perditissimam legem ferret ut libertinis in ominbus tribubus suffragium esset, idque per 
tumultum ageret et clivum Capitolinum obsideret, discusserat perruperatque coetum Domitius 
ita ut multi Manilianorum occiderentur. Quo facto et plebem infimam offenderat et senatus 
magnam gratiam inierat. 
 
For at the time when C. Manilius was tribune of the plebs, supported by a gang of freedmen 
and slaves, he was passing an utterly immoral law to allow freedmen the vote in all of the 
tribes, and was pursuing this aim with rioting and was blockading the climb to the Capitol, 
Domitius scattered and broke through the gathering so violently that many of Manilius’ men 
were killed. By this act he both gave offence to the lower ranks of the plebs and acquired great 
goodwill in the senate. 
Asconius, Pro Milone, 45C, trans. R.G. Lewis. 
 
While Asconius describes Manilius as passing that law, in another note, Asconius explains that 
the senate reconvened and overturned Manilius’ law the next day.699 After 66, all freedmen 
remained concentrated within the urban tribes; their voting power remained weak.   
Despite Domitius’ victory over Manilius, senators like Cicero still feared that 
manumission would change. First, Cicero was afraid that a politician like Clodius Pulcher would 
pass some version of Manilius’ law.700 Second, Cicero worried about the vicensima. While the 
                                                 
697 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 4.22.4.  
698 1960: 130-149. Cf. Treggiari (1967: 34-6). Indeed, Manilius’ proposal is all the more significant because the 
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105 and 120), cf. Hin (2013: 279-282). Bispham discusses the politics of how and why the Romans sorted the Allies 
into the tribes aftter the Social War (2008: 189-199).  
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700 Cicero, Pro Milone, 87 and 89. Cf. Asconius, Pro Milone, 52C. See Taylor (1960: 145 n. 48).  
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vicensima, the five percent tax on the manumission of slaves, ultimately did survive into the 
Roman Empire, Cicero testifies that this continuity was the result of the victory of senators over 
men who would have been happy to scrap this tax.701 In a letter to Atticus that he wrote in the 
early summer of 59, Cicero both highlights the financial importance of manumission to the 
Roman state as well as how this importance was nonetheless no guarantee that during the first 
century Roman manumission was going to remain the same: 
praeterea si ulla res est quae bonorum animos quos iam video esse commotos vehementius 
possit incendere, haec certe est et eo magis quod portoriis Italiae sublatis, agro Campano 
diviso, quod vectigal superest domesticum praeter vicensimam? quae mihi videtur una 
contiuncula clamore pedisequorum nostrorum esse peritura. 
 
Moreover if anything could further inflame better-class sentiment, roused already as it 
evidently is, assuredly this will do it; especially since after the abolition of customs duties in 
Italy and the distribution of the Campanian Domain the only internal revenue left is the five 
percent—and that will probably be swept away by the shouts of our footmen at a single scratch 
assembly.  
Cicero, Ad Atticum, 2.16.1 = Shackleton Bailey 36.1, trans. Shackleton Bailey.  
 
By internal tax, Cicero means a tax that Roman citizens themselves paid to the state, in contrast 
to taxes that the Romans raised from people who were not Roman citizens. Cicero worries that 
the Romans will pass a new law abolishing this tax in a fit of democratic madness, a Roman 
concern unique to the Republican period. In other words, Cicero testifies to a conflict between 
the Roman state and citizenry that took a shape distinct from the conflict between the state and 
the citizenry in the Roman Empire. Specifically, Cicero imagines the Roman citizenry uniting 
against the state to reserve all the financial benefits of manumission for themselves. 
 While the vicensima remained, nonetheless the purposes and rationales of manumission 
changed because Roman politicians changed what it meant to be a Roman citizen. According to 
Cassius Dio, in 58, Clodius Pulcher began distributing grain for free to Roman citizens, 
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abolishing the nominal fee that had originally been part of the law.702 The abolition of this fee 
changed the state’s relationship to the citizenry: the Roman state now had a limited social safety-
net, one that could accommodate citizens who could not rely on their families for aid. Dio 
elaborates on the implication of this reform for manumission in his description of the year 57. In 
that year, the senate granted Pompey imperium over the grain supply, the first time that the 
Romans decided that the grain supply required such direct and authoritative oversight.703 Dio 
reports that because of the public’s trust in Pompey’s abilities, slave-owners began to manumit 
slaves with the expectation that these new freedmen would join the grain dole (cura annonae):  
οὗτοί τε οὖν ἐμάχοντο, καὶ ὁ Πομπήιος ἔσχε μὲν καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ σίτου διαδόσει τριβήν τινα· 
πολλῶν γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐλπίδας ἐλευθερωθέντων, ἀπογραφήν σφων, ὅπως ἔν τε 
κόσμῳ καὶ ἐν τάξει τινὶ σιτοδοτηθῶσιν, ἠθέλησε ποιήσασθαι… 
 
While these men kept up their conflict, Pompey, too, encountered some delay in the 
distribution of the grain. For since many slaves had been freed in anticipation of the event, he 
wished to take a census of them in order that the grain might be supplied to them with some 
order and system. 
Cassius Dio, Roman History, 39.24.1, trans. E. Cary.704 
 
With the grain dole, the state had a new interest in the distinction between slaves and freedmen. 
While slaves were the concern of their respective owners, freedmen, as citizens, had the right to 
food. Dio’s report that Pompey initiated a census of freedmen is a demonstration of the state’s 
need to investigate and maintain through law the distinction between slaves and freedmen. 
However, Dio is also clear that Pompey’s had a personal, rather than state-like, interest in 
overseeing manumission: his successful management of the grain dole justified his novel and 
extraordinary imperium.   
 Pompey had shored up the state’s commitment to freedmen’s rights as citizens through 
his efficient management of the grain dole, similar to how Julius Caesar, during his dictatorship, 
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state sell grain (Plutarch, Life of Gaius Gracchus, 6.2 and 5.2).  
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used his colonization program to give land and offices to freedmen. Importantly, these freedmen 
were not simply an afterthought to colonization: Caesar was willing to upend Roman tradition to 
make colonies more welcoming to freedmen. The details of Julius Caesar’s founding of the 
colony of Urso survives in the Lex Coloniae Genetivae, an inscription preserved on two bronze 
tablets.705 The law explicitly prohibits the exclusion of freedmen from the office of the 
decurions:  
CV 
Si quis quem Decurion(em) indignum loci aut ordinis de-  
curionatus esse dicet, praeterquam quot libertinus 
erit, et ab IIvir(o) postulabitur, uti de ea re iudici- 
um reddatur, IIvir quo de ea re in ius aditum erit, 
ius dicito iudiciaque reddito.  
 
CV If anyone shall say that any of the decurions is unworthy of his place or of the order 
of the decurionate, except on the ground that he shall be a freedman, and it shall be 
demanded of a IIvir, that a trial be granted concerning that matter, the IIvir to whom 
approach shall have been made for a pre-trial concerning that matter, is to administer 
justice and grant trials. 
Tablet c, Col. V, L. 19-24, trans. J. Crawford. 
 
Presumably just as freedmen were grateful that Pompey supplied them with grain, so too were 
freedmen of Urso grateful that Julius Caesar granted them access to magistracies.706 The two 
politicians changed the context of manumission in order to increase their popularity and their 
power.  
 Urso was not unique in permitting freedmen to become magistrates because freedmen 
also participated in the governance of Caesar’s colony of Corinth. The Greek poet Crinagoras, 
who lived in the first century BCE, wrote an invective epigram against Corinth, the site of 
another Caesarian colony. Crinagoras complains that slaves are corrupting Corinth’s proud 
legacy:  
                                                 
705 That Julius Caesar was the supreme authority for founding of this colony, see Crawford (1996: 396-7). The 
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first century BCE (1996: 395). 
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Οἵους ἀνθ᾽ οἵων οἰκήτορας, ὦ ἐλεεινή, 
εὕραο. φεῦ μεγάλης Ἑλλάδος ἀμμορίης. 
αὐτίκα καὶ γαίης χθαμαλωτέρη εἴθε, Κόρινθε, 
κεῖσθαι, καὶ Λιβυκῆς ψάμμου ἐρημοτέρη, 
ἢ τοίοις διὰ πᾶσα παλιμπρήτοισι δοθεῖσα 
θλίβειν ἀρχαίων ὀστέα Βακχιαδῶν.  
 
What inhabitants, O luckless city, hast thou received, and in place of whom? Alas for the great 
calamity to Greece! Would Corinth, thou didst lie lower than the ground and more desert than 
the Libyan sands, rather than that wholly abandoned to such a crowd of often-sold slaves, thou 
shouldest vex the bones of the ancient Bacchiadae!    
Crinagoras, Greek Anthology, 9.284, trans. W.R. Paton, modified.  
 
Albert Harrill notes that in the context of the Urso inscription, Crinagoras’ complaint is that 
former slaves have too much power in this Corinthian colony.707 These former slaves have too 
much power because Julius Caesar discarded the traditional prohibition of freedmen holding 
magistracies. Indeed, Plutarch writes that Mark Antony’s freedman Theophilus lived in Corinth 
after Augustus was triumphant; possibly Theophilus himself became a magistrate. Plutarch 
describes this Theophilus as having been close to Antony, which is to say, Theophilus had an 
unusual amount of authority because of Antony’s own high status.708 The logic that made 
Theophilus powerful is the same logic that had made Chrysogonus powerful; Mark Antony 
elevated Theophilus similar to how Sulla elevated Chrysogonus. Sulla experimented with using 
manumission as a way to build power, and Julius Caesar, Pompey, and Mark Antony followed 
his example.  
 Because manumission was at the intersection of the state and the citizenry, manumission 
changed with the transition to the Empire. Under the Republic, the citizenry was sovereign. 
While Augustus paid lip service to this sovereignty, under his rule, his authority on issues such 
as manumission was absolute. To secure this position, Augustus centralized under his control, 
economic, political, and judicial power, including the legal oversight of manumission. Susan 
                                                 
707 Harrill (1998: 71-2). 
708 Life of Antony, 67.7. Cf. Crawford (1996: 446).  
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Treggiari notes that in doing so, Augustus continued, and legitimized, a pattern begun in the 
Republic:  
It was shocking to republican sentiment if dependent freedmen who were employed by patrons 
who held public office displayed their influence or wealth. Pompey caused offence; Cicero was 
discreet. Everyone needed the services of confidential administrators. Augustus perforce 
continued the system….709 
 
In other words, Treggiari describes Augustus creating out the practices of Pompey and Cicero 
the Imperial system of freedmen and manumission, the system that Patterson theorizes. The 
surviving evidence testifies that Augustus passed three laws that reformed manumission: the Lex 
Iunia, likely 17 BCE, Lex Fufia Canina, 2 BCE, and the Lex Aelia Sentia, 4 CE. The Lex Iunia 
clarified the legal status of slaves whom their owners had freed despite not using a magistrate. 
The Lex Fufia Canina limited the number of slaves that an owner could manumit in a will. The 
Lex Aelia Sentia codified the permissible intentions an owner might have for freeing slave; it 
also established age requirements for both the manumittor and the manumitted slave.710 All three 
reforms expanded and strengthened the state’s role as an overseer and arbiter of manumission.  
 At the same time that Augustus strengthened the state’s oversight of manumission, he 
also presented himself as an authoritative arbiter of slaves’ freedom. There was power in the 
ability to declare slaves free, and in the chaos of the first century, Augustus sought to emphasize 
that he alone had definitive control over this power. In his Res Gestae, Augustus explains that 
one of his great accomplishments was the capture,and rightful return of 30,000 slaves:  
Eo bello servorum qui fugerant a dominis suis et arma contra rem publicam ceperant triginta 
fere millia capta dominis ad supplicium sumendum tradidi. 
 
In that war I captured about 30,000 slaves who had escaped from their masters and taken up 
arms against the republic, and I handed them over to their masters for punishment.  
Augustus, Res Gestae, 25.1, trans. Brunt and Moore. 
 
                                                 
709 Treggiari (1996: 898).   
710 For these three laws, see Balaestri Fumagalli (1985), Buckland (1970: 533-551), Mouritsen (2011a: 34), and 
Treggiari (1996: 894-8). 
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Augustus presents himself as a friend to slave-owners, perhaps the same goal of the inept 
Republican Licinus Nerva. Such was the goal of Publius Popillius, who had been consul in 132 
BCE: an inscription of his boasts about his successful return of 917 slaves to their rightful 
owners during his time as praetor of Sicily.711 While Augustus’ boast about returning 30,000 
slaves to their owners is clearly in the same vein, Augustus’ words do the added work of 
delegitimizing his opposition.712 Even though Augustus does not state why these slaves fled their 
owners, they may have done so because some optimistic politician promised them their freedom, 
similar to how Sulla freed the Cornelii. But with Augustus’ victory, the recognition that was the 
basis of their freedom was destroyed. 
 How closely manumission was connected to the political trajectories of powerful men in 
the first century is evident in the case of Sextus Pompeius, the son of Pompey and enemy of 
Augustus. Cassius Dio asserts that to fight Augustus, Sextus recruited and attracted many slaves 
to his holdfast on Sicily: 
κἀκ τούτου τό τε ἐκείνου ναυτικὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν δούλων τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀφικνουμένων 
πλῆθος προσλαβὼν πάμπολυ ηὐξήθη· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ δὴ ηὐτομόλουν ὥστε καὶ τὰς 
ἀειπαρθένους καθ’ ἱερῶν εὔξασθαι ἐπισχεθῆναί σφων τὰς αὐτομολίας.  
 
Thus reinforced by the fleet of Staius and also by the multitude of slaves who kept arriving 
from Italy, he gained tremendous strength; in fact, so many persons deserted that the Vestal 
Virgins prayed over the sacrifices that their desertions might be checked. 
Cassius Dio, Roman History, 48.19.4, trans. E. Cary. 
 
As Alan Gowing points out, ancient writers from Horace to Lucan to Paterculus closely associate 
Sextus’ fighting force with slaves.713 This association suggests that when Augustus describes his 
victory over slaves in Sicily and Sardinia, he is describing his victory over Sextus without even 
naming him: “I had previously recovered Sicily and Sardinia which had been seized in the slave 
                                                 
711 Popillius labels these slaves, “FVGITEIVOS,” cf. CIL I2 638 = ILLRP 454. Cicero (Laelius de Amicitia, 37) and 
Valerius Maximus (3.7.1) describe Popillus as an enemy of Tiberius Gracchus. See Elver’s entry on Publius 
Popillius in BNP.  
712 Cf. Gowing (2002: 189 n.8). See also below. 
713 Gowing (2002: 189).  
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war.”714 Augustus’ military victory over Sextus converted Sextus’ freedmen soldiers into upstart 
slaves. As part of his centralization of power, Augustus refused to recognize Sextus’ ability to 
manumit slaves en masse. Augustus transformed Sextus from a manumittor into a traitor and 
transformed the freedmen into slaves. 
 Manumission was a practice at the center of three poles: slave-owners, freeborn Romans, 
and the Roman state. During the first century BCE, the state’s pole moved to accommodate a 
new purpose: the protection of the Romans’, now singular, head of state. This protection entailed 
the Emperor’s control over mass manumission, including the delegitimization of the mass 
manumission of opponents, as well as using manumission as part of the cultivation of a large and 
sophisticated bureaucracy. But while Augustus could control the contexts in which a slave 
experienced manumission, he did not control the slave’s experience itself. In other words, what 
about a fourth pole of manumission: that of slaves themselves?  
3. Towards slaves and manumission in Republican Rome 
 In Plautus’ Amphitruo, the slave Sosia has an unsettling encounter with the god Mercury. 
Mercury has appeared, in Thebes, to trick Alcumena into sleeping with Jupiter. First, however, 
Mercury decides to have some fun with Amphitruo’s slave Sosia: the god appears in Sosia’s own 
form. Mercury also beats and berates Sosia, activities that Plautus presents as very funny.715 As 
Mercury taunts and wounds Sosia, Sosia surrenders his identity to the god, a process that 
strengthens Mercury’s disguise as Sosia. Intriguingly, when Mercury finally lets him be, Sosia 
does not mourn the loss of his identity. Rather, he sees his loss of self as an opportunity to 
become free: 
[SO.] nisi etiam is quoque ignorabit: quod ille faxit Iuppiter, 
ut ego hodie raso capite capiam pilleum.  
                                                 
714 “… et antea Siciliam et Sardiniam occupatas bello servili reciperavi.” Res Gestae, 27.3. 




[SOSIA] Unless that is he doesn’t recognize me. For if Jupiter himself did that, 
then today I’ll put the hat of freedom on my shaved head.  
Plautus, Amphitruo, 461-2, translation my own.   
 
Sosia asserts that if his owner does not recognize him, then he will be free. Furthermore, by 
using two images closely associated with freedmen, the pilleus and the shaved head, Sosia 
imagines this freedom to be the freedom of manumission.716 But Sosia’s imagined manumission 
is manumission without an owner, since he says that he would only put on the pilleus if his 
owner does not recognize him. Sosia the slave combines the freedom of manumission with the 
freedom of maroonage. Sosia’s dream opens up the possibility that Roman slaves looked at 
freedom from a radically different perspective than either the state, slave-owners, or freeborn 
Romans, a perspective in which freedom was the goal, regardless of recognition from the state, 
slave-owners, or freeborn Romans.  
 The groups at the center of my analysis—the state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans—
differed greatly in their contact with and relationship to slaves and manumission. All three also 
had their unique stakes in manumission. The state benefited from the revenue and from the 
increase in the citizenry. Slave-owners benefited from the increased status of their subordinates; 
such status was particularly important for the competition among Roman elites. Similarly, 
freeborn Romans benefited from manumission because freedmen and freedwomen functioned as 
a social group lower themselves, but who were nonetheless above the rank of slave. The stakes 
of these groups manifested in the practice manumission. The state’s role of overseer and arbiter 
of manumission appears in the stories that Romans told about manumission and in the physical 
actions that made up the practice of manumissio vindicta. Slave-owners’ concerns about 
manumission as an aspect of their relationship to other slave-owners appear both in Cicero’s 
                                                 
716 For more on the pilleus and the shaved heads of freedmen, see Chapter 4 Section 4b.  
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rivalry with Quintus and in Demea’s rivalry with Micea. Because of the surviving evidence, 
evaluating what was at stake in manumission for Romans who did not own slaves is necessarily 
oblique. But because freeborn Romans had a stake in Roman popular culture and because 
remnants of Roman popular culture survive in texts such as Plautus’ comedies, it is possible to 
see what was at stake in freeborn Romans’ denigratation of former slaves. This denigration 
allowed freeborn Romans to position themselves as superior to former slaves, while nonetheless 
reaping the benefits of former slaves’ inclusion into Roman society. Freeborn Romans, slave-
owners, and the Roman state all had stakes in manumission. So, too, did slaves. Plautus’ Sosia 
points to how manumission was not something that slaves simply let happen to them. Rather, 
they fantasized and dreamed about freedom while living in the fear that is slavery. 
 Sosia’s dream of freedom comes directly after Mercury’s torture and obliteration of his 
identity, which is to say, a dramatized moment of fear and dread. That Plautus, like Hegel, so 
closely links the obliteration of the self with a movement towards freedom suggests that Hegel’s 
struggle of the bondsman will be useful in analyzing how Roman slaves themselves approached 
and experienced manumission and freedom. Hegel describes the bondsman as experiencing “fear 
of death” prior to moving to become “pure being-for-self”:  
For this [the bondsman’s] consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or 
just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the 
fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in 
every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. But 
this pure universal moment, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the simple, 
essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, which 
consequently is implicit in this consciousness.717 
 
                                                 
717 The italics are those of translator A.V. Miller. “Dies Bewußtsein hat nämlich nicht um dieses oder jenes, noch für 
diesen oder jenen Augenblick Angst gehabt, sondern um sein ganzes Wesen; denn es hat die Furcht des Todes, des 
absoluten Herrn, empfunden. Es ist darin innerlich aufgelöst worden, hat durchaus in sich selbst erzittert, und alles 
Fixe hat in ihm gebegt. Diese reine allgemeine Bewegugn, das absolute Flüssigwerden alles Bestehens ist aber das 
einfache Wesen des Selbstbewußtseins, die absolute Negativität, das reine Für-sich-sein, das hiemit an diesem 
Bewußtsein ist.” §194. For more on this passage, see Chapter 1 Section 4a.  
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For Hegel, the purpose is to theorize the movements and transformations of consciousness that 
are present in universal moments. Manumission was the transformation of a slave’s status, a 
transformation that required the buy in from the state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans. To 
ask how the slave experienced this transformation is to build upon the analysis of these social 
forces while simultaneously asking how to listen to a people actively and systematically silenced 
in their pursuit of freedom.
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Appendix A: The language of liberation and the enslaved citizens in 
Plautus and Terence 









Plautus Captivi Tyndarus Slave to Philocrates; 
resolution of the play 
includes the recognition that 







Plautus Casina Casina (does 




Plautus Cistillaria Selenium Planesium is a slave for the 
pimp Cappodox. Discovery 




Plautus Epidicus Telestis Telestis is a hired(?) singing 
girl. She is revealed to be 




Plautus Menaechmi  Epidamnean 
Menaechmus 
Menaechmus was separated 
from his twin brother in his 
youth and raised by a 
merchant in Epidamnos. 
- 
Plautus Persa Anonymous 
woman 
- 656: libera 




Agorastocles was born in 
Carthage but adopted and 
raised in a Greek family. 
Adelphsium and 
Anterastiles were born in 
Carthage but were enslaved 
and are now owned by the 
pimp Lycus. The play 
concludes with the 
revelation that the two 
women are the daughers of 
359-363: 
liberare 
                                                 
718 For why Tyndarus straddles the roles of the enslaved citizen and the servus callidus, see Chapter 4 Section 3a.  
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Hanno, who is 
Agorastocles’ uncle. 
Plautus Rudens Palaestra Palaestra is owned by the 
pimp Labrax. Her 
recognition of the tokens in 
a chest proves to Daemones 





Terence Heautontimorumenos Antiphila Antiphilia was raised by an 
old weaving woman, who 
dies at the beginning of the 
play. The revelation that she 
is the daughter of Chremes 
means that Clinia can marry 
her. 
- 
Terence Eunuchus Pamphila (does 
not appear on 
the stage) 
- - 




Appendix B: The language of manumission and slave characters in 
Plautus and Terence 
      
Author Play Passage Summary 
Plautus Aulularia L.S. quin ego illi me invenisse dico hanc 
praedem atque eloquor?  
Igitur orabo ut manu me emittat. ibo atque 
eloquar. 816-9. 
Lyconidis Servus 
asks his owner, 
Lyconidis 
Adulescens, to 
manumit him.  
Plautus Aulularia L.S. in arca apud me. nunc volo me emitti 
manu.  
LY. egone te emittam manu,  
scelerum cumulatissume? 823-7. 
Lycondidis Servus 
continues to ask 
about his 
manumission.  
Plautus Captivi [TY.] haec pater quando sciet,  
Tyndare, ut fueris animatus erga suom gnatum 
atque se, 
Numquam erit tam avarus quin te gratiis 
emittat manu…. 405-8. 
Tyndarus 
speculates that his 
works will earn 
him his freedom. 
Plautus Captivi TY. at ego aio recte, qui aps te sorsum sentio.  
Nam cogitato, si quis hoc gnato tuo 
Tuo’ servos faxit, qualem haberes gratiam?  




example of a freed 
slave. 
Plautus Casina CH. intellego 
Quin, si ita arbitrare, emittis me manu? LY. 
quin id volo. 




about his possible 
manumission. 
 
Plautus Casina LY. potest, 




promises the slave 
Olympio that he 
will manumit him. 
Plautus Curculio CU. egon ab lenone quicquam 
Mancupio accipiam, quibu’ sui nihil est nisi un 
lingua 
Qui abiurant si quid creditum est? alienos 
mancupatis, 
Alienos manu emittitis alienisque imperatis,  





manumission of a 
hypothetical slave. 
Plautus Menaechmi MES.  ergo edepol, si recte facias, ere, med Messenio asks for 
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emittas manu.  
1023. 
his freedom from 
Epidamnean 
Menaechmus, 
thinking that he is 
actual owner.  
Plautus Persa TO. eho, an iam manu emissiti mulierem? 483.  Toxilus asks 




Plautus Poenulus AG. emittam manu –  




explains that he 
will not free 
Milipho today, 
suggesting that he 
is open to the 
possibility later. 
Plautus Rudens [GR.] id ego continuo huic dabo adeo me ut hic 
emittat manu.  
His plan to buy his 
freedom with a 
salvaged chest 
thwarted, the slave 
Gripus schemes for 
another way to 
freedom. 
Plautus Rudens DA. pro illo dimidio ego Gripum emittam 
manu, 





plans for freeing 
Gripus. 
Terence Adelphoe DE. hercle vero serio,  
Siquidem prima dedit, haud dubiumst quin 
emitti aequom siet. 975-6.  
The senex Demea 
convinces his 
brother Micio that 
the wife of the 
servus Syrus ought 
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